Conceptualizing the image of a dancing Supreme Goddess in the Hindu tradition presents a philosophical challenge because it demands a coherent rational reconciliation between her nature as continuously changing into multiple forms and the realm of pure, absolute, never-changing, formless being. Different strategies have been proposed in the history of philosophy in India. This paper analyzes the image of the dancing Goddess as it appears in the Devī Māhātmya and in the Tantric iconography of the Goddess Kālī. An argument is (...) developed to show that Śākta philosophy resolves this tension through a radical non-dualist understanding of the role that a mental image (vikalpa) plays in accessing supreme reality. (shrink)

Like many other discussions regarding the nature of self-awareness in Classical Indian philosophical traditions, the commentators of Patañjali’s Yogaśāstra deployed the metaphor of light or luminosity to defend the position that consciousness is self-reflexive. In this paper I discuss the way the commentarial tradition of Classical Yoga misinterpreted Patañjali’s notion of self-reflexivity and articulate his account of self-awareness based on Vyāsa’s preferred metaphor of space (ākāśa). I also show how Patañjali´s notion of self-awareness could be understood in terms of “spaciousness” (...) by using Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of perception and Dan Zahavi’s studies on the first-person perspective. (shrink)

Each action, each thought is accompanied by one’s own breathing. To breathe is always thought of as an individual act. It is one’s own breathing that keeps us alive and it is one’s own breathing that leaves at the moment of death. Up until recently, it was uncommon to talk about breathing as a shared act, as a relational moment that is created with someone else. Yet, Luce Irigaray’s work calls for the cultivation of breathing to enable our ethical coexistence (...) with the other, and the eighth c. commentary on the Sāṃkhyakārikā, the Yuktidīpikā, relates the vital breath of samāna to the function of sharing. This paper searches for a philosophy of breath, such as the one that Irigaray calls for, that can emerge from a close reading of Indian philosophical sources. I explore the relational aspect of breathing throughout the development of the notion of prāṇa in the Upaniṣads and elucidate the meaning given to the term samāna within the classical Sāṃkhya tradition, unique in the Indian theory of the bodily winds. (shrink)

Classical Sāṃkhya has usually been interpreted as an intellectualist school. Its presumed method for the attainment of liberation is essentially characterized by rational inquiry into reality, which involves the intellectual understanding of the distinction between two principles: the conscious and the material. Some have argued that this liberating process is not only theoretical, but that it entails yogic practice, or that it is the natural outcome of existential forces that tend toward freedom. However, recent studies in Sāṃkhya involving detailed analysis (...) of an anonymous commentary of the Sāṃkhyakārikā, the Yuktidīpikā, suggest a more complex picture. The external functions of the five vital winds in relation to the sources of action and dispositions of being seem to play an important role in the liberating path. In this paper, I review the relation between bhāvas, karmayonis, and the five prāṇas by considering the social, moral, and interpersonal aspects of the five vital winds as described in the Yuktidīpikā. It will be shown how the external functions of prāṇa are related to the moral cultivation of vitality, leading to the enactment and manifestation of dispositions of being that bring about the realization of oneself as a knower in the ethical engagement with others. It is this unique way of understanding prāṇa in the Yuktidīpikā that makes the Sāṃkhya path for liberation something more than a theoretical cognitive method or a spontaneous and predetermined realization of one’s self. (shrink)

This book explores Patan̄jali's Yoga Sütra from a contemporary scholarly perspective. Chapters in this book explore questions regarding its metaphysics, epistemology, and praxis. Contributors to this volume guide us in a philosophical journey through this text that will be of interest to scholars and yoga practitioners alike.

Charles Tilly (1929-2008), sociólogo, historiador y politólogo norteamericano, es un autor imprescindible para la comprensión de la contienda política y el conflicto social. Sus investigaciones muestran cómo las bases sociales organizadas en diversas formas de acción colectiva pueden influir y condicionar la marcha de la historia. Sus estudios sobre las revoluciones, la formación y evolución de los Estados y su teoría de la acción colectiva giran en torno a su gran preocupación: la defensa de derechos ciudadanos y la búsqueda de (...) sistemas políticos atentos a las condiciones de vida de los más débiles. Esta obra presenta la mayor recopilación de reflexiones sobre su trabajo publicada hasta la fecha. Cada capítulo analiza sus textos, sus teorías y diseños metodológicos, y algunos añaden investigación de casos. Este libro ayuda a comprender un tiempo marcado por intensas movilizaciones populares, algunas con consecuencias muy relevantes, como las protestas que se extienden en 2011 desde Túnez a Egipto, Yemen, Libia, Siria, etc.,la llamada "primavera árabe" y distintas movilizaciones en el occidente democrático reclamando más atención a las demandas ciudadanas, como el Movimiento 15 de Mayo (15 M) en España replicado en otros países, las protestas en Grecia, Reino Unido, etc. (shrink)

This book is not only an homage to Charles Tilly, but is a proposal of applying his thought. The authors examine his concepts, theories, and methodological contributions, providing a richer understanding of them. It is an essential guide for anyone interested on the analysis of political change and social conflict.

《古希臘的人學》旨在探討在古代希臘傳統中的人學，相關的問題「人是什麼？」 人是其可見的身體，或還有什麼生命元素使得身體之所以是活著。 早在西元前六世紀開始，古希臘人的理性思辨首先關懷的課題就是人。人所處的究竟是一個什麼樣的物理世界？物理世界中的人又該如何定位？世界與人因而成了哲學探討的兩大主題。 當聚焦、關懷回到人的本身時，與人有關的首推靈魂論，其次是倫理學、政治學等。古希臘時期的靈魂論事實上就是人學，因認知到靈魂是身體（body）的生命原理，無論是從生物學、形上學乃至認識論推衍生命意義之所在 ，都不能捨靈魂而不論。 人的生命僅限在時間內，或還有永恆的面向？人除了生理生命，是否還有倫理、道德和宗教生命？人的自我完滿和完美在時間中達成，或是超越時間有永恆的生命？針對這類問題，作者丁福寧在《古希臘的人學》採取史的角度從 荷馬史詩中流露出的人之概念，及其後哲學理性思辨時期，藉著對一切起源或原理的探討，領悟到人在其身體之外，靈魂是人的生命原理。哲學家對原理和生命概念的詮釋均不同，連帶對「人是什麼？」這最基本問題的詮釋也不 同。亞理斯多德的全人概念，及其後的基督宗教思想，共同奠定了西方人學的基礎。 本書《古希臘的人學》主要研究，古代希臘人不僅關心人在這世界中的生活，如何渡合乎倫理、道德的生活。希臘人肯定人在身體死亡後，靈魂在另一個世界繼續存在。人死亡後的生命是以他在這世界中的生活作為衡量，人的理 想是相似神。人的身體屬於會毀滅的世界，理性則屬於神聖、不朽的世界。靈魂不朽不只是單純的宗教信仰，柏拉圖及亞理斯多德分別以不同的方式從理性的形上本性論證靈魂不朽。從某種角度而言，到了西元前四世紀，希臘人 所建立的人學不是封閉在時間、空間的人學體系，而是向著永恆、無限開放的人學體系。這種人學思想奠定往後所有世紀哲學家人學反省的典範。.

In this paper, we address the model of global attractor formulated in the form of evolution differential inclusions with second order in Banach spaces. Firstly, based on the fixed point theorem, the existence result of mild solutions is deduced. Then, by implementing the measure of noncompactness, the existence of global attractor associated with m -semiflow is validated. Finally, a concrete application of the main result is demonstrated to enhance the practical signification.

Here, we report on a quasi-experimental study to explore the applicability and perceived benefits of the CRAFT program, which is based on mindfulness, yoga, positive psychology, and emotional intelligence, to improve higher education student musicians’ health and well-being during the lockdown. A subset of student musicians at a Higher Conservatory of Music in Spain followed the CRAFT program during the academic year 2019/2020, 1 h per week as part of their curriculum. Students enrolled in CRAFT-based elective subjects formed the CRAFT (...) program group, while other students represented the control group. The onset of the national lockdown elicited by the COVID-19 pandemic occurred halfway through the program, which was subsequently delivered in an online format. We administered an online survey to explore the effect that the exposure to the CRAFT program had in terms of how participants dealt with various health and well-being concerns arising from the COVID-19 lockdown. There was a significantly higher proportion of proactive participants in the CRAFT program group, 92%, than in the control group, 58%, in terms of implementing practices to improve their health and well-being during the lockdown. Additionally, significantly more participants acknowledged perceived benefits from their practices in the CRAFT program group, 78%, than in the control group, 52%. Among proactive participants, yoga/meditation was the most implemented in the CRAFT program group, followed by exercise, and other yoga/meditation practices, whereas in the control group, exercise and Alexander technique-based practices were the most applied. In the CRAFT program group, the highest rate of perceived benefits was from yoga/meditation CRAFT-based practices, 51%, followed by exercise, 32%, and other yoga/meditation practices, 27%, whereas in the control group, benefits were reported by 29% of exercising participants and 16% for those having practiced the Alexander technique. A similar pattern was observed when excluding participants with previous yoga/meditation experience. This study revealed how participants can independently apply learned skills from the CRAFT program in response to a naturally occurring life event of unprecedented global impact, suggesting that previous exposure to mindfulness and yoga is likely to have a beneficial effect on how young adults react towards exceptionally stressful conditions. (shrink)

El artículo busca presentar las reflexiones acerca de la conciencia interna del tiempo de Edmund Husserl, compiladas en las Lecciones de fenomenología de la conciencia del tiempo de 1928, a la luz del retrato que hace Borges del personaje del cuento Funes el memorioso. Intenta mostrar cómo es que en ambos casos están presentes los mismos cuestionamientos acerca de nuestra experiencia del tiempo y de la persistencia de nuestra identidad en la memoria, y cómo ambas concepciones implican una crítica (...) al atomismo moderno y al empirismo radical. Primero se analizan, por un lado, las descripciones fenomenológicas de Husserl acerca de nuestra percepción de los objetos y, principalmente,del concepto de retención, y por el otro, la conciencia entendida como flujo. Luego, a partir de la caracterización que hace Borges de Funes, el personaje del cuento, y del retrato de su memoria y de la manera como experimenta el mundo a través de la percepción de instantes infinitos, se pretende ilustrar la validez de las concepciones husserlianas arriba mencionadas, dando cuenta de que Funes constituye la representación o puesta en escena de un imposible. (shrink)

Článek nabízí kritickou reflexi způsobů, jimiž se filozofie snaží zajistit a zprostředkovat vědění o sobě samé, svých dějinách a klíčových problémech. Podrobně se věnuje procesům redukce a explikace, které jsou nedílnou součástí tohoto úsilí. S pomocí mnoha konkrétních příkladů ukazuje jejich úskalí a vzájemnou provázanost.

L'éloge funèbre chez les Romains.--Le philosophe Carnéade à Rome.--Les consolations dans l'antiquité.--L'examine de conscience chez les anciens.--Un chrétien devenu paĭen.--Un paĭen devenu chrétien.

What is reductionism? -- Who is reading the book of life? -- Genetics : from grammar to meaning making -- A point for thought : why are organisms irreducible? -- A point for thought : does the genetic system include a meta-language? -- Immunology : from soldiers to housewives -- A point for thought : immune specificity and Brancusi's kiss -- A point for thought : reflections on the immune self -- Meaning making in language and biology -- A point (...) for thought : meaning : bridging the gap between physics and semantics -- The rest is silence -- The polysemy of the sign : a quantum lesson -- Recursive-hierarchy : a lesson from the tardigrade -- Context and memory : a lesson from funes the memorious -- Transgradience : a lesson from Bakhtin -- The poetry of living. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Kant's DogDavid E. Johnson (bio)In a certain way, it is always too late to pose the question of time.—Jacques Derrida, Margins of PhilosophyIt is well known that Kant was notorious in Königsberg for his strict adherence to routine; he was so regular, Ernst Cassirer reports, that the citizens of Königsberg were able to set their clocks by his movements.1 The most public articulation of this regularity was his daily (...) walk through the city. It is doubtful Kant took a dog along on his constitutional; nevertheless, at the moment in the Critique of Pure Reason that he determines the possibility of the conceptualization of sense perception, which Heidegger considered the very heart of Kant's critical project and which ultimately turns on the regulation of the synthesis of time,2 Kant trots out man's best friend. Although he needs this dog in order to demonstrate the trick of temporal synthesis that makes any sensible conceptuality possible, it is also clear that he needs to keep this dog on a tight leash; he cannot afford to let it run off or go astray. On one reading, then, the Critique of Pure Reason institutes a sort of philosophical leash law. Indeed, Kant holds the dog so tightly that it is always already a dead dog—philosophical roadkill.In literature there is perhaps no more memorable instance of the problem of conceptuality than Jorge Luis Borges's "Funes el memorioso." Within that text, the key moment is the unforgettable example of Ireneo Funes's particular observation of the manifold that others reduce to a dog: "Not only was it difficult for him to see that the generic symbol 'dog' took in all the dissimilar individuals of all shapes and sizes, it irritated him that the 'dog' of three-fourteen in the afternoon, seen in profile, should be indicated by the same noun as the dog at three-fifteen, seen frontally" [Collected Fictions [End Page 19] 136].3 For Funes the inability to synthesize the manifold of experience under a general concept also contaminates the possibility of self-recognition: "His own face in the mirror, his own hands, surprised him every time he saw them" [Collected Fictions 136].4 His surprise at his face and hands as much as his frustration at the generic concept "dog" must be read within the context of Funes's rejection of Locke's suggestion of a rigorously particular language: "In the seventeenth century, Locke postulated (and condemned) an impossible language in which each individual thing—every stone, every bird, every branch—would have its own name; Funes once contemplated a similar language, but discarded the idea as too general, too ambiguous" [Collected Fictions 136].5 In Funes's account, the untenability of Locke's language does not lie in the impossibility of a language grounded upon absolute singularity; he does not argue, for example, that even the most radical empiricism must ultimately depend upon the possibility of ideality. Rather, he argues that insofar as it does not account for the temporal difference of the same from itself, such a language is always already too general.6 In short, "every individual thing, every rock, every bird, every branch," in Funes's eyes, are each and every one more than one. The dog at 3:14 seen in profile is not the same dog when seen at 3:15 in full frontal view. For Funes, the possibility of identity conceived as self-identity and, accordingly, as self-possession over time, is suspended. My face and hands are always different from themselves; they always surprise me; thus they are not mine. In Signs of Borges Sylvia Molloy remarks that Funes's attempt to construct a rigorously particular language can only be "sustained by Funes' attention" and that the words of such a language "finally make sense only to him. Indeed, all that holds them together... is Funes himself" [118, emphasis added]. On Molloy's account, the singularity of Funes's language, grounded as it is only in Funes himself, explains "the narrator's inability to reproduce" it [118]. Yet, Molloy fails to read the maximal effect of Funes's radical empiricism: namely, the... (shrink)

This article analyzes the meaning and philosophical scope of «Funes el memorioso», a short story by J.L.Borges. «Funes el memorioso» participates in the productive symbiosis between literature and philosophy, a characteristic which is evident in most of Borges’ work and which has taken Borge’s creations to the summit of Western culture. Furthermore, by reading «Funes el memorioso» we can draw connections between the work of J.L.Borges and some of the most important authors in the History of Philosophy. (...) We try to show that the epistemologies of Plato and Hume, authors that Borges knew perfectly, influenced the creation of this short story in a decisive manner. (shrink)

La filosofía ha encontrado en la literatura de Jorge Luis Borges un ámbito único para reflexionar en torno de sus propios problemas. En este ensayo examinaré las tensiones y contradicciones que afloran dentro del paradigma metafísico de la inmediación y de la intuición. El cuento de «Funes, el memorioso» ofrece la ocasión para pensar en la imposibilidad del hombre de afirmar un sistema de signos o una facultad perceptiva que ignore el inexorable resto que guarde la diferencia entre lo (...) real y lo representado. Una vida humana que se afirme en el ideal de un saber absoluto, de una visión ininterrumpida, es finalmente funesta. El hombre vive de las mediaciones y de las interrupciones, recuerda porque olvida, despierta porque sueña, conoce porque ignora: mira porque tiene párpados. (shrink)

We are accustomed to thinking that a primrose is "concrete" and a prime number is "abstract," that "roundness" is more abstract than "round," and that "property" is more abstract than "roundness." In reality, the relation between "abstract" and "concrete" is more like the (non)relation between "abstract" and "concave," "concrete" being a sensory term [about what something feels like] and "abstract" being a functional term (about what the sensorimotor system is doing with its input in order to produce its output): Feelings (...) and things are correlated, but otherwise incommensurable. Everything that any sensorimotor system such as ourselves manages to categorize successfully is based on abstracting sensorimotor "affordances" (invariant features). The rest is merely a question of what inputs we can and do categorize, and what we must abstract from the particulars of each sensorimotor interaction in order to be able to categorize them correctly. To categorize, in other words, is to abstract. And not to categorize is merely to experience. Borges's Funes the Memorious, with his infinite, infallible rote memory, is a fictional hint at what it would be like not to be able to categorize, not to be able to selectively forget and ignore most of our input by abstracting only its reliably recurrent invariants. But a sensorimotor system like Funes would not really be viable, for if something along those lines did exist, it could not categorize recurrent objects, events or states, hence it could have no language, private or public, and could at most only feel, not function adaptively (hence survive). Luria's "S" in "The Mind of a Mnemonist" is a real-life approximation whose difficulties in conceptualizing were directly proportional to his difficulties in selectively forgetting and ignoring. Watanabe's "Ugly Duckling Theorem" shows how, if we did not selectively weight some properties more heavily than others, everything would be equally (and infinitely and indifferently) similar to everything else. Miller's "Magical Number Seven Plus or Minus Two" shows that there are (and must be) limitations on our capacity to process and remember information, both in our capacity to discriminate relatively (detect sameness/difference, degree-of-similarity) and in our capacity to discriminate absolutely (identify, categorize, name), The phenomenon of categorical perception shows how selective feature-detection puts a Whorfian "warp" on our feelings of similarity in the service of categorization, compressing within-category similarities and expanding between-category differences by abstracting and selectively filtering inputs through their invariant features, thereby allowing us to sort and name things reliably. Language does allow us to acquire categories indirectly through symbolic description.... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Borges Forgets NietzscheClancy MartinHow little moral would the world appear without forgetfulness! A poet could say that God has placed forgetfulness as a doorkeeper on the threshold of human dignity.—Nietzsche, Human, All-Too-HumanIn his short story "Funes, the Memorious," Jorges Luis Borges writes of his singular nineteen-year-old hero, Funes: "He was, let us not forget, almost incapable of general, platonic ideas. It was not only difficult for him (...) to understand that the generic term dog embraced so many unlike specimens of differing sizes and differing forms; he was disturbed by the fact that a dog at three-fourteen (seen in profile) should have the same name as the dog at three-fifteen (seen in front)." And he goes on to say that "... he was not very capable of thought. To think is to forget a difference, to generalize, to abstract. In the overly replete world of Funes there were nothing but details, almost contiguous details" (pp. 42–43).1 About a century earlier, in 1872, in a passage from his famous unpublished essay "On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense," Friedrich Nietzsche wrote: "Just as it is certain that one leaf is never totally the same as another, so it is certain that the concept "leaf" is formed by arbitrarily discarding these individual differences and by forgetting the distinguishing aspects... Every concept arises from the equation of unequal things... We obtain the concept, as we do the form, by overlooking what is individual and actual; whereas nature is acquainted with no forms and no concepts, and likewise with no species, but only with an X which remains inaccessible and undefinable for us."2 [End Page 265]From this and other passages, mostly in "On Truth and Lies," Nietzsche scholars have derived Nietzsche's much-debated (or so-called, depending on who you talk to) "theory of perspectivism." This is the idea that, roughly speaking, "truths" about the world are at best truths uttered from the perspective of some knower, who inevitably brings to world (and thus, to those truths) a particular way of looking at things, of seeing some details and excluding others, of valuing some aspects of the world more than others, etc.I will not be addressing the well-known problems of Nietzsche's theory of perspectivism (if indeed he had such a truth-theory).3 What interests me here is something most scholars have ignored about Nietzsche's perspectivism,4 and what Borges tries to illuminate in his strange little fable: the importance of forgetting to thinking and the difficulties memory may present to one who would think about "truth" as something more than "an impossible idiom in which each individual object, each stone, each bird and branch [has] an individual name" (p. 42). For Nietzsche, and for Borges writing under Nietzsche's influence, the human facts about forgetting and remembering illustrate that our epistemological projects are much more psychological than some philosophers would like to admit. Once we acknowledge the deeply psychological character of those projects, we see that they may not be "truth" projects at all, but rather psychologically valuable (perhaps even necessary) projects of strategic falsification.IThe "absent-minded" narrator of Borges's story tells us that he is adding his own tale to a collection of testimonials to Funes, as part of the project "that all those who knew him should write something about him" (pp. 35–36). Thus the play of words in the title: "Funes" is "memorious" not just because of the accident that results in his amazing and infallible memory, but also because this text is part of a larger memorial. A relationship between memory and knowing from a particular perspective is introduced immediately: Funes will be known and remembered through the gathering of many individual memorials to him. None of these testimonies will be "objective" or "impartial": all of them will necessarily preserve the perspective of the particular individual who is recalling Funes. As the narrator of our memorial confesses, his own efforts will be impoverished by "the deplorable fact of my being an Argentinian... when the theme is a Uruguayan" (p. 35). [End Page 266]Our narrator offers three... (shrink)

Samuel Beckett and Jorge Luis Borges have presented 20th century literature with a distinctive gallery of solitary figures who suffer from a series of physiological ailments: invalidism, decrepitude, infirmity and blindness, as well as neurological conditions such as amnesia and autism spectrum disorders. Beckett and Borges were concerned with the dynamics between illness and creativity, the literary representation of physical and mental disabilities, the processes of remembering and forgetting, and the inevitability of death. This article explores the depiction of physically (...) and mentally disabled characters in Borges' Funes the Memorious (1942)—a story about an Uruguayan gaucho who has been left paralysed after a fall from a horse which simultaneously endowed him with an infallible memory and perception—and Beckett's Trilogy: Molloy (1951), Malone Dies (1951) and The Unnamable (1953). It examines the prodigious memory of Funes and the forgetful minds of Molloy and Malone with reference to influential neuropsychological studies such as Alexander Luria's twofold exploration of memory and forgetfulness in The Mind of a Mnemonist (1968) and The Man with a Shattered World (1972). The article demonstrates that in contrast to Beckett's amnesiacs and Luria's brain-damaged patient, who are able to transcend their circumstances through cathartic writing, Borges' and Luria's mnemonic prodigies fail to achieve anything significant with their unlimited memories and remain imprisoned within their cognitive disabilities. It reveals that medical discourses can provide invaluable insights and lead to a deeper understanding of the minds and bodily afflictions of literary characters. (shrink)

El escándalo mayor para Borges es el tiempo y ante ese horror, sólo cabe para él construir un universo apoyado en la intuición metafísica de que el tiempo es una ilusión. Si la verdad pertenece al mundo de las ideas como para Platón, el tiempo adquirirá su sentido en función de la enternidad, si no tendremos que pensar que la eternidad es sólo una imagen cuyo soporte es el tiempo. En el trabajo se analizan dos obras La muerte vivida, El (...) inmortal donde Borges pone de relieve el carácter dramático de su concepción del tiempo, como circularidad y se comenta Funes el memorioso en que se establece la relación entre ese tipo de temporalidad y la memoria. Borges presenta a Funes como un superhombre al estilo nietzscheano que cae en el mayor error que puede caer el superhombre, tener memoria. Un tiempo circular es un tiempo sin memoria, pero Funes no es un auténtico superhombre, para él, el recuerdo sigue manteniendo esa estructura temporal que se manifiesta en la descripción. (shrink)

De 1806 à 1822 une discussion est entamée par trois ecclésiastiques hispaniques éclairés, Funes, Mier et Llorente, autour de l’Apologie de Las Casas, lue par l’abbé Grégoire en 1800, qui dégageait le vigoureux défenseur des Indiens de toute responsabilité dans la traite des Noirs. Si la publication en 1875 de l’Historia de las Indias a donné a posteriori raison sur le fond à Grégoire, son raisonnement ne doit pas, à la lecture des propos des débatteurs, être complètement pris pour (...) argent comptant. C’est de manière abusive et contradictoire que Grégoire taxe l’historien Herrera de malveillance et de légèreté. De plus, les silences publics de Las Casas, comme son Historia Apologetica longtemps inédite, accréditent aussi certaines objections de Funes et de Llorente. Between 1806 and 1822 three enlightened Hispanic clergymen, Funes, Mier, and Llorente, opened a debate about the Apology of Las Casas read by Father Grégoire in 1800, a text which denied to the energetic advocate of the Indians any responsibility in black slave trade. Although the publication of the Historia de las Indias in 1875 proved Grégoire essentially right, close reading of the discussions of the three debaters shows that his argument should not be taken at face value. In an improper and contradictory way Grégoire accuses the historian Herrera of ill will and thoughtlessness. Moreover, Las Casas’ public silence, like his Historia Apologetica which remained unpublished for a long time, also substantiated some objections from Funes and Llorente. (shrink)

Durante las últimas décadas del siglo XIX y las primeras del siglo XX, el paradigma higienista se constituyó en una de las principales influencias para determinar políticas en pos de la construcción de un proyecto de país y de una ciudadanía homogénea desde el parámetro de la civilización. El objetivo de este artículo será indagar la forma en la que el higienismo como política, paradigma y disciplina se instaló como el conocimiento autorizado para mejorar las condiciones de salud de la (...) población, dentro de los Territorios Nacionales de la Patagonia, en particular en escuelas ubicadas dentro de territorios mapuche entre 1900 y 1940. Para realizar este análisis, serán retomadas las crónicas de dos maestros, Luis Funes y Luis Feldman Josín, que fueron destinados a parajes con población indígena en la región patagónica. Por otra parte, analizaremos los efectos de la interacción de estos discursos con otros disponibles en la mitad del siglo XX a partir de los cuales se interpelaba a los sujetos indígenas, como, por ejemplo, aquellos que postulaban la dicotomía entre "civilización - barbarie”. Y, finalmente, caracterizamos los contrapuntos entre el establecimiento de las normativas a nivel nacional y la particularidad de su gestión en la Patagonia. (shrink)

As I'm a writer, I'll begin with a story. It's not, I'm sorry to say, one of my own – I wish it were – but it is very philosophical. It's by the great blind Argentinian, Jorge Luis Borges, and it's called ‘Funes the Memorious’. Somewhere in a marshy province of Uruguay, Borges comes across a young man called Funes who has gone into an extraordinary mental state after a crippling fall from a horse. He is quite unable (...) to forget anything that has ever happened to him in his physical or mental life. He ‘not only remembered every leaf on every tree of every wood, but even every one of the times he had perceived or imagined it’ – and with exceptional vividness. In an attempt to manage this colossal burden, Funes thinks about classifying and reducing his memories to some practical order. But ‘two considerations dissuaded him: the thought that the task was interminable, and the thought that it was useless. He knew that at the hour of his death he would scarcely have finished classifying even all the memories of his childhood.’. (shrink)

Half a century after Halbwachs laid the foundations of a sociology of memory, a new edition of his work Les cadres sociaux de la mémoire has allowed scholars both to understand it more fully and to appreciate its limitations. This article attempts to elucidate the problem of collective memory, distinguishing different forms of memory in the state and civil society. In this dialectic between state and society, collective memory is constructed. This is the main hypothesis of the article. The author (...) uses Fromm’s classic work on Mexican peasants as well as Borges’s Funes the Memorious. Both texts – one socio-psychoanalytic, the other literary – illustrate forms of social memory, its achievements and its limitations. (shrink)