The debate regarding the nature of joint action has come to a stalemate due to a dependence on intuitional methods. Normativists, such as Margaret Gilbert, argue that action-relative normative relations are inherent in joint action, while non-normativists, such as Michael Bratman, claim that there are minimal cases of joint action without normative relations. In this work, we describe the first experimental examinations of these intuitions, and report the results of six studies that weigh in favor of the normativist paradigm. Philosophical (...) ramifications and further extensions of this work are then discussed. (shrink)

Guido Löhr's recent article makes several insightful and productive suggestions about how to proceed with the empirical study of collective action. However, their critique of the conclusions drawn in Gomez-Lavin & Rachar (2022) is undermined by some issues with the interpretation of the debate and paper. This discussion article clears up those issues, presents new findings from experiments developed in response to Löhr's critiques, reflects on the role of experimental research in the development and refinement of philosophical theories, and adds (...) to Löhr's suggestions about the path forward. (shrink)

Stifters Narrenburg leistet eine Auseinandersetzung mit den Konsequenzen und Möglichkeiten des Historismus. Der Verlust von Tradition ruft widersprüchliche Reaktionen hervor: einerseits den Versuch, vermittels Restauration wieder am Vergangenen anzuknüpfen, andererseits die Faszination durch eine ästhetisierte und vergegenständlichte Geschichte.

What do we owe each other when we act together? According to normativists about collective action, necessarily something and potentially quite a bit. They contend that collective action inherently involves a special normative status amongst participants, which may, for example, involve mutual obligations to receive the concurrence of the others before leaving. We build on recent empirical work whose results lend plausibility to a normativist account by further investigating the specific package of mutual obligations associated with collective action according to (...) our everyday understanding. However, our results cast doubt on a proposed obligation to seek the permission of co-actors before exiting a collective action, and suggest instead that this obligation is a function of explicit promising. We then discuss how our results pave the path for a new normativism, a theory that neither under- nor overshoots the target given by our common conception of the interpersonal obligations present in collective action.*. (shrink)

‘Ulysses contracts’ are an instrument through which a psychiatric patient may prearrange involuntary commitments to be put into effect if the patient satisfies certain diagnostic criteria in the future. Proposals for Ulysses contracts typically impose numerous safeguards. This paper argues against the intuitively plausible safeguard which permits only presently remitted patients to contract. Instead of requiring a patient's remission, it is argued that the appropriate safeguard is the patient's ability, whether remitted or not, to offer good reasons for wishing to (...) contract. In short, what matters is not an executive's character, but an executive's reasons, and a bad executive may have good reasons. Attempts to deny the accessibility of good reasons in unremitted patients are rejected on the ground that psychiatric diagnosis requires psychiatrists to be able to distinguish between good and bad reasons in both remitted and unremitted patients. If psychiatrists cannot do that, psychiatric diagnosis is impossible. (shrink)

This paper uses the tools of experimental philosophy to examine the nature of interpersonal normativity in collective action, focusing on cases of immoral collective action and collective action by friends. The results of our two studies, which expand on recent empirical interventions into longstanding debates in social ontology, demonstrate that according to our everyday judgments there are interpersonal obligations in cases of collective action, even when immoral, and that, while friendship elicits judgments of togetherness, it does not affect the norms (...) of collective action. We also situate these results in the philosophical literature and discuss their consequences for a “pluralism” about sociality. (shrink)

Working memory is a foundational construct of cognitive psychology, where it is thought to be a capacity that enables us to keep information in mind and to use that information to support goal directed behavior. Philosophers have recently employed working memory to explain central cognitive processes, from consciousness to reasoning. In this paper, I show that working memory cannot meet even a minimal account of natural kindhood, as the functions of maintenance and manipulation of information that tie working memory models (...) and theories together do not have a coherent or univocal realizer in the brain. As such, working memory cannot explain central cognition. Rather, I argue that working memory merely redescribes its target phenomenon, and in doing so it obfuscates relevant distinctions amongst the many ways that brains like ours retain and transform information in the service of cognition. While this project ultimately erodes the explanatory role that working memory has played in our understanding of cognition, it simultaneously prompts us to evaluate the function of natural kinds within cognitive science, and signals the need for a productive pessimism to frame our future study of cognitive categories. (shrink)

Die vorliegende Arbeit bemüht sich, die Unvereinbarkeit von Selbstbewußtsein und Theorie zu erweisen. In Auseinandersetzung mit einschlägigen Positionen der Philosophie des Selbstbewußtseins - insbesondere derjenigen Ernst Tugendhats in ,,Selbstbewußtsein und Selbstbestimmung" sowie einiger klassischer Autoren - arbeitet sie dazu zunächst einen gemeinsamen Mangel dieser Positionen heraus, nämlich ihre Unterschlagung des konkreten Individuums. In Anwendung dieses Resultates wird sodann unter der Leitfrage nach dem anschaulichen Gegenstand des Kapitels zu Herr und Knecht in Hegels ,,Phänomenologie des Geistes" eine Interpretation dieses Textabschnittes versucht. (...) Mit ihr soll zur Klärung der Streitfrage nach der Anzahl Personen in diesem Kapitel beigetragen werden, indem die Frage als falsch gestellt erwiesen wird: die Differenzierbarkeit einzelner Individuen und damit deren Abzählbarkeit ist Ergebnis dieses Kapitels und kann folglich noch nicht im Lauf des Textes selbst erkennbar werden. (shrink)

Machine generated contents note: Introduction 1 --1. The Nature of Paradox 11 --2. Faith and Paradox 23 --3. Faith and Paradox: Cases 33 --4. Faith, Hope, and Unbelief 49 --5. Faith, Dogma, and Fanaticism 61 --6. The Structure of Humor 81 --7. On Frivolity 93 --8. Humor and Faith 103 --Conclusion 115.

In der Analyse und Bewaltigung sowohl der wachsenden okologischen Krise als auch in der steigenden Misere liegt der motivliche Ausgangspunkt dieser Arbeit. Mit Ruckgriff auf Schelling, Hegel, Marx und auf die kritische Theorie soll ein originarer philosophischer Beitrag zum Verstandnis der Grundstruktur dieser Gegenwartsprobleme geleistet werden. Die Leserlnnen sollen sich selbst uberzeugen konnen, dass sich durch den Zugriff auf die innere Verfasstheit der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit neue Emanzipationstendenzen freisetzen und begrunden lassen.".

Das Thomas-Lexikon bietet in reichhaltigen und ubersichtlichen Artikeln die 'termini technici' aus insgesamt 81 Thomasischen Opera. Zu jedem Terminus sind dessen verschiedene Bedeutungen, die einzelnen Verbindungen mit anderen Termini und die wichtigsten Sentenzen in Zitat und Ubersetzung aufgefuhrt. Das Werk ist ein massgebliches Auskunftsmittel der Thomas-Forschung und auch der Mediavistik - jeder Disziplin - im allgemeinen.

In their target article, Lynch, Parke, and O’Malley argue against the quick application of causal, interventionist explanatory frameworks to microbiomes and their purported role in many disparate states, from obesity to anxiety. I think the authors have undersold the force of their argument. A careful consideration of the scope of their claims, made easier by a parallel drawn from the history of explanation in neuroscience, yields a productive pessimism: that causal explanations likely operate at the wrong level of analysis for (...) dynamic, distributed, Quineian entities like the microbiome. That is, we shouldn’t expect causal explanations for microbiomes at all—and this includes the authors’ own “microbiome success story” of C. difficile. Neuroscience, with its own computationally challenging, dynamic entity—the brain—may provide lessons for how to approach something like predictive control over the microbiome. (shrink)

Das Thomas-Lexikon bietet in reichhaltigen und ubersichtlichen Artikeln die 'termini technici' aus insgesamt 81 Thomasischen Opera. Zu jedem Terminus sind dessen verschiedene Bedeutungen, die einzelnen Verbindungen mit anderen Termini und die wichtigsten Sentenzen in Zitat und Ubersetzung aufgefuhrt. Das Werk ist ein massgebliches Auskunftsmittel der Thomas-Forschung und auch der Mediavistik - jeder Disziplin - im allgemeinen.

To what extent do aesthetic taste and our interest in the arts constitute who we are? In this paper, we present a series of empirical findings that suggest an Aesthetic Self Effect supporting the claim that our aesthetic engagements are a central component of our identity. Counterfactual changes in aesthetic preferences, for example, moving from liking classical music to liking pop, are perceived as altering us as a person. The Aesthetic Self Effect is as strong as the impact of moral (...) changes, such as altering political partisanship or religious orientation, and significantly stronger than for other categories of taste, such as food preferences. Using a multidimensional scaling technique to map perceived aesthetic similarities among musical genres, we determined that aesthetic distances between genres correlate highly with the perceived difference in identity. Further studies generalize the Aesthetic Self Effect beyond the musical domain: general changes in visual art preferences, for example from more traditional to abstract art, also elicited a strong Self Effect. Exploring the breadth of this effect we also found an Anaesthetic Self Effect. That is, hypothetical changes from aesthetic indifference to caring about music, art, or beauty are judged to have a significant impact on identity. This effect on identity is stronger for aesthetic fields compared to leisure activities, such as hiking or playing video games. Across our studies, the Anaesthetic Self Effect turns out to be stronger than the Aesthetic Self Effect. Taken together, we found evidence for a link between aesthetics and identity: we are aesthetic selves. When our tastes in music and the arts or our aesthetic interests change we take these to be transformative changes. (shrink)

This paper examines a parallel between Aristotle’s account of phantasia and contemporary psychological models of working memory, a capacity that enables the temporary maintenance and manipulation of information used in many behaviors. These two capacities, though developed within two distinct scientific paradigms, share a common strategy of psychological explanation, Aristotelian Faculty Psychology. This strategy individuates psychological components by their target-domains and functional roles. Working memory and phantasia result from an attempt to individuate the psychological components responsible for flexible thought and (...) are thus implicated in most of our robust cognitive processes, from reading comprehension to problem solving. We then present two novel objections which suggest that these capacities cannot explain our ability to engage in flexible thought. To escape the resultant impasse, we survey alternatives and argue that most promising strategies depend on identifying the behaviors attributed to intelligent thought and action. (shrink)

The idea of basic action is a fixed point in the contemporary investigation of the nature of action. And while there are arguments aimed at putting the idea in place, it is meant to be closer to a gift of common sense than to a hard-won achievement of philosophical reflection. It first appears at the stage of innocuous description and before the announcement of philosophical positions. And yet, as any decent magician knows, the real work so often gets done in (...) the set-up. I argue that the seemingly innocent idea of basic action is, in fact, bound up with a wide-spread conception of the nature of bodily or physical action (section 3). Its legitimacy is vital to the intelligibility of the causal theory of action, according to which physical action consists of a mere event and a condition of mind joined (in the right way) by the bond of causality. Left unchecked, means-end reason threatens to permeate physical action, and thus threatens the sovereignty of the sphere of material events at the center of the causal theory: such events, including the movements of one’s body when one intentionally moves it, are thought to be constitutively independent of the subject’s rational capacities. Basic action is a necessary countermeasure, a sort of metaphysical containment wall needed to preserve the separate jurisdictions of the mind of the acting subject and what merely happens. I argue that so long as action theory proceeds under the assumption that there must be basic action, it must regard our relation to the progress of our own deeds as not different in principle from Marx’s understanding of the relation of the non-worker (Nichtarbeiter) to the material processes that realize his own ideas, namely the work done on the factory floor. Each is alienated from the progress, or getting done, of his deeds. In each the process of doing something intentionally turns out to be a case of delegating tasks to another power. How the process comes to completion is not willed, and at best watched: the causal work is not the agent’s work, his knowledge not self-knowledge (section 5). We should find this unacceptable. And if this is right, it should be a pressing question whether there must be basic action. I argue that we have no good reason to think so: basic action is not forced on us by argument (sections 2 and 4). It is open to us to consider an alternative, one on which action is not, in the fundamental case, barren of means- end structure, but instead permeated by it: we register as a force in nature not at the limit of the means-end order but precisely in its constitution. [from article introduction]. (shrink)

The ascendency of executive power in the presence of weak parliamentary and societal control has given rise to a need for deliberative forms of diplomacy in international relations. As Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden regularly include members of parliament, party representatives, and representatives of civil society in their delegations to the General Assembly of the United Nations, does this imply that a Nordic model exists? This book reviews the practice of these countries and finds that the role of societal (...) representatives has diminished from participating members of delegations to mere observers. The Nordic examples illuminate the difficulties of achieving international governance through the practice of deliberative democracy. Table of Contents List of figures, images, and tables List of abbreviations Preface 1. Introduction The problem Why do the General Assembly and Norden matter? Theory and methodology Prior research 2. Challenges and traditions Delegation and representation at the United Nations Democracy and dilemmas at the UN General Assembly Nordic diplomacy at the League of Nations Unisex state actors and the representation of women 3. Parliament and UN delegations The Scandinavian model: Denmark An anachronism and parliamentarian stronghold: Norway Routine, squeeze-out, routine: Sweden Between Lilliputian and full-scale representation: Iceland Metamorphosis or parliament lost: The Finnish Sonderweg 4. The participation of civil society Scandinavian model revisited: Denmark The return of the body-snatched: Norway Corporatism and double universalism: Sweden Short stories: Finland and Iceland 5. Conclusions: On the way to deliberative diplomacy Archives Bibliography Author Index About the Author(s)/Editor(s) Norbert Gotz, Dr. phil. (2001) in Political Science, Humboldt University Berlin, Docent (2007) in Political History, University of Helsinki, habil. (2009) in Modern History and International Relations, University of Greifswald, is Professor at the Institute of Contemporary History, Sodertorn University, Sweden. His publications include the edited volume Regional Cooperation and International Organizations: The Nordic Model in Transnational Alignment (Routledge 2009). (shrink)