The text of Martin Heidegger’s 1927–28 university lecture course on Emmanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason presents a close interpretive reading of the first two parts of this masterpiece of modern philosophy. In this course, Heidegger continues the task he enunciated in Being and Time as the problem of dismatling the history of ontology, using temporality as a clue. Within this context the relation between philosophy, ontology, and fundamental ontology is shown to be rooted in the genesis of the (...) modern mathematical sciences. Heidegger demonstrates that objectification of beings as beings is inseparable from knowledge a priori, the central problem of Kant’s Critique. He concludes that objectification rests on the productive power of imagination, a process that involves temporality, which is the basic constitution of humans as beings. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction Husserl and Kant Heidegger and Kant.

Fewer than half of the fifty-two courses Martin Heidegger gave between 1915 and 1956 have now been translated into English. Twelve of them have not yet appeared in the first Gesamtausgabe of his works. The present volume, which was first published in German in 1977, is the translation of a course given during the winter semester of 1927–8, at Marburg University. As the translators note, with its publication, all of Heidegger’s published texts on Kant are now available in English. (...) The text thus complements Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, What Is a Thing?, and “Kant’s Thesis about Being [Sein]”. (shrink)

In Kant and the Dynamics of Reason, Gerd Buchdahl proposes to solve Jacobi’s objection to Kant’s metaphysics – one needs a ‘thing-in-itself’ to enter the Critical Philosophy, but one cannot uphold both that philosophy and the ‘thing-in-itself’ – by interpreting Kant in terms of a phenomenological ‘reduction’ of objects to their transcendental conditions and their subesequent ‘realization’ in various theoretical or practical contexts. I summarize Buchdahl’s interpretation and argue: (1) Buchdahl’s view faces an exact analog (...) of Jacobi’s problem; (2) Buchdahl’s view of Kant is much more a reconstruction than an interpretation of the Critical philosophy (this counsels greater caution and frankness about the extent to which we interpret or reconstruct Kant’s texts); (3) Buchdahl’s recent effort to address Kant’s practical philosophy is inadequate. (shrink)

본 연구는 기하학에 대한 구조-구성주의 인식론을 정당화하는 것이다. 즉 구조주의와 구성주의를 융합하는 필자의 고유한 인식론으로 기하학적 인식의 본성을 해명하는 것이다. 그러나 현재의 연구는 이러한 큰 주제에 접근하기 위한 예비적 연구로서 칸트의 기하학적 직관 개념에 대한 역사-비판적 분석을 제공하는 데 한정된다. 잘 알려져 있는 것처럼, 칸트는 수학적 인식, 특히 기하학적 인식을 위해서 직관이 핵심적으로 중요하다고 주장했다. 그런데 칸트가 말하는 기하학적 인식을 위한 직관의 역할이 무엇인지는 여전히 논쟁적이다. 이점과 관련해서 역사적으로 대립적인 두 가지 해석이 있다. 하나는 베스(E. Beth), 힌티카(J. Hintikka), 프리드만(M. Fridman) (...) 등으로 이어지는 논리적 해석이며, 다른 하나는 파슨스(Parsons)와 칼슨(E. Carson)에 의해 제공된 현상학적 해석이다. 이에 필자는 특히 프리드만과 칼슨의 논쟁을 중심으로 두 해석의 내용을 재구성하고, 다음에 두 해석의 종합 가능성을 해명하고자 한다. 이를 위해 헬름홀츠-피아제의 인식론, 즉 “군 이론”에 근거한 새로운 구성주의 인식론을 제안할 것이다. 그러나 본고에서는 1차적 근사의 차원에서 그 개략적 구조만을 소개하는 데 만족하고, 종합의 구체적 내용인, 헬름홀츠-피아제의 공간 인식론에 근거한 구조-구성주의 공간 이론은 다른 지면에서 전개될 것이다. (shrink)

This entirely new translation of Critique of Pure Reason by Paul Guyer and Allan Wood is the most accurate and informative English translation ever produced of this epochal philosophical text. Though its simple, direct style will make it suitable for all new readers of Kant, the translation displays a philosophical and textual sophistication that will enlighten Kant scholars as well. This translation recreates as far as possible a text with the same interpretative nuances and richness as the original.

Martin Heidegger closes his Winter Semester 1927–28 lectures by claiming that Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, read through the lens of Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology, confirmed the accuracy of his philosophical path culminating in Being and Time. A notable interpretation of Heidegger’s debt to Kant, advanced by William Blattner, presents Heidegger as a temporal idealist. I argue that attention to Husserl’s adaptation of Kant’s critical philosophy shows that both Husserl and Heidegger are realists. I make my case (...) by tracing a unified philosophical problematic through three puzzling passages: the Schematism chapter of the first Critique, Husserl’s thought experiment of the destruction of the world in Ideas, and the passage in Being and Time that motivates Blattner’s idealist reading. Husserl and Heidegger give accounts, derived from Kant, of how the consciousness of time makes it possible for objects to be perceived as enduring unities, as well as ‘genealogies of logic’ that show how a priori knowledge, including ontology, is possible. These accounts are idealistic only in the sense that they concern the ideal or essential features of intentionality in virtue of which it puts us in touch with things as they are independently of the contributions of any mind of any type. -/- . (shrink)

There have been numerous studies on Kant’s concept of the ‘Fact of Reason’, drawing on various intellectual resources, ranging from metaphysics to psychology, from Aristotle to Mencius, from analytic philosophy to phenomenology, and beyond. How should we evaluate these studies? Is it possible that these studies can contribute both to an understanding of Kantian philosophy and to an understanding of Western philosophy as a whole, as well as shed light on the development of philosophy after Kant and on (...) the philosophical questions of our own era? In order to at least partially clarify the above questions, this article will draw on the work of philosohers such as Karl-Otto Apel, Jürgen Habermas, C.I. Lewis, Jin Yuelin and Feng Qi, and discuss how certain presuppositions of communicative action can be both regulative and constitutive, how the same propositions can be both empirical and a priori, how the same concepts can both describe reality and regulate it, and how the ‘Fact of Reason’ can be understood as the ‘Fact of Learning’, in order to offer a new interpretation of Kant’s concept of the ‘Fact of Reason’. (shrink)

'beauty has purport and significance only for human beings, for beings at once animal and rational' In the Critique of Judgement Kant offers a penetrating analysis of our experience of the beautiful and the sublime, discussing the objectivity of taste, aesthetic disinterestedness, the relation of art and nature, the role of imagination, genius and originality, the limits of representation and the connection between morality and the aesthetic. He also investigates the validity of our judgements concerning the apparent purposiveness of (...) nature with respect to the highest interests of reason and enlightenment. The work profoundly influenced the artists and writers of the classical and romantic period and the philosophy of Hegel and Schelling. It has remained a central point of reference from Schopenhauer and Nietzsche through to phenomenology, hermeneutics, the Frankfurt School, analytical aesthetics and contemporary critical theory. J. C. Meredith's classic translation has been revised in accordance with standard modern renderings and provided with a bilingual glossary. This edition also includes the important 'First Introduction' that Kant originally composed for the work. ABOUT THE SERIES: For over 100 years Oxford World's Classics has made available the widest range of literature from around the globe. Each affordable volume reflects Oxford's commitment to scholarship, providing the most accurate text plus a wealth of other valuable features, including expert introductions by leading authorities, helpful notes to clarify the text, up-to-date bibliographies for further study, and much more. (shrink)

This collection is the final volume of a four book survey of the state of phenomenology fifty years after the death of Edmund Husserl. Its publication represents a landmark in the comprehensive treatment of contemporary phenomenology in all its vastness and richness. The diversity of the issues raised here is dazzling, but the main themes of Husserl's thought are all either explicitly treated, or else they underlie the ingenious approaches found here. Time, historicity, intentionality, eidos, meaning, possibility/reality, and teleology are (...) the main concerns of this collection devoted to studies in aesthetics, metaphysics and literary interpretation, written by such authors as, among others, R. Cobb-Stevens, C. Moreno Marquez, J. Swiecimski, Sitansu Ray and M. Kronegger. These original studies of phenomenological aesthetics and literary theory by scholars from all parts of the world were gathered by the World Institute for Advanced Phenomenological Research and Learn ing during the year 1988/89 during its assessment of the phenomeno logical movement, fifty years after Husserl's death. IX A -T. Tymieniecka (ed.), Analecta Husserliana, Vol. XXXVII, ix. (shrink)

In the Critique of Judgement, Kant offers a penetrating analysis of our experience of the beautiful and the sublime. He discusses the objectivity of taste, aesthetic disinterestedness, the relation of art and nature, the role of imagination, genius and originality, the limits of representation, and the connection between morality and the aesthetic. He also investigates the validity of our judgements concerning the degree in which nature has a purpose, with respect to the highest interests of reason and enlightenment. The (...) work profoundly influenced the artists, writers, and philosophers of the classical and romantic period, including Hegel, Schelling, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche. In addition, it has remained a landmark work in fields such as phenomenology, hermeneutics, the Frankfurt School, analytical aesthetics, and contemporary critical theory. Today it remains an essential work of philosophy, and required reading for all with an interest in aesthetics. (shrink)

No one should be put off from reading Miles' Logik undMetaphysik bei Kant by his telling us that he is following the ‘phenomenological-philological method’ Heidegger practiced, as shown in his Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, his earliest work on Kant and his last to be published. I do not claim to understand Miles' conception of this method. Whatever it be, what Miles actually presents is a careful examination of a number of (...) crucial passages in Kant's first Critique in Kantian terms. From it even the most seasoned student of the Critique will find light. (shrink)

The German humanist Johann Reuchlin (1455-1522) defended the value of Jewish scholarship and literature when it was unwise and unpopular to do so. As G. Lloyd Jones points out, "A marked mistrust of the Jews had developed among Christian scholars during the later Middle Ages. It was claimed that the rabbis had purposely falsified the text of the Old Testament and given erroneous explanations of passages which were capable of a christological interpretation." Christian scholars most certainly did not advocate (...) learning the Hebrew language. Reuchlin was exceptional in pursuing and promoting Hebrew studies, believing that a working knowledge of that language was essential for a true appreciation of the Bible and rabbinic literature. Refusing to join Christian contemporaries who wished to destroy the Kabbalah and the Talmud, he spoke out against ignorance. Christians could have a useful dialogue with Jews if they gained a thorough knowledge of the writings of Jewish exegetes and philosophers. Toward that end he proposed university endowments that aroused the fury of opponents and led to the famous "battle of the books." Reuchlin's keen interest in Jewish mysticism resulted in the publication of De arte cabalistica in 1517. The first part of this dialogue reflects on messianism, the second part on the relation of the Pythagorean system to the Kabbalah, and tdhe third on the "practical Kabbalah." According to Jones, "Reuchlin demonstrates how Christians can make profitable use of Jewish mystical writings, and therefore shares with the reader his understanding of the art of the Kabbalah." That art will reach more readers in this modern English-language translation by Martin and Sarah Goodman.In addition to an introduction by G. Lloyd Jones, this edition of On the Art of the Kabbalah features a new introduction by Moshe Idel, a professor at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem and the author of many books, including Kabbalah: New Perspectives. (shrink)

Kant's Foundation of Ethics, translated by Leo Rauch, includes "What is Enlightenment?" and Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals. These unabridged works, in contemporary English with oral interpretation, articulate the fundamental principles of Kant's ethical world view. Taken together, these works challenge all free people to think about the requirements for self-determination, both in our individual lives and in our public and private institutions.

Whether this satirical inscription on a Dutch innkeeper's sign upon which a burial ground was painted had for its object mankind in general, or the rulers of states in particular, who are insatiable of war, or merely the philosophers who dream this sweet dream, it is not for us to decide. But one condition the author of this essay wishes to lay down. The practical politician assumes the attitude of looking down with great self-satisfaction on the political theorist as a (...) pedant whose empty ideas in no way threaten the security of the state, inasmuch as the state must proceed on empirical principles; so the theorist is allowed to play his game without interference from the worldly-wise statesman. Such being his attitude, the practical politician — and this is the condition I make — should at least act consistently in the case of a conflict and not suspect some danger to the state in the political theorist's opinions which are ventured and publicly expressed without any ulterior purpose. By this clausula salvatoria the author desires formally and emphatically to deprecate herewith any malevolent interpretation which might be placed on his words. (shrink)

Kant's Foundation of Ethics, translated by Leo Rauch, includes "What is Enlightenment?" and Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals. These unabridged works, in contemporary English with oral interpretation, articulate the fundamental principles of Kant's ethical world view. Taken together, these works challenge all free people to think about the requirements for self-determination, both in our individual lives and in our public and private institutions.

This new, complete translation of Kant's 'Groundwork' makes a challenging foundational work of moral philosophy accessible to all readers. Remaining faithful to the original German, the text is rendered clearly to promote reader comprehension. An inviting introduction, running commentary, and glossary further support study and interpretation.

This new translation is an extremely welcome addition to the continuing Cambridge Edition of Kant’s works. English-speaking readers of the third Critique have long been hampered by the lack of an adequate translation of this important and difficult work. James Creed Meredith’s much-reprinted translation has charm and elegance, but it is often too loose to be useful for scholarly purposes. Moreover it does not include the first version of Kant’s introduction, the so-called “First Introduction,” which is now recognized (...) as indispensable for an understanding of the work. Werner Pluhar’s more recent translation, which does include the First Introduction, is highly accurate when it confines itself to rendering Kant’s German. However, it is often more of a reconstruction than a translation, containing so many interpretative interpolations that it is often difficult to separate out Kant’s original text from the translator’s contributions. Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews have provided a translation that compares to or exceeds Pluhar’s in its literal approach to the German, but that confines all interpretative material to footnotes and endnotes, so that the text itself, with all its unclarities and ambiguities, lies open to view. In addition, Guyer, as editor of the volume, has provided a great deal of valuable supplementary material. This includes an introduction with an outline of the work and details of the history of its composition and publication, and a wealth of endnotes offering clarifications of the text, background information, and, most strikingly, many references to related passages in Kant’s voluminous writings, particularly in connection with Kant’s earlier writings related to aesthetics. The edition also records differences among the first three editions of the work, and—of particular interest—erasures from and additions to Kant’s manuscript of the First Introduction. Although the introduction and endnotes reflect interpretative views that are sometimes disputable, this supplementary material makes the present edition into a valuable resource even for those able to read the text in German. (shrink)

The article exposes Husserl’s theory of time and provides its detailed comparison with theories of time of I. Kant and F. Brentano. The author first examines the general principles of the phenomenological theory of consciousness, and then analyzes the time concept of F. Brentano and Husserl’s criticism of these ideas, and eventually makes a comparison of Husserl’s and Kant’s theories of time. The author is inclined to conclude that progress in the interpretation of the time made (...) by Husserl, is largely external, based on unacceptable epistemological principles. Critique of these principles the author plans to carry out in one of the next issues of the magazine. (shrink)

Copublished in the U.K. by Routledge. These lively essays, transcribed by Kant's students during his lectures on ethics at Konigsberg in the years 1775-1780, are celebrated not only for their insight into Kant's polished and often witty lecture style but also as a key to understanding the development of his moral thought. As Lewis White Beck points out in the Foreword to this edition, those who know Kant only from his rigorous and abstract intellectual critiques may be (...) surprised by the accessibility of these essays, which put flesh on the bones of the critical ethics, while revealing Kant as a practical moralist, greatly concerned with the nuances of human conduct and the social effects of his moral teaching. The sharply focused discussions and definitions strengthen an interpretation of Kant's more mature speculative works and remain the riches document we have for understanding the history of the preeminent ethical theory of modern times. (shrink)

There are different narratives on mathematics as part of our world, some of which are more appropriate than others. Such narratives might be of the form ‘Mathematics is useful’, ‘Mathematics is beautiful’, or ‘Mathematicians aim at theorem-credit’. These narratives play a crucial role in mathematics education and in society as they are influencing people’s willingness to engage with the subject or the way they interpret mathematical results in relation to real-world questions; the latter yielding important normative considerations. Our strategy is (...) to frame current narratives of mathematics from a virtue-theoretic perspective. We identify the practice of mathematizing, put forward by Freudenthal’s ‘Realistic mathematics education’, as virtuous and use it to evaluate different narratives. We show that this can help to render the narratives more adequately, and to provide implications for societal organization. (shrink)

What value is this scholarly debate about the origins of Jaspers' phenomenology to psychiatric clinicians? For one thing, it might help kindle enough interest among scholars and clinicians in Jaspers' General Psychopathology to warrant its reprinting. This would expand the psychiatrist's appreciation of the relevance of philosophy to medical thinking and patient care. In the GP, Jaspers quotes Kant's opinion that "the psychiatrist's competence is really commensurate with how far his education and knowledge would qualify him to belong to (...) the philosophic faculty". (shrink)

Henry Allison and Paul Guyer have recently offered interpretations of Kant's argument in Groundwork III. These interpretations share this premise: the argument moves from a non-moral, theoretical premise to a moral conclusion, and the failure of the argument is a failure to make this jump from the non-moral to the moral. This characterization both of the nature of the argument and its failure is flawed. Consider instead the possibility that in Groundwork III, Kant is struggling toward something rather (...) different from this, not trying to pull the moral rabbit out of the theoretical hat, but instead seeking a proto-phenomenological grounding of morality: a grounding that begins from first personal felt experiences that already possess moral content, and proceeds to its further practical claims via attentive reflection on these felt experiences. This paper brings this assumption to our reading of Groundwork III, showing that in doing so we acquire a deeper appreciation both of the argument, and the reasons it fails. Kant's argument is practical throughout. And the failure of the argument is the failure of Kant's nascent efforts to provide a new, phenomenological method for the grounding of practical philosophy. (shrink)

Heidegger’s reading of Kant is deciphered to have illuminated his own project concerning the basic question of Ontology, Time, Space and History [Temporality, Spatiality and Historicity] embodying the novel description of Human reality in terms of Mit-Dasein and Mit-welt [Subjectivity with the public face]. Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason led Heidegger develop his own project of Existential Phenomenology contrary to Husserilian Phenomenology. We will discuss the Kantian Heidegger following the two main issues: one, Heidegger appreciates Kant on (...) his identifying and exploring the difference of ontic/ontological. Two, Kant prioritizes time over space. Heidegger would explore the subject of ontic/ontological difference in the sense that ontic knowledge is the knowledge of particular beings, whereas ontological knowledge is described as the a priori condition inferring the ontic knowledge. In this sense ontological knowledge pertains to question of being rather than beings. This is how Heidegger’s Kant interpretation would differ from the Neo-Kantianism of Marburg School which argued that Critique of Pure Reason is a work of epistemology. In contrast to this position, Heidegger held that Critique is a unique work of transcendental philosophy; it is theory of ontological knowledge but not ontic knowledge. Ontic knowledge of beings must conform to Being of beings [ontological foundation]. Heidegger holds that this should be Kant’s “Copernican Revolution”. However, Heidegger would appropriate the Kantian notion of time in the form of temporality of Dasein. Being manifests itself on beings through Being-there [Human reality] who purely understands Being. For Heidegger, temporality of Dasein is the foundation of ontological knowledge indeed. (shrink)

This paper presents a new reading of Kant's moral feeling: in lieu of highlighting a positive feeling of respect, I am interested in a thorough phenomenological interpretation of a negative feeling of humiliation. The paper's tone is set by underscoring that human moral Gesinnung is that which is necessarily cultivated, which entails that the striving moral agent, among other things, learns to identify and confront inclinations. It is argued, then, that one's mindfulness of the various kinds of (...) pain of humiliated inclinations presupposes the agent's aesthetic attunement to the law of duty. To this end, two phenomenological interpretations are offered. First, general humiliation Kant caters for in the Critique of Practical Reason. Second, specific humiliation Kant alludes to in the Metaphysics of Morals. On the whole, the paper's findings ascertain the epistemic weight of humiliation, which to date has been undervalued. (shrink)

This study interprets the movement of Heidegger's famous "turn" through an analysis of his critique of Kant, Schelling, and Hegel in the period spanning roughly 1925 to 1936. Heidegger's "turn" sought to overcome the traditional metaphysical conception of being that had come to absolute expression through Hegel's method of dialectical reflection. Heidegger was successful to the extent that he provided the final "con-text" of being as a discourse that both frames the historical "text" of being and permeates it, allowing (...) the coherence of that text to appear in a new light. Heidegger's interpretation of the original sense of time as temporality opposed the latent dogmatism in Kant's critique of reason by shifting the locus of unity in experience away from the spontaneity of the self toward an intuitional transcending of the self as "being-in-the-world." This pointed Heidegger toward a novel revelatory conception of freedom as "letting being be," which he posed as an alternative to the absolutizing of subjectivity that took place in German idealism. Heidegger used Schellings anti-Hegelian conception of the origination of freedom from nature to clarify the meaning of Hegel's key metaphysical notion of reflection. In so doing he developed an alternative interpretation of the "nothing," in contrast to Hegel's method of double negation, that set the meaning of negation into a greater contextual perspective. Heidegger's goal of uncovering the meaning and possibility of reflection as the original possibility of evil led him to a qualified retrieval of his early Roman Catholic orientation to thinking. Transforming these paradigms into a new deconstructive discourse, Heidegger advanced beyond Schellings critique of Hegel, allowing him to establish a hermeneutical relationship with Hegel's system that simultaneously confronts and preserves it. Heidegger's early phenomenological interpretation of Pauline eschatology and Augustinian original sin thus, finally situates his interpretation of the "nothing" as the abyss of being retrieved from the primal Greek conception of nature . Heidegger thereby provides the ultimate "con-text" of metaphysics in its necessary and reciprocal relation to Hegel's conception of presence as an all-encompassing, "self-absolving" system. (shrink)

This paper attempts to present the intellectual structure within which Paul Ricoeur has conceived the possibility of a philosophical interpretation of myth. I propose that Ricoeur's hermeneutics has been able to integrate and harmonize structural analysis, phenomenological description, and ontological-existential analysis of the myth through a group of epistemological and ontological coordinates from the two first Critiques and from Kant's philosophy of religion.

Kant has long been taxed with an inability to explain the detailed normative content of our lives by making universalizability the sole arbiter of our values. Korsgaard addresses one form of this critique by defending a Kantian theory amended by a seemingly attractive conception of practical identities. Identities are dependent on the contingent circumstances of each person's world. Hence, obligations issuing from them differ from Kantian moral obligations in not applying to all persons. Still, Korsgaard takes Kantian autonomy to (...) mean the normativity of all obligations is rooted in universalizability. The wealth of values informing our lives is thus said to be accommodated within a Kantian framework.After briefly explaining Korsgaard’s understanding of practical identities and their role in her reformation of Kant's moral philosophy, I argue that she gives an inadequate explanation of how the obligations that arise from a person’s practical identities derive their authority from the person's will. I then consider how her position might be developed to meet this objection in accordance with her allegiance to “constructivism” and I argue that the epistemic commitments of people’s actual identities makes it unlikely that such a development could preserve Kantian autonomy as she interprets it. (shrink)

This paper provides a new, comprehensive overview of Martin Heidegger’s interpretations of Immanuel Kant. Its aim is to identify Heidegger’s motive in interpreting Kant and to distinguish, for the first time, the four phases of Heidegger’s reading of Kant. The promise of the “phenomenological Kant” gave Heidegger entrance to a rich domain of investigation. In four phases and with reference to Husserl, Heidegger interpreted Kant as first falling short of phenomenology (1919-1925), then approaching phenomenology (...) (1925-1927), then advancing phenomenology (1927-1929), and finally recovering phenomenology (1930 and after). By identifying this motive and these four phases, the paper sets aside a number of common misinterpretations concerning the significance of the 1925 turn to Kant, the relation of the Kant-interpretation to Husserl, the relation of the 1929 'Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics' to 'Being and Time,' and Heidegger’s regard for Kant in his later writings. The paper thereby clarifies Heidegger’s path of thinking and its indebtedness to transcendental philosophy. (shrink)

The paper aims at bringing out a valid comparison between the notion of intentionality portrayed in the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl and that of Vijňānavāda in general. One of the crucial objectives of the Husserlian phenomenology is to understand the nature of consciousness. To Husserl, Consciousness is always intentional, that is, intended or directed towards something. It constitutes the world in the sense of bestowing meaning and being to the world. The object intended by consciousness may or may not be (...) there, but it certainly has a sense. Husserl makes a distinction between empirical and transcendental consciousness. To him, the empirical ego is momentary whilst the transcendental ego survives all reduction and presides over all epistemic acts. To explore whether the Vijňānavadins propose a similar notion of Consciousness and its intentionality would be the primary objective of the paper. On the other hand, to Vijňānavāda, the apparent external world is projected by the Absolute Consciousness, the Ālaya, not by the individual consciousness or Vijňāna. Vijňānavāda distinguishes between individual consciousness (pravritti Vijňāna) and absolute consciousness (Ālaya Vijňāna). All intentional acts are performed by the individual consciousness having the Ālaya Vijňāna as its background. The Ālaya manifests itself as subject and object as well as seven pravritti Vijňānas. They are intended and constituted by the Ālaya. It, therefore, follows that Ālaya is always intentionally correlated with the pravritti Vijňānas. Vijňānavāda appears to be a kind of constitutive phenomenology rather than idealism. (shrink)

As an early articulation of Heidegger's thought, this book is an indispensable resource for scholars and students."--BOOK JACKET.

This article argues that Husserl’s interpretation of Kant’s “regressive method” was influenced by Cohen’s account of the “transcendental method.” According to Cohen’s epistemological reading of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant’s transcendental method consists in explaining the “fact of science” by using a regressive procedure from this fact to its conditions of possibility. Husserl ascribes, as Cohen does, this method to Kant himself. First, he criticizes Kant for regressively deducing conditions of possibility that elude any (...) type of intuitive fulfillment. Second, he understands Kant as a rationalist who wanted to advance intellectualism and oppose empiricism. Finally, Husserl holds that Kant’s concept of experience refers to scientific experience. All these points are central aspects of Cohen’s interpretation. Moreover, from Husserl’s own copy of Cohen’s Kant’s Theory of Experience we can observe that he had read §12 on Kant’s transcendental method. Therefore, there is a Cohenian influence on Husserl’s criticism of Kant’s method. (shrink)

In this paper, I first explain Slajov Žižek’s analysis of the grounds of Kant’s categorical imperative. I show how Žižek considered the grounds of the categorical imperative to be an example of irrationalism that ran counter to the spirit of the Enlightenment, of which Kant was, ironically, a major proponent. The irrationalism in Kant’s moral law makes him vulnerable to moral skepticism. I go on to counter this interpretation by drawing from Kant’s practical philosophy. I (...) counter the moral skeptic by arguing from moral phenomenology to the existence of a reason that is independent of empirical motivations and so objectively determining. Whatever is objectively determining logically supersedes that which is based on a particular context. The moral law is rooted in the ontology of an independent faculty of reason capable of issuing a universal law. The union of ontology and ethics means that the categorical imperative is not irrational. (shrink)

The paper deals with the notion of synthesis and transcendental ego in Kant and Husserl. It will argue that the actual difference between Kant and Husserl’s notion of transcendental ego can be understood through their conception of time. Kant accepts transcendental ego as the kind of logical necessity for synthesizing the various temporal units which provides unity to the consciousness. However, Husserl discards the necessity of transcendental ego by giving the phenomenological interpretation of time as (...) internal time consciousness. The interpretation of time as the flow of protention and retention synthesizes the time without invoking the necessity of Kantian transcendental ego outside the flow. Husserl’s analysis of internal time consciousness will also help us in understanding the methodological differences between Kant’s transcendental philosophy and phenomenology. (shrink)

Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle, the text of a lecture course presented at the University of Freiburg in the winter of 1921–22, was first published in 1985 as volume 61 of Heidegger’s collected works. Preceding Being and Time, the work shows Heidegger introducing novel vocabulary as he searches for his genuine philosophical voice. Here, Heidegger first takes up the role of the definition of philosophy and then elaborates a conception of 'factical life,'or human life as it is lived concretely in (...) relation to the world, a relation he calls 'caring.' Heidegger’s descriptions of the movement of life are original, striking, and unique to this lecture course. As he works out a phenomenology of factical life, Heidegger lays the groundwork for a phenomenological interpretation of Aristotle, one of the pivotal influences in the development of his philosophy. As an early articulation of Heidegger’s thought, this book will be an indispensable resource for scholars and students. (shrink)

Timothy J. Golden presents an existential, phenomenological, and political interpretation of Douglass's use of narrative. Reading Douglass with Kierkegaard, Kafka, Kant, and Levinas, Golden argues that analytic theism is an inauthentic preoccupation with knowledge at the expense of a concrete moral sensibility that Douglass's narrative provides.

Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle is the text of a lecture course presented at the University of Freiburg in the winter of 1921–1922, and first published in 1985 as volume 61 of Heidegger's collected works. Preceding Being and Time, the work shows the young Heidegger introducing novel vocabulary as he searches for his genuine philosophical voice. In this course, Heidegger first takes up the role of the definition of philosophy and then elaborates a unique analysis of "factical life," or human (...) life as it is lived concretely in relation to the world, a relation he calls "caring." Heidegger's descriptions of the movement of life are original and striking. As he works out a phenomenology of factical life, Heidegger lays the groundwork for a phenomenological interpretation of Aristotle, whose influence on Heidegger's philosophy was pivotal. (shrink)

What is religion? What does the concept of religion mean? Today, the word ‘religion’ appears everywhere; a seemingly all pervasive notion associated with a vast array of phenomena, including: war, terrorism, politics, science fiction, morality, and of course, with delusion and irrationality. However, what religion is, or what it means, remains a highly contested matter. It will be the aim of this paper to offer an interpretation of the meaning of the concept of religion by using just one of (...) many philosophical ways of approaching religion, namely; phenomenology as ontology. The paper will focus upon the remaining fragments of three Pre-Socratic philosophers; Anaximander, Heraclitus, and Parmenides, seeking in these fragments the basic conceptual subject matter for an interpretation of the meaning of religion. I will argue that these fragments reveal that the meaning of religion is a relation between being-human and what gets called the arche (or ground of being). Further, I will argue that this relation can be conceptually determined as a quest for ground: the ground of the human sense of being and of grounding thinking, meaning, truth, and purpose… Ultimately, I will argue in this paper that there are two essential characteristics of the meaning of religion as this relation to ground(ing). First, insofar as religion belongs to humans in our being; the meaning of religion may be characterized as the directed-ness of being-human towards meaning and purpose. Additionally, as with all relationships, the relationship that constitutes religion has a ‘towards which’ – or – if you will, a being that is related to. Thus, the second essential characteristic of religion will be disclosed as the arche; that which is the ground of being and as such, that which is otherwise than being. (shrink)

Between 1927 and 1936, Martin Heidegger devoted almost one thousand pages of close textual commentary to the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. This article aims to shed new light on the relationship between Kant and Heidegger by providing a fresh analysis of two central texts: Heidegger’s 1927/8 lecture course Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and his 1929 monograph Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. I argue that to make sense of Heidegger’s reading (...) of Kant, one must resolve two questions. First, how does Heidegger’s Kant understand the concept of the transcendental? Second, what role does the concept of a horizon play in Heidegger’s reconstruction of the Critique? I answer the first question by drawing on Cassam’s model of a self-directed transcendental argument, and the second by examining the relationship between Kant’s doctrine that ‘pure, general logic’ abstracts from all semantic content and Hume’s attack on metaphysics. I close by sketching the implications of my results for Heidegger’s own thought. Ultimately, I conclude that Heidegger’s commentary on the Critical system is defined, above all, by a single issue: the nature of the ‘form’ of intentionality. (shrink)