Animal liberationists call speciesism their enemy, but speciesism, perspicuously specified, says only that being human is sufficient for having our moral status. No one thinks it necessary. Throughout history, people have imagined alter-specifics, like the crowd at a Star Wars cantina, whom they’d recognize as their moral equals. Speciesism says nothing about our treatment of nonhumans. Speciesism’s historic popularity justifies presuming it true, a presumption buttressed by the absence of sound objections to it when properly understood. Its rationality is explained (...) by combining two ideas. First, universalizations of our reasons require some category of self-identification. Second, our primary category of self-identification is our key concept for understanding ourselves biologically, metaphysically, psychologically and socially, namely our species concept. We’re rationally bound to conspecifics by the relational “accident” of their essence being our own. (shrink)

Discussion of the closing lines of Pindar¿s seventh Nemean has concentrated almost exclusively on the lines¿ relevance to the larger question that hangs over the poem: does the ode serve as an apologia for the poet¿s uncomplimentary treatment of Neoptolemus in an earlier Paean, and is Pindar here most plainly gainsaying the vilification in which he supposedly previously engaged. The reading that I offer suggests that a very different concern frames the conclusion to the work. Rather than seeking to exculpate (...) himself, the poet announces instead that in the song that the audience has just heard, the composer has adhered to two prime virtues that the encomiastic genre should embrace: variatio and an ability to counter the language of blame. By reorienting the debate in this way, I aim to elucidate the striking metaphors and other rhetorical devices that fill the final lines, and most particularly to make sense of the canine imagery that seems so recurrent a motif. As my reading seeks to show, the dog is chosen as master trope both for his relation to the practice of invective and for his relevance to that stale act of repetition that the poet here rejects. By giving his audience a sample of the mode of speech that the calumnist practises, and that the praise poet may appropriate when combating the opposite genre, Pindar makes the merits of his own poetry shine the brighter, and invites the cognoscenti to appreciate his sophia. More broadly, the encomiastic singer¿s brief deployment of the weapons of the abuse poet allows us to understand something of the overlapping and symbiotic relations between the different genres in archaic Greek poetry. (shrink)

This paper aims to investigate the differences between the concepts of libel and slander as understood by the Polish statutory and English common law. As it turns out, the above terms are not only divergent with regard to language but also with regard to corresponding acts in the real world. Western cultures cherish such values as dignity, honour and self-fulfillment as the underlying rights of a citizen in democratic countries. The above terms are being constantly referred to in international (...) treaties and conventions but the question which should be asked is whether they receive due attention in legal practice. As regards interpretation, not only in theory, but also in practice the important issue is not how the defamatory statement makes the person referred to feel, but the impression it is likely to make on those reading it. The subsequent analysis of particular cases in the practical part supports the above claim. Although it is reiterated by the Polish legal academics that civil regulations are not sufficient to guarantee legal protection of dignity, there is an equal or even greater amount of supporters of the broadly conceived “freedom of speech”. The discussion might be summarized as involving the proponents of liberal and democratic policies on the one hand, and those who wish to avoid complete decriminalization of libel and slander and deem them necessary components of balance in a democratic state. (shrink)

In an anecdote in the Holy Bible, there is a rumor that because the Prophet David wanted to marry a woman named Bathsheba, whom he saw, he commissioned her soldier husband Uriah the Hittite to cause him to die in the most critical places of the army. In Islamic sources, some narrations originating from Isrāʾīliyyāt have been conveyed in many different ways. Likewise, in some Islamic sources, this incident, which is attributed to the Prophet David, was unfortunately also linked to (...) the marriage of the Prophet Muḥammad and Zaynab b. Jaḥsh. In addition, there is a claim that the Prophet Muḥammad sent Zayd b. Ḥāritha, who was Zaynab b. Jaḥsh’s ex-husband, to many wars and eventually caused his death in Muʾta war. First, the so-called incident between Prophet David and Uriah the Hittite will be discussed, and thereafter, Prophet Muḥammad and Zaynab b. Jaḥsh’s marriage will be thoroughly addressed in the study. In addition, it will be revealed that the incident that was attributed to the Prophet David was in no way similar to the incident of assigning Zayd b. Ḥāritha as a commander.Summary: According to a parable in the Bible, Prophet David sees a woman bathing while he was walking around the roof of his palace one night and he is impressed by her. Prophet David sends someone to investigate who this woman is, and as a result of the research, it is revealed that this woman is Bathsheba, the wife of Uriah the Hittite, one of the commanders of Prophet David. Prophet David sends someone to bring this woman and when the woman is brought to him, he commits adultery with her. The woman becomes pregnant after this affair and informs Prophet David about this situation. After receiving this news of pregnancy, Prophet David sends a message to the commander-in-chief, Joab, who is at war with his army, and asks him to send Uriah the Hittite to him. After hosting Uriah the Hittite in the palace for a few days, Prophet David sends him back to the front with a letter to be given to the commander-in-chief, Joab. In this letter, Prophet David asks the commander-in-chief, Joab, to send Uriah the Hittite to the most dangerous place in the war and to ensure that he is killed. Fulfilling the order stated in the letter of Prophet Davud, Joab sends Uriah the Hittite to a region where the war will be the harshest and causes him to be killed there. After the mourning of Bathsheba for her husband ends, Prophet David marries her. According to the Islamic belief, it is not possible for this incident to occur as it was mentioned in the Bible since the prophets were protected by Allah. It is because the parable states Prophet David committed adultery. In the Qur’ān, which is the source where we can get the clearest information about the incident, it is narrated inverses 21-25 of sûra Ṣād. Although there is a partial resemblance between the verses and the Bible, the verses do not mention either the woman or Prophet David’s sending that woman’s husband to the war because he wanted to marry her.In other Islamic sources, some relevant narrations originating in Isrāʾīliyyāt are narrated in many different ways. Our tafsīr scholars did not approve these narrations originating in Isrāʾīliyyāt. Also, they stated that the narrations expressing that Prophet David sent Uriah the Hittite to the war for his killing were not true and that such a situation would not be suitable for a prophet or even for a Muslim.In the same sources, many different possibilities were voiced in order to resolve the situation and this incident, which was attributed to Prophet David, was tried to be placed on a more reasonable ground. As a result of these efforts, the marriage of the Prophet Muḥammad and Zaynab b. Jaḥsh has been linked to this incident in various ways.Although it is not possible to give a certain date of the marriage of Zaynab and Zayd b. Ḥāritha, it is seen that this marriage occurred with the help of the Prophet Muḥammad in the first year of the emigration to Madinah. The marriage of the Prophet Muḥammad’s aunt’s daughter and Zayd, a freed slave, was for eliminating the discrimination between free individuals and slaves that existed in the society.There is not any serious problem about the marriage of Zayd and Zaynab at this point. However, at the point of ending this marriage, there are some narrations in our sources, and these leave the Prophet Muḥammad under suspicion. According to these narrations, the Prophet Muḥammad went to Zayd’s house to meet him and the Prophet Muḥammad called out to Zayd from outside the house. For not keeping the Prophet Muḥammad outside, Zaynab opened the door and invited the Prophet Muḥammad in by stating that Zayd was not at home although the clothes on her were not suitable. As soon as the Prophet Muḥammad saw her, he immediately turned his head and because he liked Zaynab, “I exonerate almighty Allah. I exonerate Allah that has turned the hearts.” he grumbled. After a while, Zayd came home and learned what the Prophet Muḥammad said. He immediately went to the Prophet Muḥammad and said “Messenger of Allah! May my mother and father be sacrificed for you. If you liked Zaynab, let me divorce her for you.” However, the Prophet Muḥammad advised him not to divorce his wife. As far as we can find in our sources, there are two other similar narrations.These narrations contain many problems in terms of both isnād and logical consistency. When we examine at the narrations in terms of isnād, we see that all three narrations are mursal. We can say that this is the first factor that reduces the reliability of narrations. Secondly, all narrations have at least one narrator accused of weakness or even dishonesty. Therefore, it is not appropriate to base a serious claim about the Prophet Muḥammad on such weak narrations. In addition, the rumor that the Prophet Muḥammad liked Zaynab, his aunt’s daughter and a married woman, and wished that she would divorce her husband has no reasonable logic. The fact that the marriage of Zayd and Zaynab ended quickly was mostly caused by Zaynab’s harsh temperament. Moreover, although Zaynab did not want this marriage, she could not oppose the order of the Prophet Muḥammad due to the verse about her. For these reasons, Zaynab could not get along with her husband and she was constantly reflecting her dissatisfaction with this marriage on Zayd. Therefore, Zayd constantly complained about Zaynab, but the Prophet Muḥammad gave Zayd the same advice every time, commanding “Keep your spouse with you, do not leave her!” Although the Prophet Muḥammad constantly banned Zayd, he could not stand Zaynab anymore and divorced her. After he divorced Zaynab, verse 37 of sûra al-Aḥzāb was sent down. Thus, the marriage of the Prophet Muḥammad and Zaynab took place as a result of a divine will.There is also a claim that the Prophet Muḥammad sent Zayd, the ex-husband of Zaynab, to many wars and consequently caused him to be killed in Muʾta war. When we examine the dates of the nine military expeditions, in which the Prophet Muḥammad appointed Zayd as a commander, it is seen that the first expedition was held on 3/624 while the others were held after 6/627. Therefore, at least eight of the nine expeditions in which Zayd served as a commander were taken place after the marriage of the Prophet Muḥammad and Zaynab. Consequently, in the light of this information, it is clear that the fact that Zayd was appointed as a commander is not similar to the situation in narrations about Prophet David. (shrink)

On countering slander, religious hate speech, and blasphemy from Islamic perspectives to build religious harmony in Indonesia.

The slandering of a firm’s products by competing firms poses significant threats to the victim firm, with the resulting damage often being as harmful as that from product-harm crises. In contrast to a true product-harm crisis, however, this disparagement is based on a false claim or fake news; thus, we call it a pseudo-product-harm crisis. Using a pseudo-product-harm crisis event that involved two competing firms, this research examines how consumer sentiments about the two firms evolved in response to the crisis. (...) Our analyses show that while both firms suffered, the damage to the offending firm (which spread fake news to cause the crisis) was more detrimental, in terms of advertising effectiveness and negative news publicity, than that to the victim firm (which suffered from the false claim). Our study indicates that, even apart from ethical concerns, the false claim about the victim firm was not an effective business strategy to increase the offending firm’s performance. (shrink)

The slandering of a firm’s products by competing firms poses significant threats to the victim firm, with the resulting damage often being as harmful as that from product-harm crises. In contrast to a true product-harm crisis, however, this disparagement is based on a false claim or fake news; thus, we call it a pseudo-product-harm crisis. Using a pseudo-product-harm crisis event that involved two competing firms, this research examines how consumer sentiments about the two firms evolved in response to the crisis. (...) Our analyses show that while both firms suffered, the damage to the offending firm was more detrimental, in terms of advertising effectiveness and negative news publicity, than that to the victim firm. Our study indicates that, even apart from ethical concerns, the false claim about the victim firm was not an effective business strategy to increase the offending firm’s performance. (shrink)

This essay investigates the indeterminacy thesis - roughly the claim that the content of authoritative legal materials (such as the texts of constitutions, statutes, cases, rules, and regulations) does not determine the outcome of particular legal disputes. The indeterminacy thesis can be formulated as either "strong" or weak." The strong version of the indeterminacy thesis is demonstrably false, but several weak versions of the thesis are true but lack the radical implications of strong indeterminacy.The strong indeterminacy thesis is the claim (...) that all cases are "hard" cases - or that in any case any conceivable result can be derived from existing legal doctrine. Strong indeterminacy does not hold if there are easy cases - cases in which some outcomes cannot be legally correct. For example, if it were the case that the first paragraph of this abstract did not slander Gore Vidal, then there would be at least one easy case, and strong indeterminacy would be false.Weak versions of the indeterminacy thesis include the claim that important cases are indeterminate, that the law does not necessarily determine outcomes, or that every case could become indeterminate if political conditions supported indeterminacy. These weaker claims may be true, but they lack the critical bite associated with strong indeterminacy.The essay also distinguishes between "determinacy," "indeterminacy," and "underdeterminacy." The law is "determinate" with respect ot a given case if and only if the set of results that can be squared with the legal materials contains only one member. The law is "indeterminate" with respect to a given case if and only if the set of results that can be squared with the legal materials is identical with the set of all imaginable results. The law is "underdeterminate" with respect to a given case if and only if the set of results that can be squared with the legal materials is a nonidentical subset of the set of all imaginable results.This article was first published in 1987, and some of the author's views have been revised in interim. (shrink)

This chapter is an intervention into the interpretation of Franz Kafka's great novels The Trial and The Castle; implicitly, it constitutes a divided assault on the divisiveness of the law. In Roman law, slander represented so serious a threat for the administration of justice that the false accuser was punished by the branding of the letter K on his forehead. The gravity of slander is a function of its calling into question the principle itself of the trial: the (...) moment of accusation. K.'s strategy can be defined with more precision as the failed attempt to render impossible, not the trial, but the confession. The profession of the protagonist of The Castle is addressed. The interpretation according to which K. wants to be accepted by the castle and settle in the village would then appear all the more mistaken. (shrink)

In this essay, after a brief decolonial analysis of the concept of “poetry” in Indigenous communities, I will investigate the poetic-philosophical implications of Cherokee culture, more specifically the poetic essence of the Cherokee language, the poetic aspects of Cherokee myth (pre-history) and post-myth (history), and the poetic-philosophical powers of Cherokee ritual. My first section analyzes the poetic essence, structure, special features, and historical context of the Cherokee language, drawing on Ruth Holmes and Betty Sharp Smith’s language textbook, Beginning Cherokee. My (...) second section considers poetic aspects of the pre-history and history of the Cherokee Nation considered as a text, using Robert J. Conley’s The Cherokee Nation: A History. And my third section investigates the poetic nature of the Cherokee rituals’ myth-ontological background and its existential psychological implications, via J. T. Garrett & Michael Tlanusta Garrett’s The Cherokee Full Circle: A Practical Guide to Ceremonies and Traditions. Collectively, these analyses will suggest that, just as the Cherokee and other tribes are the slandered, disenfranchised, suppressed and covered-over Indigenous peoples of the North American continent, so poetry writ large (including Indigenous philosophy) is the slandered, disenfranchised, suppressed and covered-over arche of western philosophy (as I have previously explored via a new interpretation of Nietzsche). In short, I will argue that both poetry and Cherokee culture can be understood as indigenous “absences” which are in truth vital and enduring presences. (shrink)

Hannah Arendt develops an immensely attractive account of `judgment', both as a supremely important human mental capacity and with respect to its place in political life, and this account rightly draws attention from a broad array of political theorists. Her essay `Truth and Politics' is one of the texts in which she first articulates this account of judgment. However, the account of truth offered in that essay is full of both puzzles and problems — notably, the puzzle of why Arendt, (...) committed as she is to elevating the dignity of political life, thinks she needs to drive a wedge between politics and truth to the extent that she does in her account of the relation between them. The question pursued in this article is: why does Arendt think that, in order to give judgment and opinion the dignity that are appropriate to them, she needs, as it were, to slander truth as `coercive', `tyrannical', and so on? (shrink)

The defining debate in this new century will be about technology and human enhancement, according to many across the political spectrum.[1] Our ability to use science to enhance our bodies and minds – as opposed to its application for therapeutic purposes – is one of the most personal and therefore passionate issues in an era where emerging technologies seduce us with new and fantastic possibilities for our future. But in the process, we are forced to rethink what it means to (...) be human or, essentially, our own identity. For some, technology holds the promise of making us superhuman; for others, it offers a darker path toward becoming Frankenstein’s monster. This paper will look at a growing chorus of calls for human enhancement to be embraced and unrestricted. Specifically, we will critically examine recent “pro-enhancement” arguments – articulated in More Than Human by Ramez Naam,[2] as one of the most visible works on the subject today – and conclude that they ultimately need to be strengthened, if they are to be convincing. Our overarching motive here is not so much that we are against human enhancement technologies; that seems to be too premature a conclusion given the state of research and debate, and such technologies may be inevitable anyway. However, we believe that a skeptical eye should be applied to claims that there should be no restrictions on any particular action. Even our most cherished human rights are bounded by reason or societal norms, for whatever they are worth. For instance, our right to free speech still does not allow us to yell “Fire!” in a crowded theater or to slander others. Our right to fall in love and to make love with whom we want does not extend to children. And for all the talk about the virtues of a “free market” or “free trade”, the invisible hand of our economy is still occasionally slapped by anti-trust lawsuits, which would not be an issue if the market were truly free. So even if human enhancement seems to be a reasonable practice and even a right, restrictions may still be required to mitigate undesirable circumstances or unintended consequences – which would be consistent with how functioning societies treat other liberties, values and rights. (shrink)

Cet article se propose de mettre en lumière les dynamiques interactionnelles mises en œuvre par la pratique comique de l’onomasti kômôidein, à travers le recours à certaines instruments théoriques fournis par la socio-linguistique (analyse interactionnelle et conversationnelle). En soulignant l’analogie existante entre les injures que les acteurs adressent contre des citoyens réels appelés par leur nom et la calomnie, la diabolè, il propose de nuancer l’opposition, qui domine la critique aristophanienne, entre les interprétations « ritualistes » et les interprétations « (...) politiques » de ce phénomène dramatique. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Collective Violence, Sacrifice, and Conflict Resolution in the Works of Paul Claudel Christopher G. Flood University ofSurrey, England Claudel's career as a writer spanned almost seventy years, from the 1880s to the 1950s. The publication of his collected works now runs to twenty-nine large volumes, excluding his correspondence and diaries, so a brief overview of any particular dimension of his writing must necessarily be reductive. On the other hand, (...) Claudel's work lends itself particularly well to discussion in terms of the relationship between violence, sacrifice and religion. In a valuable study published more than twenty years ago under the title, Claudel et l'usurpateur, Jacques Petit drew attention to the recurrence in Claudel's plays, and in many of his non- fictional writings, of a narrative structure hinging on acts of usurpation and counter-usurpation. There is a pattern of conflictual rivalry, domination and coercion, whereby acts of aggression are ultimately legitimized, or in some sense excused, in the light of a positive outcome, providential necessity and/or reconciliation between usurper and victim. Claudel's world is indeed "a world of violence," as Petit puts it (79, ch. title).1 It is also a world ofreligion: after his return to the Catholic Church in 1890, all of Claudel's major dramatic works intermesh the process of usurpation with themes deriving from his religious beliefs, and the same is true of many of his non-fictional writings. My aim is not to reinvent the wheel by going back over all of the terrain mapped out by Petit. Nor do I intend to rework Petit's empirical model wholesale in the light of René Girard's anthropological model of mimetic desire and sacrificial violence, although there are obvious areas of convergence between them. However, I shall draw implicitly on both, in order to Translations throughout this paper are my own. 160Christopher G. Flood argue that the notion of sacrifice, which is central to the resolution of rivalries in Claudel's major plays, is transformed into an idiosyncratic conception of international conflict resolution in various non-fictional writings which emerge from his forty years of experience in his parallel career as a profes sional diplomat.2 1 shall start with a schematic discussion of certain features of the plays. The first point relates to Claudel's assumptions concerning the mechanisms involved in the outbreak of individual or collective violence. It needs to be emphasized that in his plays the path towards violence is always opened by a withdrawal or weakening of temporal and/or spiritual authority. This allows the crystallization, and the direct expression, of latent rivalries which eventually lead to an explosion of aggression. The causes of the violence invariably center on the fact that one individual or group is in possession of an object which is coveted by another individual or group. The question of whether Claudel himself appears to recognize a mimetic element in this pattern of behavior would be too complex, and too fraught with imponderables, to discuss here, but there are some indications that he does so. Whatever the case, in the absence of authority, rivalry and jealousy engender verbal, and usually physical conflict, culminating in usurpation of the desired object. Thus, for example, in Tête d'or, the elderly Emperor of the unnamed kingdom has neither the authority nor the resolution to defend his kingdom against external invasion, or against the man who saves the kingdom only to usurp the throne and murder the Emperor himself.3 Similarly, in the second version of La Ville, neither Besme, the positivistic scientist and plutocrat who has created the godless City, nor his brother Lambert, the former politician, has the will to maintain or defend the society against the tensions emerging within it. Thus, the City dissolves first into immobility, then revolution. Or again, in the family drama of La Jeune Fille Violaine (second version), the obsessional rage andjealousy ofMara towards her elder sister, Violaine, explodes into coercion, slander, and horrific violence when their father absents himself from the farm for an indefinite period, leaving Violaine to marry Jacques Hury: the fact that Hury loves Violaine, but does not love Mara, makes the latter all the... (shrink)

This article approaches the issue of Matthew’s theological context by examining Matthew’s use of Mark, including through redaction and supplementation, in Matthew 1–4. This is undertaken in two parts: Matthew 1–2, which is largely additional material, and Matthew 3–4, followed by a concluding assessment. Issues addressed or alluded to in these chapters frequently find resonance in the remainder of Matthew’s gospel and so give important clues about Matthew’s concerns and their relevance for understanding its context. Such issues include the importance (...) of messiahship; continuity with Israel, but also with John the Baptist and the Church; defence against slander; heightened christological claims; soteriology; Gentile mission; the status of Torah; and Jesus as judge to come. The article suggests a location within a Jewish religious context with a Jewish self-understanding, separate from the synagogue, but claiming to belong where its opponents would claim it did not; and a Christian tradition where the approach of ‘Q’ to Torah is upheld in contrast to Mark’s, while embracing and expanding Mark’s Christology and restoring the common understanding of Gentile mission as a post- Easter phenomenon. (shrink)

continent. 1.2 (2011): 145-147. Here I accoutred myself in my new habiliments; and, having em- ployed the same precautions as before, retired from my lodging at a time least exposed to observation. It is unnecessary to des- cribe the particulars of my new equipage; suffice it to say, that one of my cares was to discolour my complexion, and give it the dun and sallow hue which is in most instances characteristic of the tribe to which I assumed to belong; (...) and that when my metamorphosis was finished, I could not, upon the strictest ex- amination, conceive that any one could have traced out the per- son of Caleb Williams in this new disguise. William Godwin Caleb Williams (352). Giorgio Agamben. Nudities . Trans. David Kishik and Stefan Pedatella. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011. 144 pp. | 10 illustrations. | ISBN: 9780804769501 | $16.95 A. The Protective Overcoat. The most pervasive, resilient, robust, sneaky, and significant concept in all of Giorgio Agamben’s essays is that of separation. This is not the same as alienation. Separation is more nostalgic, for Agamben valorizes an ancient world in which human society and its beings were not subject to such separation. He implies that these separations are damaging to human beings, crippling them at the very level of their identities. $4.99 B. The Handsome Gloves. Giorgio Agamben’s Nudities , like Profanations before it, employs a wide range of subjects in order to establish separation as a metaphor, in much the same way that interdisciplinary scholars have adopted Michel Foucault’s concepts in order to rethink societies and texts. The longest essay from Profanations, entitled “In Praise of Profanation,” laments humankind’s inability to profane as the result of what Walter Benjamin has called “the capitalist religion.” Likewise, “Nudity” adopts a pessimistic stance on the Christian theological tradition’s perverse asphyxiation of the unclothed body. $2.50 C. The Hoop Earrings. Religion separates humans from things by procuring for itself items as “sacred,” thus taking them out of common use. In this state, human beings are unable to play with them, unable to change their use-value. They become off-limits, museified. $1,499.00 D. The Uncomfortable Shoes. Biometrics polices identity, replacing meaningful metrics of identity. It is a deplorable situation that leaves human beings in danger of, and indeed already victims of, mass persecution. $111.75 E. The Prince Albert. One could characterize Giorgio Agamben’s desire to catalogue a history of ignorance as a recognition that human beings are separated from knowledge by language. Where then is the prophet, and how shall we be saved? $49.50 + tip F. The Corset. Franz Kafka’s character of Joseph K. has put himself on trial, as in Roman trials when the Kalumniator was marked with the letter K. The torture he undergoes is meant to elicit a confession of the truth. It is possible that Giorgio Agamben perceives his role as a philosopher to be confined to self-trial, and that with every passage he flays the unclothed page with prophetic intent. $27.00 G. The Derby. Giorgio Agamben himself tries to bridge various separations through exploratory play. He is not a performative writer semantically, but his exploratory style is rooted in the play spirit. His strategy of numbering points is almost comical, yet it is not misleading. It is play, after all, not ruse. He denudes with pecks, like carrion on a tattered corpse. $11.00 H. The Trousers. Although Giorgio Agamben is elsewhere concerned with the profanation of religion’s apparatuses, in essay nine he would like to consider what is consumed during days of inoperativity, how religion governs these, and how to account for our binges and purges. Inoperativity is inextricably bound to feasting, to the festival. $24.50 I. The Stylish Belt. The only essay in Nudities to contain photographs is the essay entitled, “Nudity.” All of these photographs project human bodies. $.01 I The aim here is not to tap into an original state prior to the separation but to comprehend and neutralize the apparatus that produced this separation. (66) II The contemporary is he who firmly holds his gaze on his own time so as to perceive not its light but rather its darkness. (13) III We can therefore only experience nudity as a denudation and a baring, never as a form and a stable possession. (65) IV Just as genius and talent originally distinct and even opposite—are nevertheless united in the work of the poet, so the work of creation and the work of salvation, inasmuch as they represent the two powers of a single God, remain in some way secretly conjoined. (6) V In our culture, the face-body relationship is marked by a fundamental asymmetry, in that our faces remain for the most part naked, while our bodies are normally covered. (88) VI Every man initiates a slanderous trial against himself. (21) VII The glorious body is not some other body, more agile and beautiful, more luminous and spiritual; it is the body itself, at the moment when inoperativity removes the spell from it and opens it up to a new possible common use. (103) VIII As Kleist understood so well, the relationship with a zone of nonknowledge is a dance. (114) IX The deactivation of this apparatus retroactively operates, therefore, as much on nature as on grace, as much on nudity as on clothing, liberating them from their theological signature. (90) X At any rate, whether festive inoperativity precedes religion or results from the profanation of its apparatuses, what is essential here is a dimension of praxis in which simple, quotidian human activities are neither negated nor abolished but suspended and rendered inoperative in order to be exhibited, as such, in a festive manner. (112) XI This is just how much [of] the land [the] surveyor is allowed to catch a glimpse. (36). (shrink)

In December of last year, a few clowns appeared on the grand and spectacular stage of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. These clowns were the reincarnated ghosts from the Capital Red Guard West City, East City, and Haidian Districts Pickets. They viciously attacked Chairman Mao's revolutionary line, engaged in slander on the Central Cultural Revolution Group, called dear Comrade Jiang Qing names, and sabotaged the organizations under the proletarian dictatorship. They provoked violence, created chaos, searched and confiscated the possessions (...) of revolutionary organizations, and spread reactionary declarations. The crimes they committed are simply too numerous to mention. These clowns were none other than the "Capital Red Guards United Action Committee.". (shrink)

Hannah Arendt develops an immensely attractive account of `judgment', both as a supremely important human mental capacity and with respect to its place in political life, and this account rightly draws attention from a broad array of political theorists. Her essay `Truth and Politics' is one of the texts in which she first articulates this account of judgment. However, the account of truth offered in that essay is full of both puzzles and problems — notably, the puzzle of why Arendt, (...) committed as she is to elevating the dignity of political life, thinks she needs to drive a wedge between politics and truth to the extent that she does in her account of the relation between them. The question pursued in this article is: why does Arendt think that, in order to give judgment and opinion the dignity that are appropriate to them, she needs, as it were, to slander truth as `coercive', `tyrannical', and so on? (shrink)

What is harm? I offer an account that involves the victim’s either suffering some adverse intrinsic change or being prevented from enjoying some beneficial intrinsic change. No one is harmed, I claim, in virtue of relational changes alone. Thus (excepting for contrived cases), there are neither posthumous harms nor, in life, harms of the undiscovered betrayal, slander, reputation-damaging variety. Further, two widespread moves in the philosophy of death are rejected. First, death and posthumous are not to be assimilated—death does (...) bring about adverse internal change and harms us straightforwardly. Second, Pitcher-type accounts of posthumous harm are criticized—posthumous events can thwart the satisfaction of my interests, but I am not harmed either just when this occurs or, earlier, when I first acquire or invest in those interests. We have other ways of describing what is going on. (shrink)

WHEN ONE ASSUMES, as I will, that death marks the irrevocable end to one’s existence, it is difficult to make sense of the idea that a person could be harmed or benefited by events that take place after her death. How could a posthumous event either enhance or diminish the welfare of the deceased, who no longer exists? Yet we find that many people have a prudential (i.e., self-interested) concern for what’s going to happen after their deaths.1 People are, for (...) instance, concerned that their reputations not be slandered, that their achievements not be undermined, and that their contributions not be forgotten, not even after their deaths. Of course, many philosophers would insist that such a concern for what’s going to happen after one’s death must be based on, or a remnant of, a false belief in an afterlife. I, however, will argue that even if death marks the unequivocal and permanent end to one’s existence, people have good reason to be prudentially concerned with what’s going to happen after their deaths, for, as I will show, a person’s welfare can indeed be affected by posthumous events. (shrink)

Relatively compact biography of the seventeenth-century French philosopher is determined to reverse the slander of scandal in vogue among Descartes' recent biographers and to modify the view of his intellectual development.

Helen's self-disparagement is an anomaly in epic diction, and this is especially true of those instances where she refers to herself as "dog" and "dog-face." This essay attempts to show that Helen's dog-language, in that it remains in conflict with other features of her characterization, has some generic significance for epic, helping to establish the superiority of epic performance over competing performance types which treated her differently. The metaphoric use of χύων and its derivatives has not been well understood: the (...) scholiast's gloss "shameless" is no more than a functional equivalent, and interpretations linking it primarily with reckless courage or with sexual misconduct are not well founded. An analysis of contexts suggests that "dog" as an insult has a fundamental association with physical greed and even cannibalism. The implied notion of avarice, however, may also be extended into other behavioral spheres, including those of fighting and sexuality. A character may also be called "dog" for reviling or slandering another unjustly. These strongly negative implications are out of keeping with the character given to Helen in epic. For where tragedy and lyric generally represent Helen as blameworthy, Homeric epic tends to absolve her of blame and to make her personally as well as physically attractive. The unexpected application of dog-terms to her may therefore be read as an allusion to other versions of the Troy legend which were more hostile to Helen. Negative portrayals of Helen are likely to have figured in the ancient kitharodic narrative which was a precursor of both tragedy and lyric; these are perhaps the unfriendly "songs" mentioned by Helen at Il. 6.357. By referring to such defamatory narratives through the dog-insult and through other instances of Helen's self-blame, the epic performer marks his own more favorable treatment as a generic preference. (shrink)

How can the subliminal, mysterious, but uncommonly powerful living-on, the presence, of the past be envisaged? In this essay I argue that presence is not brought about by stories — by, that is, the "storiness" of stories. Presence rather shows itself in how the past can force us—and enable us—to rewrite our stories about ourselves. The question then is how we acquire the experiences that can eventually force us to do so. How, and with what kind of things, does the (...) mémoire involontaire—from which presence wells up—get filled? In order to answer this question one might turn it around to the question how we can fill the mémoire involontaire of others. A consideration of the "art of slandering" shows that the mémoire involontaire tends to get filled with things that we believe are "common knowledge," that are "obliquely" communicated, and that are cast in metonymies. Metonymy offers a much better road to the mémoire involontaire than metaphor because metonymy is better at suggesting that what it conveys is "common knowledge." Therefore, I propose that presence resides in the metonymical region of language. Instead of being contained in the meaningful content of stories, presence resides in what a story inadvertently has to be—in, that is, the things a story has to present in order to present a story. My conclusion is that as presence the past is the exact opposite of what historians think it is. It is indestructible, uncannily close, and—despite its closeness and its durability—utterly impossible to conserve in "representations" that can be taken along in the hand luggage with which we traverse time. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Buddhist-Christian Studies 25 (2005) 49-65 [Access article in PDF] The Three Minds and Faith, Hope, and Love in Pure Land Buddhism Sharon Baker Southern Methodist University,Messiah College Generally, the Buddhist path to nirvana calls a person to leave the mundane life and live as a monk, a sage, or a saint who continually works toward the pure state, toward nirvana. The way to Buddhahood can take the practitioner through (...) the process of death and rebirth for many centuries until he attains enlightenment and nirvana. Hence, Pure Land Buddhism is good news to those forced by karma to live mundane lives keeping house, working a trade, raising children. In other words, Pure Land Buddhism is good news for the common person. Pure Land Buddhism, especially in the thought of Shinran and Tanabe, seeks to provide a straight and easy way for the "small, foolish beings," for the greatest of sinners and those who are most evil. Even the most evil person possessed by blind passions is grasped by the great compassion of Amida Buddha. This great compassion, as revealed in Amida's Vow, knows no limits. Even a person's karmic evil, deep and heavy as it is, is not oppressive for the one who is embraced by the love of Amida Buddha—love that never tires, blessing that constantly protects, compassion that never abandons. The love and compassion of Amida Buddha are realized through his Vow of Great Compassion. Shinran states that "the joy of knowing the wonder and benevolence of the Vow of great compassion that Amida established for us, beings of karmic evil, is boundless and can never be fully expressed, for it surpasses all thought and all words."1 The Vow of Great Compassion The Vow of Great Compassion does not take into consideration whether or not one is good or evil, young or old; only faith matters. Indeed, through faith, the Vow saves all sentient beings, especially those burdened with powerful sins and those torn by great evils. Believing in the Vow, therefore, does not depend upon any other good—no matter how hard he tries, no human being can ever be good enough for salvation without belief in the Vow of Great Compassion.2In an attempt to discover a salvation by faith not generated by an act of human will, Shinran is drawn to the three spiritual attitudes described in the Eighteenth Vow, which states: "If, when I attain Buddhahood, the sentient beings of the ten [End Page 49] quarters with sincere mind entrusting themselves, aspiring to be born in my land, and saying my Name even ten times, should not be born there, may I not attain the supreme enlightenment. Excluded are those who commit the five grave offenses and those who slander the right dharma."3 This is the Vow upon which true shinjin4 is based—the Vow of sincere mind and trust. Those who practice the Vow include all the good, the evil, and the foolish, who, after realizing shinjin, are certain of attaining salvation—that is, enlightenment in the Pure Land. Shinran states that "this shinjin is the very cause for the attainment of the supreme enlightenment."5 Birth in the Pure Land, along with supreme enlightenment, is assured for those who have been given true shinjin. Amida and the countless Buddhas in the ten quarters watch over believers and protect them so that they cannot be led astray into strange teachings or tormented by demonic forces. In fact, "Shinran might have said in the modern situation that just as assuredly as the sun rises in the morning, our enlightenment is guaranteed by the Vow."6It is important to note that faith in the Vow of Great Compassion is brought about only by the power and compassion of Amida Buddha. By using various compassionate means, Amida Buddha (and even Sakyamuni) awakens the supreme shinjin in people. Amida and Sakyamuni grasp the person in whom they have awakened shinjin and they never abandon him. There is no calculation on the part of the person whatsoever; there is only... (shrink)

Crito was written in response to popular slanders concerning Socrates' failure to escape from prison, and accompanying misgivings within the Socratic circle. Plato responds by asking his audience to disregard the slander of the mob and obey the moral expert instead. But he also responds by creating an image of Socrates and his friends widely at odds with the popular slander; by implying that Socrates' critics were themselves guilty of some of the behaviour they charged against Socrates; by (...) pointing out that Socrates had no viable alternative to death; and, in partial contradiction to all this, by rejecting the popular morality which saw Socrates' abandonment and death as signs of failure. In the rhetorical climax of the composition, Plato shows that Socrates chose to die rather than victimize or offend the laws of the city, which he represents as sentient beings. The weaknesses that have been perceived in the arguments of the Athenian Laws are not fatal to the composition, because it aims not at a convincing demonstration, but at providing a portrait of Socrates' own overwhelming conviction of the rightness of his decision. (shrink)

The execution of the prophet Mani by the Sasanian king Bahram I received sharply different treatments in the historiography of three of the confessional groups of the Sasanian empire. Variously a persecuted prophet, a blasphemous lunatic or a sinister heresiarch the representations of this moment sought to establish its meaning in the context of communal narratives predicated on the claims of sacred history. Despite this, it is notable that Manichean, Christian and Perso-Arabic accounts clearly share features. This indicates not only (...) that Mani’s death became a site of competition between the constituent groups of the Sasanian empire, but that the internal historiographies of these groups were in some sense entwined, or at least sensitive to the historical claims made by their opponents. This is particularly relevant in the case of the Perso-Arabic narrative. This version, which almost certainly descends from a priestly Zoroastrian source, presents a picture of a confident priesthood stiffening the spine of a wavering king. It is contended that the source of this story was composed as a counterstrike in a historical debate in which Christian and Manichean authors had successfully propagated an image of Bahram’s court as religiously tepid and his priests as slanderers or non-entities. That such an intervention was required signals a disjuncture between early and late forms of Sasanian ideology. Moreover, it presents more evidence in support of theories of a late and deliberate construction of Zoroastrian “orthodoxy”. (shrink)

Counterpunch, November 23, 2009 In his wild and slanderous "Open Letter to Amnesty International" (signed, fittingly, "Yours, in disgust and despair"),[2] The Guardian - Observer's veteran reporter Ed Vulliamy explains that two "main concerns" motivated him to draft his repudiation of AI's choice of Noam Chomsky to deliver this 2009 Stand Up For Justice lecture: One is that the "pain" individuals such as Chomsky are alleged to cause the "survivors and the bereaved" of the wars in the former Yugoslavia is (...) "immeasurable," and Vulliamy feels some kind of need to help mitigate this pain; the other, apparently, is that the "historical record" as it pertains to these wars is too precious and too fragile to be left in the wrong pair of hands. "For Amnesty International, of all people, to honour this man is to tear up whatever credibility they have estimably and admirably won over the decades, and to reduce all they say hitherto to didactic nonsense," Vulliamy writes. "By inviting Chomsky to give this lecture, Amnesty condemns itself to ridicule at best, hurtful malice at worst -- Amnesty joins the revisionists in spitting on the graves of the dead.". (shrink)

This article focuses on a particular episode in Sammy Gronemann’s life that occurred in 1902 and is briefly described in his memoires, Erinnerungen. Gronemann was asked to travel to Mainz for a propaganda lecture on behalf of the Zionist Movement in which he caused an uproar. Earlier in the year, the Jewish-orthodox newspaper Der Israelit of Mainz had published a slanderous article on the Zionist bank, the Jewish Colonial Trust, for which it was sued by the Zionist leadership. In the (...) midst of the trial against the paper and its editor-in-chief, Oskar Lehmann, efforts were made to bring the trial to a quick end by means of a settlement. During Gronemann’s talk in Mainz, he spotted Lehmann in the audience and entered into a tirade. He publicly insulted Lehmann, who angrily left the venue. This caused an uproar and jeopardized the leverage of the Zionists in the settlement negotiations and the trial’s speedy conclusion. This paper provides the background to the events, discusses its outcome, and puts the episode in its historical context. (shrink)

Samuel Johnson has an interesting comment on consequences and the telling of “white lies.” For example “Sick People and Children are often to be deceived for their Good.” David Hume apparently endorses this concept in one of his letters. Both Johnson and Rousseau anticipate Kant’s argument about consequences in that one is to tell the truth under all circumstances. Hume, I argue, would take issue with this claim in that there are cases that warrant telling white lies. Elsewhere he speaks (...) about “harmless liars” who indulge in “lying or fiction... in humorous stories.” And he says “Noble pride and spirit may openly display itself when one lies under calamity [defamation or slander] or opposition of any kind,” especially if the opposition puts one’s life in grave danger, so one’s self-preservation is threatened. Under situations like these, lying is justified. In regard to fiction, if lying is for the purpose of entertainment and where “truth is not of any importance,” it is permissible. These cases are discussed in some detail, and they offer, along with their analysis, a pragmatic defense of Hume’s position. (shrink)

Samuel Johnson has an interesting comment on consequences and the telling of “white lies.” For example “Sick People and Children are often to be deceived for their Good.” David Hume apparently endorses this concept in one of his letters. Both Johnson and Rousseau anticipate Kant’s argument about consequences in that one is to tell the truth under all circumstances. Hume, I argue, would take issue with this claim in that there are cases that warrant telling white lies. Elsewhere he speaks (...) about “harmless liars” who indulge in “lying or fiction... in humorous stories.” And he says “Noble pride and spirit may openly display itself when one lies under calamity [defamation or slander] or opposition of any kind,” especially if the opposition puts one’s life in grave danger, so one’s self-preservation is threatened. Under situations like these, lying is justified. In regard to fiction, if lying is for the purpose of entertainment and where “truth is not of any importance,” it is permissible. These cases are discussed in some detail, and they offer, along with their analysis, a pragmatic defense of Hume’s position. (shrink)

There is a widespread view according to which deontology can be construed as a flexible, reasonable view, able to incorporate consequentialist considerations when it seems compelling to do so. According to this view, deontologists can be moderate, and their presentation as die-hard fanatics, even if true to some historical figures, is basically a slanderous and misleading philosophical straw man. I argue that deontologists, properly understood, are not moderate. In the way deontology is typically understood, a deontology, as such, conceptually needs (...) to be overriding. The error I point out has pernicious implications, which are noted. (shrink)

Whatever it is, bad weather or good, the loss of a friend, sickness, slander, the failure of some letter to arrive, the spraining of an ankle, a glance into a shop, a counter-argument, the opening of a book, a dream, a fraud - either immediately or very soon after it proves to be something that "must not be missing"; it has a profound significance and use precisely for us. Is there any more dangerous seduction that might tempt one to (...) renounce one's faith in the gods of Epicurus who have no care and are unknown, and to believe instead in some petty deity who is full of care and personally knows every little hair on our head and finds nothing nauseous in the most miserable small service? Nietzsche The Gay Science § 2771. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Socrates' Trial and Conviction of the Jurors in Plato's ApologyDougal BlythI am going to argue in this paper that, in the three speeches constituting his Apology of Socrates, Plato presents the judicial proceedings that led to Socrates' execution as having precisely the opposite significance to their superficial legal meaning. This re-evaluation will lead to some reflections on the politics of Socrates' defence, and, similarly, on Plato's own aims in (...) writing the Apology. I want to show not only that the trial as portrayed demonstrates an inevitable dereliction of duty by the democratic jury, but also, more interestingly, that throughout the proceedings Socrates understands the meaning of the trial precisely in terms of his anticipation of the jurors' judicial incapacity.In the prooimion to his defence speech, Socrates requests that the jurors ignore his manner of speaking and concentrate on whether his case is just, "since this is a judge's virtue (), while that of a rhêtôr is to speak the truth" (18a5-6, cf. 35c2-5). We can gloss the expression "a judge's aretê" in this context as his function, or responsibility.1 Socrates claims that he, himself, fulfills his own responsibility as a defendant to tell the truth (17b4-c4, 33c1-2, cf. 34b5, 35b9-c2) in a speech that asserts his exemplary piety in Apollo's service and his beneficial influence on the Athenian youth. But if, in claiming that he is innocent of the charge, Socrates does tell the truth, then those jurors who thereupon convict him of impiety and corruption, and subsequently sentence him to death, have failed in their duty to judge rightly.My claim is that Socrates sees the trial as a test of the jurors' abilities. It is characteristic of Socrates to test people regarding their concern for virtue and justice, a habit to which he devotes extended discussion during his defence, even dramatising it provocatively in a central passage (29d7-e5) that I aim shortly to analyse in detail. Moreover, Socrates specifically withholds from the jury the title of dikastai or judges; he does finally award the title in his address following the sentence, but only to those who have voted [End Page 1] to acquit him (40a2-3).2 The possibility thus emerges that Socrates has treated the legal proceedings all along as a moral (and intellectual) test, or trial, of the empanelled jurors themselves, to see whether they are capable of the legal function to which they have been allotted. In that case, Socrates is putting on trial, not just those individual citizens, but the very legal system of democratic Athens.Socratic irony and truthfulnessBefore considering Socrates' own explicit judgement during those final remarks on the jurors' moral offence and punishment, I should first address briefly the issue of Socrates' irony. In the past, some writers have asserted that this irony involves him in not telling the truth about himself during his defence, in which case the jury might well have been justified in convicting him. Actually, there does seem to be a consensus among the more extended treatments of the Apology that have emerged during the last decade, at least on the point that Plato presents Socrates as committed to making as sincere an attempt at a defence of his case as is consistent with his philosophical commitment to virtue, and so to telling the truth.3I shall not re-argue this point in detail, but shall take it to be secured by two basic considerations: consistency with the Crito would require Socrates to recognise a legal obligation to make a sincere attempt at defence while his obligation to Apollo to continue his mission in Athens if possible would motivate that attempt with the goal of acquittal.4 Instead, I want to show what role irony does have in Socrates' defence, given that his principled law-abidingness requires him to attempt to persuade the jury, in accordance with truth and justice, that he is innocent (cf. 19a6-7, 18a7-b1, 18e5).Where Socrates acknowledges the obligation to defend himself, he remarks on the difficulty he faces, a difficulty that has resulted from the slander to which he has long... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Socrates' Trial and Conviction of the Jurors in Plato's ApologyDougal BlythI am going to argue in this paper that, in the three speeches constituting his Apology of Socrates, Plato presents the judicial proceedings that led to Socrates' execution as having precisely the opposite significance to their superficial legal meaning. This re-evaluation will lead to some reflections on the politics of Socrates' defence, and, similarly, on Plato's own aims in (...) writing the Apology. I want to show not only that the trial as portrayed demonstrates an inevitable dereliction of duty by the democratic jury, but also, more interestingly, that throughout the proceedings Socrates understands the meaning of the trial precisely in terms of his anticipation of the jurors' judicial incapacity.In the prooimion to his defence speech, Socrates requests that the jurors ignore his manner of speaking and concentrate on whether his case is just, "since this is a judge's virtue (), while that of a rhêtôr is to speak the truth" (18a5-6, cf. 35c2-5). We can gloss the expression "a judge's aretê" in this context as his function, or responsibility.1 Socrates claims that he, himself, fulfills his own responsibility as a defendant to tell the truth (17b4-c4, 33c1-2, cf. 34b5, 35b9-c2) in a speech that asserts his exemplary piety in Apollo's service and his beneficial influence on the Athenian youth. But if, in claiming that he is innocent of the charge, Socrates does tell the truth, then those jurors who thereupon convict him of impiety and corruption, and subsequently sentence him to death, have failed in their duty to judge rightly.My claim is that Socrates sees the trial as a test of the jurors' abilities. It is characteristic of Socrates to test people regarding their concern for virtue and justice, a habit to which he devotes extended discussion during his defence, even dramatising it provocatively in a central passage (29d7-e5) that I aim shortly to analyse in detail. Moreover, Socrates specifically withholds from the jury the title of dikastai or judges; he does finally award the title in his address following the sentence, but only to those who have voted [End Page 1] to acquit him (40a2-3).2 The possibility thus emerges that Socrates has treated the legal proceedings all along as a moral (and intellectual) test, or trial, of the empanelled jurors themselves, to see whether they are capable of the legal function to which they have been allotted. In that case, Socrates is putting on trial, not just those individual citizens, but the very legal system of democratic Athens.Socratic irony and truthfulnessBefore considering Socrates' own explicit judgement during those final remarks on the jurors' moral offence and punishment, I should first address briefly the issue of Socrates' irony. In the past, some writers have asserted that this irony involves him in not telling the truth about himself during his defence, in which case the jury might well have been justified in convicting him. Actually, there does seem to be a consensus among the more extended treatments of the Apology that have emerged during the last decade, at least on the point that Plato presents Socrates as committed to making as sincere an attempt at a defence of his case as is consistent with his philosophical commitment to virtue, and so to telling the truth.3I shall not re-argue this point in detail, but shall take it to be secured by two basic considerations: consistency with the Crito would require Socrates to recognise a legal obligation to make a sincere attempt at defence while his obligation to Apollo to continue his mission in Athens if possible would motivate that attempt with the goal of acquittal.4 Instead, I want to show what role irony does have in Socrates' defence, given that his principled law-abidingness requires him to attempt to persuade the jury, in accordance with truth and justice, that he is innocent (cf. 19a6-7, 18a7-b1, 18e5).Where Socrates acknowledges the obligation to defend himself, he remarks on the difficulty he faces, a difficulty that has resulted from the slander to which he has long... (shrink)

Mahloket [dispute] has been part of the human experience since time immemorial. Upon departure from the Garden of Eden the first mahloket arose between Cain and Abel - a conflict that ultimately led to bloodshed. Ever since, the phenomenon of mahloket has been a fact of life¿ The state of mahloket nowadays is lamentable. Debates on the internet are aggressive, even violent, seemingly governed solely by the law of the jungle. A terrible litany of personal attacks, lies, distortions, slander, (...) invasion of privacy, and an overall lack of civility abound¿ We are facing a critical threat to humanity in general, and to the State of Israel, the Jewish nation, and the Torah in particular.After years of exploring the topic of mahloket - recognizing its importance, its benefits, and its destructive potential - Rabbi Yuval Cherlow presents LeShem Shamayim, an ambitious and groundbreaking work on the ethics of public discourse. Drawing upon both the culture of debate embodied by generations of Jewish Sages and upon principles of postmodernism, Rabbi Cherlow has written a comprehensive code of ethics for conducting fair, productive discourse. (shrink)

Libel played an important and extraordinary role in early modern conflict culture. The article discusses their functions and the way they were assessed in court. The case study illustrates argumentative spaces and different levels of normative references in libel trials in 16th century electoral Saxony. In 1569, Andreas Langener – in consequence of a long stagnating private conflict – posted several libels against the nobleman Tham Pflugk in different public places in the city of Dresden. Consequently, he was arrested and (...) charged with ‘libelling’. Depending on the reference to conflicting social and legal norms, he had therefore been either threatened with corporal punishment including his execution, or rewarded with laudations. In this case, the act of libelling could be seen as slander, but also as a service to the community, which Langener had informed about potentially harmful transgression of norms. While the common good was the highest maxim, different and sometimes conflicting legally protected interests had to be discussed. The situational decision depended on whether the articulated charges where true and relevant for the public, on the invective language, and especially on the quality and size of the public sphere reached by the libel. (shrink)

'Jiwoohak' in Confucian Analects is described as one stage of the six-process of life written by Confucius after he recalls his own life. Since Confucius is suggested as a incarnation of sage and also as a being of ideal living, many Confucian scholars have paid attention to this direct description of Confucius's life. Nevertheless, the Confucian scholars show different opinions on a detailed interpretation, especially on the interpretation on 'Isoon(耳順)'. Zhu Xi interprets 'Isoon' as a stage of getting to know (...) without thinking because of that one's Ji(知) reached the most. He thinks that the three-process of 'Boolhok(不惑)' - 'Jicheonmyeong(知天命)' - 'Isoon' is an intensive course of 'Ji'. But, this Zhu Xi's interpretation is rejected by some of the later scholars such as Dasan Chong Yak-Yong, Ito Jinsai and Jiao Xun etc. These later scholars interpret that 'Isoon' is a stage of being not offensive when someone hears of something against the process of nature or slander on oneself. And they regard Zhu Xi's interpretation as a mistranslation by his impractical attempt to sanctify Confucius. However, Zhu Xi's interpretation is based on his Theory of Mind-Nature and the six-process is applied not to a sage but to an ordinary human. Therefore, to raise a question on Zhu Xi's interpretation means to disagree the sanctification of human designated by Zhu Xi and Dasan Chong Yak-Yong and Ito Jinsai stand on that position. Then, Zhu Xi's interpretation on ‘Jiwoohak’ should be read in the context of his Mind-Nature Theory not to misread it. In addition, to analyze his interpretation on the six-process of life can help Zhu Xi's Theory of Mind-Nature and understanding of human. This paper focuses on that the three-process of 'Boolhok' - 'Jicheonmyeong' - 'Isoon' is an intensive course of 'Ji'. Zhu Xi accounts that 'Boolhok' is to know in terms of Sa(事, affair), 'Jicheonmyeong' is to know in terms of Li(理, principle) and 'Isoon' is to be well versed in terms of both Sa and Li. The progress of 'Sa - Li - Li and Sa' can be explained as 'phenomenalistic knowing - substantialistic knowing - knowing the unit of phenomenon and substance' as Avatamsaka shows. The development of this three-process means not an increase or extend of the knowledge but a leap and qualitative transformation of a subject and object. (shrink)

The election campaigns in Poland have become oriented to the still more extent on fighting back the political opponents. Only seldom we can watch skirmishes about programmes and battles with the use of substantial arguments. Instead, we observe more and more mutual accusations, personal reproaches and attempts of slandering the opponent using unethical methods. The attitude of one politician to another assumed quite special features both on the level of verbal behaviour and their attitudes. Almost in every election campaign since (...) the year 1989 the voters have had the occasions to observe the behaviours of politicians which were far from the moral standards and which significantly lowered the level of political culture in Poland. Since a few years rival discreditations, intrigues, announcing untrue information about opponents and creation of media facts have dominated during the election battles. Occurrences of such type are crucial for political alienation among the citizens and contribute to preservation of a negative picture of the politics itself as a sort of dishonest and immoral activity. Various methods of depreciation of opponents are still more and more willingly used. This paper will discuss selected behaviours of political competitors towards each other; also an attempt will be undertaken to assess those behaviours from the ethics’ point of view. (shrink)

While the Prophet's articulation of the message of tawhid resulted in the clustering of his followers around him, it also led to reactions from the majority of his interlocutors. At first, he was tried to be discouraged by not taking his message seriously or by humiliating him, and when it was seen that his followers increased over time, he was tried to be prevented by harsher methods. The polytheists claimed that the Prophet was a magician who spoke incantations from his (...) mouth, a liar who reported news he had learned from others as if it had been revealed to him, and a person who made statements contrary to the religion of ancestors because he had lost his sanity and needed to be treated. In this context, this article deals with the slander of the polytheists that the Prophet was a "majnun" and tries to understand what they meant by this claim. When the translations of the Qur'anic verses that remind us of the allegations of the polytheists are taken into consideration, it is seen that most of the translations give the word "majnun" the meaning of "madness". When we examine the meaning attributed to the expression by the Jahiliyyah Arabs, the word takes on a completely different meaning, and it is understood that the polytheists meant that the word revealed to the Prophet was taught to him not by Allah but by the jinn whom he had befriended. (shrink)