Philosophical writing on gratitude displays a pronounced preference for targeted gratitude (A’s being grateful to B for x) over propositional gratitude (A’s being grateful that p), treating the latter as a poor, less interesting cousin of the former, when it treats it at all. This paper challenges and attempts to rectify the relegation of propositional gratitude to second-class status. It argues that propositional gratitude is not only not reducible to targeted gratitude but indeed is more basic than it and that (...) propositional gratitude is morally important because of its conceptual connections to the virtue of humility. (shrink)

Public reason liberals claim that legitimate rules must be justifiable to diverse perspectives. This Public Justification Principle threatens that failing to justify rules to reprehensible agents makes those rules illegitimate. Although public reason liberals have replies to this objection, they cannot avoid the challenge of powerful deceivers. Powerful deceivers trick people who are purportedly owed public justification into considering otherwise good rules to be unjustified. Avoiding this challenge requires discounting some failures of justification, according to what caused people’s beliefs. I (...) offer a conception of public justification that accommodates these externalist considerations while positioning Public Reason Liberalism to provide insight into real cases of deception. (shrink)

Propositionalism is the view that intentional attitudes, such as belief, are relations to propositions. Propositionalists argue that propositionalism follows from the intuitive validity of certain kinds of inferences involving attitude reports. Jubien (2001) argues powerfully against propositions and sketches some interesting positive proposals, based on Russell’s multiple relation theory of judgment, about how to accommodate “propositional phenomena” without appeal to propositions. This paper argues that none of Jubien’s proposals succeeds in accommodating an important range of propositional phenomena, such as the (...) aforementioned validity of attitude-report inferences. It then shows that the notion of a predication act-type, which remains importantly Russellian in spirit, is sufficient to explain the range of propositional phenomena in question, in particular the validity of attitude-report inferences. The paper concludes with a discussion of whether predication act-types are really just propositions by another name. (shrink)

From the publisher: "This book is a lucid and accessible companion to Plato’s Republic, throwing light upon the text’s arguments and main themes, placing them in the wider context of the text’s structure. In its illumination of the philosophical ideas underpinning the work, it provides readers with an understanding and appreciation of the complexity and literary artistry of Plato’s Republic. McAleer not only unpacks the key overarching questions of the text – What is justice? And Is a just life happier (...) than an unjust life? – but also highlights some fascinating, overlooked passages which contribute to our understanding of Plato’s philosophical thought.". (shrink)

The Public Justification Principle requires that coercive institutions be justified to all who live under them. I argue that this principle often cannot be satisfied without persons depending on the pure informative testimony of others, even under realistically idealized situations. Two main results follow. First, the sense of justification relevant to this principle has a strongly externalist component. Second, normative expectations of trust are essential to public justification. On the view I propose, whether the Public Justification Principle is satisfied depends (...) on the features of the network of testifiers in which persons are embedded. I consider several such networks to show which features are plausibly relevant. The importance of testimony for public justification ultimately suggests that we should moderate our expectations about the kind of conciliation we can achieve with the social order in which we live. (shrink)

Quine introduced a famous distinction between the ‘notional’ sense and the ‘relational’ sense of certain attitude verbs. The distinction is both intuitive and sound but is often conflated with another distinction Quine draws between ‘dyadic’ and ‘triadic’ (or higher degree) attitudes. I argue that this conflation is largely responsible for the mistaken view that Quine’s account of attitudes is undermined by the problem of the ‘exportation’ of singular terms within attitude contexts. Quine’s system is also supposed to suffer from the (...) problem of ‘suspended judgement with continued belief’. I argue that this criticism fails to take account of a crucial presupposition of Quine’s about the connection between thought and language. The aim of the paper is to defend the spirit of Quine’s account of attitudes by offering solutions to these two problems. (shrink)

Prominent defenders of the Enlightenment, like Jürgen Habermas, are beginning to recognize that the characterization of human beings in entirely rational and secular terms leaves out something important. Religion, they admit, plays an important role in human existence. But the return to a traditional monotheistic religion seems sociologically difficult after the death of God. We argue that Homeric polytheism retains a phenomenologically rich account of the sacred, and a similarly rich understanding of human existence in its midst. By opening ourselves (...) up to the moods of wonder and gratitude at the root of Homer's sense of the sacred, we can re-appropriate a polytheistic understanding of the sacred that allows us to recover and revive the intensity and meaningfulness that Homer's polytheists enjoyed. (shrink)

We develop the theory of layered posets and use the notion of layering to prove a new iteration theorem is κ-cc, as long as direct limits are used sufficiently often. This iteration theorem simplifies and generalizes the various chain condition arguments for universal Kunen iterations in the literature on saturated ideals, especially in situations where finite support iterations are not possible. We also provide two applications:1 For any n≥1, a wide variety of <ωn−1-closed, ωn+1-cc posets of size ωn+1 can consistently (...) be absorbed by quotients of saturated ideals on ωn.2 For any n∈ω, the tree property at ωn+3 is consistent with Chang’s conjecture ↠. (shrink)

The paper presents a new theory of perceptual demonstrative thought, the property-dependent theory. It argues that the theory is superior to both the object-dependent theory (Evans, McDowell) and the object-independent theory (Burge).

We prove a variety of theorems about stationary set reflection and concepts related to internal approachability. We prove that an implication of Fuchino–Usuba relating stationary reflection to a version of Strong Chang’s Conjecture cannot be reversed; strengthen and simplify some results of Krueger about forcing axioms and approachability; and prove that some other related results of Krueger are sharp. We also adapt some ideas of Woodin to simplify and unify many arguments in the literature involving preservation of forcing axioms.

Given an ideal $I$ , let $\mathbb{P}_{I}$ denote the forcing with $I$ -positive sets. We consider models of forcing axioms $MA(\Gamma)$ which also have a normal ideal $I$ with completeness $\omega_{2}$ such that $\mathbb{P}_{I}\in \Gamma$ . Using a bit more than a superhuge cardinal, we produce a model of PFA (proper forcing axiom) which has many ideals on $\omega_{2}$ whose associated forcings are proper; a similar phenomenon is also observed in the standard model of $MA^{+\omega_{1}}(\sigma\mbox{-closed})$ obtained from a supercompact cardinal. (...) Our model of PFA also exhibits weaker versions of ideal properties, which were shown by Foreman and Magidor to be inconsistent with PFA. Along the way, we also show (1) the diagonal reflection principle for internally club sets ( $\mathit{DRP}(IC_{\omega_{1}})$ ) introduced by the author in earlier work is equivalent to a natural weakening of “there is an ideal $I$ such that $\mathbb{P}_{I}$ is proper”; and (2) for many natural classes $\Gamma$ of posets, $MA^{+\omega_{1}}(\Gamma)$ is equivalent to an apparently stronger version which we call $MA^{+\operatorname{Diag}}(\Gamma)$. (shrink)

Collective procedural memory is a group’s memory of how to do things, as opposed to a group’s memory of facts. It enables groups to mount effective responses to periodic events (e.g., natural hazards) and to sustain collective projects (e.g., combatting climate change). This article presents an account of collective procedural memory called the Ability Conception. The Ability Conception has various advantages over other accounts of collective procedural memory, such as those appealing to collective know-how and collective identity. It also demonstrates (...) new applications for collective procedural memory. I develop three in this article: to social epistemology, to the ethics of memorialization, and to a pattern of group vulnerability to recurring hazardous events that I call the saeculum effect. (shrink)

The article discusses the characteristics of virtuous persons in relation to their social role(s). It explores the key features of the neo-Aristotelian account of right action and some problems for this account in the context of a certain social role. The problem can be characterized as a dilemma. When evaluating an action in some role, one view is that the obligations and requirements of roles could be taken as something already given by social or professional role descriptions, such that the (...) virtuous person must respond to these demands in the right way. Alternatively, the virtuous person could evaluate the role itself in terms of what the “good parent, teacher, doctor” and so on should be like. Using two different neo-Aristotelian approaches to the ethics of professional roles as examples I argue that neither strategy is, as it stands, satisfactory. ‘Internalism’ about role demands takes institutionally specified role requirements in a way that is too strongly determinate for a virtue ethical analysis. On the other side, ‘externalism’ is all too indeterminate in bypassing or failing to accommodate the institutionally determined demands of social or professional roles. These shortcomings contour an “institution shaped gap” in virtue ethics such that it needs to attend to the qualities of social institutions as well as the character and actions of individuals. In response I suggest that there is a distinctly Aristotelian way in which the virtue ethicist can address it, by appeal to the distinctive function or “characteristic activity”— ergon—of the institution. (shrink)

It is well known that saturation of ideals is closely related to the “antichain-catching” phenomenon from Foreman–Magidor–Shelah [10]. We consider several antichain-catching properties that are weaker than saturation, and prove:If${\cal I}$is a normal ideal on$\omega _2 $which satisfiesstationary antichain catching, then there is an inner model with a Woodin cardinal;For any$n \in \omega $, it is consistent relative to large cardinals that there is a normal ideal${\cal I}$on$\omega _n $which satisfiesprojective antichain catching, yet${\cal I}$is not saturated. This provides a negative (...) answer to Open Question number 13 from Foreman’s chapter in the Handbook of Set Theory. (shrink)

The question of ontological commitment in Plato’s Hippias Major has been important in disputes over the dialogue’s place in the corpus, its meaning, and its authenticity. But this question seems to have been settled—the Hippias Major is not committed to the ‘forms.’ Such an ontological conclusion has been vigorously defended, but its defenses rest on a problematic meta-ontological framework. This paper suggests a more adequate framework and brings more evidence to the evaluation of the question of ontological commitment in the (...) Hippias Major. It concludes that the dialogue is indeed committed to some kind of form. (shrink)

Two epistemic principles are Knowledge Exclusion and Belief Exclusion. Knowledge Exclusion says that it is necessarily the case that if an agent knows that p, then she does not believe that ∼p, and Belief Exclusion says that it is necessarily the case that if an agent believes that q, then she does not believe that ∼q. Many epistemologists find it reasonable to reject the latter principle and accept the former. I argue that this is in fact not reasonable by proposing (...) a case in which an agent can use that she has contradictory beliefs towards a proposition as decisive evidence for that proposition. A natural response is that this case conflicts with common assumptions about the relation between knowledge, contradictory beliefs and rationality. I reply by drawing ideas from Lasonen-Aarnio’s remarks on unreasonable knowledge to explain why these common assumptions do not threaten my argument. (shrink)

This article examines whether vision in Plato’s Timaeus can realize its primary function of permitting humans to stabilize their misaligned orbits of intelligence by getting to know the universe’s orbits as revealed through the heavenly bodies’ movements. I consider a concern that Timaeus, while seemingly requiring nocturnal vision for this purpose, appears to preclude its possibility, thereby threatening the dialogue’s internal coherence. I then argue that Timaeus has the resources to overcome this worry and to provide a philosophically cogent account (...) of nocturnal vision. (shrink)

I argue that a virtue ethics takes virtue to be more basic than rightness and at least as basic as goodness. My account is Aristotelian because it avoids the excessive inclusivity of Martha Nussbaum's account and the deficient inclusivity of Gary Watson's account. I defend the account against the objection that Aristotle does not have a virtue ethics by its lights, and conclude with some remarks on moral taxonomy.

Burke proved that the generalized nonstationary ideal, denoted by NS, is universal in the following sense: every normal ideal, and every tower of normal ideals of inaccessible height, is a canonical Rudin‐Keisler projection of the restriction of NS to some stationary set. We investigate how far Burke's theorem can be pushed, by analyzing the universality properties of NS with respect to the wider class of ‐systems of filters introduced by Audrito and Steila. First we answer a question of Audrito and (...) Steila, by proving that ‐systems of filters do not capture all kinds of set‐generic embeddings. We provide a characterization of supercompactness in terms of short extenders and canonical projections of NS, without any reference to the strength of the extenders; as a corollary, NS can consistently fail to canonically project to arbitrarily strong short extenders. We prove that ω‐cofinal towers of normal ultrafilters, e.g., the kind used to characterize I2 and I3 embeddings, are well‐founded if and only if they are canonical projections of NS. Finally, we provide a characterization of “ is Jónsson” in terms of canonical projections of NS. (shrink)

The modern lawyer operates within a conception of law as a body of rules. To confront the law of contract, of torts, or of property, is to familiarize oneself with an intricate set of rules. Such familiarity is not yet legal scholarship, much less legal practice. For in order to use the rules as lawyers use them, the rules must be contemplated and considered, and the relationship between the different rules must be understood. Because the intellectual processes involved in handling (...) the rules exhibit a high degree of sophistication, those intellectual processes may themselves become the subject matter of philosophical argument. Thus we may regard jurisprudential theories as embodying differing understandings of the processes of handling legal rules; and we may conceive of legal theory as the attempt to grasp the moral significance of rules as a foundation for social order. This essay shall offer some thoughts on the relationship between the rule of law, considered as a moral ideal, and the notion of rules as the principal means by which legal order is manifested. (shrink)

This paper argues that a certain way of thinking about the function of the biobank—about what it does and is constructed for as a social institution aimed at ‘some good’—can and should play a substantial role in an effective biobanking ethic. It first exemplifies an ‘institution shaped gap’ in the current field of biobanking ethics. Next the biobank is conceptualized as a social institution that is apt for a certain kind of purposive functional definition such that we know it by (...) what it does and what it is designed to do. This purpose is then characterized further as essentially incorporating the human goods the institution is designed to serve, such that it plays a useful and indispensible role in how it should operate, i.e. in the ethics and governance of biobanking. Finally the ethical scope and limitations of such a theory is clarified by a discussion of some theoretical objections and suggested practical examples of its application. (shrink)

This paper argues that Twin Earth twins belong to the same psychological natural kind, but that the reason for this is not that the causal powers of mental states supervene on local neural structure. Fodor’s argument for this latter thesis is criticized and found to rest on a confusion between it and the claim that Putnamian and Burgean type relational psychological properties do not affect the causal powers of the mental states that have them. While it is true that Putnamian (...) and Burgean type relational psychological properties do not affect causal powers, it is false that no relational psychological properties do. Examples of relational psychological properties that do affect causal powers are given and psychological laws are sketched that subsume twins in virtue of them instantiating these relational properties rather than them sharing the narrow contents of their thoughts. (shrink)

This paper argues that Plato’s arguments at Cratylus 386e-390d are more robustly analogical than is generally supposed. Accordingly, it first establishes the nature of the main analogues. It then demonstrates the argument’s underlying structural relation, extending it to the target domain and to Socrates’ chosen method for evaluating that domain.

In the preceding article, Buchner and Wippich used a guessing-corrected, multinomial process-dissociation analysis to test whether a gender bias in fame judgments reported by Banaji and Greenwald was unconscious. In their two experiments, Buchner and Wippich found no evidence for unconscious mediation of this gender bias. Their conclusion can be questioned by noting that the gender difference in familiarity of previously seen names that Buchner and Wippich modeled was different from the gender difference in criterion for fame judgments reported by (...) Banaji and Greenwald, the assumptions of Buchner and Wippich's multinomial model excluded processes that are plausibly involved in the fame judgment task, and the constructs of Buchner and Wippich's model that corresponded most closely to Banaji and Greenwald's gender-bias interpretation were formulated so as to preclude the possibility of modeling that interpretation. Perhaps a more complex multinomial model can model the Banaji and Greenwald interpretation. (shrink)

Both Derrida and Ricœur address philosophy’s relation to metaphor, and both take Aristotle as their starting points. However, though Ricœur’s The Rule of Metaphor is largely a response to Derrida’s “White Mythology,” Ricœur seems to pass right over Derrida’s critically important interpretation of Aristotle. In this essay, I dispel concerns that Ricœur may have been intellectually irresponsible in his engagement with Derrida on this point, and I demonstrate how Study 1 makes better sense as a detailed response to Derrida.

In two experiments we demonstrate a substantial cross‐cultural difference in a mnemonic context effect, whereby a magnitude estimate of a simple stimulus such as a line or circle is biased toward the center of the distribution of previously seen instances of the same class. In support of the hypothesis that Asians are more likely than Americans to disperse their attention to both the target stimulus and its mnemonic context, this effect was consistently larger for Japanese than for Americans. Moreover, the (...) cultural difference was attenuated by an experimentally induced belief in class homogeneity that augmented the context effect itself in both cultures. More important, these belief effects happened in the absence of any objective change in stimulus distribution. Implications for sociocultural shaping of cognition are discussed. (shrink)

Huttenlocher et al. (J Exp Psychol Gen 129:220–241, 2000) introduce the category adjustment model (CAM). Given that participants imperfectly remember stimuli (which we refer to as “targets”), CAM holds that participants maximize accuracy by using information about the distribution of the targets to improve their judgments. CAM predicts that judgments will be a weighted average of the imperfect memory of the target and the mean of the distribution of targets. Huttenlocher et al. (2000) report on three experiments and conclude that (...) CAM is “verified”. We attempt to replicate the conditions in Experiment 3 from Huttenlocher et al. (2000). We analyze judgment-level data rather than averaged data. We find evidence of a bias toward a set of recent targets rather than a bias toward the running mean. We do not find evidence of learning. The judgments in our dataset are not consistent with CAM. We discuss other defects in HHV—including dividing by zero. It seems that evidence for CAM is a statistical artifact that appears when researchers analyze data averaged across trials and do not consider a recency bias. (shrink)

In Powers of Horror,1 the psychoanalyst Julia Kristeva presented the first explicit, elaborated theory of ‘abjection,’ which she defines as the casting off of that which is not of one’s “clean and proper”2 self. According to Kristeva, abjection is a demarcating impulse which establishes the basis of all object relations, and is operative in the Lacanian narrative of subject formation in early childhood via object differentiation. Abjection continues to operate post-Oedipally to prevent the dissolution of the subject by repressing identification (...) with that which is other, and particularly that which is only tenuously other: the abject. Though Kristeva’s theory is braided into problematic Freudian premises, this essay will argue that abjection remains operative independent of the Oedipal model. (shrink)

In "Virtue and Right" Robert Johnson argues that virtue ethics that accept standards such as Virtuous Agent (A's x-ing is right in circumstances c iff a fully virtuous agent would x in c) are incomplete, since they cannot account for duties of moral self-improvement. This paper offers four solutions to the problem of incompleteness: the first discards Virtuous Agent and counts actions as wrong iff a vicious person would perform them; the second retains Virtuous Agent but counts self-improving actions as (...) countererogatory: wrong but nonetheless good to do; the third replaces Virtuous Agent with a standard appealing to the Mengzian virtue of righteousness, understood as situational appropriateness; the fourth replaces Virtuous Agent with a standard that holds an action right if it promotes the agent's virtue. Each solution accommodates duties of moral self-improvement, so a virtue ethics embracing any of them would not be incomplete. (shrink)

This volume explores the versatility of the concept of pneuma in philosophical and medical theories in the wake of Aristotle’s physics. It offers fourteen separate studies of how the concept of pneuma was used in a range of physical, physiological, psychological, cosmological and ethical inquiries. The focus is on individual thinkers or traditions and the specific questions they sought to address, including early Peripatetic sources, the Stoics, the major Hellenistic medical traditions, Galen, as well as Proclus in Late Antiquity and (...) John Zacharias Aktouarios in the early 14th century. Building on new scholarly approaches and on recent advancements in our understanding of Graeco-Roman philosophy and medicine, the volume prompts a profound re-evaluation of this fluid and adaptable, but crucially important, substance, in antiquity and beyond. (shrink)

We obtain lower bounds for the consistency strength of fully nonregular ultrafilters on ω₂.

An underpinning assumption of modern legal positivism is that the question of how legal standards differ from normative standards in other spheres of human thought is resolved via the concept of a legal system and the notion of internal logic, through use of contextual definition. This approach is seen to lead to an untenable form of structuralism altogether at odds with the positivist's intentions. An alternative strategy is offered which allows the positivists to retain their deepest insights, though at a (...) price. (shrink)

This article considers the relationship between the philosophies of Thomas Aquinas and Francisco Suarez. It has been said that Suarez made significant departures from the natural law theory of Aquinas, by putting greater emphasis on divine command as the source of natural law precepts, and by replacing Aquinas’s focus on good and bad with a focus on right and wrong. Hence, Suarez appears to replace Aquinas’s eudaimonist account of ethics with one based in deontology. The article argues that the differences (...) separating Aquinas and Suarez are minimal, and that Suarez can be seen as upholding the central tenets of Aquinas’s doctrine of natural law. This has ramifications for our understanding not only of Suarez, but also of Aquinas himself. (shrink)

Both of the books under review offer a challenge to the dominant jurisprudential tradition of legal positivism. Underlying this superficial similarity in aims is a sharp divergence in philosophical outlook. Whereas Dworkin's arguments operate within a body of background assumptions that he shares with his opponents, and which he has done much to shape, Simmonds sees his task as challenging those assumptions. This is particularly evident in the moral philosophies at the heart of each book: Dworkin can be seen as (...) offering a Protestant-voluntarist-atheist philosophy; whereas Simmonds resembles a Catholic-conservative-Aristotelian. (shrink)

If deontic logic is to cast light on any of the normative sciences, such as legal reasoning, then certain problems regarding its logical constants must be faced. Recent studies in the area of deontic logic have tended to assume that it is our responses to the “paradoxes” of deontic implication which are fundamental to resolving problems with the use of deontic logic to investigate various branches of normative reasoning. In this paper I wish to show that the paradoxes are of (...) secondary importance; that they are merely by‐products of the central issue, namely the ability of certain syntactic forms to embody natural language structures used in reasoning about norms. An investigation of modal syntax is proffered as the best starting‐point from which to tackle the questions that still dog the legitimacy of deontic logic. Part I provides some philosophical background to the discussion of deontic logical constants. Part II addresses in greater detail issues concerning the representation of normative concepts; and Part III offers a few remarks on the general issue of deontic logic's fruitfulness as an analytical tool. (shrink)