Experimental studies have developed, conducted, and evaluated classroom interventions for foreign language anxiety reduction. However, various characteristics of those classroom interventions make it difficult to synthesize the findings and apply them to practice. We conducted what is, to the best of our knowledge, the first systematic review on educational interventions for FLA. Six criteria were established for inclusion of studies. Using English keywords, we identified 854 potentially eligible studies through ProQuest and Scopus, 40 of which were finally included. All included (...) studies were published from 2007 to 2020. The studies differed in type of intervention, duration of intervention, and scale to measure FLA. Our systematic review resulted in seven features of classroom interventions, categorized as student–student interactions, student-teacher interactions, self-management, and mood boosters; we also categorized interventions as either individual or interactional. (shrink)

In this book, T. L. Short places the notorious difficulties of Peirce's important writings in a more productive light, arguing that he wrote philosophy as a scientist, by framing conjectures intended to be refined or superseded in the inquiries they initiate. He argues also that Peirce held that the methods and metaphysics of modern science are amended as inquiry progresses, making metaphysics a branch of empirical knowledge. Additionally, Short shows that Peirce's scientific work expanded empiricism on empirical grounds, grounding his (...) phenomenology and subverting the fact/value dichotomy, and that he understood statistical explanations in nineteenth-century science as reintroducing the idea of final causation, now made empirical. Those innovations underlie Peirce's late ideas of a normative science and of philosophy as a branch of science. Short's rich and original study shows us how to read Peirce's writings and why they are worth reading. (shrink)

V članku poskušam analizirati nekatere značilne diskurze posvečene »neuspehu avantgarde« ter tako osvetliti latentno strukturo zanikanja / potlačitve / izključitve, na kateri leži temelj zahodne moderne umetnosti, se pravi strukturo, ki je bila razvita kot druga plat samooblikovanja umetnosti v dobi, ko je nastal mit o njeni avtonomiji. Odkar so moderne »umetnosti« padle v rodovno kategorijo »Umetnost«, ta daje videz, da je postajala vedno bolj obrobna, da pa je hkrati pridobivala v zameno več privilegijev. Da bi se lahko vzpostavila v (...) sublimiranem območju visoke kulture, je bila umetnost morda prisiljena zavreči vse, česar ni bilo mogoče udobno uskladiti z njeno samodefinicijo. Medtem ko so dualizem med »visoko« in »nizko« kulturo prenehali utemeljevati v realnosti, so izumili nov pripomoček, da bi zavaroval navidezne meje, ter da bi pospešil proces avtonomizacije umetnosti. Modernizem v tem primeru služi kot bolj izpopolnjen ter okrepljeni vzvod potlačitve; vsebuje tudi uporniško avantgardo, ki služi za začasno sprostitev potlačenega. Medsebojna povezanost med modernizmom in avantgardo se bo tako pokazala kot spopad med estetiko nadzora in estetiko anarhije. (shrink)

This article introduces the notion of duplex elements of the finite rings and corresponding neutrosophic rings. The authors establish duplex ring Dup(R) and neutrosophic duplex ring Dup(R)I)) by way of various illustrations. The tables of different duplicities are constructed to reveal the comparison between rings Dup(Zn), Dup(Dup(Zn)) and Dup(Dup(Dup(Zn ))) for the cyclic ring Zn . The proposed duplicity structures have several algebraic systems with dissimilar consequences. Author’s characterize finite rings with R + R is different from the duplex ring (...) Dup(R). However, this characterization supports that R + R = Dup(R) for some well known rings, namely zero rings and finite fields. (shrink)

Can God create an unliftable stone? Beall & Cotnoir propose that ‘God can create an unliftable stone’ is a truth-value gap (neither true nor false). However, this yields a revenge paradox on whether God can eschew gaps. Can God avoid gappy ascriptions of power? Either way, God’s power seems to have limits. In response, it may be said that ascribing God the power to avoid gaps is itself gappy—it concerns a power that God neither has nor lacks. Yet this ends (...) up being inconsistent, for it implies that God definitely lacks that power. Following Aquinas, perhaps Beall & Cotnoir could accept this lack and still uphold omnipotence, suggesting that the power to avoid gaps is impossible for God. Yet the Aquinian stratagem is enough to block the original paradox, which saps the motivation to proffer truth-value gaps in addition. I conclude that the gappy solution is either inadequate or insufficiently motivated. (shrink)

This paper begins with a problem stemming from Hume regarding credences about credences. Suppose one has a credence of .95 in p, and suppose one assesses the credence to be such. But suppose one’s second-order credence in this assessment is less than 1. Then, by a standard conditionalization rule, one’s credence in p becomes less than .95. Moreover, such “erosion” can iterate by considering one’s, third-, fourth-, fifth-order credences, etc. (In light of this, some have rejected higher-order credences; however, it (...) is argued that Lewis’ “Principal Principle” forbids this.) The paper then offers a partial solution by describing circumstances under which a person has reason to assign credence 1 to a first-order credence. The solution takes the form of a “transparency” view of self-knowledge from Parent (2017, chapter 8). Briefly, it is argued that when one “reflex-like” utters a sentence “The probability of p is n”, then as a matter of psychological law, the utterance is an expression of one’s own judgment. The Principal Principle then necessitates that one’s credence in p is n, assuming one is being rational. Thus, upon perceiving such an utterance, one can thereby have a reason to assign a second-order credence of 1. (shrink)

This text is designed to help students construct and evaluate arguments.

This article discusses textually problematic passages in Catullus 63, a particularly corrupt poem from a particularly corrupt manuscript tradition. It proposes new conjectures and revives several old ones. Throughout there are notes on punctuation, conjecture attribution and an analysis of the structure of Attis’ lament.

This essay argues that normative judgments, in general, and moral judgments, in particular, are "truth apt" and can be objects of belief. Other main claims are: judgments about reasons, if interpreted as true, do not have metaphysical implications that are incompatible with a scientific view of the world. Two kinds of normative claims should be distinguished: substantive claims about what reasons people have and structural claims about what attitudes people must have insofar as they are rational. Employing this distinction, the (...) practical significance of substantive normative judgments is explained, and critical analysis of expressivist and Kantian views on this question is offered. (shrink)

The scientific transformation of the hermeneutic art has been the common goal for the various formalist-structuralist programs of interpretation that have dominated human studies in our century - such as New Criticism in literary analysis, the formalist programs in art history and musicology, the Gestalt and Freudian psychology, structuralism in linguistics and anthropology, etc. In this volume, these formalist-structuralist programs shall be called structural programs of interpretation in Europe and America.

Ethics and school business officials -- Making ethical decisions -- Ethics for school business officials -- Examining personal and professional codes of ethics -- Approaching ethical dilemmas -- Human resource management -- Financial resource management -- Facility, property, and information management -- Ancillary services : transportation.

The present piece is a reply to G. Hoffmann on my infallibilist view of self-knowledge. Contra Hoffmann, it is argued that the view does not preclude a Quinean epistemology, wherein every belief is subject to empirical revision.