Inequalities in expectations to receive care permeate social structures, reinforcing racialized and gendered hierarchies. Harming the people who are overburdened and disadvantaged as caregivers, these inequalities also shape the subjectivities and corporeal habits of the class of people who expect to receive care from others. With three examples, I illustrate a series of justificatory asymmetries across gender and racial lines that illustrate asymmetries in deference and attendance to the needs of others as well as assertions of the rightful occupation of (...) space. These justificatory asymmetries are cogent reasons to evaluate the justice of caregiving arrangements in a way that tracks data about who cares for whom, which can be understood by the concept of the arrow of care map. I suggest, therefore, that the arrow of care map is a necessary component of any critical care theory. In addition, employing a method called living counterfactually, I show that when women of color assert full claimant status, we are reversing arrows of care, which then elicits resistance and violence from varied actors in the real world. These considerations together contribute to further defense of the theory of liberal dependency care’s constructivism, which combines hypothetical acceptability with autonomy skills in the real world. Each level, in turn, relies on the transparency of care practices in the real world as enabled by the arrow of care map. (shrink)

RésuméDans cet article, je réponds à Clark Wolf, Elizabeth Edenberg et Helga Varden. Partageant des sympathies pour le libéralisme opposé à l'oppression et pour la théorie du contrat social, ils me recommandent avec insistance de développer ma théorie dans des directions nouvelles — respectivement comme une forme de justice pour tous les sujets, avec une justification politique libérale, et suivant la conception kantienne de « droit privé ». Je réponds en expliquant que l'inclusivité est incorporée dans l'idée même du schéma (...) des relations de soin (« arrow of care map ») que je mets de l'avant, comme elle est inscrite dans la variété des théories contractuelles que je soutiens. De plus, j'insiste sur le fait que le libéralisme qui rejette l'oppression ne doit pas formuler ses arguments seulement dans les termes de la politique libérale. (shrink)