Within the Irish government there is a discussion regarding the possibility of limiting the legal protection afforded to the confessional secret. This paper addresses the question of whether this suggestion, if it were to be implemented by the legislature, would be compatible with the right to religious freedom under Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). This text will also highlight the role of the confessional secret in canon law and the protection of it under German law. (...) Catholic priests, should this plan that is currently under discussion be implemented, were obliged to disclose the knowledge gained in confession to law enforcement authorities. The canonical consequence of such a breach of the confessional secret would be excommunication. In such cases priests therefore would only have the choice between breaking the law (which would probably also be punishable under criminal law) and excommunication, with all the resulting disadvantages. In this paper, the canonical law rules regarding confession are presented before the provisions relating to the confessional secret in § 53 para. 1 No. 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, § 383 para. 1 No. 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure and § 139 para. 2 of the Criminal Code are discussed. Specifically, the question is raised as to whether a duty of priests to co-operate with the law enforcement authorities may be established by law. Here in particular the protection of the confessional secret under the protection of freedom of religion under Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights will be discussed. It has to be noted however that the protection afforded by Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights extends far less than the scope of § 53 para. 1 No. 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, § 129 para. 2 of the Criminal Code and § 383 para. 1 No. 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as Art. 9 ECHR only protects the confessional secret as far as it is required from a religious point of view, but not a general pastoral secret. The article then includes a discussion on the limitations of Article 9 ECHR. Limitations of Article 9(1) ECHR on religious freedom under Article 9(2) ECHR are only permitted if they are prescribed by law and necessary in a democratic society for the protection of public order, health, morals or the rights of others. This is discussed against the background of the legislative goal of more effective law enforcement. As a result, a limitation of the protection of confessional secret through normal (sub-constitutional, domestic) laws, despite the understandable goal of more effective law enforcement, is not compatible with Article 9 of the ECHR. (shrink)

Straipsnyje nagrinėjama Kanto nužymėtos ir Deleuze’o eksperimentiniame mąstyme rekonstruotos vaizduotės kaip vieno iš trijų proto gebėjimų raiškos lauko alternatyvos. Siekiama atsakyti į paties Deleuze’o išsikeltą kantišką klausimą: kokia yra giliausia paslaptis? Aptinkamos kelios atsakymo alternatyvos. Šiame tyrime paaiškėjo, kad Deleuze’o atsakymai į paties išsikeltą klausimą „kokia yra giliausia vaizduotės paslaptis?“ patiria metamorfozes, kurios apsuka ratą. Nuo pradinės pozicijos, kai vaizduotė veikia tik paklusdama intelektui ar protui, ji juda link laisvo trijų nepriklausomų sugebėjimų – intelekto, proto, vaizduotės atitikimo, paskui (...) – link jų nedarnios dermės, jų kovos, kuri skatina kiekvienos naują atsiskleidimą, galiausiai – prie vaizduotės anihiliacijos, kuri leidžia užgimti naujai minčiai, taigi, ratas apsisuka ir grįžtama prie jų dermės naujame lygmenyje, moderuojant filosofiniam skoniui. Tačiau visas šias metaformorfozes jungia viena bendra Kanto suformuluota prielaida: vaizduotė niekada neišvengia triadinės priklausomybės, ji neveikia viena; ji galima tik santykyje su intelektu ir protu, t. y. kitais trimis jai paraleliais ir simultaniškais sugebėjimais. (shrink)

Ðio straipsnio pavadinime uþkoduota ir tyrimo problema. Èia bus svarstomas filosofijos ir literatûrossuartëjimo prieigø dekonstrukcinis tyrimas Jacques Derrida postfilosofijoje. Kantas simbolizuoja klasikinæ filosofo, Kafka – literato laikysenà. Taèiau tai tik straipsnio autorës iðmonë. Bus atsispirta nuo to,kaip Derrida perskaito Kafkos parabolæ Prieð ástatymà romane Procesas. Autorë pripaþins, kad ið tiesøsodieèio kaip kantininko ir durininko kaip paties Derrida suprieðinimas leidþia geriau suvokti Derridaiðrastos sàvokos différance konotacijas. Kita vertus, taip suprasta skirtis iðveda á singuliarumo, paraðo,paslapties sàvokø judëjimà Derrida tekstuose. Taèiau lieka neaiðku, (...) ar ið tiesø Derrida neprieðtaraujasavo teiginiui, kad raðymas vyksta anapus filosofijos ir literatûros, kai prieina prie iðvados, kad sodietis--kantininkas negalëjo suprasti jam skirto áëjimo singuliarumo, nes turëjo problemø su literatûra. Ar taireiðkia, kad literatûra, skirtingai nei filosofija, lieka atvira paslapèiai ir neþinojimui? O filosofija tampasusijusi su þinojimu ir paslapties áminimu? Autorës nuomone, paties Derrida hermeneutikos dekonstrukcija knygoje Pentinai: Nietzsche’s stiliai tokiai iðvadai prieðtarautø.Pagrindiniai þodþiai: differénce, Derrida, Kafka, sodietis-kantininkas, filosofija ir literatûra. (shrink)

For the purposes of this article, the right to confidentiality of communications between a lawyer and a client (legal professional privilege) is analysed and understood as a rule under which, in judicial or administrative proceedings, the content of communications between a lawyer and his client shall not be disclosed; if this rule is breached, the content of the communications in question is not treated as evidence in the process. Legal professional privilege is related to several articles of the Convention for (...) the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The European Court of Human Rights has found that the violation of the right of an accused to communicate with a lawyer without a third party departs from Article 6(3)(c) of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms which entitles to defend oneself in person or through a legal assistant. This kind of communication also relates to the Article 8 of the Convention, which provides a right to respect for private and family life, home and correspondence. In the opinion of the European Court of Human Rights, according to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms there is no difference if a lawyer representing a client is a practitioner or not. However, when dealing with the violations of EU competition law, the Court of Justice of the European Union acknowledges the protection of legal professional privilege only with regard to the communications between an accused companies and an independent lawyer (who does not work for his client on an employment contract basis). When the protection of legal professional privilege is not granted for communications of the accused company with its own legal personnel, a question may arise whether it is considered that sufficient level of confidentiality is ensured for these companies. (shrink)

The article deals with the impact of the recent jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) on the German labour law practice. After a brief introduction of the general importance of the jurisprudence of the ECHR for the German labour law (I.), the authors illustrate the German and the ECHR’s jurisprudence on the duty of loyalty towards the ecclesiastic employer (II.) and whistle blowing (III.). Analysing this jurisprudence, the authors come to the conclusion that the ECHR approved the (...) principles of the German jurisprudence in these cases. Therefore, its impact on the practice will be rather marginal as it does not obtain such a far-reaching significance that a change in the jurisprudence regarding dismissals is to be expected. The judgements merely raised the awareness for the set of problems in the context of ecclesiastic employers and whistle blowing. In this regard, the article will try to provide the reader with basic directions on how to deal with this jurisprudence. Finally, the authors argue that concerns, the ECHR could evolve into a further instance reviewing all German judgements not only regarding the question if there is a violation of the Convention or not but regarding the correctness of the findings are unfounded. On the other side, the article addresses the problem that – apparently – applications have been declared admissible by the ECHR despite Art. 35 para. 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights because the final decision on the national level – dismissing the complaint as inadmissible – did not reveal the reason why the application did not succeed. (shrink)