John Bell showed that a big class of local hidden-variable models stands in conflict with quantum mechanics and experiment. Recently, there were suggestions that empirically adequate hidden-variable models might exist which presuppose a weaker notion of local causality. We will show that a Bell-type inequality can be derived also from these weaker assumptions.

Institute of Theoretical Physics, Exact Sciences Sidlerstrasse 5, University of Bern, CH-3012 Bern Switzerland portmann{at}itp.unibe.ch' + u + '@' + d + ''//--> awuethr{at}itp.unibe.ch' + u + '@' + d + ''//--> John Bell showed that a big class of local hidden-variable models stands in conflict with quantum mechanics and experiment. Recently, there were suggestions that empirically adequate hidden-variable models might exist which presuppose a weaker notion of local causality. We will show that a Bell-type inequality can be derived also (...) from these weaker assumptions. Introduction The EPR-Bohm experiment Local causality Bell's inequality from separate common causes 4.1 A weak screening-off principle 4.2 Perfect correlation and ‘determinism’ 4.3 A minimal theory for spins 4.4 No conspiracy Discussion. (shrink)

Falsification no longer is the cornerstone of philosophy of science; but it still looms widely that scientists ought to drop an explanatory hypothesis in view of negative results. We shall argue that, to the contrary, negative empirical results are unable to disqualify causally explanatory hypotheses—not because of the shielding effect of auxiliary assumptions but because of the fact that the causal irrelevance of a factor cannot empirically be established. This perspective is elaborated at a case study taken from the history (...) of plant physiology: the formaldehyde model of photosynthesis, which for about sixty years dominated the field—despite the fact that in these sixty years all the attempts to conclusively demonstrate even the presence of formaldehyde in plants failed. (shrink)

In his Geography, Ptolemy recorded the geographical coordinates of more than 6,300 toponyms of the known oikoumenē. This study presents the type of geographical information that was used by Ptolemy as well as the methods he applied to derive his geographical coordinates. A new methodological approach was developed in order to analyse the characteristic deviations of Ptolemy’s data from their reconstructed reference locations. The clusters of displacement vectors establish that Ptolemy did not obtain his coordinates from astronomical observations at each (...) geographical location. The characteristic displacement vectors reveal how Ptolemy derived the coordinates: he constructed locations on maps using a compass and ruler, for which he employed a small amount of astronomical reference data and geographical distance information; he made schematic drawings of coastlines, based on textual descriptions of coastal formations; and he situated additional locations within the established framework using reports of travel itineraries. (shrink)

The information technological progress that has been achieved over the last decades has also given the humanities the opportunity to expand their methodological toolbox. This paper explores how recent advancements in natural language processing may be used for research in the history of ideas so as to overcome traditional scholarship's inevitably selective approach to historical sources. By employing two machine learning techniques whose potential for the analysis of conceptual continuities and innovations has never been considered before, we aim to determine (...) the extent to which they can enhance conventional research methods. It will amount to a critical evaluation of how the advantages of computational in-breadth analysis could be combined with the merits of traditional in-depth analysis in a philosophically fruitful way. After a brief technical description, the approach will be applied to an example: the conceptual (dis)continuity between medieval and early modern philosophy. All the challenges encountered during development and application will be carefully evaluated. We will then be able to assess whether these tools and techniques present promising extensions to the methodological toolbox of traditional scholarship, or whether they do not yet have the potential for a task as complex as the analysis of philosophical literature. The present investigation can thus be seen as an experiment on how far one can go with current machine-learning techniques in this area of research. In doing so, it provides important insights and guidance for future advances in the field. (shrink)

In the light of recent discussions we present the main results of our project, the aim of which was to derive a Bell-type inequality from the weakest possible assumptions. A principal outcome of the project is that a Bell-type inequality can be derived from the assumption of separate common causes (Graßhoff, Portmann and Wüthrich 2005), even without the assumption of perfectly anticorrelating event types (Portmann and Wüthrich 2007). We also address the critique that in Graßhoff et al. (2005) we implicitly (...) assume a common common cause (Hofer-Szabó forthcoming). (shrink)

A response to Lindsay Craig's essay, The So-Called Extended Synthesis and Population Genetics.

The sociology of knowledge is faced with a problem of historical temporality that it has carefully avoided up until now. The subject has been avoided or ignored because a discussion of it in depth would run the risk of questioning all modern scientific thought. The problem is that of the concept of absolute time as it is used in evolutionist theory. In this category of theory I include not only social evolutionism, abused for a long time and recently reanimated by (...) the “socio-biologists,” but also biological, paleontological, geological and other types of evolutionism, that is, those qualified as “scientific.”. (shrink)

Gerd Buchdahl; XIV—The Relation Between ‘Understanding’ and ‘Reason’ in the Architectonic of Kant's Philosophy1, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume.

I. Reputed shortcomings of Descartes as philosopher of science.II ‘Knowledge’ in mathematics and in physics. The ‘ontological’ postulates of Descartes's philosophy and philosophy of physics.III. The ‘foundations of dynamics’: ‘Newton's First Law of Motion’ and its status.IV. Descartes's conception of ‘hypothesis’: the competing claims of the ideal of the a priori in physics and the conception of retroductive inference. V. Descartes's notion of ‘analysis’. The distinction between ‘procedure’ and ‘inference’. The notion of ‘induction’ and ‘understanding through models’: ‘Snell's Law of (...) Refraction’. (shrink)

The Leuphana Semester at Leuphana University Lüneburg, together with the module “Science bears responsibility” demonstrate how innovative methods of teaching and learning can be combined with the topic of sustainable development and how new forms of university teaching can be introduced. With regard to module content, it has become apparent that, due to the complexity of the field of sustainability, a single discipline alone is unable to provide analyses and solutions. If teaching in higher education is to adequately deal with (...) this complexity, then it is necessary to develop inter- and transdisciplinary approaches that go beyond a purely specialist orientation. (shrink)

In this volume the author tackles this problem in a rigorous analysis which begins with the general dynamics of living systems and leads the reader step-by-step ...

Simple Heuristics That Make Us Smart invites readers to embark on a new journey into a land of rationality that differs from the familiar territory of cognitive science and economics. Traditional views of rationality tend to see decision makers as possessing superhuman powers of reason, limitless knowledge, and all of eternity in which to ponder choices. To understand decisions in the real world, we need a different, more psychologically plausible notion of rationality, and this book provides it. It is about (...) fast and frugal heuristics--simple rules for making decisions when time is pressing and deep thought an unaffordable luxury. These heuristics can enable both living organisms and artificial systems to make smart choices, classifications, and predictions by employing bounded rationality. But when and how can such fast and frugal heuristics work? Can judgments based simply on one good reason be as accurate as those based on many reasons? Could less knowledge even lead to systematically better predictions than more knowledge? Simple Heuristics explores these questions, developing computational models of heuristics and testing them through experiments and analyses. It shows how fast and frugal heuristics can produce adaptive decisions in situations as varied as choosing a mate, dividing resources among offspring, predicting high school drop out rates, and playing the stock market. As an interdisciplinary work that is both useful and engaging, this book will appeal to a wide audience. It is ideal for researchers in cognitive psychology, evolutionary psychology, and cognitive science, as well as in economics and artificial intelligence. It will also inspire anyone interested in simply making good decisions. (shrink)

Die Arbeit verfolgt die Entwicklung einer Theorie der Wirtschaftskrisen bei Marx und in der politischen Ökonomie des 19. Jahrhunderts. Marx hat die großen Krisen seiner Zeit und ihre Verläufe in umfangreichen, erst jüngst veröffentlichten Studienheften erforscht und in ökonomischen Manuskripten theoretisch verarbeitet. Er wollte die Wiederkehr der Krisen erklären und auch verstehen, wie sie die Welt verändern und was sie über diese aussagen.