Émilie du Châtelet

Despite the growing amount of scholarship on Du Châtelet surprisingly little has been written about her principles of knowledge and, in turn, there is all but agreement on how her account of knowledge is to be understood. This paper investigates the ontological and epistemological status of the first principles in the context of the Institutions de Physique. I argue that there are two levels on which the two principles work: At a first stage, they are principles which make beings or (...) things intelligible to an understanding being. At a second stage, they are the principles which must be reflected upon and drawn on in establishing true judgements. The second stage of reflection on the principles of knowledge serves to avoid error in judgements by ensuring that our judgements adhere to the principles, according to which beings are intelligible to us in the first place. In my conclusion, I discuss the main consequences of this epistemic and ontological meaning of the first principles for Du Châtelet’s account of knowledge. (shrink)

Du Châtelet’s Institutions de Physique centres around questions of natural philosophy but in the first few chapters outlines a metaphysical foundation that focuses on the principles of knowledge and ontology. While the first wave of contemporary Du Châtelet scholarship in the 1970ies and 1980ies read Du Châtelet’s metaphysical foundation as a stripped-down version of Leibniz-Wolffian metaphysics, the latest work has argued against this by suggesting that Du Châtelet’s metaphysics is a method for her physics and can stand on its own (...) feet. This paper draws on the latter scholarship but argues that her metaphysical exposition of what beings are, and how they are to be understood, lays the foundation for all knowledge and is prior to and independent of her investigation into knowledge in physics. This paper thus focuses on Du Châtelet’s metaphysics in its own right, independent of its Leibnizian and Wolffian background and independent of her physics, in order to grasp her project from its foundation. The paper shows that Du Châtelet’s previously largely overlooked understanding of what ‘a being’ is, as outlined in the third chapter of the Institutions de Physique, is based on her principles of knowledge and is at the heart of her metaphysical foundation. By analysing chapter 3 and her definition of ‘a being’ the paper outlines the principal tenets of Du Châtelet’s ontology and her account of knowledge. (shrink)

In this chapter, I examine similarities and divergences between Du Châtelet and Descartes on their endorsement of the use of hypotheses in science, using the work of Condillac to locate them in his scheme of systematizers. I conclude that, while Du Châtelet is still clearly a natural philosopher, as opposed to modern scientist, her conception of hypotheses is considerably more modern than is Descartes’, a difference that finds its roots in their divergence on the nature of first principles.

In the second chapter of her <i>Institutions de Physique</i> Emilie Du Chatelet gives two cosmological arguments for the existence of God. In this chapter I focus on the first of these arguments. I argue that, while it bears some significant similarities to arguments given by John Locke and Christian Wolff, it improves on these arguments in at least two ways. First, it avoids a potential equivocation in Locke's argument; and second, it avoids Wolff's mere stipulation that whoever claims that there (...) cannot be an infinite regress of contingent beings does not understand what a sufficient reason is. I finally argue that her argument avoids a related objection, considered by David Hume, on which to explain a causal chain is merely to explain each link in the chain. (shrink)

Émilie Du Châtelet was a fictionalist about mathematics. Mathematical fictionalism (henceforth, fictionalism) is the view that, strictly speaking, mathematical entities such as numbers, functions, and sets, are fictions that are useful for human purposes, but are not themselves real in an ontological sense. I first explain fictionalism. Then I illustrate Du Châtelet’s position with regard to mathematical entities and give textual evidence of her fictionalism from Institutions de Physique. I offer a sketch of the philosophical-scientific issues that motivated Du Châtelet’s (...) fictionalism: explaining the behavior of bodies, as well as the ontological extraneity of mathematical entities, had they been taken to be real abstracta. Finally, I argue that Du Châtelet’s fictionalism was plausibly motivated by Leibniz’s, Wolff’s, and other mathematicians’ views who themselves held fictionalist positions with regard to certain mathematical issues. Although I project onto Du Châtelet a philosophical position which was not identified as such at the time of her writing, I do so with the aim of highlighting her systematicity and making sense of her priorities, as well as showing a link between historical and contemporary uses of fictions, and issues in the metaphysics of science. (shrink)

Abstractabstract:The Discourse on Happiness is Émilie du Châtelet's most translated work, but there is no systematic interpretation of her account of the nature and means to happiness in the secondary literature. I argue that the key to understanding her account lies in interpreting the various roles of the "great machines of happiness." I show that Du Châtelet provides a sophisticated hedonistic account of the nature of happiness, in which passions and tastes are the means to self-perpetuating, increasing, and long-lasting sources (...) of pleasure. In addition, I argue that the remaining "great machines of happiness" are not logically necessary conditions for happiness, but rather character traits that support our tastes and passions. (shrink)

O século XVIII é considerado uma época em que o método de pesquisa newtoniano está bem estabelecido e o seu uso não é questionado, segundo autores como Kuhn. No entanto, como veremos, isso está longe da realidade, pois aqui propomos os seguintes dois objetivos: por um lado, observaremos como dentro dos próprios autores chamados newtonianos não há um uso uniforme do método newtoniano e que alguns deles até o modificam em suas obras onde expõem a doutrina de Newton. Por outro (...) lado, exporemos o método de Émilie du Châtelet, que, tendo lido Newton e esses pensadores, rejeita a metodologia que eles propõem e se prepara para elaborar o que pode ser considerado um precedente do método hipotético-dedutivo utilizado hoje. Em última análise, o objetivo deste estudo é lançar luz sobre a situação do newtonianismo no século XVIII e mostrar a obra de du Châtelet como uma ponte entre duas épocas em relação à metodologia. (shrink)

Existe-t-il une tension entre la Loi de continuité (LC) d’Émilie du Châtelet et sa conviction qu’il existe une différence de nature entre les propositions absolument certaines et les propositions moralement certaines? Dans cet article, je soutiens qu’il n’y a pas de tension, car les commentateurs peuvent faire au moins deux choix d’interprétation. Tout d’abord, ils pourraient affirmer que pour du Châtelet, la LC ne devrait s’appliquer qu’au domaine empirique : il existe un fossé épistémique entre le monde naturel et empirique (...) à partir duquel nous obtenons des vérités moralement certaines, et le monde abstrait et métaphysique à partir duquel nous obtenons des vérités absolument certaines. L’autre alternative, que je défends ici, est la suivante : interpréter du Châtelet comme croyant en une formulation épistémologique de la LC, auquel cas (i) il n’y a pas de différence de nature entre les propositions absolument certaines et moralement certaines, et (ii) le domaine de toutes les vérités est constitué de toutes les vérités, même les vérités absolument certaines (contrairement aux positions de Brading en 2019, Detlefsen en 2014, et de Wells à venir). Cette interprétation résout la tension car elle signifie que du Châtelet n’est pas engagée – à proprement parler – dans une différence de nature entre les vérités absolument et moralement certaines, ce qui est donc cohérent avec une formulation épistémologique de la LC (puisqu’il n’y aurait pas de sauts ou de lacunes entre l’une et l’autre). Selon cette interprétation, il est en principe possible que des vérités moralement certaines deviennent des vérités absolument certaines, une fois que le Principe de contradiction (PC) ou Dieu est la raison suffisante pour laquelle les premières sont en fait absolument certaines. (shrink)

Cet article analyse le rôle des principes premiers dans les Institutions de physique d’Émilie du Châtelet et le rapport de sa conception au projet métaphysique de Christian Wolff, en étudiant la fonction architectonique que revêt la métaphysique générale ou l’ontologie grâce à ce que Wolff appelle les « notions directrices » ou « fondamentales ». J’examine d’abord la doctrine wolffienne telle qu’elle est détaillée dans la dissertation « Des notions directrices et du véritable usage de la philosophie première » de (...) 1729. Ensuite, je regarde de plus près les développements dédiés aux principes premiers dans les Institutions, afin de mettre en lumière leur rôle fondateur en physique. Je souhaite montrer que du Châtelet élabore une conception où les principes métaphysiques – au sens fort conféré au terme de principe ontologique par Wolff – rendent possible l’acquisition de la connaissance et l’accès à la certitude, en assurant l’intelligibilité et le fondement de toutes les sciences. Enfin, je discuterai l’inscription de cette perspective dans la théorie des principes des Lumières, notamment en rapport avec les conceptions sur la métaphysique et le principe premier de Maupertuis et d’Alembert. (shrink)

L’article met en évidence les enjeux de la conceptualisation de la certitude en physique à partir de l’analyse de la situation épistémique du sujet connaissant. Il s’agit d’abord de penser l’incertitude comme notre condition épistémique et de considérer qu’elle est moins une défaillance constitutive que l’identité de tout sujet connaissant. L’article essaie ensuite de montrer comment Émilie du Châtelet travaille au coeur de la distinction conceptuelle leibnizienne entre certitude et probabilité pour élaborer un nouveau régime de certitude.

Dans cet article, nous proposons d’examiner les choix de composition et d’écriture opérés par Émilie du Châtelet dans sa traduction française des Principia Mathematica d’Isaac Newton. En particulier, nous nous interrogeons sur la coexistence au sein de cette dernière de deux textes de style mathématique différent que constituent d’une part la traduction proprement dite des démonstrations géométriques des Principia, et d’autre part la « solution analytique » jointe au deuxième tome des Principes mathématiques de la philosophie naturelle. Dans la mesure (...) où l’ensemble des démonstrations géométriques du texte newtonien sont irréductibles à toute forme de « traduction » analytique complète, nous suggérons que la mise en regard du texte newtonien avec sa « Solution analytique » proposée par du Châtelet procède d’une réflexion singulière de sa part sur les principes régissant la philosophie naturelle. (shrink)

Este artículo se propone examinar el posicionamiento de Émilie Du Châtelet (1706-1749) respecto del tema de la defensa de la educación de las mujeres. Nos concentraremos en dos de sus obras: su adaptación al francés de La fábula de las abejas de Bernard Mandeville y su Discurso sobre la felicidad. Estudiaremos cómo Du Châtelet dialoga con distintos referentes de este debate, como François Fénelon, el abad de Saint-Pierre y Anna Maria van Schurman. Nuestro fin es demostrar la radicalidad de la (...) posición de Du Châtelet, en oposición a aquellas interpretaciones que tienden a desacreditar o a subestimar el compromiso de esta pensadora con la causa de la defensa de la educación de las mujeres. (shrink)

Du Châtelet holds that mathematical representations play an explanatory role in natural science. Moreover, she writes that things proceed in nature as they do in geometry. How should we square these assertions with Du Châtelet’s idealism about mathematical objects, on which they are ‘fictions’ dependent on acts of abstraction? The question is especially pressing because some of her important interlocutors (Wolff, Maupertuis, and Voltaire) denied that mathematics informs us about the properties of material things. After situating Du Châtelet in this (...) debate, this chapter argues, first, that her account of the origins of mathematical objects is less subjectivist than it might seem. Mathematical objects are non-arbitrary, public entities. While mathematical objects are partly mind-dependent, so are material things. Mathematical objects can approximate the material. Second, it is argued that this moderate metaphysical position underlies Du Châtelet’s persistent claims that mathematics is required for certain kinds of general knowledge, including in natural science. The chapter concludes with an illustrative example: an analysis of Du Châtelet’s argument that matter is continuous. A key premise in the argument is that mathematical representations and material nature correspond. (shrink)

I argue that Émilie Du Châtelet breaks with Christian Wolff regarding the scope and epistemological content of the principle of sufficient reason, despite his influence on her basic ontology and their agreement that the principle of sufficient reason has foundational importance. These differences have decisive consequences for the ways in which Du Châtelet and Wolff conceive of science.

This article discusses Du Châtelet’s challenging claim that entertaining illusions, especially illusions of being esteemed by posterity, is conducive to happiness. It does so by taking a contextualizing approach, contrasting her views with some Epicurean aspects of the views on illusions and happiness in Bernard de Fontenelle and Julien Offray de La Mettrie. I will argue for three claims: (1) Du Châtelet’s comparison between self-related illusions and illusions in the theater is vulnerable to objections deriving from some distinctions that Fontenelle’s (...) poetics draws between the role of illusions in the theater and the role of illusions in real life. (2) Examining Fontenelle’s analysis of the detrimental effects of self-related illusions indicates several respects in which Du Châtelet has underestimated the ambivalent nature of illusions. (3) Du Châtelet’s view that illusions are akin to sensations that are favorable to us problematically generalizes La Mettrie’s insight that some acts of the imagination have a quasi-perceptual nature. (shrink)

The present book contextualizes Du Châtelet's contribution to the philosophy of her time. The editor offers this tribute to an Époque Émilienne as a collection of innovative papers on Emilie Du Châtelet's powerful philosophy and legacy. Du Châtelet was an outstanding figure in the era she lived in. Her work and achievements were unique, though not an exception in the 18th century, which did not lack outstanding women. Her personal intellectual education, her scholarly network and her mental acumen were celebrated (...) in her time, perceiving her to have "multiplied nine figures by nine figures in her head". She was able to gain access to institutions which were normally denied to women. To call an epoch an Époque Émilienne may be seen as daring and audacious, but it will not be the last time if we continue to bring women philosophers back into the memory of the history of philosophy. The contributors paid attention to the philosophical state of the art, which forms the background to Du Châtelet's philosophy. They follow the transformation of philosophical concepts under her pen and retrace the impact of her ideas. The book is of interest to scholars working in the history of philosophy as well as in gender studies. It is of special interest for scholars working on the 18th century, Kant, Leibniz, Wolff, Newton and the European Enlightenment. (shrink)

El siglo XVIII está considerado como una época en la que el método de investigación newtoniano está bien establecido y su uso no se cuestiona, según autores como Kuhn. Sin embargo, como veremos, esto está muy alejado de la realidad, ya que aquí planteamos los dos objetivos siguientes: por un lado, observaremos como dentro de los propios llamados newtonianos no hay un uso uniforme del método newtoniano y que algunos de ellos incluso lo modifican en sus obras donde exponen la (...) doctrina de Newton. Por otro lado, expondremos el método de Émilie du Châtelet, quien, habiendo leído a Newton y a estos pensadores, siente rechazo hacia la metodología que proponen y se dispone a elaborar lo que se puede considerar un precedente del método hipotético-deductivo utilizado hoy día. Lo que se persigue con el presente estudio, en definitiva, es arrojar luz sobre la situación del newtonianismo del siglo XVIII y mostrar el trabajo de du Châtelet como un puente entre dos épocas en relación a la metodología. (shrink)

Much scholarship has claimed the physics of Emilie du Châtelet’s treatise, Institutions de physique, is Newtonian. I argue against that idea. To do so, I distinguish three strands of meaning for the category ‘Newtonian science,’ and I examine her book against them. I conclude that her physics is not Newtonian in any useful or informative sense. To capture what is specific about it, we need better interpretive categories.

There is a growing consensus that Emilie Du Châtelet’s challenging essay “On Freedom” defends compatibilism. I offer an alternative, libertarian reading of the essay. I lay out the prima facie textual evidence for such a reading. I also explain how apparently compatibilist remarks in “On Freedom” can be read as aspects of a sophisticated type of libertarianism that rejects blind or arbitrary choice. To this end, I consider the historical context of Du Châtelet’s essay, and especially the dialectic between various (...) strands of eighteenth-century libertarianism and compatibilism. (shrink)

This is an English translation of Emilie Du Châtelet's "Sur la liberté." This 18th century text discusses freedom of the will, determinism, and divine foreknowledge. Translated from French by Julia Jorati, with the help of Julie Roy. French edition of this text, on which this translation is based: “Sur la liberté,” in Oeuvres complètes de Voltaire, vol. 14, edited by William H. Barber, 484–502. Oxford: Voltaire Foundation, 1989.

In her Discourse on Happiness, Émilie du Châtelet argues susceptibility to illusion is one of the five ‘great machines of happiness,’ and that ‘we owe most of our pleasures to illusions’. However, many who read the Discourse find this aspect of her view puzzling and in tension with her claims that we must always seek truth and obey reason. To understand better her claims in the Discourse on Happiness, this article explores Du Châtelet's discussions of illusions in her Foundations of (...) Physics, On Liberty, and the Dissertation on the Nature and Propagation of Fire. I distinguish four types of illusions that Du Châtelet posits and clarify the ways in which these relate to her views on happiness and love in the Discourse and argue that she avoids deceptive or perpetual illusions of happiness through the use of the principle of sufficient reason. (shrink)

Émilie Du Châtelet’s Foundations of Physics (Institutions de physique, 1740/42) has recently been attracting increasing interest from analytical philosophy in the anglophone world. Du Châtelet’s conception of space and time constitutes a controversial issue. I argue that the current debate underestimates the modal approach and epistemological turn in Du Châtelet’s view on space and time. A historical perspective on Abraham Gotthelf Kästner’s criticism and Jean Henry Samuel Formey’s plagiarism of Du Châtelet underlines the significance of this turning point. Against this (...) background, I revisit Leonhard Euler’s space-time realism and its influence on Immanuel Kant. -/- Les Institutions de physique (1740/1742) d’Émilie Du Châtelet suscitent depuis peu un intérêt croissant dans le monde anglophone, chez les philosophes analytiques. Une question controversée concerne les concepts d’espace et de temps de Du Châtelet. Je soutiens que le débat actuel sous-estime l’approche modale et la tournure épistémologique des considérations de Du Châtelet sur l’espace et le temps. Un regard historique sur la critique d’Abraham Gotthelf Kästner et le plagiat de Du Châtelet par Jean Henry Samuel Formey souligne l’importance de ce tournant. Dans ce contexte, je revisite le réalisme spatio-temporel de Leonhard Euler et son influence sur Emmanuel Kant. (shrink)

Émilie Du Châtelet is the only French woman author of a work included in the corpus of clandestine philosophical literature: a set of treatises, dissertations, or letters that circulated in Europe, and especially in France, mainly in manuscript form, during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the main purpose of which was to subject religion to rigorous rational criticism (philosophical, historical, scientific). These Examens de la religion, one of the most controversial works in this corpus, circulated during the eighteenth century and (...) gave rise to a form of legend: sometimes said to be the work of Émilie Du Châtelet, sometimes the result of a form of collaboration between Du Châtelet and the one whose life she shared for a long time: Voltaire. If the feminine point of view on the Bible played a role in the recent attribution of this text to Émilie Du Châtelet, the existence of a properly feminine writing in the wider context of clandestine philosophical literature can now be discussed. This article aims to put this debate into perspective, at both the methodological and philosophical level. (shrink)

There is a tension in Emilie Du Châtelet’s thought on mathematics. The objects of mathematics are ideal or fictional entities; nevertheless, mathematics is presented as indispensable for an account of the physical world. After outlining Du Châtelet’s position, and showing how she departs from Christian Wolff’s pessimism about Newtonian mathematical physics, I show that the tension in her position is only apparent. Du Châtelet has a worked-out defense of the explanatory and epistemic need for mathematical objects, consistent with their metaphysical (...) nonfundamentality. I conclude by sketching how Du Châtelet’s conception of mathematical indispensability differs interestingly from many contemporary approaches. (shrink)

The Southern Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.

- Emilie du Châtelet offers an interesting and unusual account of the origin of our representation of extension. - She is an idealist about the essence extension, bodies and space, regarding them as mental constructs. - Du Châtelet's account requires a brute fact about the mind, in apparent tension with the Principle of Sufficient Reason.

ABSTRACTÉmilie du Châtelet’s recently-discovered Essai sur l’optique offers new insights into her early natural philosophy. Here I analyse the Essai in detail, focusing on Du Châtelet’s use of attr...

In diesem Band werden neueste Forschungen zur Physikerin, Mathematikerin und Philosophin Emilie Du Châtelet vorgestellt. Emilie Du Châtelet genoss in der deutschen Aufklärung eine hohe Reputation. Sie verband Leibniz Metaphysik mit der Physik von Newton und gelangte zu erstaunlichen Ergebnissen, die die Physik auf den Weg zu Einsteins Energieformel führte. Ihre Werke wurden sofort ins Deutsche übersetzt, Kant nimmt in seiner ersten Dissertation von 1747 auf sie Bezug. Die Sammlung stellt Texte vor, die den Einfluss der deutschen Aufklärung auf Du (...) Châtelets und Du Châtelets Einfluss auf die deutsche Philosophie diskutieren. Die großen Namen der Epoche stehen hier zur Debatte, Leibniz, Wolff, Boskovic, Euler, Friedrich II, Voltaire, La Mettrie und viele weitere Größen der Aufklärung werden in ihrem Zusammenhang mit Du Châtelet vorgestellt. (shrink)

This paper explores the theory of freedom that Emilie du Châtelet advances in her essay “On Freedom.” Using contemporary terminology, we can characterize this theory as a version of agent-causal compatibilism. More specifically, the theory has the following elements: (a) freedom consists in the power to act in accordance with one’s choices, (b) freedom requires the ability to suspend desires and master passions, (c) freedom requires a power of self-motion in the agent, and (d) freedom is compatible with moral necessity (...) but not with physical necessity. While these elements may at first appear disparate, the paper shows that they fit together quite well. The resulting theory is a surprising combination of doctrines that appear to be based on Samuel Clarke’s libertarian account of free will and doctrines that are reminiscent of the compatibilist accounts of John Locke, Anthony Collins, Gottfried Leibniz, and Thomas Hobbes. (shrink)

Aujourd'hui Emilie du Châtelet est peu ou mal connue, d'où l'urgence de dresser le portrait de la Marquise du Châtelet en philosophe à part entière, et non pas en simple traductrice de Newton, ou en simple compagne de Voltaire. Il est temps de lire Émilie du Châtelet pour elle-même.

The role and function of Women philosophers within the canonical tradition of philosophy is widely discussed. In my talk I focus on Marie de Gournay and Emilie du Châtelet, who criticized this tradition and who argued in favour of the thesis that “good philosophy” is also “good feminist” philosophy. Both of them presuppose that traditional philosophy’s neglecting of women’s concern is a one sided philosophy based on wrong premises. Both identify methodical misuse as reasons of misogynist statements. Both defend the (...) idea that the consequent use of philosophical instruments supports women’s rights. Their feminist critique is also a critical review of methodic failures of the traditional canon. (shrink)

This paper examines Du Châtelet’s and Kant’s responses to the famous vis viva controversy – Du Châtelet in her Institutions Physiques (1742) and Kant in his debut, the Thoughts on the True Estimation of Living Forces (1746–49). The Institutions was not only a highly influential contribution to the vis viva controversy, but also a pioneering attempt to integrate Leibnizian metaphysics and Newtonian physics. The young Kant’s evident knowledge of this work has led some to speculate about his indebtedness to her (...) philosophy. My study corrects such speculations as well as misunderstandings of the Living Forces. This corrective result has implications for how to investigate Kant’s relation to the ever-evolving landscape of Leibniz exegeses. (shrink)

This paper analyzes the teleological perspective articulated by Émilie du Châtelet in her Institutions de physique (1740). I argue for the decisive influence of Christian Wolff on the metaphysical conception advanced by du Châtelet in the first chapters of this work aimed at providing a consistent metaphysical foundation to the new physics. I further claim that the principle of sufficient reason plays a crucial role in this endeavor. I then show that du Châtelet initiates a significant shift in teleology: she (...) moves away from the ‘idiographic’ standpoint focused on details and singularities, and advances a new, ‘nomothetic’ teleological perspective based on the regularity of the laws of nature. (shrink)

Much early modern metaphysics grew with an eye to the new science of its time, but few figures took it as seriously as Emilie du Châtelet. Happily, her oeuvre is now attracting close, renewed attention, and so the time is ripe for looking into her metaphysical foundation for empirical theory. Accordingly, I move here to do just that. I establish two conclusions. First, du Châtelet's basic metaphysics is a robust realism. Idealist strands, while they exist, are confined to non-basic regimes. (...) Second, her substance realism seems internally coherent, so her foundational project appears successful.I have two aims in this paper. Historically, I show that du Châtelet's main source of inspiration was Christian... (shrink)

The object of this article is to lay bare the consensualist presuppositions implicit within contemporary analyses of the controversies of the Classical Age by proposing an alternative model: agonistic pluralism. The convergence between this political reading of the controversies and an epistemological reading is reinforced by a discussion of Hasok Chang's work, which develops a model of epistemic pluralism that breaks away from studies in the history of science undertaken following the Kuhnian model of scientific revolutions. This makes it possible (...) to question the theoretical convergence of two anti-hegemonic claims: one political, the other epistemological. I aim to put this new model of analysis to the test by applying it to a well known, oft-analysed dispute, that which erupted between Dortous de Mairan and Emilie du Châtelet following the publication of the Institutions de Physique. (shrink)

In the mid-eighteenth century, it was usually taken for granted that all curves described by a single mathematical function were continuous, which meant that they had a shape without bends and a well-defined derivative. In this paper I discuss arguments for this claim made by two authors, Emilie du Châtelet and Roger Boscovich. I show that according to them, the claim follows from the law of continuity, which also applies to natural processes, so that natural processes and mathematical functions have (...) a shared characteristic of being continuous. However, there were certain problems with their argument, and they had to deal with a counterexample, namely a mathematical function that seemed to describe a discontinuous curve. (shrink)

Im Mittelpunkt der vorliegenden Studie steht die Frage nach der Tragweite und Anwendungsrelevanz der Methodenlehre Émilie du Châtelets für die Physik im 18. Jahrhundert, mit der sich die Französin an der Diskussion um Energie- und Impulserhaltung und um das Prinzip der kleinsten Wirkung beteiligte. Andrea Reichenberger zeigt, dass Prinzipien und Hypothesen für Émilie du Châtelet als Fundament und Gerüst wissenschaftlicher Erkenntnis gelten. Im Zusammenspiel beider Komponenten erweisen sich das Prinzip des Widerspruchs und das Prinzip des zureichenden Grundes als regulative Leitlinien (...) und Handlungsmaxime für die auf Hypothesen gestützte Theoriebildung und -begründung. Die sich daraus ergebenden Konsequenzen für den Status und Inhalt der Newtonschen Axiome werden exemplarisch aufgezeigt. (shrink)

Translation for this volume by Lydia Patton of Chapter 9 (pages 179-200) of Émilie du Châtelet's Institutions de Physique (Foundations of Physics). Original publication date 1750. Paris: Chez Prault Fils.

British Journal for the History of Philosophy, Volume 21, Issue 1, Page 207-209, January 2013.

A survey article on the metaphysics, physics and methodology of Du Châtelet.

Summary In about 1735, Emilie Du Châtelet began to translate Mandeville's Fable of the Bees. Her work, which is largely ignored by scholars, did, as this article demonstrates, turn out to be one of transformation rather than of translation and came at a crucial moment in the emerging French luxury debate. So far commercial society and luxury had been defended in purely economic terms, for instance in Melon's Essai politique, or as an aspect of divine providence for fallen man, by (...) Pierre Nicole amongst others. There was as yet no coherent defence on the level of secular ethics. As this article shows, Du Châtelet set out to remedy this. In co-operation with Voltaire, with whose recent praise of English society in the Lettres philosophiques she strongly identified, she rewrote the Fable to offer a defence of modern commercial society as both natural and moral. The article argues that she was able to do so by taking recourse to classic Epicureanism in the guise of Lucretius' De rerum natura, as an alternative to the Neo-Epicureanism, with its Augustinian overtones, as espoused by Mandeville. Voltaire in turn used her translation to lay the foundations for his defence of commercial society and progress in his Traité de métaphysique in which he uses the precise passages she had inserted into Mandeville's original. This article analyses the further aspects Voltaire adds to her arguments. Taken together, Du Châtelet's ?translation? and Voltaire's Traité offer a coherent defence of bourgeois society that would underlie Voltaire's later historiographical and philosophical works and which were crucial to his concept of ?Enlightenment? and ?progress? (shrink)