This article focuses on the interpretative complexities encountered in the work of Lidwien van de Ven. First, it aims to map out the always porous nature of the relationships between aesthetics, politics and religion that make up her palimpsest-like images. Second, it aims to tease out a three-part analytics of photography. Third, it attempts to flesh out a difficult notion of spectacle that is inherent to her wide-ranging practice, and which distinguishes her project from liberal photojournalism with its obeisance to (...) identity politics and its weak notion of ethics. Finally, it aims to isolate, within the dialectical machinery of spectacle that is so often put to work by western democracies, a pragmatic moment in our encounter with her photographs that has real political purchase. With a variable notion of close reading at the crux of the operation, the article probes the efficacy of this moment so akin to philosophical aesthetics. (shrink)

The article focuses on the work of Ian Wallace, Jeff Wall and Rodney Graham, in particular, a notion of the studio that provides both an anchor and departure for the work of all three. This genealogy turns primarily on Wallace’s photo-conceptual work from the 1970s, which establishes the space of the studio as an allegory of painting or the modernist tradition, and as the topological equivalent of the museum and street. Using Wallace’s model of post-studio practice as an analytic, the (...) article unpacks the tensions of Wall’s notion of cinematography, highlighting his mounting hesitations with photography understood on the model of the studio system, as an inside/outside relationship and as the mimesis of painting. Finally, the article puts the notions of studio as genealogy and dispositif to work in order to understand the logic of Graham’s emphasis on the durational art of film. (shrink)

The Shape of Agency offers interlinked explanations of the basic building blocks of agency, as well as its exemplary instances. The first part offers accounts of a collection of related phenomena that have long troubled philosophers of action: control over behaviour, non-deviant causation, and intentional action. These accounts build on earlier work in the causalist tradition, and undermine the claims made by many that causalism cannot offer a satisfying account of non-deviant causation, and therefore fails as an account of intentional (...) action. The second part turns to modes of agentive excellence—ways that agents display quality of form—providing a novel account of skill, including an account of the ways that agents display more or less skill. Shepherd discusses the role of knowledge in skill, and concludes that while knowledge is often important, it is inessential. This leads to a discussion of the way that knowledge of action and knowledge of how to act informs action execution. Knowledgeable action includes a unique epistemic underpinning: in knowledgeable action, the agent has authoritative knowledge of what she is doing and how she is doing it when and because she is poised to control her action by way of practical reasoning. (shrink)

The rise of experimental philosophy has placed metaphilosophical questions, particularly those concerning concepts, at the center of philosophical attention. X-phi offers empirically rigorous methods for identifying conceptual content, but what exactly it contributes towards evaluating conceptual content remains unclear. We show how x-phi complements Rudolf Carnap’s underappreciated methodology for concept determination, explication. This clarifies and extends x-phi’s positive philosophical import, and also exhibits explication’s broad appeal. But there is a potential problem: Carnap’s account of explication was limited to empirical and (...) logical concepts, but many concepts of interest to philosophers are essentially normative. With formal epistemology as a case study, we show how x-phi assisted explication can apply to normative domains. (shrink)

This book addresses the perennial question: What is justice?

It seems obvious that phenomenally conscious experience is something of great value, and that this value maps onto a range of important ethical issues. For example, claims about the value of life for those in a permanent vegetative state, debates about treatment and study of disorders of consciousness, controversies about end-of-life care for those with advanced dementia, and arguments about the moral status of embryos, fetuses, and non-human animals arguably turn on the moral significance of various facts about consciousness. However, (...) though work has been done on the moral significance of elements of consciousness, such as pain and pleasure, little explicit attention has been devoted to the ethical significance of consciousness. In this book Joshua Shepherd presents a systematic account of the value present within conscious experience. This account emphasizes not only the nature of consciousness, but the importance of items within experience such as affect, valence, and the complex overall shape of particular valuable experiences. Shepherd also relates this account to difficult cases involving non-humans and those with disorders of consciousness, arguing that the value of consciousness influences and partially explains the degree of moral status a being possesses, without fully determining it. The upshot is a deeper understanding of both the moral importance of phenomenal consciousness and its relations to moral status. This book will be of great interest to philosophers and students of ethics, bioethics, philosophy of psychology, philosophy of mind and cognitive science. (shrink)

In this paper, I offer evidence that folk views of free will and moral responsibility accord a central place to consciousness. In sections 2 and 3, I contrast action production via conscious states and processes with action in concordance with an agent's long-standing and endorsed motivations, values, and character traits. Results indicate that conscious action production is considered much more important for free will than is concordance with motivations, values, and character traits. In section 4, I contrast the absence of (...) consciousness with the presence of consciousness in behaviorally identical agents. Most participants attribute free will to conscious agents, but not to nonconscious agents. Focusing in particular on two leading views of free will and moral responsibility, namely, Deep Self and Reasons-Responsive Views, I argue that these results present philosophers of mind and action with the following explanatory burden: develop a substantive theory of the connection between consciousness on the on.. (shrink)

Recent work in cognitive science suggests that conscious thought plays a much less central role in the production of human behavior than most think. Partially on the basis of this work, Peter Carruthers has advanced the claim that humans never consciously decide to act. This claim is of independent interest for action theory, and its potential truth poses a problem for theories of free will and autonomy, which often take our capacity to consciously decide to be of central importance. In (...) this article, I examine the nature of conscious deciding and I argue that Carruthers fails to establish the claim that humans never consciously decide to act. (shrink)

"Ist der Mensch in seinem Denken und Handeln ein geistig freies Wesen oder steht er unter dem Zwange einer rein naturgesetzlichen ehernen Notwendigkeit? Auf wenige Fragen ist so viel Scharfsinn gewendet worden als auf diese. Die Idee der Freiheit des menschlichen Willens hat warme Anhänger wie hartnäckige Gegner in reicher Zahl gefunden. Ein und dasselbe Ding wird hier gleich oft für das kostbarste Gut der Menschheit wie für die ärgste Illusion erklärt." Rudolf Steiner (Gröls-Klassiker - Edition Werke der Weltliteratur).

Some of the things we do intentionally we do halfheartedly. I develop and defend an account of halfheartedness with respect to action on which one is halfhearted with respect to an action A if one’s overall motivation to A is weak. This requires getting clear on what it is to have some level of overall motivation with respect to an action, and on what it means to say one’s overall motivation is weak or strong. After developing this account, I defend (...) the claim that one key functional expression of halfhearted action is the possession of impaired control over the action in question. Finally, I elucidate a puzzle that sometimes arises with respect to halfhearted action. The puzzle arises when an agent’s commitment in acting conflicts with an agent’s acceptance of poor performance. (shrink)

It is natural to think that at root, agents are beings that act. Agents do more than this, however – agents omit to act. Sometimes agents do so intentionally. How should we understand intentional omission? Recent accounts of intentional omission have given causation a central theoretical role. The move is well-motivated. If some form of causalism about intentional omission can successfully exploit similarities between action and omission, it might inherit the broad support causalism about intentional action enjoys. In this paper (...) I consider the prospects for causalism about intentional omission. I examine two recent proposals: one Carolina Sartorio (2009) defends, and one Randolph Clarke (2010a) defends. I argue these versions fail, and for a similar reason. Reflection on the function of intention for agency brings this reason to light, and motivates a novel causalism about intentional omission. On the account I go on to defend necessarily, an agent J intentionally omits to A only if an intention of J’s with relevant content (or the intention’s acquisition) causes in J a disposition not to A. Though the causal work done by intentions to omit differs in some cases from the causal work done by intentions to act, it turns out that causalism about intentional behavior (i.e., about action and omission) is viable. (shrink)

Gary Steiner argues that ethologists and philosophers in the analytic and continental traditions have largely failed to advance an adequate explanation of animal behavior. Critically engaging the positions of Marc Hauser, Daniel Dennett, Donald Davidson, John Searle, Martin Heidegger, and Hans-Georg Gadamer, among others, Steiner shows how the Western philosophical tradition has forced animals into human experiential categories in order to make sense of their cognitive abilities and moral status and how desperately we need a new approach to (...) animal rights. Steiner rejects the traditional assumption that a lack of formal rationality confers an inferior moral status on animals vis-à-vis human beings. Instead, he offers an associationist view of animal cognition in which animals grasp and adapt to their environments without employing concepts or intentionality. Steiner challenges the standard assumption of liberal individualism according to which humans have no obligations of justice toward animals. Instead, he advocates a "cosmic holism" that attributes a moral status to animals equivalent to that of people. Arguing for a relationship of justice between humans and nature, Steiner emphasizes our kinship with animals and the fundamental moral obligations entailed by this kinship. (shrink)

Heidegger pertenece a la historia del lenguaje y de la literatura tanto como a la de la ontolog a, de la epistemolog a fenomenol gica o de la est tica (tal vez ...

In _Animals and the Limits of Postmodernism_, Gary Steiner illuminates postmodernism's inability to produce viable ethical and political principles. Ethics requires notions of self, agency, and value that are not available to postmodernists. Thus, much of what is published under the rubric of postmodernist theory lacks a proper basis for a systematic engagement with ethics. Steiner demonstrates this through a provocative critique of postmodernist approaches to the moral status of animals, set against the background of a broader indictment (...) of postmodernism's failure to establish clear principles for action. He revisits the ideas of Derrida, Foucault, Nietzsche, and Heidegger, together with recent work by their American interpreters, and shows that the basic terms of postmodern thought are incompatible with definitive claims about the moral status of animals--as well as humans. Steiner also identifies the failures of liberal humanist thought in regards to this same moral dilemma, and he encourages a rethinking of humanist ideas in a way that avoids the anthropocentric limitations of traditional humanist thought. Drawing on the achievements of the Stoics and Kant, he builds on his earlier ideas of cosmic holism and non-anthropocentric cosmopolitanism to arrive at a more concrete foundation for animal rights. (shrink)

But the charged personal encounter between master and disciple is precisely what interests George Steiner in this book, a sustained reflection on the infinitely ...

With characteristic lucidity and style, Steiner makes Heidegger's immensely difficult body of work accessible to the general reader. In a new introduction, Steiner addresses language and philosophy and the rise of Nazism. "It would be hard to imagine a better introduction to the work of philosopher Martin Heidegger."--George Kateb, The New Republic.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Nietzsche and the Philosophers ed. by Mark T. ConardMelanie ShepherdMark T. Conard, ed., Nietzsche and the Philosophers New York: Routledge, 2017. vi + 299 pp. isbn 978-0-367-88513-7. Paper, $42.36.While every good philosopher engages a philosophical tradition in some way, the history of philosophy is more central to Nietzsche's work than to most. Insofar as a wide range of philosophers are implicated in a metaphysics and framework of values (...) Nietzsche seeks to overturn, he is drawn into ongoing conversation with interlocutors spanning millennia. Moreover, as Mark Conard notes in the opening of this volume, Nietzsche engages the history of philosophy in order to critique the practice of philosophy itself. Nietzsche prepares a way for philosophers of the future, Conard suggests, by reinterpreting traditional philosophy and its exemplars (3). The motivation for this volume, which is devoted to Nietzsche's relationship to a number of individual philosophers, is thus apparent and uncomplicated, and the volume brings several seasoned scholars together to address the significance of Nietzsche's relationship to philosophers from a range of traditions and historical periods.Conard includes with the obviously essential figures (Plato, Kant, Schopenhauer) a group of less obvious ones (Aristotle, Anaximander, Bernard Williams), the blend of which makes for a dynamic volume. However, the selection of interlocutors is somewhat unguided. While this is largely a function of the enormous pool from which one might select in Nietzsche's case, a little more intentionality at this stage would have been desirable. For instance, were the volume restricted to philosophers with whom Nietzsche directly engaged, the lack of a feminine interlocutor for Nietzsche, though not inevitable, would be understandable. Yet the inclusion of Williams opens the field considerably, making the failure to find a feminine interlocutor more regrettable. These issues notwithstanding, Conard delivers a relevant and worthwhile volume.Paul Loeb's "Nietzsche's Place in the Aristotelian History of Philosophy" opens the volume with an appropriately comprehensive question about [End Page 117] Nietzsche's relationship to the discipline of philosophy. Although Nietzsche's philosophical importance is now secure, scholars have previously questioned whether he even is a philosopher. Loeb lays out fifteen different reasons for this resistance and links each, point by point, to Aristotle's conception of the philosopher, in order to demonstrate that the problem is rooted in the dominance of an Aristotelian definition of philosophy. However, as Loeb also demonstrates in fifteen points, Nietzsche offers a new conception of philosophy that directly challenges the Aristotelian model. In addition to demonstrating the Aristotelian roots of the philosophical dismissal of Nietzsche, Loeb criticizes the shortsightedness of contemporary interpretations of Nietzsche that translate his thought into an Aristotelian mold by focusing on texts like The Will to Power and GM while giving less attention to Z, EH, and A. Loeb is sometimes overly bold. Using five criteria for philosophical importance enumerated at the beginning of the essay, he offers what are arguably too-quick assessments of the historical importance of a number of philosophers. Nevertheless, the essay is interesting, thorough, and erudite.Daniel Conway's "Twilight of an Idol: Nietzsche's Affirmation of Socrates" explores Nietzsche's relationship to the "decadent" Socrates in his later works. Beginning with Nietzsche's interpretation of Socrates's claim in the Phaedo that he and Crito owe a cock to Asclepius, Conway draws attention to the way in which Nietzsche distinguishes Socrates's asceticism from that of the other "great sages" in TI. While many who emulate Socrates's ascetic self-mastery do so in order to continue life in a decadent state, Socrates achieved real self-mastery by wholeheartedly willing his own death, recognizing death as "the only doctor" for decadence. In this way, Socrates's final words deliver an ironic message across the millennia to heirs of his "improvement morality": improvement morality improves no one—no one, that is, except for the Nietzsche of EH, who receives Socrates's ironic message and sets about the task of the overcoming of morality. Thus, Conway says, Nietzsche affirms Socrates's role in setting a stage for Nietzsche himself to emerge as the first immoralist. Conway notes that we might flinch at this image... (shrink)

An anthology of writings by and about Rudolf Steiner qua economist that documents his search for a deeper understanding of modern economic life. This book throws light on many of the problems that face us today, problems that we cannot solve unless we take hold of the economic life in a conscious, human way and resist the temptation to defer to market forces alone. Though well-known as a seer, the idea of Rudolf Steiner as an economist may seem (...) surprising. Seers do not usually have much concrete to say about economic life, beyond laments about its evils and injunctions that it be guided by some moral dimension. Rudolf Steiner, however, gave many lectures and wrote many articles about modern economic life, which he saw as the arena in which humanity has to find a new relationship to the spirituality that formerly came from above or outside -- from churches and external principles. Today the human being has to find morality within, which one cannot fully do unless one takes hold of the economic realm in a conscious, human way. Whether through concrete references to the meaning and working of money, or in attempting to give a fuller understanding of work or of the significance of market economics in our time, Steiner shows himself to be well versed in the subject. This publication presents a selection of his articles in a context of essays by Christopher Houghton Budd. (shrink)

"We have no more beginnings", George Steiner begins in this radical book. A far-reaching exploration of the idea of creation in Western thought, literature, religion, and history, he reflects on the different ways people have of talking about beginnings, on the "coretiredness" that pervades end-of-the-millennium spirit, and on the changing grammar of discussions about the end of Western art and culture.

The following essay presents faculty reflections on field experiences required for students in an introductory Philosophy of Education course. The essay is a reflective tracing on the becoming of philosophical thinking that occurs when college students spend a significant time philosophizing with younger students at local elementary sites using community of inquiry methodology. In introductory philosophy courses students are being introduced to the array of philosophical positions in education, but more importantly, they are also learning ways of thinking philosophically about (...) issues in education. The question is how to best foster the growth of philosophical thinking in the limited weeks of a college semester with a diverse group of students. The authors find that communities of inquiry where adults and children interact offers additional layers of epistemology and ontology upon which to question and reflect. As college level students begin to see themselves as community members with children, conceptions of both what it means to be a philosophical thinker as well as what it means to do philosophy begin to change. (shrink)

In a remarkable book, one of the preeminent essayists and literary thinkers of our era concerns himself with language and its relation to literature and religion. Written during a period when the art of reading and the status of a text have been threatened by literary movements that question their validity and by computer technology, Steiner's essays affirm the primacy of reading in the classical sense.

In order to account for how organisms can apprehend the contents of the external representations they manipulate in cognizing, the endorsement of representationalism fosters a situation of what I call cognitive overdetermination. I argue that this situation is problematic for the inclusion of these external representations in cognitive processing, as the hypothesis of extended cognition would like to have it. Since that situation arises from a commitment to representationalism (even minimal), it only affects the viability of representationalist versions of extended (...) cognition. (shrink)

Into the central theme of necessity, chance, and providence, Steiner introduces a fascinating description of the nature spirits, particularly the gnomes.

Surveying a wide range of cultural controversies, from the Mapplethorpe affair to Salman Rushdie's death sentence, from canon-revision in the academy to the scandals that have surrounded Anthony Blunt, Martin Heidegger, and Paul de Man, Wendy Steiner shows that the fear and outrage they inspired are the result of dangerous misunderstanding about the relationship between art and life. "Stimulating. . . . A splendid rebuttal of those on the left and right who think that the pleasures induced by art (...) are trivial or dangerous. . . . One of the most powerful defenses of the potentiality of art."--Andrew Delbanco, New York Times Book Review "A concise and . . . readable account of recent contretemps that have galvanized the debate over the role and purposes of art. . . . [Steiner] writes passionately about what she believes in."--Michiko Kakutani, New York Times "This is one of the few works of cultural criticism that is actually intelligible to the nonspecialist reader. . . . Steiner's perspective is fresh and her perceptions invariably shrewd, far-ranging, and reasonable. A welcome association of sense and sensibility."-- Kirkus Reviews, starred review "Steiner has succeeded so well in [the] task she has undertaken. The Scandal of Pleasure is itself characterized by many of the qualities Steiner demans of art, among them, complexity, tolerance and the pleasures of unfettered thought."--Eleanor Heartly, Art in America "Steiner . . . provides the best and clearest short presentation of each of [the] debates."--Alexander Nehamas, Boston Book Review "Steiner has done a fine job as a historian/reporter and as a writer of sophisticated, very clear, cultural criticism. Her reportage alone would be enough to make this a distinguished book."--Mark Edmundson, Lingua Franca. (shrink)

This book contains a collection of important recent writing on left-liberalism, a political philosophy that recognizes both strong liberty rights and strong ...

This article proposes a methodological schema for engaging in a productive discussion of ethical issues regarding human brain organoids, which are three-dimensional cortical neural tissues created using human pluripotent stem cells. Although moral consideration of HBOs significantly involves the possibility that they have consciousness, there is no widely accepted procedure to determine whether HBOs are conscious. Given that this is the case, it has been argued that we should adopt a precautionary principle about consciousness according to which, if we are (...) not certain whether HBOs have consciousness—and where treating HBOs as not having consciousness may cause harm to them—we should proceed as if they do have consciousness. This article emphasizes a methodological advantage of adopting the precautionary principle: it enables us to sidestep the question of whether HBOs have consciousness and, instead, directly address the question of what kinds of conscious experiences HBOs can have, where the what-kind-question is more tractable than the whether-question. By addressing the what-kind-question, we will be able to examine how much moral consideration HBOs deserve. With this in mind, this article confronts the what-kind-question with the assistance of experimental studies of consciousness and suggests an ethical framework which supports restricting the creation and use of HBOs in bioscience. (shrink)

In this chapter, I pursue two aims. Firstly, I propose an original survey and analysis of the way proponents of 4E cognition have until now defined the relations between normativity and cognitive science. A first distinction is made between making normativity an explanandum of 4E cognitive science, and turning normativity into a property or part of the explanantia of 4E cognitive science. Inside of the latter option, one must distinguish between methodological, ontological and semantic claims on the value of normativity (...) for studying and defining cognitive phenomena. The second aim of the paper consists in developing the further claim that normativity is an essential property of daily intentional concepts and of scientific concepts. I show how 4E cognition might further develop this latter claim in the context of recent debates about cognitive ontologies in neuroscience. (shrink)

Ann Margaret Sharp, American philosopher of education, believed that friends could, in fact, be quite critical of one another. Writing in her essay, “What is a Community of Inquiry,” she states,... but children know that the group has taken on a great significance for them: each one’s happiness means as much to each of them as their own. They truly care for each other as persons, and this care enables them to converse in ways they never have before. They can (...) engage in inquiry without fear of rebuff or humiliation. They can try out ideas that they never would have thought of expressing before just to see what happens.I am grateful to the friends of Sharp who spent time in pursuit of understanding her work and its... (shrink)