Etienne Bonot de Condillac

L’étude proposée ici se déroulera en trois moments. Il s’agit, dans un premier temps, de revenir sur la manière dont la question du rapport entre vérité et fiction est posée dans le Traité des sensations de Condillac. Il faut rappeler la justification du recours à la fiction d’une statue gagnant un sens à la fois dans le cadre d’une analyse portant sur l’origine des idées, c’est-à-dire du recours à l’imagination dans le contexte d’une enquête métaphysique ressortissant à la raison. Dans (...) un second temps, il faut se pencher sur ce qu’on peut appeler la fonction du romanesque dans le dispositif global de la fiction condillacienne, c’est-à-dire, non pas seulement ce qui revient au fictionnel, mais en propre à un art narratif visant des séquences événementielles singulières. Enfin, on terminera par quelques remarques sur ce qui est très souvent négligé dans les études portant sur ce texte – du moins en philosophie, et qui ne manque pourtant pas d’être curieux, à savoir, justement, son inscription dans le registre des Mémoires ou des pseudo-Mémoires. (shrink)

Cabanis’ enucleation of the notion of instinct in his Rapports du physique et du moral de l’homme articulates through a critique of the use of this notion by Étienne Bonnot de Condillac, who would not have recognised the founding role of physiology in human perceptive and intellectual activity. An analysis of Cabanis’ criticism to Condillac and an investigation of the meaning attributed to the notion of instinct by both philosophers allow to individuate in this notion the expression of two different (...) types of materialism. The different position of Cabanis and Condillac on this notion, in fact, reflects the divergence on a series of notions – e.g. reflexion, sensitivity, habitus – which can be traced back to the different aims of their investigations. In addition to highlighting this basic divergence, this paper aims to bring out – especially referring to Condillac’s Logique – some points of contact, of which Cabanis seems not to have considered, concerning the conception of the human body as ‘organisation physique’. (shrink)

In the 17th century the dissemination of philosophical ideas relied also on the critical summaries and reviews published by the journals. The focus of this paper is the reactions of two of these journals – the Journal de Trévoux, edited by the Jesuits of the Parisian Collège Louis Le Grand, and the Journal des Sçavans – to Condillac’s works. The Jesuit journal, under the direction of pére Berthier – probably himself the author of the reviews – had a precise plan (...) in presenting Condillac’s philosophy as an anti-empiricist and anti-materialist doctrine, sometime giving a misrepresentation of the author’s thought, which is also criticized on some points. The decision of the Journal de Trévoux to review the main works of Condillac is anyway worthy of attention, and probably betrays a certain interest toward the more up to date philosophical enquiry. The Journal des Sçavans was on the other hand more faithful in presenting Condillac’s works. (shrink)

In this paper I trace the manner in which Herder’s philosophy of language grounds his approach to hermeneutical issues regarding history, interpretation, and translation. Herder’s approach to the question of language has been repeatedly lauded for its important influence on the later work done by Schleiermacher, Dilthey, and Gadamer, but in this discussion I am going to put him more directly in conversation with Wilhelm von Humboldt. Although recent critics have derided Humboldt’s theory as both derivative and wrong, I will (...) argue that we should instead recognize that Humboldt’s philosophy of language represents a significant development of Herder’s thesis. This development is accomplished by way of Humboldt’s application of Kant’s mature theory of reason to a program for comparative linguistics. In Humboldt’s hands, this amounts to a new strain of philosophical anthropology. (shrink)

The present article proposes to study Condillac’s analysis of Spinoza’s Ethics, against the background of the more general criticism that the French abbot makes of the seventeenth-century logique de système. From the Essai sur l’origine des connaissances humaines to the Traité des systèmes to the later texts, Condillac’s theory and critique of systems are crossed by two components: on the one hand, the search for the sensory origin of ideas, that Condillac radicalizes in his Traité des sensations into a theory (...) of knowledge as a ‘transformed sensation’. On the other hand, an operative logic of signs, which from the Essai to the works subsequent to the Traité des sensations translates sensibility into a knowledge, or a ‘well-made language’, whose logic is calculation. My objective is to clarify how the new ‘systematic spirit’, repeatedly invoked by the abbot, departs from the ‘bad metaphysics’ that he claims to liquidate. The comparison with the Spinozist system will be illuminating: in his treatise on the metaphysical systems of the seventeenth century Condillac proposes a critical analysis of the ‘geometrical spirit’; in his latest work, La langue des calculs, he proposes a new logic to which he assigns the task of bringing together the abstract and the concrete, beyond the ruins of classical metaphysics. The ‘systematic spirit’ and ‘spirit of system’ will be revealed, in spite of Condillac’s efforts, as being much closer to what it appears at first sight. (shrink)

This essay—part of a larger project of constructing a new, historically informed philosophy of dance, built on four phenomenological constructs that I call “Moves”—concerns the second Move, “gesture,” the etymology of which reveals its close connection to the Greek word “metaphor.” More specifically, I examine the treatments of gesture by the philosophers George Herbert Mead and Etienne Bonnot de Condillac, both of whom view it as the foundation of language. I conclude by showing how gesture can be used in analyzing (...) various types of dance, which in turn suggests transformational potential for philosophy, dance, and society as a whole. (shrink)

This is a brief summary of Condillac's philosophy of language in his Origins of Human Knowledge.

Condillac's Essay on the Origin of Human Knowledge, first published in French in 1746 and offered here in a new translation, represented in its time a radical departure from the dominant conception of the mind as a reservoir of innately given ideas. Descartes had held that knowledge must rest on ideas; Condillac turned this upside down by arguing that speech and words are the origin of mental life and knowledge. He argued, further, that language has its origin in human interaction (...) and in our natural capacity to react spontaneously and instinctively to the expression of emotions and states of mind in others. The importance of this pointedly anti-Cartesian view, and its relevance to both aesthetics and epistemology, were quickly understood, and Condillac's work influenced many later philosophers including Herder, Rousseau, and Adam Smith. His conception also anticipated Wittgenstein's view of language, its usage, and its relation to mind and thought. (shrink)

This essay argues that Pufendorf conceived the principles of natural law against the rationalism and innatism of the 17th century, and that Condillac similarly formulated a conception of the human origin of language, both of them thus securing open and human foundations for the two primal institutions of law and language, and also making all citizens free agents in the ordering of communal living.

This article reexamines Condillac's Traité des systêmes (1749) and the broader Enlightenment controversy over "systems." Historians have often read this work as an epistemological treatise: an expression of the empiricist rejection of seventeenth-century rationalism. Yet a different picture emerges when we consider its pedagogical aims. Condillac sought not only to refute his opponents, but also to train readers how to evaluate philosophical arguments on their own, promoting a streamlined critical technique that involved parsing texts for a reductive logical structure. In (...) the process, he helped construct an enduring stereotype of the seventeenth-century philosophers as rigidly systematic thinkers. (shrink)

The paper builds an argument about empathy, kinesthesia, choreography, and power as they were constituted in early eighteenth century France. It examines the conditions under which one body could claim to know what another body was feeling, using two sets of documents – philosophical examinations of perception and kinesthesia by Condillac and notations of dances published by Feuillet. Reading these documents intertextually, I postulate a kind of corporeal episteme that grounds how the body is constructed. And I endeavor to situate (...) this body within the colonial and expansionist politics of its historical moment. (shrink)

Condillac's Essay on the Origin of Human Knowledge, first published in French in 1746 and offered here in a new translation, represented in its time a radical departure from the dominant conception of the mind as a reservoir of innately given ideas. Descartes had held that knowledge must rest on ideas; Condillac turned this upside down by arguing that speech and words are the origin of mental life and knowledge. He argued, further, that language has its origin in human interaction (...) and in our natural capacity to react spontaneously and instinctively to the expression of emotions and states of mind in others. The importance of this pointedly anti-Cartesian view, and its relevance to both aesthetics and epistemology, were quickly understood, and Condillac's work influenced many later philosophers including Herder, Rousseau, and Adam Smith. His conception also anticipated Wittgenstein's view of language, its usage, and its relation to mind and thought. (shrink)

Condillac's claim that all our ideas are derived from sensations leads him to hold against Descartes that they are not on that account obscure and confused. The question is whether and how far he can refute the Cartesian thesis.

This is the first English translation of Condillac's most influential works: the Essay on the Origins of Human Knowledge and Course for Study of Instruction of the Prince of Parma. The Essays lay the foundation for Condillac's theory of mind. He argues that all mental operations are, in fact, sensory processes and nothing more. An outgrowth of Locke's empirical account of ideas and sensations as a source of knowledge, Condillac's theory goes beyond Locke's foundations, introducing his universal method for understanding (...) any complex entity: the reduction of all matters to their origins and then to their simplest forms. The Course, originally written to teach Prince Ferdinand of Parma to think and to develop good habits of mind following the principle of association of ideas, covers grammar, writing, reasoning, thinking, and ancient and modern history. Philip writes in the introduction: "[the] mind is moldable to reason and to 'nature' which gave it a model and provides the ultimate authority for all it can know or do.". (shrink)

Implicit in the theoretical chemical writings of Antoine Laurent Lavoisier is a theory of language that is not in complete harmony with the philosopher of language whom he takes as his explicit authority, Condillac. Lavoisier's reform of the nomenclature of chemistry leads to his dividing scientific language into two sets with different properties: a denotative artificial nomenclature and connotative natural language. This division supposedly permits knowledge to be stored in the nomenclature while the natural language retains the rhetorical tools necessary (...) for creative thought and argument. The consequences of this reform of scientific language are, however, the opposite of what Lavoisier had intended. (shrink)

This paper intends to deal with Condillacian Linguistics. Although the Condillacian philosophy of mind and analysis of language were the most important in the late eighteenth century, none of them is mentioned in Chomsky's work (1966, Cartesian Linguistics). It would be useful for the history of Western thought if Chomsky's monumental error were generally recognized and if Condillacian Linguistics were at last to find the place it rightly deserves. The main thesis of Condillac's linguistic ideas (language is the first step (...) in the analysis of thought) is briefly presented with reference to its context and consequences. (shrink)

This highly readable translation of the major works of the 18th- century philosopher Etienne Bonnot, Abbe de Condillac, a disciple of Locke and a contemporary of Rousseau, Voltaire, and Diderot, shows his influence on psychiatric diagnosis as well as on the education of the deaf, the retarded, and the preschool child. Published two hundred years after Condillac's death, this translation contains treatises which were, until now, virtually unavailable in English: A Treatise on Systems, A Treatise of the Sensations, Logic.

... parmi les meilleurs raisonneurs et les plus profonds metaphysiciens de son siecle." This prophecy of Rousseau's has been only partially fulfilled. ...

Condillac's Essay on the Origin of Human Knowledge, first published in French in 1746 and offered here in a new translation, represented in its time a radical departure from the dominant conception of the mind as a reservoir of innately given ideas. Descartes had held that knowledge must rest on ideas; Condillac turned this upside down by arguing that speech and words are the origin of mental life and knowledge. He argued, further, that language has its origin in human interaction (...) and in our natural capacity to react spontaneously and instinctively to the expression of emotions and states of mind in others. The importance of this pointedly anti-Cartesian view, and its relevance to both aesthetics and epistemology, were quickly understood, and Condillac's work influenced many later philosophers including Herder, Rousseau, and Adam Smith. His conception also anticipated Wittgenstein's view of language, its usage, and its relation to mind and thought. (shrink)

Condillac's view of language and its function in man's work of constructing the world receive a careful and well-documented though rather uncritical examination in this work. Salvucci concludes that Condillac had fought to guarantee the dignity of man, and that this is a good thing.--R. D. G.

And yet, as one advances further in the present edition, one realizes that in several respects its format fits Condillac's thought surprisingly well, particularly his rigorous, intransigent rationalism and his strong sense of the structure of thought. Condillac's starting point is in Locke's empiricism and in a determined anti-metaphysical and anti-systematic conviction; he set out to go beyond even Locke's tabula rasa sensationalism. Not only should the entire content of our mind be traced back to sense impressions which had been (...) received from objects outside of us or by inner impressions, but even the faculties and acts of the mind which transform these data into ideas should be explained as the effect of characteristics that are inherent in sensations. This was the thesis and the intent. But as Condillac's philosophy developed, the constructive, Cartesian forces of his mind, his almost passionate demand for precision, mathematical cogency and radical analysis became more and more prevalent. Already the subtitle of the 1746 edition of the Essai sur l'origine des connaissances humaines announces the Cartesian heritage or parentage; the subtitle reads: "ouvrage où l'on réduit à un seul principe tout ce qui concerne l'entendement.". (shrink)