(2014). Introduction to the Special Issue on Strategy, Story, and Emergence: Essays on Scenario Planning. World Futures: Vol. 70, Strategy, Story, and Emergence: Essays on Scenario Planning, pp. 2-4.

Researchers have been interested in what retrieval process is responsible for overgeneral autobiographical memories (OGM) in depression. Previous cross-sectional studies demonstrated that, for negatively valenced cues, directly retrieved OGM, rather than generatively retrieved OGM, are associated with depression. However, longitudinal evidence of this relationship is still lacking and needs to be tested. We conducted a re-analysis of the online computerised memory specificity training (c-MeST) data to examine whether directly retrieved OGM for negative cues prospectively predicts high levels of depression 1 (...) month later. Participants who met the criteria of current major depressive disorders (N = 116; n = 58 in the c-MeST group and n = 58 in the control group) recalled autobiographical memories for positive and negative cues and judged each retrieval process (i.e. direct or generative). The results supported our prediction, and directly retrieved OGM for negative cues predicted high levels of depressive symptoms 1 month later even after controlling for the group effect, baseline depressive symptoms, executive functioning and rumination. Exploratory analysis showed that direct retrieval of specific memories prospectively predicted low levels of depression. These results support the theory that elevated accessibility of negatively valenced general memory representations is a vulnerability factor for depressive symptoms. (shrink)

We review some techniques and notions for quantum information theory. It is shown that the dynamical entropies is discussed and some numerical computations of these entropies are carried for several states.

We review some notions for general quantum entropies. The entropy of the compound systems is discussed and a numerical computation of the quantum dynamical systems is carried for the noisy optical channel.

For ${b \in {^{\omega}}{\omega}}$ , let ${\mathfrak{c}^{\exists}_{b, 1}}$ be the minimal number of functions (or slaloms with width 1) to catch every functions below b in infinitely many positions. In this paper, by using the technique of forcing, we construct a generic model in which there are many coefficients ${\mathfrak{c}^{\exists}_{{b_\alpha}, 1}}$ with pairwise different values. In particular, under the assumption that a weakly inaccessible cardinal exists, we can construct a generic model in which there are continuum many coefficients ${\mathfrak{c}^{\exists}_{{b_\alpha}, 1}}$ (...) with pairwise different values. In conjunction with these results, we give a generic model in which there are many Yorioka’s ideals ${\mathcal{I}_{f_\alpha}}$ with pairwise different covering numbers. (shrink)

In 2002, Yorioka introduced the σ-ideal ${{\mathcal {I}}_f}$ for strictly increasing functions f from ω into ω to analyze the cofinality of the strong measure zero ideal. For each f, we study the cardinal coefficients (the additivity, covering number, uniformity and cofinality) of ${{\mathcal {I}}_f}$.

(2014). The Mind of the Scenario Thinker. World Futures: Vol. 70, Strategy, Story, and Emergence: Essays on Scenario Planning, pp. 44-51.

(2014). Virtue-Based Management. World Futures: Vol. 70, Strategy, Story, and Emergence: Essays on Scenario Planning, pp. 19-27.

According to Dignāga, the word “cow” makes one understand all cows in a general form by excluding non-cows. However, how does one understand the non-cows to be excluded? Hattori answers as follows: “On perceiving the particular which is endowed with dewlap, horns, a hump on the back, and so forth, one understands that it is not a non-cow, because one knows that a non-cow is not endowed with these attributes.” Hattori regards observation of a dewlap, etc. as the cause of (...) excluding non-cows. Akamatsu presents a view similar to Hattori’s. Tanizawa, however, criticises Akamatsu by pointing out that then the apohavādin would have accepted positive elements such as a dewlap as defining characteristics of a cow. Stating that X is not a cow because it is not endowed with a dewlap, etc., amounts to accepting that the dewlap, etc. are the defining characteristics of a cow. Instead of a real universal cowness the apohavādin would have accepted a dewlap, etc. Akamatsu’s understanding of apoha, if it was correct, implies Tanizawa, would destroy the essence of the Buddhist theory of apoha. Continuing the view of Hattori and Akamatsu, Yoshimizu recently published two articles on Dignāga’s theory of apoha. He claims that “the word “cow” excludes all horses by virtue of the fact that horns are never seen on them.” Thus, “the word “cow” can exclude all of them collectively by virtue of the fact that none of them has all the members of the set of characteristics that form the worldly definition of “cow”.” Horns, one of the characteristic features of cows, are indeed mentioned by Dignāga in PS 5:43. Yoshimizu understands Dignāga’s semantics as being parallel to the modern semantics of componential analysis. A question arises: what does Dignāga, the founder of the Buddhist theory of apoha, really think regarding this issue? The present article sheds light on the incompatibility of the two interpretations by investigating the relevant source texts. It further shows that the issue Tanizawa deals with was already discussed by Dignāga. Examining Dignāga’s discussions shows that Tanizawa is right in his understanding of apoha. The interpretation by Hattori and other scholars is not supported by Dignāga’s text. The present conclusion is also supported by Mādhava, Uddyotakara and Kumārila. None of them assumes Dignāga’s theory to be as Hattori, etc. take it. (shrink)

あの高名な「絶対矛盾的自己同一」とは、いったいどういう意味なのか―。西田哲学の本質をつかみ、その全貌をわかりやすく示す!

ウィトゲンシュタインさんと落語を探検!「粗忽長屋」は“私とは何か”という謎をめぐる物語であり、「堀の内」は“笑いの本質”についての深淵な哲学書。そして「芝浜」には、“わたしたちの世界は夢ではないのか” というテーマが隠されていた...

Following Dharmakīrti’s interpretation, PS I 9ab has been understood as stating a view common to both Sautrāntikas and Yogācāras, i.e. a view that self-awareness is the result of a means of valid cognition. It has also been understood that Dignāga accepts two different views attributed to Sautrāntikas with regard to pramāṇaphala: in PS ad I 8cd he regards the cognition of an external object as the result; in PS ad I 9ab–cd he alternatively presents another view that self-awareness is the (...) result. Dignāga’s text, however, does not support these interpretations. Rather it contradicts them. In fact Dignāga presupposes a single view, and not two, attributed to Sautrāntikas, a view that the cognition of an external object is the result. In I 9ab he is presenting an alternative view that is attributed only to Yogācāras, i.e. a view that is not common to Sautrāntikas. Althogh the Sautrāntika sākāravāda essentially has an internal structure, Dignāga presupposes that an external object can be regarded as the object of cognition because it is similar to the image of object. He assumes that the objects of pramāṇa and phala, both being external objects, are identical. Criticizing Dignāga’s claim that bāhyārthajñāna is the phala, Kumārila points out that there is a serious gap between the objects of pramāṇa and phala. Consequently Dharmakīrti has to admit that even in the Sautrāntika view an external object is not directly cognized and instead proposes as the second view of Sautrāntikas that svasaṃvitti is the phala. At the same time he reinterprets Dignāga and defends from Kumārila’s criticism by introducing the two different levels. When investigating the real nature, i.e. in the paramārtha level, svasaṃvitti is the phala, whereas in the upacāra level, bāhyārthajñāna or bāhyārthaniścaya is the phala. Thus, Dharmakīrti avoids Kumārila’s criticism of Dignāga. Kumārila triggers Dharmakīrti’s new introduction of the second view of Santrāntikas that svasaṃvitti is the phala. (shrink)

In his paper “Non-human moral status: problems with phenomenal consciousness,” Joshua Shepherd emphasized an objectivist understanding of welfare to establish the moral status of non-human entities...

v. 1. A critical edition of Mimamsa-Slokavarttika ad 1.1.2 (Codanasutra) -- v. 2. An annotated translation of Mimamsa-Slokavarttika ad 1.1.2 (Codanasutra).