The author discusses an inscription of the late fourth or early third century BC carved on a bronze plaque found in the first excavations at Dodona, on which a Zakynthian, by name Agathon, records a link of proxeny between himself and his family and the Epirote koinon of the Molossians, through Kassandra, the Trojan prophetess. The plaque is decorated by a prominent phallus with testicles, which the author interprets as referring to the continuity, past and future, of the "geneá" (...) of Agathon. Other explanations of the whole piece have been proposed, and the present essay is intended only to explore the possibility of this interpretation. (shrink)

The personality and the writings of Marsilio Ficino mark the turning point from the middleages to the Renaissance. In John Marenbon’s apt description, medieval philosophy is ‘the story of a complex tradition founded in Neoplatonism, but not simply as a continuation or development of Neoplatonism itself’. ‘Not simply’ because the Enneads, the first and finest flowering of that tradition, testify to Plotinus’ deep engagement, not only with the thought of Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics and the Middle Platonists, but also with (...) a variety of theologico-mystical writings of diverse middleeastern provenances, from Egypt to Persia. This complex tradition, Ficino transmitted to the West in the form of translations from Greek into Latin of the dialogues of Plato and the Enneads of Plotinus as well as of several commentaries on those texts by later thinkers. In addition to such exegetical works, Ficino wrote several philosophical treatises of his own. Finally, as an ordained priest, he was also well acquainted with the writings of the Church Fathers, all of which had contributed to his belief that religion should not be separated from philosophy. To the completion of this ambitious scholarly programme and the fulfilment of his commitment to the Church, he brought the resources of his powerfully syncretistic mind. Rather than merely combining various texts and traditions, he made them speak to each other and, in the process, evolved a system that was both sui generis and attuned to the new ways of thinking that were then emerging in quattrocento Florence. His in-depth understanding of all these texts, together with his ability to spot similarities, analogies and correspondences between them, enabled him to fuse into a coherent system various elements which a modern historian of philosophy would regard as dissimilar if not incompatible. His philosophical acumen enabled him, when he thought it appropriate, to improve on the views of those he regarded as his masters and to fill whatever gaps he found in their arguments. The present essay is an attempt to unravel the nature of Ficino’s syncretism, in which three levels of widening scope will be distinguished: authorial, trans-authorial and trans-doctrinal. To achieve a desirable level of both precision and concision, a short text will then be analysed, namely Speech Five of his most widely read treatise, a Latin commentary on Plato’s Symposium, entitled Commentarium in Convivium Platonis De Amore. It will be shown how, through the fictional speech that he put in the mouth of Marsuppini, his chosen spokesperson of the Platonic Agathon, Ficino succeeded, not only in blending Platonic, Plotinian and Christian elements in the reconstruction of an argument that Plato had meant us to regard as flawed to the core, but he also composed an elegant and original speech that continues to intrigue and enchant its readers after a gap of over six centuries. (shrink)

The personality and the writings of Marsilio Ficino mark the turning point from the middleages to the Renaissance. In John Marenbon’s apt description, medieval philosophy is ‘the story of a complex tradition founded in Neoplatonism, but not simply as a continuation or development of Neoplatonism itself’. ‘Not simply’ because the Enneads, the first and finest flowering of that tradition, testify to Plotinus’ deep engagement, not only with the thought of Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics and the Middle Platonists, but also with (...) a variety of theologico-mystical writings of diverse middleeastern provenances, from Egypt to Persia. This complex tradition, Ficino transmitted to the West in the form of translations from Greek into Latin of the dialogues of Plato and the Enneads of Plotinus as well as of several commentaries on those texts by later thinkers. In addition to such exegetical works, Ficino wrote several philosophical treatises of his own. Finally, as an ordained priest, he was also well acquainted with the writings of the Church Fathers, all of which had contributed to his belief that religion should not be separated from philosophy. To the completion of this ambitious scholarly programme and the fulfilment of his commitment to the Church, he brought the resources of his powerfully syncretistic mind. Rather than merely combining various texts and traditions, he made them speak to each other and, in the process, evolved a system that was both sui generis and attuned to the new ways of thinking that were then emerging in quattrocento Florence. His in-depth understanding of all these texts, together with his ability to spot similarities, analogies and correspondences between them, enabled him to fuse into a coherent system various elements which a modern historian of philosophy would regard as dissimilar if not incompatible. His philosophical acumen enabled him, when he thought it appropriate, to improve on the views of those he regarded as his masters and to fill whatever gaps he found in their arguments. The present essay is an attempt to unravel the nature of Ficino’s syncretism, in which three levels of widening scope will be distinguished: authorial, trans-authorial and trans-doctrinal. To achieve a desirable level of both precision and concision, a short text will then be analysed, namely Speech Five of his most widely read treatise, a Latin commentary on Plato’s Symposium, entitled Commentarium in Convivium Platonis De Amore. It will be shown how, through the fictional speech that he put in the mouth of Marsuppini, his chosen spokesperson of the Platonic Agathon, Ficino succeeded, not only in blending Platonic, Plotinian and Christian elements in the reconstruction of an argument that Plato had meant us to regard as flawed to the core, but he also composed an elegant and original speech that continues to intrigue and enchant its readers after a gap of over six centuries. (shrink)

We suggest a certain minimal approach to the historical Socrates on the basis of Plato’s Apology. This text makes it possible to reconstruct the authentic charge and the defense line of Socrates, as well as his motivation and the quintessence of his philosophical challenge. The most important thing is what the philosopher says in the face of his death sentence: that the greatest good for a man is to live an examined life focusing on virtues and ethical values. Unfortunately, the (...) preponderance of studies, even the most recent ones, fail to recognize the philosopher’s provocative challenge, whilst it is not only a crucial motif in the Socratic examining, i.e. testing the interlocutors’ knowledge by means of irony, elenchos and aporia, but also an inspiration for his direct and indirect followers in seeking virtues and the greatest good. (shrink)

La discussione sull’idea del buono occupa uno spazio marginale nel libro VI della Repubblica, ma comporta un eccezionale impegno teorico : di qui la vastita della letteratura esegetica che contrasta con la brevita del testo platonico. Il problema cruciale e questo : in Repubblica VI 504a‑509c to agathon non e piu solo un principio di valorizzazione e un criterio di valutazione di cose e condotte – com’e consueto in Platone – ma assume il ruolo di principio ontologico ed epistemologico. (...) Questa posizione ha spesso suggerito interpretazioni di tipo “teologico” dell’idea del buono. Quello che si puo affermare sulla base del testo, e che Platone ha conferito in queste pagine della Repubblica un primato al vertice etico del triangolo i cui altri vertici sono quello ontologico e quello epistemologico ; l’intento e quello di offrire una fondazione etica assoluta, mediante la connessione della sfera del valore con quelle dell’essere e della verita.L’unificazione delle dimensioni etica, ontologica ed epistemologica sarebbe parsa teoricamente insostenibile ad Aristotele, cui si deve una critica devastante alla teoria platonica del buono. (shrink)

Agathon's mannered yet striking encomium on Eros in Plato's Symposium has attracted critical attention in ample measure, yet at least one dark corner remains unilluminated. As the speaker approaches his climax in the words quoted above, he slips into nautical imagery: κυβερντης πιβτης … , but then disconcerts readers and commentators alike by immediately lapsing into the down-to-earth language of παρασττης τε σωτρ … words which seem to lack maritime connotations. The standard editions offer no help: Hug–Schöner devote several (...) lines to the metaphors as they conceive them and suggest various groupings, but conclude somewhat despairingly: ‘dass es im ubrigen hier nicht auf Schärfe der Begriffe ankommt, leuchtet ein’. Dover, elsewhere a supportive editor, here only offers observations on πιβτης and the ‘predominantly nautical sense’ of κυβερντης ; he translates παρασττης as ‘comrade-in-arms, – strictly the hoplite posted beside one’. Bury has some desultory statements which lead nowhere, while lecture-notes of pupils betray perplexity; some consider the four nouns here to be an ‘odd assortment’, and say that ‘many emendations have been suggested’. It has even been suggested that it was perhaps Plato's intention to show Agathon talking ‘near-nonsense’. (shrink)

Les deux fragments d'inscriptions publiés par Graindor et repris dans IG II2, 4308 avec la signature du sculpteur Agathon d'Anagyre recollent, à condition de mettre le fragment a à droite du fragment b. Cette base vraisemblablement en l'honneur d'un citoyen du dème de Mélité, se dressait sur l'Acropole.

It is possible to pick out a number of tendencies in axiology development. Among them we can see the disciplinary invasion of axiology into the sphere of agathological (agathon - greek - the Good) knowledge. The invasion tendency is connected with the definite understanding of the value nature and with the including non-value content into the axiological sphere. Value and agathon (the good) have different significance. In philosophy of values there are two axiologies: creative and noncreative. In creative (...) axiology the value world is the world created by the free and reasonable subject. All the history of agathon (the good) studying allows for picking it (agathon) out as a subject for special research in agathology. (shrink)

This is a revised short overview of Plato’s “greatest thing to be learned” or the “greatest lesson” (megiston mathêma) – the Idea of the Good.

This is a short overview of Plato’s “greatest thing to be learned” or the “greatest lesson” (megiston mathêma) – the Idea of the Good.

THERE ARE ANY NUMBER OF REASONS for wanting to know what Aristotle means by “good”. For students of Aristotle, understanding his conception of goodness would provide an authentic Nicomachean metaethics, so to speak, a clearer view of his natural teleology, and a great deal of help in making sense of his cosmology and his metaphysics, especially the theological bits. For the less historically minded, the rebirth of virtue ethics makes the relation between nature and norm an important problem, with implications (...) not only for ethics proper but also for social philosophy and the foundations of the social sciences. Epistemology and the philosophy of science finally have begun to take questions of value more seriously, and therefore they ought also to be interested in possible connections between knowledge of nature and the apprehension of value. Aristotle’s conception of goodness is relevant to all these questions. (shrink)

Dada la cantidad de referencias a koinōnía en los diálogos de Platón, llama la atención que la frase “bien común” sea usada solo una vez – en el Cármides 166d. Sócrates pregunta a su interlocutor Critias: “¿No crees que es por el bien común, para casi todos los hombres, el que deba descubrirse cómo son todos los seres?”. La pregunta surge después de que Critias ha afirmado que sōphrosýnē es autoconocimiento, lo cual luego especifica como un “conocimiento de todos los (...) demás conocimientos y de sí mismo”. En este artículo, sostengo que no es casualidad que Sócrates mencione el “bien común” precisamente en este momento en su discusión con Critias. La noción de sōphrosýnē que Critias defiende es incoherente debido a lo que este afirma que es su característica distintiva – su reflexividad. Debido a su total reflexividad, no apunta a ningún fin más allá de sí mismo y, por lo tanto, es incapaz de revelar “los seres” ni de estar conectado a ningún bien fuera de sí mismo. El bien común que Sócrates menciona aquí está, por ende, esencialmente relacionado al reconocimiento de la ignorancia que motiva a asombrarse de un bien más allá del amor de nuestras propias cosas. Por lo tanto, sugiero una explicación para la curiosa adición de “casi” en el comentario de Sócrates aquí: Critias mismo muestra que, a menos que él pueda admitir la ignorancia y experimentar tal asombro, entonces él no está constitucionalmente incluido en este bien común. (shrink)

This is a revised short overview of Plato’s “greatest thing to be learned” or the “greatest lesson” (megiston mathêma) – the Idea of the Good.

Agathon, in his panegyric of Eros, had maintained that it is good, beautiful, and divine. Socrates begins his elenchus of this claim by pointing out that Eros is relational in character: love is always love of something, desire desire for something. Eros falls in that class of terms later described as ta pros ti, terms which have their meaning ‘toward’ something else. Furthermore, Eros lacks what it loves and desires to possess it: “everyone … who desires something desires what (...) has not been obtained and is not present; his love and desire are set on things he lacks, things he does not possess.” Desire implies privation. Agathon and Plato also agree that Eros is always in love with the beautiful ; as Agathon had earlier said, “the world was fashioned by the gods through love of beautiful things; for there is no love of the ugly.” It then follows that, since Eros is love of what it lacks, it cannot be beautiful or good, and since the gods possess both attributes, it cannot be divine. It is not, however, bad or ugly or mortal, but ‘intermediate’ between those attributes. (shrink)

After Agathon’s speech in Plato’s Symposium, Socrates takes a little time to make some comments about it. One of these comments is that the speech brought Gorgias to his memory (198c2–5). In this paper we intend to track down in three complementary levels the diverse reasons why this recollection took place: (A) regarding the form of the speech, we will try to show that there is an equivalence in how both Gorgias in his Encomium to Helen and the character (...) of Agathon in the Syposium construct their respective logoi; (B) regarding the style of writing, we will see the frequent use in the poet’s speech of the rhetoric resource of “saying things alike” (isa legein) usually ascribed to Gorgias; (C) finally, regarding the contents of both speeches we will try to show that many of the elements used by the sophist to praise the logos in his Encomiun to Helen (EH) may be found, more or less, in Agathon’s praise of Eros. The article will try to show, thus, which are the precise elements that may have made Socrates remember Gorgias after listening to the tragic poet. (shrink)

Agathon, in his panegyric of Eros, had maintained that it is good, beautiful, and divine. Socrates begins his elenchus of this claim by pointing out that Eros is relational in character: love is always love of something, desire desire for something. Eros falls in that class of terms later described as ta pros ti, terms which have their meaning ‘toward’ something else. Furthermore, Eros lacks what it loves and desires to possess it: “everyone … who desires something desires what (...) has not been obtained and is not present; his love and desire are set on things he lacks, things he does not possess.” Desire implies privation. Agathon and Plato also agree that Eros is always in love with the beautiful ; as Agathon had earlier said, “the world was fashioned by the gods through love of beautiful things; for there is no love of the ugly.” It then follows that, since Eros is love of what it lacks, it cannot be beautiful or good, and since the gods possess both attributes, it cannot be divine. It is not, however, bad or ugly or mortal, but ‘intermediate’ between those attributes. (shrink)

Aristotle opens the first chapter of the first book of the Nicomachean Ethics as follows: “Every art and every inquire, and similarly every action as well as undertaking, seem to aim at some good. Hence people have right defined that the good is that at which all things aim”. The article indicates and elucidates the difficulties found in the quoted statement on the basis of translation and commentary by Sebastian Petrycy of Pilzno.

La confrontation des vestiges du péribole du sanctuaire d'Apollon à Delphes et des données relatives aux chantiers de réfection fournies par le Compte des Trésoriers CID II 81 invite à situer les travaux au mur Est entre les portes Β et F (cette dernière se trouvant au Nord de l'emplacement du futur portique d'Attale) et à les mettre en relation avec la reconstruction du temple et le réaménagement du téménos.

In this paper I investigate the understanding of eros expressed in the speeches of Phaedrus and Agathon in Plato’s Symposium, two speeches often neglected in the literature. I argue that they contain crucial insights about the nature of eros that reappear in Diotima’s speech. Finally, I consider the relation of Socrates and Alcibiades in light of these insights, arguing that the figure of Alcibiades should be seen as a negative illustration of the notion of erotic education described by Diotima.

A commentary on the Symposium as a challenge and a gift to Athens. I begin with a reflection on three dates: 416 bce, the date of Agathon’s victory party, c. 400, the approximate date of Apollodorus’ retelling of the party, and c. 375, the approximate date of the ‘publication’ of the dialogue, and I argue that Plato reminds his contemporary Athens both of its great poetic and legal and scientific traditions and of the historical fact that the way late (...) fourth century Athens appropriated them in some way led to the city’s demise at the turn of the century; thus the dialogue is Plato’s challenge to his contemporary Athens to recognize and overcome its flawed relation to its cultural resources. Heard in this way, the key moments are Aristophanes’ implied critique of Pausanias and Eryximachus and Socrates’ implied critique of Aristophanes and Agathon. Proceeding by a close reading, I argue that Plato exposes, for those moved to rise to his challenge, the failure of his great predecessors to conceive the divine in a way that, worthy of the height and otherness divinity requires, can provide substantive orientation for the burgeoning new reason that animates the city’s culture. (shrink)

After Agathon's speech in Plato's Symposium, Socrates takes a little time to make some comments about it. One of these comments is that the speech brought Gorgias to his memory (198 c 2-5). In this article we intend to track down in three complementary levels the diverse reasons why this recollection took place: (A) regarding the form of the speech, we will try to show that there is an equivalence in how both Gorgias in his Encomium to Helen and (...) the character of Agathon in the Symposium construct their respective logoi; (B) regarding the style of writing, we will see the frequent use in the poet's speech of the rhetoric resource of "saying things alike'' (isa legein) usually ascribed to Gorgias; (C) finally, regarding the contents of both speeches we will try to show that many of the elements used by the sophist to praise the logos in his Encomium to Helen may be found, more or less, in Agathon's praise of Eros. The article will try to show, thus, which are the precise elements that may have made Socrates remember Gorgias after listening to the tragic poet. (shrink)

After Agathon's speech in Plato's Symposium, Socrates takes a little time to make some comments about it. One of these comments is that the speech brought Gorgias to his memory (198 c 2-5). In this article we intend to track down in three complementary levels the diverse reasons why this recollection took place: (A) regarding the form of the speech, we will try to show that there is an equivalence in how both Gorgias in his Encomium to Helen and (...) the character of Agathon in the Symposium construct their respective logoi; (B) regarding the style of writing, we will see the frequent use in the poet's speech of the rhetoric resource of "saying things alike'' (isa legein) usually ascribed to Gorgias; (C) finally, regarding the contents of both speeches we will try to show that many of the elements used by the sophist to praise the logos in his Encomium to Helen may be found, more or less, in Agathon's praise of Eros. The article will try to show, thus, which are the precise elements that may have made Socrates remember Gorgias after listening to the tragic poet. (shrink)

Plato held that the Agathon (Being itself in its font) is the source or ‘common cause’ both of being(s) and of our understanding, both of the world (cosmos) and of our intellectual grasp thereof, both of the world beyond us (objectivity) that yet includes us and of the world of our inner thoughts (subjectivity) that yet stretches out to embrace the entire universe. This divine presupposition, found ‘philosophically’ in Plato and ‘religiously’ in Augustine’s doctrine of divine illumination, is that (...) God is the common cause of us and our world, for both are held within the same divine/cosmic embrace, by the same Spirit operating within us and beyond us. This leads us to a ‘hand-in-its-glove’ or ‘mind-in-its-world’ proportionate realism that avoids the epistemological defects of Kant’s transcendental realism and Bhaskar’s critical realism. Finally, we should regard knowing by acquaintance as paradigmatic, as the fundamental form of knowing in terms of which the other types are best approached and understood. There is, I suggest, an important sense in which ‘all knowing is knowing in the biblical sense.’. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to examine whether and, if so, how far, the Augustinian notion of pulchrum is related to Plotinus’ concept of beauty, as it appears in Ennead I. 6. The Augustinian notion of beauty will be analyzed by focusing on the De natura boni, considering plurality and unity in Augustine’s identification of bonum with esse, both in their ontological and axiological dimensions. Topics selected for special consideration will be, first, beauty as outcome of modus, species and (...) ordo naturalis, and, secondly, corruptio as cause of deformitas. The first part of the paper will attempt to explain the Augustinian identification of esse with bonum and pulchrum.The second part will analyze Plotinus’ notion of beauty, as spelled out in Ennead I. 6, considering the Plotinian identity of to kalon and to agathon. Topics selected for analysis will be, first, the concept of form as cause of beauty, and secondly, the notion of to aischron as partial or absolute lack of form. The second part of the paper will attempt to explain Plotinus’ concept of good as yielding the nature of beauty through an analysis of Plotinus’ reflections on being and unity. The third part of this paper will consider the differences between Plotinus’ and Augustine’s identity of ugliness and non-being, as related to the notion of matter. Topics selected for analysis will be, firstly, Plotinus’ identity of matter and to aischron, and, secondly, Augustine’s concept of matter as capacitas formarum. The conclusion will prove how Plotinus’ concept of matter as coinciding with ugliness shows a wide theoretical difference between Augustine’s and Plotinus’ ontological-axiological patterns. (shrink)