Background:Acting ethically, in accordance with professional and personal moral values, lies at the heart of nursing practice. However, contextual factors, or obstacles within the work environment, can constrain nurses in their ethical practice – hence the importance of the workplace ethical climate. Interest in nurse workplace ethical climates has snowballed in recent years because the ethical climate has emerged as a key variable in the experience of nurse moral distress. Significantly, this study appears to be the first of its kind (...) carried out in New Zealand.Aim/objective:The purpose of this study was to explore and describe how registered nurses working on a medical ward in a New Zealand hospital perceive their workplace ethical climate.Research design/participants/context:This was a small, qualitative descriptive study. Seven registered nurses were interviewed in two focus group meetings. An inductive method of thematic data analysis was used for this research.Ethical considerations:Ethics approval for this study was granted by the New Zealand Ministry of Health’s Central Regional Health and Disability Ethics Committee on 14 June 2012.Findings:The themes identified in the data centred on three dominant elements that – together – shaped the prevailing ethical climate: staffing levels, patient throughput and the attitude of some managers towards nursing staff.Discussion:While findings from this study regarding staffing levels and the power dynamics between nurses and managers support those from other ethical climate studies, of note is the impact of patient throughput on local nurses’ ethical practice. This issue has not been singled out as having a detrimental influence on ethical climates elsewhere.Conclusion:Moral distress is inevitable in an ethical climate where the organisation’s main priorities are perceived by nursing staff to be budget and patient throughput, rather than patient safety and care. (shrink)

The widespread use of stimulants among healthy individuals to improve cognition has received growing attention; however, public attitudes toward this practice are not well understood. We determined the effect of framing metaphors and context of use on public opinion toward cognitive enhancement. We recruited 3,727 participants from the United States to complete three surveys using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk between April and July 2017. Participants read vignettes describing an individual using cognitive enhancement, varying framing metaphors (fuel versus steroid), and context of (...) use (athletes versus students versus employees). The main outcome measure was the difference in respondent-assigned level of acceptability of the use of cognitive enhancement by others and by themselves between the contrasting vignettes. Participants were more likely to support the use of cognitive enhancement by others than by themselves and more when the use of enhancement by others was framed with a fuel metaphor than with a steroid metaphor. Metaphoric framing did not affect participants’ attitudes toward their own use. Participants supported the use of enhancement by employees more than by students or athletes. These results are discussed in relation to existing ethical and policy literature. (shrink)

It is commonly accepted – not only in the philosophical literature but also in daily life – that ignorance is a failure of some sort. As a result, a desideratum of any ontological account of ignorance is that it must be able to explain why there is something wrong with being ignorant of a true proposition. This article shows two things. First, two influential accounts of ignorance – the Knowledge Account and the True Belief Account – do not satisfy this (...) requirement. They fail to provide a satisfying normative account of the badness of ignorance. Second, this article suggests an alternative explanation of what makes ignorance a bad cognitive state. In a nutshell, ignorance is bad because it is the manifestation of a vice, namely, of what Cassam calls “epistemic insouciance”. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Journal of Aesthetic Education 37.1 (2003) 13-31 [Access article in PDF] A Philosophical Inquiry into the Nature of Computer Art Holle Humphries Before the computer is accepted unquestioningly as a legitimate artistic medium, some of the challenging aesthetic and philosophical issues raised by [computer art] must be solved. The most haunting questions concern the impact of the technology on the artist, the creative process, and the nature (...) of art. 1How might we lead students in an exploration of the philosophical issues regarding art created with a computer? The most important step is first to guide them in exploring ontological concepts and questions asked about the nature of art and computer art, before investigating related issues of epistemology, value, and criticism. Students need to understand the nature of their art tool and medium of choice. Therefore, it becomes a matter of concern to discover that when discussing and writing about computer art, students sometimes use such terms interchangeably as "computer art" and "computer-generated art," when they are not synonymous, and talk about "virtual reality" as though engaging in any activity that involves a computer constitutes experiencing one. It is clear that this problem arises because many have not paused to examine the nature of computer art within the context of the process and product of art, and the subtle nuances regarding what might distinguish each from other human enterprise. To help clarify their thinking, we might use the foundation of art theory and the strategy of philosophical inquiry, implemented by adopting questioning strategies, to guide students through an exploration of the ontological nature of computer art. This can begin by launching the question: "What is the nature of art — or computer art?" Philosophy of Art: "What is the Nature of Art?" Many philosophers have attempted to describe or define the nature of art formulated in a theory of art. A theory of art attempts to specify where the essence of art is thought to reside, or what exactly art's essence is. [End Page 13]The imitation theory, initiated in the 5th century B.C. by Plato, held that to be a work of art, an object must mirror reality. 2 As this theory placed the essence of art in the objective properties of the art work itself, we consider the imitation theory to be object-centered or objective in nature. Similarly, with his formalist theory of art, Clive Bell claimed that the essence of art lies in the object — within the structural design properties of a work of art. To qualify as a work of art, an object must exhibit significant form. Significant form consists of certain formal properties such as the art elements of lines and color combined in a particular way according to art principles, all used to create certain forms and relations of forms. 3The expression theories of art shifted attention to the artist and audience and thus are considered subject centered, or subjective, bound up in notions of the experience of creation by the artist and/or the response of the audience. Benedetto Croce asserted that a work of art resides in the mind of the artist. An artist must experience an intuition, and it is this mental process that constitutes art, not the object which the artist might create thereafter. 4 Robin Collingwood claimed that art is an exploration, clarification, and expression of an artist's emotion, made clear to an audience through a medium. 5 Leo Tolstoy believed that art should be a vehicle by which the emotion experienced by the artist at the time of creation is transmitted to an audience, so that the audience can experience that emotion as well. 6Morris Weitz asserted that none of these theories capture an essence of art because they are either too broad, too narrow, or else are circular. He claimed that the concept of art cannot be limited to one essence delimited in a definition. Weitz suggested that we must instead look at what theories of art have to say is important about art so that we know what to... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Journal of Aesthetic Education 37.1 (2003) 13-31 [Access article in PDF] A Philosophical Inquiry into the Nature of Computer Art Holle Humphries Before the computer is accepted unquestioningly as a legitimate artistic medium, some of the challenging aesthetic and philosophical issues raised by [computer art] must be solved. The most haunting questions concern the impact of the technology on the artist, the creative process, and the nature (...) of art. 1How might we lead students in an exploration of the philosophical issues regarding art created with a computer? The most important step is first to guide them in exploring ontological concepts and questions asked about the nature of art and computer art, before investigating related issues of epistemology, value, and criticism. Students need to understand the nature of their art tool and medium of choice. Therefore, it becomes a matter of concern to discover that when discussing and writing about computer art, students sometimes use such terms interchangeably as "computer art" and "computer-generated art," when they are not synonymous, and talk about "virtual reality" as though engaging in any activity that involves a computer constitutes experiencing one. It is clear that this problem arises because many have not paused to examine the nature of computer art within the context of the process and product of art, and the subtle nuances regarding what might distinguish each from other human enterprise. To help clarify their thinking, we might use the foundation of art theory and the strategy of philosophical inquiry, implemented by adopting questioning strategies, to guide students through an exploration of the ontological nature of computer art. This can begin by launching the question: "What is the nature of art — or computer art?" Philosophy of Art: "What is the Nature of Art?" Many philosophers have attempted to describe or define the nature of art formulated in a theory of art. A theory of art attempts to specify where the essence of art is thought to reside, or what exactly art's essence is. [End Page 13]The imitation theory, initiated in the 5th century B.C. by Plato, held that to be a work of art, an object must mirror reality. 2 As this theory placed the essence of art in the objective properties of the art work itself, we consider the imitation theory to be object-centered or objective in nature. Similarly, with his formalist theory of art, Clive Bell claimed that the essence of art lies in the object — within the structural design properties of a work of art. To qualify as a work of art, an object must exhibit significant form. Significant form consists of certain formal properties such as the art elements of lines and color combined in a particular way according to art principles, all used to create certain forms and relations of forms. 3The expression theories of art shifted attention to the artist and audience and thus are considered subject centered, or subjective, bound up in notions of the experience of creation by the artist and/or the response of the audience. Benedetto Croce asserted that a work of art resides in the mind of the artist. An artist must experience an intuition, and it is this mental process that constitutes art, not the object which the artist might create thereafter. 4 Robin Collingwood claimed that art is an exploration, clarification, and expression of an artist's emotion, made clear to an audience through a medium. 5 Leo Tolstoy believed that art should be a vehicle by which the emotion experienced by the artist at the time of creation is transmitted to an audience, so that the audience can experience that emotion as well. 6Morris Weitz asserted that none of these theories capture an essence of art because they are either too broad, too narrow, or else are circular. He claimed that the concept of art cannot be limited to one essence delimited in a definition. Weitz suggested that we must instead look at what theories of art have to say is important about art so that we know what to... (shrink)

Dans la genese de sa constitution, la philosophie n'a pu faire l'economie d'une confrontation avec la musique qui fournissait aux anciens Grecs les schemes fondamentaux de la culture. De cette confrontation Platon est le temoin. Scindant la musique, il privilegie l'Harmonique, qui en est la partie theorique, sans toutefois lui reconnaitre la titre de science supreme. Correlativement, il condamne comme dysharmonie, tumulte fracassant et perturbateur de l'ordre cosmique, l'harmonie chromaticiste dont il s'emploie, non sans paradoxe, a decrire le detail. Par (...) cette lecture en filigrane des Dialogues de Platon, l'auteur se propose de reconstruire la pensee qui procede de l'harmonie chromaticiste et de montrer son importance dans l'elaboration de la philosophie fondatrice. Au carrefour des disciplines du savoir antique, ce livre s'adresse non seulement aux philosophes, mais aussi a tous ceux qui, musiciens ou stylisticiens, s'interessent a la forme musicale. (shrink)

Investigating the theoretical and empirical relationships between transparency and trust in the context of surveillance, this volume argues that neither transparency nor trust provides a simple and self-evident path for mitigating the negative political and social consequences of state surveillance practices. Dominant in both the scholarly literature and public debate is the conviction that transparency can promote better-informed decisions, greater oversight, and restore trust damaged by the secrecy of surveillance. The contributions to this volume challenge this conventional wisdom by considering (...) how relations of trust and policies of transparency are modulated by underlying power asymmetries, socio-historical legacies, economic structures, and institutional constraints. They study trust and transparency as embedded in specific socio-political contexts to show how, under certain conditions, transparency can become a tool of social control that erodes trust, while mistrust-rather than trust-can sometimes offer the most promising approach to safeguarding rights and freedom in an age of surveillance. The first book addressing the inter-relationship of trust, transparency, and surveillance practices, this volume will be of interest to scholars and students of surveillance studies as well as appeal to an interdisciplinary audience given the contributions come from political science, sociology, philosophy, law, and civil society. (shrink)

Western economically driven instrumental ethics fuel the dominant institutional logic in many business schools and are associated with the negative social and environmental situation widely linked to the mode of global development. Other ethical framings have been subordinated, marginalized, or denied. Through the explicit commitment of prominent international certifying bodies of management education, educators, researchers, and practitioners will be encouraged to give increasing effect to the Principles for Responsible Management Education (PRME). The PRME is a United Nations‐led, institution‐level mechanism for (...) reorienting the direction of business schools and for increasing both educator and student capacities to contribute to a more inclusive and sustainable mode of development globally. We propose greater emphasis be given to various forms of relational ethics from which to guide the functional aspirations of institutions. We explore the creative opportunity for institutional change by contrasting the prevailing Western economically driven instrumental institutional logic with indigenous ethical framings. We draw upon Seo and Creed's conceptual framework of institutional change to discuss two films—Mann v. Ford and Waste = Food—to bring greater attention to the generative potential of indigenous perspectives in institutional praxis. Our examples could equally invite an application of other systems of relational ethics that have been overshadowed by the current domination of economic instrumentalism in almost all realms of decision making. We conclude by providing some teaching resources that can be used or adapted for geographical‐ or disciplinary‐specific attention to the issues we raise. (shrink)

Are people with flawed faces regarded as having flawed moral characters? An “anomalous-is-bad” stereotype is hypothesized to facilitate negative biases against people with facial anomalies (e.g., scars), but whether and how these biases affect behavior and brain functioning remain open questions. We examined responses to anomalous faces in the brain (using a visual oddball paradigm), behavior (in economic games), and attitudes. At the level of the brain, the amygdala demonstrated a specific neural response to anomalous faces—sensitive to disgust and a (...) lack of beauty but independent of responses to salience or arousal. At the level of behavior, people with anomalous faces were subjected to less prosociality from participants highest in socioeconomic status. At the level of attitudes, we replicated previously reported negative character evaluations made about individuals with facial anomalies, and further identified explicit biases directed against them as a group. Across these levels of organization, the specific amygdala response to facial anomalies correlated with stronger just-world beliefs (i.e., people get what they deserve), less dispositional empathic concern, and less prosociality toward people with facial anomalies. Characterizing the “anomalous-is-bad” stereotype at multiple levels of organization can reveal underappreciated psychological burdens shouldered by people who look different. (shrink)

Pionnière dans la pénalisation du viol en 1980, la France a été en eurocrime qu’aurait entraîné l’unanimité dans l’acceptation de la nouvelle définition proposée par la Commission européenne. L’absence de consentement devient finalement pour tous le critère principal, et de nombreux pays ont aligné récemment leur législation avec la directive européenne. Sur le droit à l’avortement, la convergence est moins sensible, plusieurs pays mettent d’importantes restrictions. La constitutionnalisation de la liberté d’avorter et de sa garantie en France va peut-être conduire (...) à son inscription dans les droits humains. (shrink)

Objective—To identify and describe the current state of clinical ethics support services in the UK.Design—A series of questionnaire surveys of key individuals in National Health Service (NHS) trusts, health authorities, health boards, local research ethics committees and health professional organisations. Interviews with chairmen/women of clinical ethics committees identified in the surveys.Setting—The UK National Health Service.Results—Responses to the questionnaires were received from all but one NHS trust and all but one health authority/board. A variety of models of clinical ethics support were (...) identified including twenty formal clinical ethics committees (CECs). A further twenty NHS trusts expressed an intention to establish a CEC within the next twelve months. Most CECs in the UK have been in existence less than five years and are still defining their role. The chairmen identified education of committee members and contact with other ethics committees as important requirements for committee development. Problems were identified around lack of support for the committee and with raising the profile of the committee within the institution. There has been little evaluation of clinical ethics support services either in the UK or in other countries with longer established services. What evaluation has occurred has focused on process rather than outcome measures.Conclusions—Clinical ethics support services are developing in the UK. A number of issues have been identified that need to be addressed if such support services are to develop effectively. (shrink)

Our exemplar of a Native American relational ethic is depicted through the Seven Grandfather Teachings, an ancient sacred story of Potawatomi and Ojibwe peoples. These teachings state that human beings are responsible to act with wisdom, respect, love, honesty, humility, bravery, and truth toward each other and all creation. We illustrate the possible uses of this ethic through exercises wherein students reflect on the values and learn lessons related to ethics, leadership, teamwork, and relationships, or create stories using Native American (...) story form. (shrink)

Recently, there has been considerable interest in large language models: machine learning systems which produce human-like text and dialogue. Applications of these systems have been plagued by persistent inaccuracies in their output; these are often called “AI hallucinations”. We argue that these falsehoods, and the overall activity of large language models, is better understood as bullshit in the sense explored by Frankfurt (On Bullshit, Princeton, 2005): the models are in an important way indifferent to the truth of their outputs. We (...) distinguish two ways in which the models can be said to be bullshitters, and argue that they clearly meet at least one of these definitions. We further argue that describing AI misrepresentations as bullshit is both a more useful and more accurate way of predicting and discussing the behaviour of these systems. (shrink)

Kline's evolutionary analysis of teaching provides welcome reframing for cross-species comparisons. However, theory based on competition cannot explain the transmission of human cultural elements that were collectively created. Humans evolved in a cultural niche andteaching-learningcoevolved to transmit culture. To study human cultural variation in teaching, we need a more articulated theory of this distinctively human engagement.

Two years ago, the US National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of Medicine released a report drafted by an international committee regarding the use of gene editing in humans. Once a tedious and expensive process, gene editing has now become more accessible and cheaper using the new CRISPR technology, making the issue of its use more urgent and pressing. The committee cites general support for somatic nonheritable gene editing to correct for a serious disease already present in a (...) human being, but more controversial is germline gene editing for heritable conditions. Performing gene editing that affects an individual's descendants is at present tightly controlled in the US, but around the... (shrink)

The meaning of life and man's alienation from himself and his natural environment is examined in brief selections, illustrated with photographs, from the works of Albert Schweitzer.

Was passiert, wenn die Bevölkerung die Möglichkeit erhält, sich ungeschminkt und ungefiltert zu bioethischen Problemstellungen zu äußern?

This long-awaited two-volume set constitutes the definitive presentation of the system of classifying moral judgment built up by Lawrence Kohlberg and his associates over a period of twenty years. Researchers in child development and education around the world, many of whom have worked with interim versions of the system, indeed, all those seriously interested in understanding the problem of moral judgment, will find it an indispensable resource. Volume I reviews Kohlberg's stage theory, and the by-now large body of research on (...) the significance and utility of his moral stages. Issues of reliability and validity are addressed. The volume ends with detailed instructions for using the forms in Volume 2. Volume 2, in a specially-designed, user-friendly format, includes three alternative functionally-equivalent forms of the scoring system. (shrink)

Why equality cannot be conditional on a shared human “nature” but has to be for all For centuries, ringing declarations about all men being created equal appealed to a shared human nature as the reason to consider ourselves equals. But appeals to natural equality invited gradations of natural difference, and the ambiguity at the heart of “nature” enabled generations to write of people as equal by nature while barely noticing the exclusion of those marked as inferior by their gender, race, (...) or class. Despite what we commonly tell ourselves, these exclusions and gradations continue today. In Unconditional Equals, political philosopher Anne Phillips challenges attempts to justify equality by reference to a shared human nature, arguing that justification turns into conditions and ends up as exclusion. Rejecting the logic of justification, she calls instead for a genuinely unconditional equality. Drawing on political, feminist, and postcolonial theory, Unconditional Equals argues that we should understand equality not as something grounded in shared characteristics but as something people enact when they refuse to be considered inferiors. At a time when the supposedly shared belief in human equality is so patently not shared, the book makes a powerful case for seeing equality as a commitment we make to ourselves and others, and a claim we make on others when they deny us our status as equals. (shrink)

WINNER BEST SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY BOOK IN 2021 / NASSP BOOK AWARD 2022 -/- Together we can often achieve things that are impossible to do on our own. We can prevent something bad from happening or we can produce something good, even if none of us could do it by herself. But when are we morally required to do something of moral importance together with others? This book develops an original theory of collective moral obligations. These are obligations that individual moral (...) agents hold jointly, but not as unified collective agents. To think of some of our obligations as joint or collective is the best way of making sense of our intuitions regarding collective moral action problems. Where we have reason to believe that our efforts are most efficient as part of a collective endeavor we may incur collective obligations together with others who are similarly placed as long as we are able to establish compossible individual contributory strategies towards that goal. The book concludes with a discussion of “massively shared obligations” to large-scale moral problems such as global poverty. (shrink)

Together we can achieve things that we could never do on our own. In fact, there are sheer endless opportunities for producing morally desirable outcomes together with others. Unsurprisingly, scholars have been finding the idea of collective moral obligations intriguing. Yet, there is little agreement among scholars on the nature of such obligations and on the extent to which their existence might force us to adjust existing theories of moral obligation. What interests me in this paper is the perspective of (...) the moral deliberating agent who faces a collective action problem, i.e. the type of reasoning she employs when deciding how to act. I hope to show that agents have collective obligations precisely when they are required to employ ‘we-reasoning’, a type of reasoning that differs from I-mode, best response reasoning, as I shall explain below. More precisely, two (or more) individual agents have a collective moral obligation to do x if x is an option for action that is only collectively available (more on that later) and each has sufficient reason to rank x highest out of the options available to them. (shrink)

Subcortical substrates for behavioural integration include the fore/midbrain nuclei of the basal ganglia and the hindbrain medial reticular formation. The midbrain superior colliculus requires basal ganglia disinhibition in order to generate orienting movements. The colliculus should therefore be seen as one of many competitors vying for control of the body's effector systems with the basal ganglia acting as the key arbiter. (Published Online May 1 2007).

_A portion of the revenue from this book’s sales will be donated to Doctors Without Borders to assist the humanitarian work of nurses, doctors, and other health care providers in the fight against COVID-19 and beyond._ _Concepts and Cases in Nursing Ethics_ is an introduction to contemporary ethical issues in health care, designed especially for Canadian audiences. The book is organized around six key concepts: beneficence, autonomy, truth-telling, confidentiality, justice, and integrity. Each of these concepts is explained and discussed with (...) reference to professional and legal norms. The discussion is then supplemented by case studies that exemplify the relevant concepts and show how each applies in health care and nursing practice. This new fourth edition includes an added chapter on end-of-life issues, and it is revised throughout to reflect the latest developments on topics such as global health ethics, cultural competence, social media, and palliative sedation, as well as ethical issues relating to COVID-19. (shrink)