How have spokespersons for the positive psychology movement presented the movement to the public and to the profession of psychology? Moreover, what are the consequences for psychology of that presentation? These questions inform my assessment of the "virtues" of positive psychology, which I interpret in two ways. First, there are the ways in which the movement implicitly presents itself as virtuous, not least by constituting itself as a corrective to "negative psychology." Second, there are the ways in which Martin Seligman, (...) in calling for a new and discrete scientific enterprise, promotes building "signature strengths" as routes to virtue and thus "authentic happiness." Alternative ways to conceptualize virtue and authenticity are considered, as are the epistemic problems that inhere in movements in general, and the positive psychology movement in particular. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

Do mainstream psychologists think critically? And are the many critiques of the mainstream made by its critics “on target”? Answering both questions requires consensus about what critical thinking consists in, and there seems to be little consensus in sight. I begin by accepting Slife, Yanchar, and Reber's claim that “rigorous thinking” itself is insufficient for critical thinking in and about psychology, and I then consider various suggestions made by critics of the mainstream about thematic assumptions that should be included in (...) critical thinking about the mainstream. After identifying three areas of mainstream research in which some of these assumptions seem to have been challenged from within the mainstream, I conclude by considering how both critique and metacritique may be combined, repositioned, and/or recontextualized, to advance the important cause of critical thinking in and about psychology. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

The discourse of postmodernism proclaims with a unified voice the context-dependence or knower-dependence, the relativity or subjectivity, of all truth claims. But the discourse of postmodernism also proclaims universal truths upon which this antirealist epistemology itself rests. These constitute the very foundational claims that the postmodernist campaign, in all of its alleged antifoundationalism, strives to subvert. In this article, the author considers 3 universal truth claims of PM discourse. And because the antirealism that defines much of PM discourse is often (...) grounded in the doctrine of social constructionism , the 3 truth claims under consideration constitute the claims of SC itself, especially the claims of SC as it has been propounded within postmodern therapy circles. Each of the 3 claims is articulated, and then followed by a critique which asks whether the claim is not either simply a variant of the so-called modernist paradigm that is under attack, or the product of the very observational/empirical powers that PM doctrine seeks to erode in its anti-empiricist spirit. Particular attention is give to challenging the value, found within postmodern circles, of a pragmatic or utilitarian standard for acceptance of theory or discourse. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

Rationality or reason, traditionally conceived as a universal, essential human faculty, is out of favor these days. Its defenders are few, compared to its many challengers. The challengers are not those who lament the decline of reason but rather those who express an egalitarian impulse, in their determination to refute universal, essential ideals of reason. These challengers are a diverse lot and sometimes prefer to speak instead of “rationalities” , or what Shweder called “divergent rationalities.” This paper considers the question (...) whether this trend toward divergent rationalities is itself reasonable. To answer this question, the paper begins with some standard definitions of rationality or reason, on the understanding that any such standard is what stands in question. This is followed by recent work of Evnine that demonstrates just how our personhood logically entails universal epistemic “dimensions,” some of which are normative, rational dimensions. Evidence that Nisbett and Shweder muster to challenge a universal rationality is then considered, ending with a defense of just that which is challenged. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)