"Obituario intelectual:Niklas Luhmann o la teorí­a como pasión" Durante tres décadas Niklas Luhmann se dio a la tarea de elaborar una teorí­a de la sociedad moderna desde la óptica de la teorí­a de los sistemas sociales operativamente clausurados. La empresa llevada a cabo por este pensador alemán lo ha colocado como uno de los más importantes teóricos sociológicos del presente siglo. En el presente escrito, que hace las veces de un pequeño homenaje a Luhmann, fallecido el 6 de noviembre de (...) 1998, se realizará un breve esbozo biográfico de la persona Niklas Luhmann, así­ como un apretado resumen de las principales tesis y aportes de su teorí­a.Se incorpora además, un listado de las obras más destacadas del autor, anotando aquellas disponibles en español, así­ como alguna bibliografí­a secundaria. (shrink)

Tradicionalmente se ha separado a la epistemología y a la hermenéutica, puesto que la primera trata de lo conmensurable y la segunda, lo inconmensurable. Sin embargo, en mi opinión, hoy en día es posible unir a la epistemología y la hermenéutica sólo si partimos de una teoría de la epistemología contemporánea: la teoría de la verdad como aceptabilidad racional en condiciones epistémicas óptimas. Dicha teoría permite justificar lo conmensurable y entender lo inconmensurable.Traditionally epistemology and hermeneutics have been separated, since the (...) first deals with commensurability and the second with incommensurability. Nevertheless, in my opinion, nowadays it is possible to unite epistemology and hermeneutics if we start from a theory contemporary epistemology: the theory of the truth as rational acceptability in optimal epistemic conditions. This theory allows us to justify commensurability and to understand incommensurability. (shrink)

We present a Hilbert-style axiomatization of a recently introduced logic, called G'3 G'3 is based on a 3-valued semantics. We prove a soundness and completeness theorem. The replacement theorem holds in G'3. As it has already been shown in previous work, G'3 can express some non-monotonic semantics. We prove that G'3can define the same class of functions as Lukasiewicz 3 valued logic. Moreover, we identify some normal forms for this logic.

La mística como categoría ha generado, históricamente, grandes problemas hermenéuticos que han permitido analizar dicha experiencia desde diversas perspectivas. El neoplatonismo como culmen de la filosofía antigua y, en especial, la filosofía de Plotino invita a una vivencia que, a menudo, ha sido considerada como mística. A través de diferentes estudios, profundizaremos en los aspectos ontoló-gicos y epistemológicos de la experiencia mencionada. Apoyándonos en las Enéadas, haremos ver que, para Plotino, esta experiencia mística supone más una hermenéutica de la racionalidad (...) que una invitación al irracionalismo. (shrink)

This paper discusses the introduction of fraudulent “molecular detector” technology into Mexico. The case is used to argue that contemporary science and technology studies’ approaches to scientific policy-making make basic assumptions about the societies they operate in that are inconsistent with the Mexican context. This paper also argues that contrary to what happens in the so-called Global North, the relative power of Mexican science in government and policy circles is as much limited by its relatively weak position as much as (...) it is by self-censorship and unrealized impact in the country’s fragile democracy. The case is also used to highlight the necessity for more politically involved scientific institutions in Mexico, as these become critical safeguards against incoming destabilizing technologies from more powerful nations into the local “peripheral” context. (shrink)

Mounting evidence suggests that participation in clinical trials confers neither advantage nor disadvantage on those enrolled. Narrow focus on the question of a “trial effect,” however, distracts from a broader mechanism by which patients may benefit from ongoing clinical research. We hypothesize that the existence of clinical trials infrastructure—the organizational culture, systems, and expertise that develop as a product of sustained participation in cooperative clinical trials research—may function as a quality improvement lever, improving the quality of care and outcomes of (...) all patients within an institution or region independent of their individual participation in trials. We further contend that this “infrastructure effect” can yield particular benefits for patients in low- and middle-income countries. The hypothesis of an infrastructure effect as a quality improvement intervention, if correct, justifies enhanced research capacity in LMIC as a pillar of health system development. (shrink)

This paper argues that analyses of the ways in which Big Data has been enacted in other academic disciplines can provide us with concepts that will help understand the application of Big Data to social questions. We use examples drawn from our Science and Technology Studies analyses of -omic biology and high energy physics to demonstrate the utility of three theoretical concepts: primary and secondary inscriptions, crafted and found data, and the locus of legitimate interpretation. These help us to show (...) how the histories, organisational forms, and power dynamics of a field lead to different enactments of big data. The paper suggests that these concepts can be used to help us to understand the ways in which Big Data is being enacted in the domain of the social sciences, and to outline in general terms the ways in which this enactment might be different to that which we have observed in the ‘hard’ sciences. We contend that the locus of legitimate interpretation of Big Data biology and physics is tightly delineated, found within the disciplinary institutions and cultures of these disciplines. We suggest that when using Big Data to make knowledge claims about ‘the social’ the locus of legitimate interpretation is more diffuse, with knowledge claims that are treated as being credible made from other disciplines, or even by those outside academia entirely. (shrink)

When a circular coin is rotated in depth, is there any sense in which it comes to resemble an ellipse? While this question is at the center of a rich and divided philosophical tradition (with some scholars answering affirmatively and some negatively), Morales et al. (2020, 2021) took an empirical approach, reporting 10 experiments whose results favor such perspectival similarity. Recently, Burge and Burge (2022) offered a vigorous critique of this work, objecting to its approach and conclusions on both philosophical (...) and empirical grounds. Here, we answer these objections on both fronts. We show that Burge and Burge’s critique rests on misunderstandings of Morales et al.’s claims; of the relation between the data and conclusions; and of the philosophical context in which the work appears. Specifically, Burge and Burge attribute to us a much stronger (and stranger) view than we hold, involving the introduction of “a new entity” located “in some intermediate position(s) between the distal shape and the retinal image.” We do not hold this view. Indeed, once properly understood, most of Burge and Burge’s objections favor Morales et al.’s claims rather than oppose them. Finally, we discuss several questions that remain unanswered, and reflect on a productive path forward on these issues of foundational scientific and philosophical interest. (shrink)

Our pains can be more or less intense, our mental imagery can be more or less vivid, our perceptual experiences can be more or less striking. These degrees of intensity of conscious experiences are all manifestations of a phenomenal property I call mental strength. In this article, I argue that mental strength is a domain-general phenomenal magnitude; in other words, it is a phenomenal quantity shared by all conscious experiences that explains their degree of felt intensity. Mental strength has been (...) largely overlooked in favor of mental states’ type, representational contents, domain-specific phenomenology, or processes such as attention. Considering mental strength in our reflections about the mind illuminates debates about the relation of representational contents and phenomenal character, and it also helps address questions about the structure and functions of consciousness. Mental strength provides a unifying construct to model what is shared in the phenomenology of different types of conscious experiences. (shrink)

In this chapter, we discuss a selection of current views of the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC). We focus on the different predictions they make, in particular with respect to the role of prefrontal cortex (PFC) during visual experiences, which is an area of critical interest and some source of contention. Our discussion of these views focuses on the level of functional anatomy, rather than at the neuronal circuitry level. We take this approach because we currently understand more about experimental (...) evidence at this coarse level and because these results are appropriate for arbitrating between current theoretical frameworks. We discuss the Two-Visual-Systems Hypothesis (Milner & Goodale 1995; 2006), Local Recurrency (Lamme 2010; Lamme 2006), Higher Order (Lau 2008; Lau & Rosenthal 2011) and Global Workspace theories (Baars 1997; Baars 2005; Dehaene & Naccache 2001; Dehaene 2014). Despite the apparent stark differences between conscious and unconscious perceptual processing, available evidence suggests that their neural substrates must be largely shared. This indicates that the difference in neural activity between conscious and unconscious perceptual processing is likely to be subtle and highly specialized. We argue that current experimental evidence about the involvement of specific activity in prefrontal cortex supports the higher order neural theory of consciousness. In consequence, imaging techniques that focus only on marked differences between conscious and unconscious level of activity are likely to be insensitive to the relevant neural activity patterns that underlie conscious experiences. Finally, it follows from the evidence we discuss that the functional advantages of conscious over unconscious perceptual processing may be more limited than commonly thought. (shrink)

Arguably the most foundational principle in perception research is that our experience of the world goes beyond the retinal image; we perceive the distal environment itself, not the proximal stimulation it causes. Shape may be the paradigm case of such “unconscious inference”: When a coin is rotated in depth, we infer the circular object it truly is, discarding the perspectival ellipse projected on our eyes. But is this really the fate of such perspectival shapes? Or does a tilted coin retain (...) an elliptical appearance even when we know it’s circular? This question has generated heated debate from Locke and Hume to the present; but whereas extant arguments rely primarily on introspection, this problem is also open to empirical test. If tilted coins bear a representational similarity to elliptical objects, then a circular coin should, when rotated, impair search for a distal ellipse. Here, nine experiments demonstrate that this is so, suggesting that perspectival shapes persist in the mind far longer than traditionally assumed. Subjects saw search arrays of three-dimensional “coins,” and simply had to locate a distally elliptical coin. Surprisingly, rotated circular coins slowed search for elliptical targets, even when subjects clearly knew the rotated coins were circular. This pattern arose with static and dynamic cues, couldn’t be explained by strategic responding or unfamiliarity, generalized across shape classes, and occurred even with sustained viewing. Finally, these effects extended beyond artificial displays to real-world objects viewed in naturalistic, full-cue conditions. We conclude that objects have a remarkably persistent dual character: their objective shape “out there,” and their perspectival shape “from here.”. (shrink)

Hace unas décadas la filosofía de la cienciaera una disciplina centrada en estudioslógico-lingüísticos y basada en la distinciónentre contexto de justificación y contextode descubrimiento. Sin embargo, hoysabemos que la ciencia es acción humana,por lo que la filosofía de la ciencia tambiénes práctica. De ahí que hoy en día no hayaseparación entre razón teórica y razónpráctica. Un ejemplo de ello es elfalibilismo y la razonabilidad en la filosofíade la ciencia y en la hermenéutica filosófica.Tradicionalmente se ha visto al falibilismocomo una metodología (...) exclusiva de lafilosofía de la ciencia teórica y se ha pensadoque la razonabilidad se refiere a la moral yla política, que son cuestiones de la razónpráctica. Sin embargo, tanto en la filosofíade la ciencia como en la hermenéuticafilosófica, el falibilismo y la razonabilidadse hallan estrechamente relacionados, porlo que no habría separación en dichasdisciplinas en un sentido teórico y práctico.A fin de mostrar lo anterior, presentamoscuatro secciones: en la primera,mostraremos las principales críticas a laseparación entre razón teórica y razónpráctica; en la dos siguientes, abordaremosel falibilismo y la razonabilidad en lafilosofía de la ciencia y en la hermenéuticafilosófica; en la última, trataremos elcarácter predictivo de la razonabilidad enambas disciplinas.A few decades ago, philosophy of sciencewas focused in logical and linguistic studiesand based in the distinction between context of discovery and context of justification. Nowadays we know that science is human action, hence philosophy of science has a practical side that prevents a sharp separation between theoretical and practical reason. Fallibilism and reasonability in philosophy of science and hermeneuticsare an example of such a view. Fallibilism has been considered as amethodology of exclusive use in philosophyof science, while reasonability has been considered as referring to morals and politics which belong to practical reason.However,both in philosophy of science as in hermeneutics fallibilism and reasonability are closely related, hence there is no separation between both disciplines. To illustrate this, I will proceed in four parts.Inthe first one, I discuss the main criticisms to the separation between theoretical and practical reason; in parts two and three, I will consider fallibilism and reasonability in the philosophy of science and the practical reason. In the last part, I will discuss the predictive character of reasonability in both disciplines. (shrink)

Introspection is a fundamental part of our mental lives. Nevertheless, its reliability and its underlying cognitive architecture have been widely disputed. Here, I propose a principled way to model introspection. By using time-tested principles from signal detection theory (SDT) and extrapolating them from perception to introspection, I offer a new framework for an introspective signal detection theory (iSDT). In SDT, the reliability of perceptual judgments is a function of the strength of an internal perceptual response (signal- to-noise ratio) which is, (...) to a large extent, driven by the intensity of the stimulus. In parallel to perception, iSDT models the reliability of introspective judgments as a function of the strength of an internal introspective response (signal-to-noise ratio) which is, to a large extent, driven by the intensity of conscious experiences. Thus, by modelling introspection after perception, iSDT can calibrate introspection’s reliability across a whole range of contexts. iSDT offers a novel, illuminating way of thinking about introspection and the cognitive processes that support it. (shrink)

Aun cuando se plantea que Arendt y Benjamin sostienen posiciones filosófico políticas irreconciliables, nosotros consideramos que existen líneas de confluencia que parten de una crítica a la Modernidad y los llevan a explorar temas como la narración, la narratividad, la autoridad y la legitimidad. En este trabajo me centraré en la visión que cada uno de ellos tiene sobre el Marxismo, sus apropiaciones, así como las derivaciones a las que llegan. Intentaré mostrar que, mientras en Arendt sobresale una crítica al (...) marxismo como parte de la tradición de pensamiento Occidental, en Benjamin derivará en un giro al idealismo y la teología que pasará a ser redención. (shrink)

La palabra “Grimorio” deviene del provenzal “Grammaire noir” traducible como “Gramática negra” o “Gramática de la oscuridad”. Estos son los libros de magia utilizados por brujas y hechiceros desde que el Diablo formó parte de la imaginería popular. Parecería contradictorio que un texto sagrado —siguiendo las ideas de Roger Caillois y James Frazer—, correspondería con la “escrituralidad”: la estructura de su mensaje debería ser puntual y científica; pero hay ejemplos donde no se respeta esto. Dentro de la literatura fantástica hispanoamericana (...) encontramos manuscritos y libros sagrados con una gran carga de oralidad: el argentino Enrique Anderson Imbert con su cuento “El Grimorio” donde, más que una gramática, parece una historia dedicada a alguien. Para este estudio se utilizará la novela corta de Emiliano González: El discípulo; una novela de horror sobrenatural ; donde aparece una versión extraña de un grimorio. La estrategia de análisis parte de los estudios sobre la evolución y uso cotidiano de la lengua de Ignace Gelb, Peter Koch y Wulf Oesterreicher, para determinar si es una cuestión cultural o si es tan solo una curiosidad literaria el deconstruir así un texto sagrado al hacer que tenga elementos orales. ¿Se está reconfigurando o resemantizando el manuscrito como texto sagrado en la literatura mexicana del siglo xx? ¿Se puede llamar a estos escritos “grimorios” aunque no se traten de empastados con las mismas características del grimoire medieval? Estas respuestas esperan dilucidarse a partir de la literatura y de su estudio. (shrink)

Metacognition is the capacity to evaluate the success of one's own cognitive processes in various domains; for example, memory and perception. It remains controversial whether metacognition relies on a domain-general resource that is applied to different tasks or if self-evaluative processes are domain specific. Here, we investigated this issue directly by examining the neural substrates engaged when metacognitive judgments were made by human participants of both sexes during perceptual and memory tasks matched for stimulus and performance characteristics. By comparing patterns (...) of fMRI activity while subjects evaluated their performance, we revealed both domain-specific and domain-general metacognitive representations. Multivoxel activity patterns in anterior prefrontal cortex predicted levels of confidence in a domain-specific fashion, whereas domain-general signals predicting confidence and accuracy were found in a widespread network in the frontal and posterior midline. The demonstration of domain-specific metacognitive representations suggests the presence of a content-rich mechanism available to introspection and cognitive control. (shrink)

Martin Buber believed that life's deepest truth lies in human relationships. In this classic work he puts this belief into practice, applying it to the concrete problems of contemporary society.

Implementing corporate social responsibility (CSR) in supply chains is not a trivial task. In fact, many firms in recent years have publicly proclaimed that in order to keep their CSR commitments, they had to reduce reliance on external suppliers by vertically integrating their operations. Our aim in this article is to examine whether there is truly a relationship between a firm’s CSR performance and its level of vertical integration. Drawing on a multi-industry sample of 2,715 firm-year observations, and after addressing (...) endogeneity concerns, we demonstrate that firms with higher CSR performance tend to vertically integrate more (or, outsource less). We also demonstrate that this tendency is weaker for firms that have higher degrees of asset specificity or international diversification. Our core conclusion is that CSR performance and outsourcing are at odds, but firms can reconcile this tension by deepening their collaborations with suppliers. (shrink)

Studying the neural correlates of conscious awareness depends on a reliable comparison between activations associated with awareness and unawareness. One particularly difficult confound to remove is task performance capacity, i.e. the difference in performance between the conditions of interest. While ideally task performance capacity should be matched across different conditions, this is difficult to achieve experimentally. However, differences in performance could theoretically be corrected for mathematically. One such proposal is found in a recent paper by Lamy, Salti and Bar-Haim [Lamy (...) D, Salti M, Bar-Haim Y. Neural correlates of subjective awareness and unconscious processing: an ERP study. J Cognitive Neurosci 2009,21:1435-46], who put forward a corrective method for an electroencephalography experiment. We argue that their analysis is essentially grounded in a version of High Threshold Theory, which has been shown to be inferior in general to Signal Detection Theory. We show through a series of computer simulations that their correction method only partially removes the influence of perfor- mance capacity, which can yield misleading results. We present a mathematical correction method based on Signal Detection Theory that is theoretically capable of removing performance capacity confounds. We discuss the limitations of mathemati- cally correcting for performance capacity confounds in imaging studies and its impact for theories about consciousness. (shrink)

The present paper has three objectives: Presenting an actualization of a proof of the decidability of monadic predicates logic in the contemporary model theory context; Show examples of decidable and undecidable fragments inside First order logic, offering an original proof of the following theorem: Any formula of First of order logic is decidable if its prenex normal form is in the following form: ∀x1,…,∀xn∃y1,…,∃ymφ; Presenting a theorem that characterizes the validity of First order logic by the tautologicity of Propositional logic, (...) said result is interesting since immediately arises the doubt of how to conciliate said characterization with Alonzo Church’s Undecidability Theorem for First Order Logic. (shrink)

Andres Bonifacio is a household name in the history of the Philippines.His name has been included into many discussion and controversies revolvingover his identity as the Father of the Revolution and being the founder ofKataastaasang, Kagalanggalangag Katipunan . His poems serve as legaciesthat can unlock what kind of person is Andres. Through his poems, he expressedreflections about the situation of the Indios during the time of colonization andthe rage of the revolution. This descriptive study analyzed four selected poemsof Andres Bonifacio (...) and sought to find a new insight into the poems through a Neo-Marxist perspective using a Neo-Marxist lens, specifically the theory of cultural hegemony by Antonio Gramsci. Based on the content analysis of hispoems, it was found out that Bonifacio was affected by the false consciousnesspropagated by the colonizers during the Spanish settlement in the country. Italso answered the question whether Bonifacio is a patriotic man or a nationalistichero. Keywords: Literature, revolution, neo-marxism, poems, Andres Bonifacio, descriptiveresearch, Philippines. (shrink)

By the desiyn with the categories of the Doymatics and the “Theory of Law” of an interfase for legal information retrieval, it will verify the consistence of the theories of legal justification suggested by the Jurisprudence. The verification will be in the congruence of the use of automated legal documentation by judges and lawyers in continental countries in their practice.

This is the first book-length study of Descartes's metaphysics to place it in its immediate historical context, the Late Scholastic philosophy of thinkers such as Suárez against which Descartes reacted. Jorge Secada views Cartesian philosophy as an 'essentialist' reply to the 'existentialism' of the School, and his discussion includes careful analyses and original interpretations of such central Cartesian themes as the role of scepticism, intentionality and the doctrine of the material falsity of ideas, universals and the relation between sense (...) and understanding, causation and the proofs of the existence of God, the theory of substance, and the dualism of mind and matter. His study offers a picture of Descartes's metaphysics that is both novel and philosophically illuminating. (shrink)

Consciousness and confidence seem intimately related. Accordingly, some researchers use confidence ratings as a measure of, or proxy for, consciousness. Rosenthal discusses the potential connections between the two, and rejects confidence as a valid measure of consciousness. He argues that there are better alternatives to get at conscious experiences such as direct subjective reports of awareness (i.e. subjects’ reports of perceiving something or of the degree of visibility of a stimulus). In this chapter, we offer a different perspective. Confidence ratings (...) in general, and metacognitive measures in particular, may offer important advantages over subjective ratings. The arguments we offer here are supported by empirical, practical and socio-strategic considerations. However, we do not suggest consciousness and confidence are interchangeable. We recognize the limitations of confidence ratings in some experimental designs and for some research questions. Nevertheless, we also address a potential conceptual link between consciousness and confidence that stems from Rosenthal’s very own work on mental quality space theory. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:.. MERELY A MAN OF LETTERS" an interview with Jorge Luis Borges* Philosophy and Literature: Why don't you tell us about some of the philosophers who have influenced your work and in whom you have been the most interested? Jorge Luis Borges: Well, I think that's an easy one. You might talk in terms of two: Berkeley and Schopenhauer. But I suppose Hume might be worked in (...) also, because, after all, Hume refutes Berkeley. Really, he comes from Berkeley—even if Berkeley comes from Locke. You might think of Locke, of Berkeley, and of Hume as being three links in an argument..... But I suppose that when someone refutes someone else in philosophy, he is carrying on the argument. P&L: And Schopenhauer? Borges: Schopenhauer is very different from Hume. Of course, Schopenhauer had his idea of the Will. That is not to be found in Hume.... The case of Berkeley was different. I suppose he thought of God as being aware of all things all the time, if I don't get him wrong. If we go away, does this room disappear? No, because God is thinking about it. Now, in the case of Schopenhauer, I was rereading Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, The World as Will and Idea, and I was rather taken aback, or baffled I should say, puzzled by something that keeps on recurring in Schopenhauer. Of course it may have been a slip of the pen, but as he goes back to it, and as he was a very careful writer, I wonder if it is a slip of the pen. For example, Schopenhauer begins by saying that the universe, the stars, the spaces in between, the planets, *On April 14, 1976, two editors of Philosophy and Literature, along with an interested colleague, interviewed Jorge Luis Borges at Michigan State University, where he held a position as visiting professor for the winter term. These remarks are edited from the transcript of that conversation. 337 338Philosophy and Literature this planet, those things, have no existence—except in the mind which perceives them. But then, to my surprise—and I suppose you can explain this to me, since you are philosophers and I am not—what Schopenhauer says is that all those things have no existence except in the brain. And that the universe—I remember these words, I don't think I'm inventing them now—"ist ein Gehirnphänomen," that the world is a cerebral phenomenon. Now, I was baffled. Because, of course, if you think of the universe, I suppose the brain is as much a part of the external world as the stars or the moon. The brain after all is a system of visual, of tactile, perceptions. He keeps on insisting on the brain. I don't think, for example, that Bishop Berkeley insists on the brain, or Hume, who would have insisted on the mind, consciousness. P&L: People sometimes say that they see Berkeley in stories like "Orbis Tertius." Borges: Yes, I suppose they do. Well, of course. But in that story I was led by literary means also. P&L: How do you distinguish the literary from the philosophical means in that story? Could you explain that? Borges: Very easily.... Encyclopedias have been my chief reading. I have always been interested in encyclopedias. I used to go to the Biblioteca National in Buenos Aires—and since I was so shy, I felt I could not cope with asking for a book, so I looked on the shelves for the Encyclopaedia Britannica. I would pick up any chance volume and I would read it. One night I was richly rewarded, because I read all about the Druses, Dryden and the Druids—a treasure trove, no?—all in the same volume, "Dr-." Then I came to the idea of how fine it would be to think of an encyclopedia... a very rigorous one of course, of an imaginary world, where everything should be linked. For example, you would have a language and then a literature, and then a history and so on. Then I thought I would write a story of a fancy encyclopedia. Of course that would require many different people to write it... (shrink)

To find the neural substrates of consciousness, researchers compare subjects’ neural activity when they are aware of stimuli against neural activity when they are not aware. Ideally, to guarantee that the neural substrates of consciousness—and nothing but the neural substrates of consciousness—are isolated, the only difference between these two contrast conditions should be conscious awareness. Nevertheless, in practice, it is quite challenging to eliminate confounds and irrelevant differences between conscious and unconscious conditions. In particular, there is an often-neglected confound that (...) is crucial to eliminate from neuroimaging studies: task performance. Unless subjects’ task performance is matched (and hence perceptual signal processing is matched), researchers risk finding the neural correlates of perception, rather than conscious perception. Here, we discuss the theoretical motivations for the performance matching framework and review empirical demonstrations of, and theoretical inferences derived from, obtaining differences in consciousness while controlling for task performance. We summarize signal detection theoretic modeling frameworks that explain how it is that we can derive performance-matched differences in consciousness without the effect being trivially driven by differences in criterion setting, and also provide principles for designing experimental paradigms that yield performance-matched differences in awareness. Finally, we address potential technical and theoretical issues that stem from matching performance across conditions of awareness, and we introduce the notion of “triangulation” for designing comprehensive experimental sets that can better reveal the neural substrates of consciousness. (shrink)

Can philosophy elaborate a discourse on hope? This question leads the monographic issue of the Rivista Italiana di Filosofia Politica that we introduce in this article. Its intent is to explore the relationship between philosophy and political reality not (only) in the light of a critique of the present, but (also) of a generative variant of the inaugural gesture of thinking.