A model of when and where saccades are made necessarily incorporates a model of the “When” and “Where” of target selection. We suggest that the framework proposed by Findlay & Walker does not specify sufficiently how selection processes contribute to the spatial and temporal determinants of saccade generation. Examples from across-trial priming in visual search and from the inhibition of temporally segmented distractors show linkage between the processes involved in computing when and where selection operates, so that there is cooperation (...) rather than competition between so-called Where and When pathways. Aspects of spatial selection may also determine the remote distractor effect on saccades. The detailed relations between the processes involved in selection and saccade generation may be best understood in relation to detailed computational accounts of the processes. (shrink)

Der Artikel spürt den subtilen Veränderungen nach, die bei Patienten, die mit tiefer Hirnstimulation behandelt werden, möglicherweise beobachtet werden können. Dabei sollen im Rückgriff auf Konzeptionen zur narrativen Identität mittels einer möglichst genauen Beschreibung und Analyse der Selbstwahrnehmung der Patienten sowie der Wahrnehmung ihres Umfelds die Änderungen im praktischen Selbstverhältnis untersucht werden, u. a. am Beispiel technomorpher Metaphern, die von den Patienten in ihren Selbstbeschreibungen verwendet werden. Ziel ist es, die Neuartigkeit und das Spezifische der Neurotechnologien – über die bisherigen (...) Untersuchungen hinaus – hinsichtlich des Umgangs mit sich selbst herauszuarbeiten und greifbar zu machen. Abschließend werden auf Basis der Analyse der Patienten-Narrationen die entsprechenden normativen Implikationen für eine ethische Bewertung des Einsatzes von Neurotechnologien benannt. (shrink)

Das Handbuch bietet einen Überblick über die technischen, historischen, sozialen, medialen, kulturwissenschaftlichen und technikphilosophischen Dimensionen verschiedener Typen von Mensch-Maschine-Interaktion sowie über deren ethische Implikationen. Dabei werden zum einen wissenshistorische Analysen der Diskurse in Philosophie, Literatur und Technik sowie ihrer medialen, apparativen und literalen Praktiken von ca. 1870 bis in die Gegenwart verfolgt. Zum anderen wird das komplexe Verhältnis von Menschen und Maschinen anhand von zentralen Begriffs- und Problemfeldern dargestellt und kritisch befragt.

Der Artikel spürt den subtilen Veränderungen nach, die bei Patienten, die mit tiefer Hirnstimulation behandelt werden, möglicherweise beobachtet werden können. Dabei sollen im Rückgriff auf Konzeptionen zur narrativen Identität mittels einer möglichst genauen Beschreibung und Analyse der Selbstwahrnehmung der Patienten sowie der Wahrnehmung ihres Umfelds die Änderungen im praktischen Selbstverhältnis untersucht werden, u. a. am Beispiel technomorpher Metaphern, die von den Patienten in ihren Selbstbeschreibungen verwendet werden. Ziel ist es, die Neuartigkeit und das Spezifische der Neurotechnologien – über die bisherigen (...) Untersuchungen hinaus – hinsichtlich des Umgangs mit sich selbst herauszuarbeiten und greifbar zu machen. Abschließend werden auf Basis der Analyse der Patienten-Narrationen die entsprechenden normativen Implikationen für eine ethische Bewertung des Einsatzes von Neurotechnologien benannt. (shrink)

In den Publikationen der Synthetischen Biologie und in Darstellungen dieser neuen Biotechnologie finden sich häufig Begriffe des Herstellens, Konstruierens, Erschaffens und Kreierens. Im folgenden Beitrag wird dieses Begriffsfeld auf der Basis von technikphilosophischen und kunsttheoretischen Ansätzen systematisiert. Es wird erstens untersucht, inwiefern sich die verschiedenen Forschungsrichtungen in der Synthetischen Biologie mit diesem Begriffsinstrumentarium angemessen beschreiben lassen; zweitens wird analysiert, welche ethischen Fragestellungen mit den unterschiedlichen Begriffen des Herstellens und Erschaffens im Fall der Synthetischen Biologie verbunden sind.

This essay explores the nature of being visible and its normative dimensions. In a first part, core traits of an anthropology of visibility are sketched, drawing mainly on Hans Blumenberg’s phenomenological studies. In a second part, human visibility is investigated regarding its implications for our self-understanding, for our relation to others, and for the publicness of our existence. Apart from Blumenberg, also Jean-Paul Sartre, Charles Taylor, Hannah Arendt are involved in this examination. In a third part, two ‘basic rights’ are (...) brought into focus: the right to be seen and the right to remain unseen. In addition to the philosophical exploration, texts by Ralph Ellison, Elena Ferrante and Dave Eggers are discussed as literary references. In a fourth part, a performance by Marina Abramovic that thematised the connection of visibility and recognition is introduced and analysed. (shrink)

Military drones combine surveillance technology with missile equipment in a far-reaching way. In this article, I argue that military drones could and should be object for a philosophical investigation, referring in particular on Chamayou’s theory of the drone, who also coined the term “an eye turned into a weapon.” Focusing on issues of human self-understanding, agency, and alterity, I examine the intricate human-technology relations in the context of designing and deploying military drones. For that purpose, I am drawing on the (...) postphenomenological approach developed by Don Ihde in order to systematize the manifold aspects of human-technology relations in a four-level model. This inquiry also includes a critical reflection on the normative implications of this technology. In doing so, I do not intent to offer an exhaustive relational ontology of military drones. I rather aim at providing a framework that is able to capture the core dimensions of this technology and their complex interrelations in a systematic way that has been missing in the philosophical debate so far. (shrink)

Wie verhalten sich Körper und Geist oder Natur und Freiheit zueinander und welche Rolle spielt der Lebensbegriff bei der Bestimmung des Verhältnisses der Begriffe? Die Erarbeitung der „Funktionen des Lebendigen“ kann als ein vielschichtiges Arbeitsprogramm verstanden werden, mit dem eine zentrale Problemlage unserer Zeit, unserer Gesellschaft und unserer Technik erschlossen werden kann. In der Verbindung des methodologischen Begriffs der Funktion mit dem phänomenalen Begriff des Lebendigen liegt ein philosophisches, wissenschaftstheoretische und kulturreflexives Potential. Denn zum einen ist der Funktionsbegriff ein Schlüsselbegriff (...) im Diskurs der Moderne, gerade im Kontext von anthropologischen, lebensphänomenologischen und bioethischen Fragen. Und zum anderen stellt das Phänomen des Lebendigen nach wie vor eine der großen Herausforderungen für das philosophische Denken dar, sei es in ontologischer, anthropologischer oder ethischer Hinsicht. Die Beiträge dieses Bandes beleuchten die unterschiedlichen Problemdimensionen des Lebendigen durch begrifflich-systematische Überlegungen ebenso wie spezielle Analysen zu Formen, Normen, Erfahrungen und Grenzen des Lebendigen. (shrink)

Angesichts der enormen Entwicklungen in der Technik zu Beginn des 20. Jahrhunderts, insbesondere angesichts der »totalen Mobilmachung«, die man im Ersten Weltkrieg zu beobachten und zu erfahren glaubte, entstand in den 1920er und 1930er Jahren ein Diskurs über die Technik, in dem das ›Allesumfassende‹ und ›Allesvereinnahmende‹, also ›Totalisierende‹ der Maschinerien zum Thema gemacht wurde. So fragte sich Hans Freyer 1929 wie es sein konnte, dass »ein System von bloßen Mitteln derart schicksalsbestimmend, menschenverwandelnd, geschichtsbildend wirken kann«. Karl Jaspers wiederum beschrieb die (...) »globale« Dimension, die die Technik seiner Einschätzung nach angenommen hatte, und sprach 1931 in seinem Essay Die geistige Situation der Zeit von der »Herrschaft des Apparats« und sogar von einem »Riesenapparat«, der den einzelnen Menschen überformen würde, insbesondere durch eine normierende Massenkultur, die das tägliche Leben der Menschen grundlegend ändern würde. (shrink)

Es ist vermutlich kein Zufall, dass zu den ersten Maschinen, mit denen Menschen interagierten, auch Illusionsmaschinen gehörten. Die Theater im antiken Griechenland besaßen kranartige Vorrichtungen, die es erlaubten, Schauspieler überraschend in die Bühnenhandlung hineinschweben und eingreifen zu lassen, Götter mimend, die das Geschehen nach ihren Wünschen lenken konnten. Bekannt ist diese Theatertechnik als ›Deus ex machina‹.

Emerging neurotechnologies, such as brain-computer interfaces, interact closely with a user’s body by enabling actions controlled with brain activity. This can have a profound impact on the user’s experience of movement, the sense of agency and other body-and action-related aspects. In this introduction to the special issue “Mechanized Brains, Embodied Technologies”, we reflect on the relationships between embodiment, movement and agency that are addressed in the collected papers.

Definition of the problem This article critically addresses the conceptualization of trust in the ethical discussion on artificial intelligence (AI) in the specific context of social robots in care. First, we attempt to define in which respect we can speak of ‘social’ robots and how their ‘social affordances’ affect the human propensity to trust in human–robot interaction. Against this background, we examine the use of the concept of ‘trust’ and ‘trustworthiness’ with respect to the guidelines and recommendations of the High-Level (...) Expert Group on AI of the European Union. Arguments Trust is analyzed as a multidimensional concept and phenomenon that must be primarily understood as departing from trusting as a human functioning and capability. To trust is an essential part of the human basic capability to form relations with others. We further want to discuss the concept of _responsivity _which has been established in phenomenological research as a foundational structure of the relation between the self and the other. We argue that trust and trusting as a capability is fundamentally _responsive_ and needs responsive others to be realized. An understanding of _responsivity_ is thus crucial to conceptualize trusting in the ethical framework of human flourishing. We apply a phenomenological–anthropological analysis to explore the link between certain qualities of social robots that construct responsiveness and thereby simulate responsivity and the human propensity to trust. Conclusion Against this background, we want to critically ask whether the concept of trustworthiness in social human–robot interaction could be misguided because of the limited ethical demands that the constructed responsiveness of social robots is able to answer to. (shrink)

Ethical questions with regard to modern neurosciences have significant relevance because the human brain provides the organic basis for central aspects of our self-concept. Neuroethics identifies and reflects the ethical questions raised by modern neurosciences. Here we deal with ethical questions in the contexts of brain imaging techniques and several interventions into the human brain. Besides the central question how to preserve personal identity and higher cognitive functions we address specific ethical aspects of neurotechnology and neuroprosthetics as well as the (...) questions relevant in the context of neuroenhancement. (shrink)

This paper offers an account of Susan Haack’s philosophy of law and points out several aspects within the legal pragmatist tradition that deserve further discussion. Firstly, a systematic presentation of legal pragmatism as it is defended by Haack, who follows Justice Oliver W. Holmes here, is given. Secondly, the limits of an evolutionary perspective of law recommended by legal pragmatism are considered. Finally, the paper discusses whether legal pragmatism is able to handle different legal traditions, thereby focusing on Anglo-American (...) common law and European civil law. (shrink)

Das Buch untersucht das technische Selbst- und Weltverhältnis systematisch und in seiner historischen Entwicklung. Ausgangspunkt ist die Selbstaufklärung über uns als handelnde Personen in der technischen Zivilisation. Dabei können wir dem Phänomen der Technik nur durch die Integration von anthropologischen, ontologischen, sozialphilosophischen und kulturphilosophischen Momenten gerecht werden. Diese werden insbesondere in Auseinandersetzung mit Texten von Cassirer, Heidegger, Jünger, Arendt, Anders, Ortega y Gasset, Husserl, Blumenberg und Adorno generiert. Zudem werden die entsprechenden historischen Linien zu Platon, Kant, Hegel und Marx kenntlich (...) gemacht. Dabei werden diese vielstimmigen und heterogenen Selbstverständigungsleistungen über das "Problem" der Technik in Deutungsmuster transformiert, die eine systematische Durchdringung des technischen Selbst- und Weltverhältnisses gestatten. Im Anschluss widmet sich Müller der Frage, wie sich Personen im Hinblick auf Technisierungsprozesse selbst interpretieren, Orientierungsräume kartieren und ihren Handlungshorizont ändern. Dies ermöglicht den Anschluss an aktuelle Fragen, insbesondere an solche, die durch aktuelle Medizintechniken aufgeworfen werden. (shrink)

This issue is dedicated to consciousness in medieval and early modern philosophy of mind. It aims to shed new light on the continuities and innovations during the transition from medieval to early modern philosophy of mind. The four papers, by Sonja Schierbaum, Daniel Schmal, Oliver Istvan Toth, and Philipp N. Müller, focus on consciousness and, more specifically, on one of its less frequently considered aspects: memory.

My philosophical case study concerns textbook presentations of the theory of demand. Does this theory contain anything more than just a collection of tautologies? In order to determine its empirical content, it must be viewed holistically. But then, the theory implies false factual claims. We can avoid this result by embracing the theory’s normative character. The resulting consequences will be illuminated with the new autodetermination thesis recently proposed in the philosophy of physics by Oliver Timmer. Applying his ideas to (...) the theory of demand reveals that the statements of this discipline simultaneously concern both values and facts. (shrink)

Artificial intelligence (AI) and robotics are digital technologies that will have significant impact on the development of humanity in the near future. They have raised fundamental questions about what we should do with these systems, what the systems themselves should do, what risks they involve, and how we can control these. - After the Introduction to the field (§1), the main themes (§2) of this article are: Ethical issues that arise with AI systems as objects, i.e., tools made and used (...) by humans. This includes issues of privacy (§2.1) and manipulation (§2.2), opacity (§2.3) and bias (§2.4), human-robot interaction (§2.5), employment (§2.6), and the effects of autonomy (§2.7). Then AI systems as subjects, i.e., ethics for the AI systems themselves in machine ethics (§2.8) and artificial moral agency (§2.9). Finally, the problem of a possible future AI superintelligence leading to a “singularity” (§2.10). We close with a remark on the vision of AI (§3). - For each section within these themes, we provide a general explanation of the ethical issues, outline existing positions and arguments, then analyse how these play out with current technologies and finally, what policy consequences may be drawn. (shrink)

Will future lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS), or ‘killer robots’, be a threat to humanity? The European Parliament has called for a moratorium or ban of LAWS; the ‘Contracting Parties to the Geneva Convention at the United Nations’ are presently discussing such a ban, which is supported by the great majority of writers and campaigners on the issue. However, the main arguments in favour of a ban are unsound. LAWS do not support extrajudicial killings, they do not take responsibility away (...) from humans; in fact they increase the abil-ity to hold humans accountable for war crimes. Using LAWS in war would probably reduce human suffering overall. Finally, the availability of LAWS would probably not increase the probability of war or other lethal conflict—especially as compared to extant remote-controlled weapons. The widespread fear of killer robots is unfounded: They are probably good news. (shrink)

A shared narrative in the literature on the evolution of cooperation maintains that social _learning_ evolves early to allow for the transmission of cumulative culture. Social _norms_, whilst present at the outset, only rise to prominence later on, mainly to stabilise cooperation against the threat of defection. In contrast, I argue that once we consider insights from social epistemology, an expansion of this narrative presents itself: An interesting kind of social norm — an epistemic coordination norm — was operative in (...) early and important instances of specialised social learning. I show how there’s a need for such norms in two key social learning strategies and explain how this need is constituted. In assessor-teaching (e.g. Castro et al., 2019b, 2021), epistemic coordination norms allow agents to coordinate around the _content_ of social learning, i.e., what is to be known and how this is to be done. These norms also allow agents to coordinate around the form of cultural learning in what’s sometimes called strategic social learning (Laland, 2004; Hoppitt & Laland, 2013; Heyes, 2018, Chap. 5) and elsewhere. Broadly speaking, this concerns how cultural learning is organised within the social group. The upshot is that the evolution of social learning and social norms are intertwined in important and underappreciated ways from early on. The above matters as it informs our views about the evolution of social norms more generally. Truly _social_ norms emerged to coordinate a plurality of complex behaviours and interactions, amongst them specialised social learning. I substantiate this view by contrasting it with Jonathan Birch’s views on the evolution of norms. What results is a general but cohesive narrative on the early evolution of social norms. (shrink)

Cumulative cultural knowledge [CCK], the knowledge we acquire via social learning and has been refined by previous generations, is of central importance to our species’ flourishing. Considering its importance, we should expect that our best epistemological theories can account for how this happens. Perhaps surprisingly, CCK and how we acquire it via cultural learning has only received little attention from social epistemologists. Here, I focus on how we should epistemically evaluate how agents acquire CCK. After sampling some reasons why extant (...) theories cannot account for CCK, I suggest that things aren’t as bleak as they might look. I explain how agents deserve epistemic credit for how CCK is transmitted in cultural learning by promoting a central need of their social group: The efficient and safe transmission of CCK. A good initial fit exists between this observation and Greco’s knowledge-economy framework. Ultimately, however, Greco’s account doesn’t straightforwardly account for CCK because of its strict focus on testimony. I point out two issues in the framework due to this focus. The resulting view advocates giving epistemic credit to agents when they act to promote their communities’ epistemic needs in the right way and highlights the various ways in which agents come to do this. (shrink)

I begin by criticizing an elaboration of an argument in this journal due to Hawley , who argued that, where Leibniz’s Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles faces counterexamples, invoking relations to save PII fails. I argue that insufficient attention has been paid to a particular distinction. I proceed by demonstrating that in most putative counterexamples to PII , the so-called Discerning Defence trumps the Summing Defence of PII. The general kind of objects that do the discerning in all cases (...) form a category that has received little if any attention in metaphysics. This category of objects lies between indiscernibles and individuals and is called relationals: objects that can be discerned by means of relations only and not by properties. Remarkably, relationals turn out to populate the universe. (shrink)

This paper investigates the prospects of Rodney Brooks’ proposal for AI without representation. It turns out that the supposedly characteristic features of “new AI” (embodiment, situatedness, absence of reasoning, and absence of representation) are all present in conventional systems: “New AI” is just like old AI. Brooks proposal boils down to the architectural rejection of central control in intelligent agents—Which, however, turns out to be crucial. Some of more recent cognitive science suggests that we might do well to dispose of (...) the image of intelligent agents as central representation processors. If this paradigm shift is achieved, Brooks’ proposal for cognition without representation appears promising for full-blown intelligent agents—Though not for conscious agents. (shrink)

This paper reviews the hole argument as an argument against spacetime substantivalism. After a careful presentation of the argument itself, I critically review possible responses.

Considered by many to be Abraham Robinson's magnum opus, this book offers an explanation of the development and applications of non-standard analysis by the mathematician who founded the subject. Non-standard analysis grew out of Robinson's attempt to resolve the contradictions posed by infinitesimals within calculus. He introduced this new subject in a seminar at Princeton in 1960, and it remains as controversial today as it was then. This paperback reprint of the 1974 revised edition is indispensable reading for anyone interested (...) in non-standard analysis. It treats in rich detail many areas of application, including topology, functions of a real variable, functions of a complex variable, and normed linear spaces, together with problems of boundary layer flow of viscous fluids and rederivations of Saint-Venant's hypothesis concerning the distribution of stresses in an elastic body. (shrink)

Artificial intelligence (AI) is a digital technology that will be of major importance for the development of humanity in the near future. AI has raised fundamental questions about what we should do with such systems, what the systems themselves should do, what risks they involve and how we can control these. - After the background to the field (1), this article introduces the main debates (2), first on ethical issues that arise with AI systems as objects, i.e. tools made and (...) used by humans; here, the main sections are privacy (2.1), manipulation (2.2), opacity (2.3), bias (2.4), autonomy & responsibility (2.6) and the singularity (2.7). Then we look at AI systems as subjects, i.e. when ethics is for the AI systems themselves in machine ethics (2.8.) and artificial moral agency (2.9). Finally we look at future developments and the concept of AI (3). For each section within these themes, we provide a general explanation of the ethical issues, we outline existing positions and arguments, then we analyse how this plays out with current technologies and finally what policy conse-quences may be drawn. (shrink)