In early German ecology, the key concept used to refer to a synecological unit was Biozönose. Taken together with the concept of the Biotop, it was also understood as an integrated higher-order unit of life, sometimes called a “Holozön”. These units were often perceived as having properties similar to those of individual organisms, and they informed the mainstream of German ecology until at least the late 1960s. Here I ask how “organismic” these concepts really were and what conceptual problems they (...) entailed. To do so, I focus on some almost forgotten dissident positions, especially those of Friedrich Simon Bodenheimer and Fritz Peus, which I contrast with the mainstream German ecology of the time. In a radical paper published in 1954 that postulated the “dissolution of the concepts of biocoenosis and biotope”, Peus in particular elicited a forceful response from many prominent German ecologists. An analysis of the ensuing debate, including especially a colloquium held in 1959 that was partly inspired by Peus’ paper, is helpful for sifting the various arguments proffered with respect to a quasi-organismic perception of the biocoenosis in German speaking ecology. Although German mainstream ecologists rejected the notion of the biocoenosis as a superorganism, ontological holism was quite common among them. Additionally, the mainstream concept of the biocoenosis was plagued by several methodological problems and much conceptual confusion, to which the “dissidents” rightly pointed. Some of these problems are still pertinent today, e.g. in connection with more modern concepts such as “ecosystem”. (shrink)

Sound definitions of its basic concepts are fundamental to every scientific discipline. In some instances, like in the case of the ecosystem concept, the question arises if we can define such concepts at all. And if we can define them, how should we choose from the multiple definitions available? And what are the preconditions for a scientifically sound and useful definition? On the basis of the ecosystem concept, this paper illustrates a major, often neglected distinction in the definition of ecological (...) concepts, namely that between defining criteria and additional descriptive statements connected to those definitions. As is demonstrated by examples from the literature, mixing up these categories leads to false inferences about the properties of physical objects (e.g. a particular forest) subsumed by the concept (e.g. the ecosystem). As a further consequence, this inference becomes problematic in terms of theory development and/or the application of ecological concepts for management decisions. (shrink)

Un estudio de caso de investigación socio-ecológica realizado en Puerto Williams, Cabo de Hornos (Chile), revela que las personas pertenecientes a diferentes grupos socioculturales poseen una diversidad de perspectivas y relaciones con la naturaleza. Por ejemplo, los miembros de la Comunidad Indígena Yagán y los antiguos residentes (en su mayoría descendientes de colonos de principios del siglo XX), expresaron un fuerte sentimiento de pertenencia y hogar. Sin embargo, las personas identificadas con el uso de los recursos no tuvo respuestas positivas (...) respecto al sentimiento de hogar. Entre los entrevistados, el concepto de un territorio común presentó contrastes muy marcados. Aquellos que se identificaban con un tipo de relación de cultivo de la tierra favorecieron la propiedad privada sobre la pública. Para los entrevistados con una relación de tipo integrado con la naturaleza, la libertad de movimiento fue uno de los valores esenciales. Algunos de los entrevistados identificados con el uso de los recursos y con relaciones intelectuales y estéticas con la naturaleza, valoraron también de manera positiva la tierra como bien común. La aproximación utilizada en este estudio transforma las nociones polarizadas y dicotómicas en gradientes de perspectivas relacionadas a diferentes grados de ambientes ecológicos y culturales, locales y globales. La visión híbrida resultante de las perspectivas acerca de la naturaleza puede ser de utilidad en tiempos de cambio global, donde tanto escalas locales como globales contribuyen a identificar problemáticas asimétricas específicas, como también oportunidades de comunicación entre los diferentes grupos socioculturales. (shrink)

Un estudio de caso de investigación socio-ecológica realizado en Puerto Williams, Cabo de Hornos (Chile), revela que las personas pertenecientes a diferentes grupos socioculturales poseen una diversidad de perspectivas y relaciones con la naturaleza. Por ejemplo, los miembros de la Comunidad Indígena Yagán y los antiguos residentes (en su mayoría descendientes de colonos de principios del siglo XX), expresaron un fuerte sentimiento de pertenencia y hogar. Sin embargo, las personas identificadas con el uso de los recursos no tuvo respuestas positivas (...) respecto al sentimiento de hogar. Entre los entrevistados, el concepto de un territorio común presentó contrastes muy marcados. Aquellos que se identificaban con un tipo de relación de cultivo de la tierra favorecieron la propiedad privada sobre la pública. Para los entrevistados con una relación de tipo integrado con la naturaleza, la libertad de movimiento fue uno de los valores esenciales. Algunos de los entrevistados identificados con el uso de los recursos y con relaciones intelectuales y estéticas con la naturaleza, valoraron también de manera positiva la tierra como bien común. La aproximación utilizada en este estudio transforma las nociones polarizadas y dicotómicas en gradientes de perspectivas relacionadas a diferentes grados de ambientes ecológicos y culturales, locales y globales. La visión híbrida resultante de las perspectivas acerca de la naturaleza puede ser de utilidad en tiempos de cambio global, donde tanto escalas locales como globales contribuyen a identificar problemáticas asimétricas específicas, como también oportunidades de comunicación entre los diferentes grupos socioculturales. (shrink)

It is often assumed that believing that p for a normative reason consists in nothing more than (i) believing that p for a reason and (ii) that reason’s corresponding to a normative reason to believe that p, where (i) and (ii) are independent factors. This is the Composite View. In this paper, we argue against the Composite View on extensional and theoretical grounds. We advocate an alternative that we call the Prime View. On this view, believing for a normative reason (...) is a distinctive achievement that isn’t exhausted by the mere conjunction of (i) and (ii). Its being an achievement entails that (i) and (ii) are not independent when one believes for a normative reason: minimally, (i) must hold because (ii) holds. Apart from its intrinsic interest, our discussion has important upshots for central issues in epistemology, including the analysis of doxastic justification, the epistemology of perception, and the place of competence in epistemology. (shrink)

This paper considers the place of reasons in the metaphysics of epistemic normativity and defends a middle ground between two popular extremes in the literature. Against members of the ‘reasons first’ movement, we argue that reasons are not the sole fundamental constituents of epistemic normativity. We suggest instead that the virtue-theoretic property of competence is the key building block. To support this approach, we note that reasons must be possessed to play a role in the analysis of central epistemically normative (...) properties, and argue that the relation of possession must be analyzed in terms of competence. But while we diverge with reasons-firsters on this score, we also distance ourselves from those who deny reasons any important role in epistemology. For we maintain that possessed reasons do help to ground deontic facts in the epistemic domain (e.g., facts about what one epistemically ought to believe, may believe, or is justified in believing). Indeed, we present an argument that the possession of sufficient epistemic reasons is necessary and sufficient for propositional justification, and that proper basing on such reasons yields doxastic justification. But since possession and proper basing are themselves grounded in competence, reasons are not the end of the explanatory road: competence enables them to do their work, putting them—and us—in the middle. (shrink)

We argue for a novel view of suspending judgment properly--i.e., suspending judgment in an ex post justified way. In so doing we argue for a Kantian virtue-theoretic view of epistemic normativity and against teleological virtue-theoretic accounts.

We argue that we can avoid epistemic dilemmas by properly understanding the nature and epistemology of the suspension of judgment, with a particular focus on conflicts between higher-order evidence and first-order evidence.

Recent writers claim that responsibilist virtue epistemology courts skepticism, owing to the fact that most of us lack the virtues it deems necessary for justified belief and knowledge. A powerful version of this objection is the challenge from situationist social psychology pressed by Alfano (2012, 2013) and Olin and Doris (2014). This paper develops a new version of responsibilism that is immune from this objection, and shows that this view has many advantages over other forms of virtue epistemology. My responsibilism (...) dispenses with the ubiquitous but (I argue) mistaken idea that responsibilist virtue properties must be understood in terms of character traits. My view parallels an often overlooked form of virtue ethics suggested by Thomson (1997) that some situationists (e.g., Harman (2001)) have praised. That form shares with other forms the thought that virtue properties are normatively fundamental, but it adds that act-attaching ones are prior to person-attaching ones, and require no backing by character traits. Far from being an ad hoc retreat position, I argue that this view is independently attractive. (shrink)

Many epistemologists treat rationality and justification as the same thing. Those who don’t lack detailed accounts of the difference, leading their opponents to suspect that the distinction is an ad hoc attempt to safeguard their theories of justification. In this paper, I offer a new and detailed account of the distinction. The account is inspired by no particular views in epistemology, but rather by insights from the literature on reasons and rationality outside of epistemology. Specifically, it turns on a version (...) of the familiar distinction in meta-ethics between possessing apparent normative reasons (which may be merely apparent) and possessing objective normative reasons. The paper proceeds as follows. In §1, I discuss the history of indifference to the distinction between rationality and justification in epistemology and the striking contrast with meta-ethics. I introduced the distinction between apparent reasons and possessed objective reasons in §2 and provide a deeper basis for it in §3. I explain how the ideas extend to epistemology in §4 and explore the upshots for some central issues in §5. (shrink)

Keine ausführliche Beschreibung für "Platon" verfügbar.

Internalism holds that epistemic justification is determined by what is internal to the mind, not by facts about the mind-independent world. This paper introduces and defends a new kind of internalism that is rooted in rationalist ideas that have been neglected in recent epistemology, despite inspiring internalist projects in cognitive science. Ignoring rationalist insights has, I argue, damaged the prospects for internalism, by needlessly saddling internalists with empiricist burdens. Internalists can refuse these burdens by accepting a better philosophy of mind. (...) Rather than looking to 17th century rationalists, I look to Kant, and especially his idea that normativity is grounded in the constitution of agency and mind. A Kantian approach can avoid stock objections to internalism, I argue, and can also capture all the alleged benefits of externalism. The paper is structured as follows. In §2, I get back to basics and consider more ways to satisfy the core internalist template than have become standard. I draw attention to rationalist insights about how normativity could be grounded in the constitution of mind, and hypothesize that if internalism respects these insights, some problems disappear. I develop this hypothesis in §3 with a Kantian view. I further defend this view in §4. I conclude in §5 by explaining why Kantian internalism answers the latest challenges to internalism. (shrink)

Past research has found that mere in‐group/out‐group categorizations are sufficient to elicit biases in face memory. The current research yields novel evidence that mere social categorization is also sufficient to modulate processes underlying face perception, even for faces for which we have strong perceptual expertise: same‐race (SR) faces. Using the composite face paradigm, we find that SR faces categorized as in‐group members (i.e., fellow university students) are processed more holistically than are SR faces categorized as out‐group members (i.e., students at (...) another university). Hence, holding perceptual expertise with faces constant, categorizing an SR target as an out‐group member debilitates the strong holistic processing typically observed for SR faces. (shrink)

Dieses Buch zeichnet ein knappes Bild von Karl Jaspers‘ ungewöhnlichem Leben und von seiner Philosophie. Der Leser lernt eine tapfere Persönlichkeit kennen, die ein Leben zwischen den Extremen bewältigen musste. Bedroht durch eine unheilbare Krankheit und bedrängt durch das Nazi-Regime gelingt es Jaspers dennoch, ein fruchtbares Werk als Psychiater, Forscher, akademischer Lehrer, als Philosoph und politischer Schriftsteller aufzubauen und dabei eine ungewöhnlich glückliche Ehe zu leben. Der Leser wird in die Hauptthemen seines Denkens eingeführt: Sinn des Lebens in Grenzsituationen, zwischenmenschliche (...) Kommunikation, Gott, Sinn der Geschichte und die Verteidigung der Demokratie. Seine Kritik an illiberal-totalitären Denkweisen, die Warnung vor dem Atomkrieg sowie sein liberales Ethos der Humanität erweisen sich für die Gegenwart als überraschend aktuell. (shrink)

Inhalt: I. AUSEINANDERSETZUNG MIT GRUNDPOSITIONEN DER KRITISCHEN GESELLSCHAFTSTHEORIE DER FRANKFURTER SCHULE. Hans ALBERT: Dialektische Denkwege. Jürgen Habermas und der Kritische Rationalismus. William D. FUSFIELD: Some Pseudoscientific Features of Transcendental-Pragmatic Grounding Projects. Evelyn GRÖBL-STEINBACH: Reflektierte versus naive Aufklärung? Kritische Theorie und Kritischer Rationalismus - Versuch einer Bestandsaufnahme. Kurt SALAMUN: Befriedetes Dasein und offene Gesellschaft. Gesellschaftliche Zielvorstellungen in Kritischer Theorie und Kritischem Rationalismus. II. DAS LEIB-SEELE-PROBLEM UND DIE KONZEPTION DER OFFENEN GESELLSCHAFT. Volker GADENNE: Ist der Leib-Seele-Dualismus widerlegt? Arpad SÖLTER: Der europäische (...) Sonderweg zur offenen Gesellschaft. Miroslav PROKOPIJEVIC: Justice in the "Open Society". Wojciech DOMALEWSKI: Zwei Toleranzbegriffe. III. VON DER TOTALITÄREN DER OFFENEN GESELLSCHAFT IN DER EHEMALIGEN SOZIALISTISCHEN LÄNDERN. Dieter WITTRICH: Alltagserfahrung als Politikum. Dariusz ALEKSANDROWICZ: Die sich öffnende Gesellschaft und ihre Feinde. Andreas PICKEL: Schocktherapie als rationale Reformstrategie? Eine Kritik der theoretischen Grundlagen radikaler Marktkonzepte und ein Plädoyer für Reformgradualismus. IV. METHODISCHE PROBLEME DER GESELLSCHAFTSWISSENSCHAFTEN. Herbert KEUTH: Sozialwissenschaften, Werturteile und Verantwortung. Michael SCHMID: Die Logik institutioneller Analyse aus der Sicht des Kritischen Rationalismus. Peter V. ZIMA: Framework ist kein Mythos. Zu Karl R. Poppers Thesen über wissenschaftliche Kommunikation. (shrink)