L’addition, dans la cinquième édition en 1683 de La Logique ou L’Art de penser, d’un chapitre consacré à la définition générale du signe et de plusieurs chapitres relevant spécifiquement d’une analyse des signes linguistiques, a été parfois interprétée comme une apparition tardive du “problème du langage” dans le traité d’Arnauld et Nicole. Parce que la plupart de ces chapitres supplémentaires sont la transposition de passages auparavant destinés dans la Perpétuité de la foi (1669-1674) à réfuter le sens calviniste de Ceci (...) est mon corps, on a été enclin à attribuer l’importance de la question du signe et du “problème du langage” dans l’édition de 1683 à une origine théologique. J’essaie au contraire de montrer que, dès la première édition de L’Art de penser en 1662, la problématisation des écarts des expressions linguistiques avec une correspondance terme à terme entre les mots et les idées a été indissociable pour Port-Royal de l’analyse des opérations de l’esprit. Selon moi, dans la Perpétuité de la foi, la critique du sens calviniste de la formule eucharistique constitue elle-même une application de cette analyse logique du langage : les passages incorporés ensuite dans L’Art de penser sont dans le prolongement des réflexions de 1662 sur les difficultés d’adéquation entre le dire et le vouloir-dire. Je montre pour finir que la définition générale du signe à Port-Royal suppose une restructuration de la définition augustinienne du De doctrina christiana, et fonde en 1683 une identification de la relation de signification linguistique à un rapport de représentation des mots aux idées, qui vient redoubler le rapport de représentation des idées aux choses établi en 1662. (shrink)

Kenelm Digby’s Two Treatises, of the Nature of Bodies and of the Nature of Mans Soule defends quite an idiosyncratic approach to mind-body dualism. In his use of the divisibility argument to prove that the human soul cannot be a material substance, Digby takes an uncompromising stand for merely potential material parts. In his Treatise of Bodies the present article focuses on the mode of construction of the definition of quantity as divisibility and on its links to two distinct fundamental (...) arguments against the actual material parts doctrine. The first, positive, argument consists of a semantic reason drawn from Digby’s general doctrine of meaning, whereas the second, negative, argument, addresses the traditional question of the composition of the continuum. The latter, the author contends, does not build on the medieval controversy itself, but on Digby’s opposition to Galileo’s claim of indivisibilism in his Dialogues Concerning Two Sciences. (shrink)

In the last two decades, Ralph Cudworth has been acknowledged as one of the paramount figures in the history of theories of consciousness. This paper discusses the interpretation defended by Udo Thiel and Vili Lähteenmäki. Both contend that, for Cudworth, the reflexivity defining consciousness does not constitute self-consciousness, which, they say, requires self-determination for practical ends. On the contrary, I argue that for Cudworth any degree of consciousness implies a species of self-perception that must be considered a degree of self-consciousness. (...) To do justice to Cudworth’s full position, I claim, we must take into account a kind of consciousness that I call ‘to-oneself ’ consciousness. Furthermore, I argue, the problem of the ethical self-formation of every human soul as one personality should be seen as going beyond the mere consideration of practical rationality. (shrink)

The book Descartes and the First Cartesians published by Roger Ariew in 2014, like the revised and expanded version of Descartes and the Last Scholastics, published in 2011 under the title Descartes Among the Scholastics, contributes in an exemplary way to eliminating the mythologization of modernity in the history of Cartesianism, and more generally, in the history of early-modern philosophy. From one book to the next, and with the help of numerous articles in the background that develop the same critique (...) of the mythology of the modern philosopher maintained by many commentators, Ariew patiently demonstrates that what one calls "the system of the philosophy of Descartes" constitutes neither the absolute beginning... (shrink)

In the free-will discussion between Hobbes and Bramhall, Hobbes’s principle that actions are necessary is not immediately action-theoretic. The fundamental theoretical context of Hobbes’s explanation of action lies in an understanding of causation more generally. However, Hobbes’s action theory is not simply modeled after the account of cause and effect in his First Philosophy. It introduces a temporal qualification which ranks necessitarianism higher than First Philosophy does: not only a voluntary action, but also the determinate moment when the mental act (...) of volition is formed, is necessitated. My paper argues that this strengthening of causal necessity is due to the Hobbesian scheme of deliberation, which must be analyzed in terms of one distinctive kind of ‘mental discourse’ and practical reasoning, not merely in terms of a series of passions. For Hobbes, the impossibility of a direct representation of the future requires the mediation of a mental construction. (shrink)

This special issue of the journal Les Archives de Philosophie aims to underline the diversity of the doctrines at Port-Royal. It focusses on semiology, epistemology anf theology It ries to caracterize the theories of Port Royal not only in connection with their contemporaries, but also with the Medieval and Post-medieval traditions.

This special issue of the journal Les Archives de Philosophie aims to underline the diversity of the doctrines at Port-Royal. It focusses on semiology, epistemology anf theology It ries to caracterize the theories of Port Royal not only in connection with their contemporaries, but also with the Medieval and Post-medieval traditions.

Résumé Le refus par Arnauld, en 1641, de la thèse cartésienne d’une fausseté des idées, et non des seuls jugements, est habituellement analysé en fonction de l’admission, vue comme un revirement sous l’influence des Quatrièmes réponses, des idées de la sensation comme idées fausses dans la Logique. J’essaie au contraire de rapporter ce refus seulement aux textes des Méditations et des Premières réponses qui lui servent d’appui. Arnauld construit son objection en sorte que la thèse des idées fausses apparaisse en (...) contradiction avec la doctrine cartésienne même des idées. Ce n’est nullement la fausseté des idées de la sensation, mais la fausseté des idées tout court, qui est sa cible, et ses écrits ultérieurs manifestent une forme de continuité avec les raisons de sa critique initiale, plutôt qu’un simple abandon de cette dernière. (shrink)

Je ne dirai pas, pour désigner Archéologie du sujet, les livres d’Alain de Libera, car même si nous avons deux volumes, et si la série doit se poursuivre, ce n’est pourtant jamais que d’un seul livre qu’il s’agit, d’un même individu livre, dans son identité diachronique (2007, 2008). Archéologie du sujet aurait pu ne pas s’appeler Archéologie du sujet, et pourtant le livre aurait été le même individu, sous une autre description, qui aurait été l’équivalent français du titre donné en (...) 1994 par... (shrink)

RésuméL’opuscule de Pascal Expériences nouvelles touchant le vide donne le schéma d’une démonstration physique visant à mettre un terme aux controverses entre plénistes et vacuistes. La forme traditionnelle de la dispute avec laquelle Pascal veut rompre se trouve cependant réactivée par Étienne Noël, qui reprend à son compte des objections plénistes que les Expériences nouvelles n’envisagent comme possibles que pour mieux les invalider. Les lettres de Pascal Au très révérend père Noël et À Monsieur Le Pailleur permettent au contraire de (...) délimiter un autre champ disputationnel que celui auquel Noël obéit. Pascal subordonne la dispute à la reconnaissance de principes épistémologiques communs: la discussion antithétique sur le vide doit être contrôlée par des critères méthodologiques acceptés par tous. Contre la figure de la dispute savante, Pascal définit ainsi un modèle radicalement nouveau: la dispute scientifique. (shrink)

Résumé L’opuscule de Pascal _Expériences nouvelles touchant le vide_ donne le schéma d’une démonstration physique visant à mettre un terme aux controverses entre plénistes et vacuistes. La forme traditionnelle de la dispute avec laquelle Pascal veut rompre se trouve cependant réactivée par Étienne Noël, qui reprend à son compte des objections plénistes que les _Expériences nouvelles_ n’envisagent comme possibles que pour mieux les invalider. Les lettres de Pascal _Au très révérend père Noël_ et _À Monsieur Le Pailleur_ permettent au contraire (...) de délimiter un autre champ disputationnel que celui auquel Noël obéit. Pascal subordonne la dispute à la reconnaissance de principes épistémologiques communs: la discussion antithétique sur le vide doit être contrôlée par des critères méthodologiques acceptés par tous. Contre la figure de la dispute savante, Pascal définit ainsi un modèle radicalement nouveau: la dispute scientifique. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 30, Issue 1, pp 28 - 57 Hobbes considered as unambiguous and unproblematic his demonstration in _De Corpore_ that every effect past, present or future is necessary, since it always requires a sufficient cause that cannot be sufficient without being necessary, so that nothing is possible which will not be actual at some time. Now, this approach to necessity and possibility was received by his contemporary readers as missing its aim. Two immediate criticisms of _De Corpore_ by (...) Moranus and Ward exhibit from this viewpoint an interesting difference as to their common argument that only hypothetical necessity can result from Hobbes’s premises. My essay relates this argumentative difference to the absence or presence in the background of the free-will dispute between Hobbes and Bramhall. From there, I examine also different interpretations of the ‘hypothetical necessity-argument’ in the indirect critical reception of _De Corpore_, when the target is Hobbes’s necessitarianism in the controversy with Bramhall, based on significant material from his _De Corpore_ project. Remarkably, although Leibniz agrees with Bramhall that Hobbes only proves a hypothetical necessity, Leibniz’s understanding of hypothetical necessity is not that of Bramhall. Another striking difference is displayed in the use of the ‘hypothetical necessity-argument’ by More, which as it were blurs the connection of the free-will issue with Hobbes’s general doctrine of causality. (shrink)

Pascal’s wager was sometimes viewed in the eighteenth-century as an argument conquering its whole demonstrative force not in the Pensées but in a passage of Locke’s Essay Concerning the Human Understanding (II, XXI, § 70) dealing with the preference to be given to a virtuous life when considering the possibility of another eternal life. In this paper, I intend to show that this interpretation is ill-founded. The argument of the wager highlights the discrepancy between the requirements of alethic reason on (...) the one side and of practical reason on the other side: the wager is to be seen not as a proposition, but as an act. When emphasizing the conditions on which this act can conform to rationality, the argument used of in the Pensées puts the comparison between a unity (my life ante mortem) and a multiplicity (other possible lives post mortem) on the front of the stage, in combination with a reckoning of the chances of winning or losing the bet on God’s existence. The reduction ad absurdum of the act of betting against God’s existence is deduced from a double infinitization, not only quantitative (an infinity of lives), but also qualitative (a reiterating infinity of happiness) of the second member in the comparison. Now, the case is different in Locke’s argumentation. Its reading is vitiated if we deem that the § 70 in the Essay II, XXI consists in a self-sufficient demonstration, understandable by itself. Through a close examination of the chapter XXI in its entire, it appears on the contrary that the thesis of an alleged improvement or even of a mere equivalent of Pascal’s wager in the Essay is defeated by the necessity to put back Locke’s own argument in its true place, actually as the result of a complex enquiry on the principle of the determination of the will. (shrink)

Dans la série de principes auxquels un Mémoire pour Gabriel Cramer rédigé par Condillac début 1747 ramène le système monadologique de Leibniz, le principe de l’ingrédience de la matière par les êtres simples ou monades échappe à la critique. Condillac accorde le principe [P1] les monades sont les premiers éléments de la matière. Il rejette seulement les deux principes subalternes [P2] les monades ont un principe interne de tous leurs changements et [P3] chaque état passager d’une monade représente sous un (...) certain point de vue l’univers, qui sous-tendent la notion de perceptions inconscientes. Composée dans la même période, la dissertation anonyme Les Monades est tout entière organisée en vue de la démonstration par Condillac en personne de la vérité de la thèse monadologique il y a des composés, donc il y a des êtres simples et de son corrélat, le principe la matière a pour éléments des êtres simples. Une analyse minutieuse des procédés argumentatifs déployés dans Les Monades permet d’interpréter cette défense de la thèse monadologique comme une remise en cause par Condillac en 1747 de l’hétérogénéité qu’il a maintenue en 1746 dans l’ Essai sur l’origine des connaissances humaines entre l’étendue et les qualités dites secondes. En donnant en son nom propre une preuve (opposée à celle par la raison suffisante dans l’ Ontologia de Wolff) de la vérité de la thèse monadologique, Condillac essaie de fonder une parfaite phénoménalisation de l’étendue. La dissertation Les Monades ne doit pas être vue simplement comme un préliminaire à la critique des systèmes abstraits dans le Traité des systèmes de 1749. La tentative d’une monadologie réformée dans la dissertation de 1747 marque le commencement d’une interrogation sur l’idée d’étendue appelée à se poursuivre dans le Traité des sensations de 1754. (shrink)

Commençons par une histoire qui n’est pas prise de Pascal. Le jeune saint Louis de Gonzague jouait un jour à la balle. « Que feriez-vous, lui dit-on, si vous saviez que votre mort est proche ? » Il répondit simplement qu’il continuerait à jouer à la balle. Cette légende chère aux théologiens de la Contre-Réforme1 fournit l’illustration..

Science et sagesse, ou la forme logique de la démonstration Selon la Lettre Dédicatoire du De Cive à William Cavendish, troisième comte de Devonshire, datée par Hobbes du 1er novembre 1641 à Paris, autant y a-t-il de genres de choses où la raison humaine trouve à s’exercer, autant y a-t-il de parties de la philosophie, la philosophie devant recevoir autant de noms différents qu’elle comporte de ramifications conformes à la diversité des matières soumises au raisonnement. Quand le raisonnemen...

L'histoire critique des textes bibliques a été conçue par Richard Simon comme un art de juger, selon des règles strictes, des meilleures leçons à conserver. Cette méthode, qui impose dans la traduction de l'Écriture une règle d'uniformité textuelle, aurait fait défaut selon lui dans la version du Nouveau Testament donnée à Port-Royal « selon la Vulgate, avec les différences du grec ». La critique à la manière de Richard Simon n'est cependant pour Antoine Arnauld, qui préfère l'uniformité du sens à (...) celle du texte, qu'un art sans jugement : c'est de l'extension de l'art de penser à une logique pour le contingent, que dépend à ses yeux une définition véritablement générale de la critique. The critical history of biblical texts was conceived by Richard Simon as an ars judicandi, whose rules had to be applied to the discrimination between true and false lessons. Concerning translation, this method required in his view a principle of textual uniformity, so he thought defective the Port-Royal version of The New Testament . Antoine Arnauld, however, gave preference to the semantic uniformity over the literal one, and stated that a real definition of critique in its logical generality ought to be supplied by the extension of the art of thinking to the case of contingent truths. (shrink)

Dans sa correspondance avec Descartes (1648-1649), Henry More cherche à amener l’auteur des Principia philosophiae à expliciter en une thèse infinitiste sur l’étendue matérielle la formule équivoque de mundus indefinite extensus dans l’article II.21. Les lettres de More, développant une indication rapidement esquissée dans son poème Democritus Platonissans (1646), font de l’infinitisme la condition nécessaire de la cohérence interne de la doctrine physique des Principia. Sans cela, l’hypothèse cosmologique des tourbillons dans Principia III entrerait en contradiction avec les principes des (...) choses matérielles dans Principia II. More associe en outre une exigence logique, relative à la définition du corps, à cette exigence physique. Le corps ne doit plus être défini comme substance étendue. Or, en subordonnant la philosophie naturelle des Principia à une ontologie générale selon laquelle une étendue non matérielle est la propriété de toute substance en tant que substance, les lettres de More à Descartes représentent surtout une étape-charnière dans la pneumatologie de More. La correspondance de 1648-1649 marque un début d’abandon du modèle « holenmérien » de l’étendue spirituelle adopté dans les poèmes philosophiques des années 1640. Au moyen de sa lecture des Principia, More opère un premier retour critique sur sa doctrine des substances immatérielles. (shrink)

Cet article examine la définition, par Ramus, des normes de chaque science et l’influence de la critique de ce modèle ramiste dans l’émergence, au tournant du XVIIe siècle, d’une vision de la philosophie comme système de toutes les sciences. En étudiant la manière dont Bartholomäus Keckermann décrit les conditions qui permettent d’envisager la philosophie comme système des systèmes, on remarque la nette diffraction de l’héritage aristotélicien (principalement les Analytica posteriora) dans les thèses ramistes d’une part, dans l’approche systématique de Keckermann (...) par rapport aux disciplines philosophiques d’autre part. Cette différence a eu un fort impact sur les fonctions attribuées à la logique (Ramus) et à la métaphysique (Keckermann) dans l’architecture des savoirs. (shrink)

La critique dont a été l’objet de la part d’Arnauld la proposition de Malebranche les plaisirs des sens rendent heureux a été à l’origine d’une longue argumentation de Bayle afin de démontrer, contre Arnauld, que la propriété de « rendre heureux » attribuée par Malebranche aux plaisirs sensibles a pour fondement leur spiritualité : les plaisirs des sens ne sont pas matériels. Cet article examine la manière dont Bayle parvient à ruiner la catégorisation des plaisirs en corporels et intellectuels, ou (...) sensuels et spirituels, en combinant deux stratégies : l’utilisation du principe épicurien le bonheur est le plaisir comme d’un critère pour prouver la vérité de la proposition de Malebranche, et l’utilisation de l’absence d’intentionnalité des sensations selon Malebranche comme confirmation de la nature purement psychique du plaisir chez Epicure. (shrink)

English summary: Condillacs 1746 Essai sur lorigine des connaissance humaines represents a pioneering approach to the philosophy of knowledge. Working through a semiotic method, Condillac is able to radically revisit the theory of ideas developed by predecessors such as Malebranche and Locke. This critical edition allows readers to better understand Condillacs essential contributions to Enlightenment philosophy. French description: L'Essai sur l'origine des connaissances humaines que Condillac publie en 1746 est un texte surprenant a plusieurs points de vue. Il l'est tout (...) d'abord du fait qu'on ne sait pas exactement dans quelles conditions il a ete compose, et que, faute de manuscrits, il reste impossible a ce jour d'en connaitre la redaction initiale. Dans ses ouvrages ulterieurs, Condillac en a par ailleurs critique plusieurs elements, mais rien ne nous permet de savoir s'il a touche a l'Essai quand il a entrepris de reviser ses ecrits en vue de leur publication dans ses oeuvres completes qu'il n'aura pas eu le temps de mener a bonne fin. Il l'est aussi dans son contenu qui s'efforce d'articuler une philosophie de la connaissance avec ce que nous considererions comme une semiotique generale. Dans cet effort, le genie de Condillac prend appui sur toute la culture de son temps pour ouvrir avec alacrite une voie de recherche dans laquelle il fait oeuvre de pionnier. Ayant en effet arrime l'idee au signe, il entreprend l'inventaire des modalites de fonctionnement de toutes les especes de signes d'institution. Il lui devient alors possible de bousculer de l'interieur la theorie des idees sous les formes qu'elle a prises chez ses predecesseurs, en particulier Malebranche et Locke, et de reconduire sans reste l'idee jusqu'a la sensation. Au cours de ce travail, il met en place non seulement les bases, mais jusqu'au projet, destine a alimenter pour longtemps les discussions, d'une theorie de l'esprit. (shrink)

The collected essays in Locke and Cartesian Philosophy, according to its editors, "advocate for a shift of emphasis" in the study of Locke and Descartes away from traditional questions related to their role in "the 'epistemological turn' of early modern philosophy". Instead, "issues such as cosmic organization, the qualities and nature of bodies, the nature of ideas, [and] the substance of the soul" should receive more attention. The contributions address these questions as well as free will and Milton's detailed accounting (...) of Locke's initial exposure to Descartes. The volume advocates for a shift in emphasis rather than a revolution by including several contributions in the traditional areas of the theory... (shrink)

Online supplement, "Mulsow: Additions to Notes drawn from the 2002 edition of Moderne aus dem Untergrund" full versions of nearly 300 notes that were truncated in the print edition. Hosted on H. C. Erik Midelfort's website. Martin Mulsow's seismic reinterpretation of the origins of the Enlightenment in Germany won awards and renown in its original German edition, and now H. C. Erik Midelfort's translation makes this sensational book available to English-speaking readers. In Enlightenment Underground, Mulsow shows that even in the (...) late seventeenth century some thinkers in Germany ventured to express extremely dangerous ideas, but did so as part of a secret underground. Scouring manuscript collections across northern Europe, Mulsow studied the writings of countless hitherto unknown radical jurists, theologians, historians, and dissident students who pushed for the secularization of legal, political, social, and religious knowledge. Often their works circulated in manuscript, anonymously, or as clandestinely published books. Working as a philosophical microhistorian, Mulsow has discovered the identities of several covert radicals and linked them to circles of young German scholars, many of whom were connected with the vibrant radical cultures of the Netherlands, England, and Denmark. The author reveals how radical ideas and contributions to intellectual doubt came from Socinians and Jews, church historians and biblical scholars, political theorists, and unemployed university students. He shows that misreadings of humorous or ironic works sometimes gave rise to unintended skeptical thoughts or corrosively political interpretations of Christianity. This landmark book overturns stereotypical views of the early Enlightenment in Germany as cautious, conservative, and moderate, and replaces them with a new portrait that reveals a movement far more radical, unintended, and puzzling than previously suspected. (shrink)

This book explores a question central to philosophy--namely, what does it take for a belief to be justified or rational? According to a widespread view, whether one has justification for believing a proposition is determined by how probable that proposition is, given one's evidence. In this book this view is rejected and replaced with another: in order for one to have justification for believing a proposition, one's evidence must normically support it--roughly, one's evidence must make the falsity of that proposition (...) abnormal in the sense of calling for special, independent explanation. This conception of justification bears upon a range of topics in epistemology and beyond. Ultimately, this way of looking at justification guides us to a new, unfamiliar picture of how we should respond to our evidence and manage our own fallibility. This picture is developed here. (shrink)

Divided into four parts, this treatise begins with well-known criticisms of nonreligious ethics and then develops an atheistic metaethics. In Part 2, Martin criticizes the Christian foundation of ethics, specifically the ’divine command theory’ and the idea of imitating the life of Jesus as the basis of Christian morality. Part 3 demonstrates that life can be meaningful in the absence of religious belief. Part 4 criticizes the theistic point of view in general terms as well as the specific Christian doctrines (...) of the atonement, salvation, and the resurrection. (publisher, edited). (shrink)

This collection of texts (originally published in German under the title Holzwege) is Heidegger's first post-war book and contains some of the major expositions of his later philosophy. Of particular note are 'The Origin of the Work of Art', perhaps the most discussed of all of Heidegger's essays, and 'Nietzsche's Word 'God is Dead',' which sums up a decade of Nietzsche research. Although translations of the essays have appeared individually in a variety of places, this is the first English translation (...) to bring them all together as Heidegger intended. The text is taken from the last edition of the work, which contains the author's final corrections together with important marginal annotations that provide considerable insight into the development of his thought. This fresh and accurate new translation will be an invaluable resource for all students of Heidegger, whether they work in philosophy, literary theory, religious studies, or intellectual history. (shrink)

Many philosophers and psychologists argue that out everyday ability to predict and explain the actions and mental states of others is grounded in out possession of a primitive 'folk' psychological theory. Recently however, this theory has come under challenge from the simulation alternative. This alternative view says that human beings are able to predict and explain each other's actions by using the resources of their own minds to simulate the psychological aetiology of the actions of the others. This book and (...) the companion volume Folk Psychology: The Theory of Mind Debate together offer a richly woven fabric of philosophical and psychological theory, which promises to yield real insights into the nature of our mental lives. (shrink)

This paper addresses a problem about epistemic warrant. The problem is posed by philosophical arguments for externalism about the contents of thoughts, and similarly by philosophical arguments for architecturalism about thinking, when these arguments are put together with a thesis of first person authority. In each case, first personal knowledge about our thoughts plus the kind of knowledge that is provided by a philosophical argument seem, together, to open an unacceptably ‘non-empirical’ route to knowledge of empirical facts. Furthermore, this unwelcome (...) prospect of transferring a ‘non-empirical’ warrant from premises about our own mental states and about philosophical theory to a conclusion about external environment or internal architecture seems to depend upon little more than the possibility of knowledge by inference. (The use of the scare-quoted term ‘non-empirical’ is explained a couple of paragraphs further on.). (shrink)

And, as The Promise of Salvation makes clear through abundant empirical evidence, religion will not disappear as long as these promises continue to help people ...

This book traces the development of theories of the self and personal identity from the ancient Greeks to the present day. From Plato and Aristotle to Freud and Foucault, Raymond Martin and John Barresi explore the works of a wide range of thinkers and reveal the larger intellectual trends, controversies, and ideas that have revolutionized the way we think about ourselves. The authors open with ancient Greece, where the ideas of Plato, Aristotle, and the materialistic atomists laid the groundwork for (...) future theories. They then discuss the ideas of the church fathers and medieval and Renaissance philosophers, including St. Paul, Philo, Augustine, Aquinas, and Montaigne. In their coverage of the emergence of a new mechanistic conception of nature in the seventeenth century, Martin and Barresi note a shift away from religious and purely philosophical notions of self and personal identity to more scientific and social conceptions, a trend that has continued to the present day. They explore modern philosophy and psychology, including the origins of different traditions within each discipline, and explain both the theoretical relevance of feminism and gender and ethnic studies and also the ways that Derrida and other recent thinkers have challenged the very idea that a unified self or personal identity even exists. Martin and Barresi cover a number of issues broached by philosophers and psychologists, such as the existence of a fixed and unchanging self and whether the concept of the soul has a use outside of religious contexts. They address the question of whether notions of the soul and the self are still viable in today's world. Together, they reveal the fascinating ways in which great thinkers have grappled with these and other questions and the astounding impact their ideas have had on the development of self-understanding in the west. (shrink)

Of course, although this view on meaning was the prevailing one for almost a century, many of the people who initiated the enterprise of logical semantics, including people like Frege and Wittgenstein, had an open eye for all that it did not catch. However, the logical means which Frege, Wittgenstein, Russell, and the generation that succeeded them, had at their disposal were those of classical mathematical logic and set-theory, and these indeed are not very suited for an analysis of other (...) aspects of meaning than those which the slogan covers. A real change in view then had to await the emergence of other concepts, which in due course became available mainly under the influence of developments in computer science and cognate disciplines such as artificial intelligence. And this is one of the reasons why it took almost a century before any serious and successful challenge of the view that meaning equals truthconditions from within logical semantics could emerge. (shrink)

In this paper I respond to Marcello Di Bello’s criticisms of the ‘normic account’ of the criminal standard of proof. In so doing, I further elaborate on what the normic account predicts about certain significant legal categories of evidence, including DNA and fingerprint evidence and eyewitness identifications.

Taking issue with those who see recent social transformations as an extension of modernity, the author contends that social theory must confront an epochal change from the modern era to a new era of globality, in which human beings can conceive of forces at work on a global scale, and in which they espouse values that take the globe as their reference point. The book begins by assessing the problems of writing about modernity, showing how narratives of an endlessly self-perpetuating (...) modern age were intrinsic to the "modern project," the attempt by Enlightenment philosophers to transform the everyday world in accord with science and logic under the auspices of the nation-state. Now we are beginning to realize that the nation-state and the modern project cannot renew themselves endlessly through expansion. Instead, the author contends, the age has culminated in its own dissolution, and globality has supplanted modernity as the basis for action and social organization. In theorizing the global age, he considers the worldwide environmental consequences of aggregate human activities, the reconception of human security in the age of nuclear weapons, technological advances in communication systems, the rise of a global economy, and the growing reflexivity of global consciousness, as people and groups begin to refer to the globe as the frame for their beliefs. The book concludes by examining the consequences of the Global Age thesis for politics, identifying a new popular construction of the state that the author terms "performative citizenship." In the modern age, the nation-state was the central power and citizens were beneficiaries of that power, with rights and duties. In the global age, citizens respond to the lack of central power by creating, or performing, the state themselves. The global managerial class uses the skills learned in the bureaucracy of the nation-state to bring pressure on national governments in the interests of global economic, environmental, or human-rights issues. (shrink)

This chapter gives substance to the idea of a ‘communitarian value-driven epistemology’ by developing and combining ideas from Edward Craig's and Bernard Williams' ‘epistemic genealogy’ and Barry Barnes' and Steven Shapin's ‘sociology of knowledge’. In order to make transparent how this project might slot into more familiar, or more mainstream, projects, the paper maintains throughout a critical dialogue with Jon Kvanvig's position. The chapter is structured around an attempt to defend Craig's position against Kvanvig's criticisms: by treating the institution of (...) testimony as a collective good underwritten by the intrinsic and interrelated values of accuracy and sincerity; by rendering protoknowledge attributions as ascriptions of honour; and by allowing attributions of protoknowledge to be intertwined with attributions of freedom. The view that emerges is that the core of our knowledge practices comprises institutions of testimony, and that these practices are a collective good. (shrink)

Explores the moral dimensions of the current global role of the U.S. military.