Ranging from Plato to Marx, one can only find a few philosophers who have talked about money without detesting it. Naturally, economists are avoiding such an attitude. But they deliver only functional definitions, nothing which could give a hint at the essence of money. The essay tries to clarify it by delineating a currency as an ‘ens ficitivum’ – created by our semiotic activities, which have been analysed by Charles Sanders Peirce. So, the thesis is: Money is basically a sign (...) indicating at a present time one’s ability to handle future events. (shrink)

Discussing some aspects of Carl Schmitt’s, Chantal Mouffe’s, Paul Ricoeur’s, and Jacques Rancière’s political theories the paper tries to determine the proper subject of political and social philosophy. To that end the author constructs two terminological oppositions: ‚the social’ versus ‘the society’, ‘the political’ versus ‘politics’. These four nouns form a terminological square which marks the social and the political difference. The social appears when underprivileged people demand a redistribution of wealth and influence, i. e. a reconstruction of a given (...) society. The political emerges when the hidden normative framework of politics comes into vie. Confronting the social and the political difference in this way makes it possible to determine: politics are the matter of the political sciences, the difference between politics and the political, conversely, is the theme of political philosophy; society is the subject of sociology, the difference between the social and any form of society, however, is the issue of social philosophy. (shrink)

The paper tries to contribute to the discussion of the following problem: Nearly every government acts as if it has a natural right to collect taxes – if necessary by force. How legitimate is such an act of expropriation? To find an acceptable solution, three different theories of property are discussed – eventually favouring the Kantian approach. Subsequently, possible vindications of taxation are presented: (1) control of conduct, (2) financing public institutions, (3) reduction of social differences. All three justifications turn (...) out to be de ficient. What remains is John St. Mill's almost forgotten theory; he sees taxes as a sacrifice and, on this account, pleads for a proportional taxation. (shrink)

The paper tries to contribute to the discussion of the following problem: Nearly every government acts as if it has a natural right to collect taxes - if necessary by force. How legitimate is such an act of expropriation? To find an acceptable solution, three different theories of property are discussed - eventually favouring the Kantian approach. Subsequently, possible vindications of taxation are presented: (1) control of conduct, (2) financing public institutions, (3) reduction of social differences. All three justifications turn (...) out to be deficient. What remains is John St. Mill’s almost forgotten theory; he sees taxes as a sacrifice and, on this account, pleads for a proportional taxation. (shrink)

Onto-semiotisch kann man eine Theorie nennen, welche angibt, wo die Zeichen an die Welt anknüpfen. Wittgenstein hat über dieses Problem viel nachgedacht, ohne eine rechte Lösung zu finden. Erforderlich ist eine Konzeption, die beide Arten von Zeichen, Repräsentatoren wie Indikatoren zu vereinigen vermag. An eben dieser Aufgabe scheitert Saussure, dem es nicht gelingt, Mentalismus und Strukturalismus so zu verbinden, daß die Konkurrenz von Repräsentatoren und Indikatoren aufgehoben wird. Dies gelingt Heidegger in Sein und Zeit. Er fundiert die Repräsentationssemiotik so in (...) einer onto-semiotischen Lehre von den Verweisungen, daß schließlich der Weltbezug der Zeichen deutlich wird. (shrink)

Friedrich Nietzsche has emerged as one of the most important and influential modern philosophers. For several decades, the book series Monographien und Texte zur Nietzsche-Forschung (MTNF) has set the agenda in a rapidly growing and changing field of Nietzsche scholarship. The scope of the series is interdisciplinary and international in orientation reflects the entire spectrum of research on Nietzsche, from philosophy to literary studies and political theory. The series publishes monographs and edited volumes that undergo a strict peer-review process. The (...) book series is led by an international team of editors, whose work represents the full range of current Nietzsche scholarship. (shrink)

The Frege point to the effect that e.g. the clauses of conditionals are not asserted and therefore cannot be assertions is often taken to establish a dichotomy between the content of a speech act, which is propositional and belongs to logic and semantics, and its force, which belongs to pragmatics. Recently this dichotomy has been questioned by philosophers such as Peter Hanks and Francois Recanati, who propose act-theoretic accounts of propositions, argue that we can’t account for propositional unity independently of (...) the forceful acts of speakers, and respond to the Frege point by appealing to a notion of force cancellation. I argue that the notion of force cancellation is faced with a dilemma and offer an alternative response to the Frege point, which extends the act-theoretic account to logical acts such as conditionalizing or disjoining. Such higher-level acts allow us to present forceful acts while suspending commitment to them. In connecting them, a subject rather commits to an affirmation function of such acts. In contrast, the Frege point confuses a lack of commitment to what is put forward with a lack of commitment or force in what is put forward. (shrink)

Frege argued for the force-content distinction not only by appealing to the logical and fictional contexts which are most closely associated with the “Frege point", but also based on the fact that an affirmative answer to a yes-no question constitutes an assertion. Supposedly this is only intelligible if the question contains a forceless thought or proposition which an affirmative answer then asserts. Against this I argue that this fact more readily supports the view that questions operate on assertions and other (...) forceful acts themselves. Force is neither added to propositions as on the traditional view, nor is it cancelled as has recently been proposed. Rather higher-level acts such as questioning, but also e.g. conditionalizing, embed and present assertoric or directive acts that are forceful and committal, while suspending commitment to them. The Frege point confounds different varieties of force and the question whether something is merely presented for consideration with the question what is so presented. Force is representational: through assertoric and directive force indicators subjects non-conceptually present positions of theoretical or practical knowledge, while interrogative acts indicate positions of wondering which strive for such knowledge. (shrink)

Raimo Tuomela’s most important contribution to the philosophy of collective intentionality was his development of the notion of the we-mode. In my chapter I extend the notion of we-mode to that of role-mode, the mode in which individual and collective subjects feel, think and act as occupants of roles within groups and institutional structures. I focus on how being in role-mode is manifest in the minds of subjects and on the following points. First, I argue that both we-mode and role-mode (...) are best thought of as further modifications of I-consciousness, respectively we-consciousness. Second, role-mode is further characterized by the fact that subjects will take positions as role occupants that they won’t take as mere individuals, or we-mode group members, or in other roles. Third, such divergences are only possible against a background of agreements between positions taken in different modes. Fourth, such divergences are also grounded in decision making procedures and the accessibility and admissibility of sources of evidence. Fifth, role-mode goes all the way down, that is, it is also manifest in how subjects feel, move and comport themselves when they occupy their roles. To put it into fashionable jargon, it is embodied and enacted. (shrink)

In addition to the Frege point, Frege also argued for the force-content distinction from the fact that an affirmative answer to a yes-no question constitutes an assertion. I argue that this fact more readily supports the view that questions operate on and present assertions and other forceful acts themselves. Force is neither added to propositions as on the traditional view, nor is it cancelled as has recently been proposed. Rather higher level acts such as questioning, but also e.g. conditionalizing, embed (...) assertive or directive acts that are forceful and committal, while suspending commitment to them. The Frege point confounds different varieties of force and the question whether something is merely presented for consideration with the question what is so presented. Force is representational: through assertoric and directive force indicators subjects non-conceptually present positions of theoretical or practical knowledge, while interrogative acts indicate positions of wondering which strive for such knowledge. (shrink)