The Commentary on Plato's Parmenides by Proclus is the most important extant document on the interpretation of this enigmatic dialogue in antiquity, and has had a crucial influence on all subsequent readings. In Proclus' Commentary, the Parmenides provides the argumentative and conceptual framework for a scientific theology wherein all mythological discourse about the gods can be integrated. Its exposition was therefore the culmination of the curriculum of the Platonic school. This theological reading of the Parmenides persisted, through the medium of (...) Ficino, until the nineteenth century. Previously this important text was only accessible in the edition of V. Cousin. This new critical edition is based on an exhaustive study of both the Greek tradition and the medieval Latin translation. (shrink)

IN THE DISCUSSION on education in the Republic, Socrates lays down the principles which those who speak about the gods must follow if they want to avoid the errors of traditional mythology. The first typos of this rational theology is this: "God is the cause, not of all things, but only of the good." For "God, being good, cannot be responsible for everything happening in our life, as is commonly believed, but only for a small part. For we have a (...) far smaller share of good than of evil, and while God must be held to be the sole cause of good, we must look for some other factors than God as cause of the evil." Rightly celebrated, this passage has set the agenda for ages of reflection in Western thought on the cause of evil. In contrast to traditional mythology where the gods are seen as the origin of both good and evil--as Homer says, "Zeus has two jars standing on the floor of his palace, full of fates, good in one and evil in the other"--the divinity is now freed of all responsibility for evil. God, who is entirely good, can only be the cause of well-being. If this answer sets God free of all responsibility for evil, it seems to be at the cost of limiting God's power: for God is no longer responsible for "most things in human life," since most of them are evil. What, then, may be the cause or causes of evil? Do bad things have a cause? Or do they just happen? Plato's formulation seems to suggest that he favours a dualistic solution to the problem of evil: God is the cause of all good, but for evil we have to find other causes. What could those causes be: matter, cosmic necessity, an evil soul? Various answers of this type were developed in later Platonism and in later mythological philosophies. Without denying that Plato often uses a dualistic discourse and uses elements of it in his cosmology, I do think that Plato had something different in mind. After all, he was not primarily interested in the problem of theodicy. For in this passage of the Republic, he is not concerned with the problem of evil in the universe as a whole, which is really the theodicy question, but with evil in "human life," that is, evil insofar as human beings experience it and suffer from it: the fact that we are not at all living well but are instead miserable and unhappy. (shrink)

This appears in a supplementary issue of the Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies, entitled "Ancient Approaches to Plato's Timaeus.".

Although the treatise presented here is most interesting, it was never widely disseminated. As far as we know, it is preserved only in Latin, in one manuscript. The text poses many questions. Who produced a copy of the text? Who is the translator? Is the treatise a genuine work of Averroes? And if so, what was his intention in writing this monograph on the First Cause?

Critical Edition of Henricus Bate’s translation of Ibn Ezra’s Book of the World, which deals with the astrological prediction and interpretation of political events and with weathe...

How can evil exist in a world governed by providence? That is the main question addressed in this chapter. To answer it, the author first sets out Proclus’ defence of providence, which combines the gods’ transcendence with their sharing goodness. The next step is to show that despite providence, evils have reality as well. There is, however, no substance or principle of evil, and only human and irrational souls and material bodies are susceptible to it. Evil’s having a ‘parhypostasis’ is (...) explained as its existing upon and alongside real existents; uncaused because a result of weakness, not power; not pure privation because parasitic on good existents, and hence a ‘subcontrary’ of the good. Finally, the author returns to the relation between providence and evil, showing that bodily evil fits the good of the universe, and that providence will punish evil souls in due course. (shrink)

This volume is a study of the influence of Timaeus on the development of Western cosmology in three axial periods of European culture: Late Antiquity, Middle Ages and Renaissance.

From an epistemological viewpoint, the Forms constitute the objects of true knowledge. From an ontological point of view, they are the principles that underlie the order of the universe.

The volumes of the 'Symposium Aristotelicum' have become the obligatory reference works for all studies on Aristotle. In this eighteenth volume a distinguished group of scholars offers a chapter-by-chapter study of the first book of Aristotle's Metaphysics. Book Alpha is not just a fundamental text for reconstructing the early history of Greek philosophy; it sets the agenda for Aristotle's own project of wisdom after what he had learned from his predecessors. The volume comprises eleven chapters, each dealing with a different (...) section of the text, a new edition of the Greek text, based on an exhaustive examination of the complex manuscript and indirect tradition, and an introduction which offers new insights into the relation between the two divergent traditions of the text. (shrink)

Averroès, musulman andalou du XIIe siècle, discute le " De anima " d'Aristote dans une approche rationalisante du rapport entre religion et philosophie, entre étude de la vérité révélée et surnaturelle, et étude démonstrative de l'univers. La béatitude spirituelle de l'homme est décrite dans le Coran. En philosophie, elle serait l'union de son intellect à l'intellect agent universel.

Throws light on the particular renewal of the theological and philosophical tradition which Henry of Ghent brought about and elucidates various aspects of his metaphysics and epistemology ethics, and theology.

Over the last decades, the Commissio Leonina has built up a very strong reputation. Editions such as theSentencia libri De anima and the Sentencia libri de sensu et sensato by R.-A. Gauthier or the commentaries on Boethius by P.-M. Gils, L.-J. Bataillon and C.A. Grassi have set new philological standards, not only because of their fine critical introductions and excellent reconstructions of Thomas Aquinas’ texts, but also because of their rich and accurate apparatus fontium. It may be doubted, however, whether (...) the present edition of De spiritualibus creaturis by Father J. Cos lives up to the same high standards. (shrink)

Essays on key moments in the intellectual history of the West This book forms a major contribution to the discussion on fate, providence and moral responsibility in Antiquity, the Middle Ages and Early Modern times. Through 37 original papers, renowned scholars from many different countries, as well as a number of young and promising researchers, write the history of the philosophical problems of freedom and determinism since its origins in pre-socratic philosophy up to the seventeenth century. The main focus points (...) are classic Antiquity (Plato and Aristotle), the Neoplatonic synthesis of late Antiquity (Plotinus, Proclus, Simplicius), and thirteenth-century scholasticism (Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent). They do not only represent key moments in the intellectual history of the West, but are also the central figures and periods to which Carlos Steel, the dedicatary of this volume, has devoted his philosophical career. (shrink)

Ambrosianus B 165 sup., a 14th-cent. Constantinopolitan manuscript containing Proclus' In Parmenidem, was once owned by the Cardinal Bessarion, who has read, corrected and annotated the text with remarkable care. In this contribution, we provide an analysis of Bessarion's work on this manuscript, thus offering a case-study of his philological method. We also discuss some quotations from this text in Bessarion's works, which testify to the importance of his knowledge of Proclus for his own writings. In addition, Bessarion's Greek scholia (...) on books II and III of Proclus' commentary are edited here for the first time. (shrink)

t. 1. Livres I à IV -- t. 2. Livres V à VII et Notes marginales de Nicolas de Cues.

He also protected higher causes from responsibility by saying that evil may result from a combination of goods. Proclus objects: evil is real, and not the mere privation of form. Rather, it is a parasite feeding off good. Parasites have no proper cause, and higher beings are thus vindicated as being the causes only of the good off which evil feeds."--BOOK JACKET.

Dans ce volume considérable, on été réunies les contributions d'un Congrès international tenu à Louvain en 1998 pour marquer l'achèvement de la première édition de la Théologie Platonicienne de Proclus. Ces contributions, toutes rigoureusement centrées sur la Théol. Plat. concernent (1) les principes et les sources de la Théol. plat. (2) Les méthodes théologiques de Proclus (3) La postérité de la Théol. plat. dans le monde grec, païen comme chrétien, et dans le monde islamique. Des indices très détaillés permettent de (...) retrouver tous les passages cités et commentés dans ce volume. (shrink)

The volumes of the 'Symposium Aristotelicum' have become the obligatory reference works for all studies on Aristotle. In this eighteenth volume a distinguished group of scholars offers a chapter-by-chapter study of the first book of Aristotle's Metaphysics. Aristotle presents here his philosophical project as a search for wisdom, which is found in the knowledge of the first principles allowing us to explain whatever exists. As he shows, the earlier philosophers had been seeking such a wisdom, though they had divergent views (...) on what these first principles were. Before Aristotle sets out his own views, he offers a critical examination of his predecessors' views, ending up with a lengthy discussion of Plato's doctrine of the Forms. Book Alpha is not just a fundamental text for reconstructing the early history of Greek philosophy; it sets the agenda for Aristotle's own project of wisdom after what he had learned from his predecessors. (shrink)

Wie sich die Augen der Nachteule zum Tageslicht verhalten, so die Vernunft unserer Seele zu dem was, seiner Natur nach am offenbarsten ist. Dieser Vergleich des Aristoteles am Anfang der Metaphysik (II, 993b9-11) hat in der mittelalterlichen Philosophie Anlass gegeben zu verschiedenen Interpretationen. Was hier zur Diskussion steht, ist die Frage, ob dem Menschen eine Erkenntnis dessen moglich ist, was sich der sinnlichen Wahrnehmung entzieht. Kann der Geist, der mit dem Korper verbunden ist, die substantiae separatae erkennen, die ersten Ursachen (...) dieser Welt, die selbst diese physische Ordnung uberschreiten. Es ist die scholastische Version der modernen Frage nach der Moglichkeit der Metaphysik. In dieser Lectio Albertina untersucht Carlos Steel am Beispiel der Interpretation des Nachtvogel-Gleichnisses, wie unterschiedlich Thomas und Albert die Frage nach der erkenntnistheoretischen Grundlage der Metaphysik beantwortet haben. Die Differenz zwischen beide Positionen wird auch die spatere Diskussion bis in die Renaissance kennzeichen. (shrink)

In Summa log., I, 5-8 and Quodlib., V, 10-11 Ockham formulates the semantic that lies behind the syntactical distinction between abstract and concrete names and describes the different modes of signification corresponding to them. Sometimes concrete and abstract names stand for different things. For example, 'whiteness' signifies a quality inhering in a subject, whereas 'white' signifies the subject exhibiting that quality and, obliquely, the quality itself. There is a temptation to conclude from such cases that all abstract and concrete names (...) function in the same way. This interpretation, however, seems to imply a 'Platonic' ontology by accepting the existence of universal forms in re. To avoid this conclusion, O. contends that, in the category of substance, abstract and concrete terms are synonymous and simply signify the same thing. Thus nothing is signified by the term ' man' which is not also signified by 'humanity' and vice versa. If we do not take into account that abstract terms may incorporate some syncategorematic elements not included in concrete terms, we must grant that the proposition „man is humanity” is literally true, and we have to reject propositions such as „humanity is in man” or „Socrates is man by his humanity”. For this individual cannot be understood as a bare substrate sustaining a universal essence. Nevertheless, even though this is true from a philosophical standpoint, secundum veritatem fidei it would be false to say that ' man' and ' humanity' are synonymous. As a matter of fact, in theological language these terms can stand for different things. Here a distinction is made between 'humanity' signifying human nature and 'man' which signifies the same nature but connotes also something about the sustenance of that nature. This distinction must be rejected in the case of Socrates. Here humanity coincides with man so that the proposition „Socrates is a substrate sustaining a human nature” is false. But the same proposition is true when it is said of the divine Person united with the human nature in Christ. It follows that O. accepts in theology a semantic distinction between abstract and concrete names and also the existence of an essence different from the subject, both of which he opposes from a philosophical standpoint. He schrinks from applying his original logical insights to the theological dogmas which are often formulated in terms that involve a realistic ontology of essences. But even when he limits the results of his semantic analysis to the realm of pure philosophy, it seems difficult to maintain the equivalence in signification of abstract and concrete names. (shrink)

La logique spécifique des jugements de valeur est à chercher dans le discours rhétorique. Cette thèse développée par Ch. Perelman dans L'Empire rhétorique (1977) nous rappelle l'introduction à l'éthique de Jean Buridan (XIVe s.). Selon Buridan la philosophie morale ne peut se contenter d'appliquer la logique générale: elle a besoin d'une logique spéciale, une „logique morale” qui n'est rien autre que la technique persuasive qu'on étudie dans la Rhétorique. Roger Bacon (XlIIe s.) a même essayé d'intégrer cette rhétorique dans l'éthique (...) : elle est la partie pratique de la science morale. Bien que leur textes rappellent parfois les considérations de la ‘nouvelle rhétorique’, la relation entre l'éthique et la rhétorique y est envisagée d'une manière toute différente. Pour les auteurs médiévaux la rhétorique est une science auxiliaire de l'éthique : elle sert de liaison entre la théorie et la pratique. Dans la partie théorétique de l'éthique la logique ‘générale’ reste en vigeur. Ce n'est que pour mettre en pratique les règles et valeurs qui ont été ‘démontrées’ par la théorie qu'on a recours à la technique persuasive et sa logique ‘spéciale’. La rhétorique n'a donc qu'une fonction subsidaire. On retrouve la même conception au début des temps modernes chez Francis Bacon qui attribue à la rhétorique la fonction d'appliquer le dictamen rationis à l'imagination pour exciter ainsi la volonté. Une tout autre conception est défendue par l'humaniste Lorenzo Valla qui essaie de réintégrer l'argumentation morale dans le discours rhétorique où elle trouve sa place originaire. Notre propre point de vue est développé en confrontation avec Aristote, de qui nous avons hérité le projet d'une ‘science pratique’ et l'ambiguité qui en est inhérente 1° La rhétorique présuppose l'éthique. 2° L'éthique qui se veut epistème, ne relève pas de la rhétorique qui n'est qu'une technè. Elle se présente comme une science à caractère dialectique. 3° Les difficultés arrivent dès qu'on exalte la fonction pratique de cette science (cf. récemment R. Hare). Dès que l'éthique veut être efficace dans la vie concrète, elle devient une argumentation qui relève plutôt du discours épidectique (Weltanschauung). Notre société, en pleine crise morale, a certainement besoin d'un tel discours qui essaie d'intensifier l'adhésion à des valeurs morales. Mais il nous semble qu'il reste à côté d'un tel discours - en pleine expansion des nos jours - une place bien discrète pour une reflection critique qui en analyse les raisons : qui n'est pas inutile, bien que peu efficace. (shrink)