日本初の“日英対訳版”登場!今こそ日本精神の源流を学ぶ時。「武士道」は、人類最高の指導理念です。本書は「武士道」の全てが分かる珠玉の一冊。ぜひ、世界の人々に「日本精神」を知って欲しい。.

This paper describes availability of personal Web-pages and a prototype development for Decision Support for Internet Users, called DSIU, which is an area of research for decision support by using information on the Internet. The availability of Web-pages concerns usage of formal pages, which are provided by companies and so on, and personal pages, which are provided by private persons. Web-pages are gathered by using an Internet search engine to determine destinations for travel and personal pages are confirmed to provide (...) much subjective information than formal pages. The prototype development concerns a travel recommendation system, which is a kind of decision support systems. The prototype uses subjective and objective information on the Internet to select several destinations for users and to provide explanations the reason why the destinations are recommended. This paper also describes our perspective of DSIU researches. (shrink)

This article studies three most basic systems of truth as well as their subsystems over set theory ZF possibly with AC or the axiom of global choice GC, and then correlates them with subsystems of Morse–Kelley class theory MK. The article aims at making an initial step towards the axiomatic study of truth in set theory in connection with class theory. Some new results on the side of class theory, such as conservativity, forcing and some forms of the reflection principle, (...) are also presented. The equivalence results among systems of truth and classes obtained in this article are summarized in Theorem 104 , Theorem 107 and Theorem 108. (shrink)

Truth is often considered to be a logico-linguistic tool for expressing indirect endorsements and infinite conjunctions. In this article, I will point out another logico-linguistic function of truth: to enable and validate what I call a blind argument, namely, an argument that involves indirectly endorsed statements. Admitting this function among the logico-linguistic functions of truth has some interesting consequences. In particular, it yields a new type of so-called conservativeness argument, which poses a new type of threat to deflationism about truth.

The present paper suggests relative truth definability as a tool for comparing conceptual aspects of axiomatic theories of truth and gives an overview of recent developments of axiomatic theories of truth in the light of it. We also show several new proof-theoretic results via relative truth definability including a complete answer to the conjecture raised by Feferman in [13].

人間存在の総体性の回復、人称的対立における和解と統合の試み。日々の風景、断想、聖書研究等も収録。.

The Correspondence of Tiglath-pileser III and Sargon II from Calah/Nimrud. By Mikko Luukko. State Archives of Assyria, vol. 19. Helsinki: Neo-Assyrian Text Corpus Project, 2012. Pp. lxxiv + 287, 3 plts., illus. $89.50.

The conservativeness argument poses a dilemma to deflationism about truth, according to which a deflationist theory of truth must be conservative but no adequate theory of truth is conservative. The debate on the conservativeness argument has so far been framed in a specific formal setting, where theories of truth are formulated over arithmetical base theories. I will argue that the appropriate formal setting for evaluating the conservativeness argument is provided not by theories of truth over arithmetic but by those over (...) subject matters ‘richer’ than arithmetic, such as set theory. The move to this new formal setting provides deflationists with better defence and brings a broader perspective to the debate. (shrink)

In this article we study the systems KF and VF of truth over set theory as well as related systems and compare them with the corresponding systems over arithmetic.

Classes are the objects of the second sort of second-order set theory. They have sets as their members and behave like sets, but paradoxes tell us that many classes cannot be sets. Then, what are classes? Predicativism about classes suggests that classes are predicates of sets, and this article investigates the question from the predicativist point of view in light of recent developments in the use of classes in set theory. Predicativism has been considered too restrictive and unable to accommodate (...) the use of classes in set theory. This diagnosis, however, is only true of a certain specific type of predicativism. In this article, we propose a new type of predicativism, which we call liberal predicativism, and argue that predicativism is still a highly viable option, and our liberal version provides a sufficiently versatile and workable nominalist concept of classes for set theory. (shrink)

In referring to biographies of Edison as examples, the following are shown: the image of a scientist or an engineer in biographies has dramatically changed over time; the images produced anew in each period fitted well to the social milieu of the day; biographies therefore acquired a large readership and contributed to informing to the public of the value of science and technology and the necessity of promoting them. It is also pointed out that a new image of scientist or (...) engineer is to be created which is surely attractive to people today if we expect biographies to remain effective in promoting public understanding of science as before. (shrink)

This paper studies several systems of the transfinite iteration and autonomous progression of self-applicable truth and determines their proof-theoretic strength.

Second-order arithmetic and class theory are second-order theories of mathematical subjects of foundational importance, namely, arithmetic and set theory. Despite the similarity in appearance, there turned out to be significant mathematical dissimilarities between them. The present paper studies various principles in class theory, from such a comparative perspective between second-order arithmetic and class theory, and presents a few new dissimilarities between them.

The Sustainable Development Goal of the United Nations related to reduced inequalities calls for greater economic inclusion of the poor. Yet, how business leaders grant economic opportunities and development to the poor is significantly under-researched. Extending burgeoning responsible leadership theory that promotes paradox-savvy leadership for building inclusive ventures through various actors, this study introduces new concepts of inclusive leadership that foster the economic inclusion of the poor from Amartya Sen’s capability approach perspective. By studying how leaders include the poor in (...) social businesses, we provide a fresh perspective of inclusive leadership as a personalized empowering cycle of economic–social–economic inclusion to close the gaps between the rich and poor in business and society. This perspective provides new territories of diversity and inclusion research for reduced inequality. (shrink)

We introduce and analyze a new axiomatic theory $\mathsf {CD}$ of truth. The primitive truth predicate can be applied to sentences containing the truth predicate. The theory is thoroughly classical in the sense that $\mathsf {CD}$ is not only formulated in classical logic, but that the axiomatized notion of truth itself is classical: The truth predicate commutes with all quantifiers and connectives, and thus the theory proves that there are no truth value gaps or gluts. To avoid inconsistency, the instances (...) of the T-schema are restricted to determinate sentences. Determinateness is introduced as a further primitive predicate and axiomatized. The semantics and proof theory of $\mathsf {CD}$ are analyzed. (shrink)

The Geach‐Kaplan sentence is alleged to be an example of a non‐first‐orderizable sentence, and the proof of the alleged non‐first‐orderizability is credited to David Kaplan. However, there is also a widely shared intuition that the Geach‐Kaplan sentence is still first‐orderizable by invoking sets or other extra non‐logical resources. The plausibility of this intuition is particularly crucial for first‐orderism, namely, the thesis that all our scientific discourse and reasoning can be adequately formalized by first‐order logic. I first argue that the Geach‐Kaplan (...) sentence is, in fact, not first‐orderizable even by invoking extra non‐logical resources, in any sense that is acceptable for first‐orderism and adequately corresponds to the sense in which the Geach‐Kaplan sentence is deemed to be non‐first‐orderizable simpliciter via Kaplan's proof. To address this problem on behalf of first‐orderism, I then propose an alternative conception of first‐orderizability in the sense of which the Geach‐Kaplan sentence and any other second‐order sentences become first‐orderizable by invoking extra non‐logical resources; furthermore, in certain circumstances, they are first‐orderizable without incurring any extra ontological commitment. My analysis also turns out to yield (as a biproduct) a significant enhancement of the so‐called paradox of plurality. (shrink)