The author suggests that law is best represented, understood, and taught in the form of open‐ended, defeasible, normative, conditional propositions. The meaning, role, and significance of defeasibility is explained by presenting three ‘canonical forms’ and by distinguishing exceptions and overrides. The role of equity in the law of contract, as understood by the author, is taken as an exemplar of override and parallels are drawn with policy in the English law of tort and with mercy in the criminal law of (...) England and Wales. The third and preferred canonical form is sequenced and internally differentiated and seeks a satisfactory middle way between all‐or‐nothing rules and wild‐card discretion and a reconciliation of the surface demands of legal rules and the deeper values embedded in law. The suggested approach therefore resists closure and seeks a conceptual restructuring of law which opens it up to the influence of notions such as justice and equity and locates them as open‐ended conditions of defeasance inhabiting the express or implied ‘unless…’ clause which is taken to be an element in every fully‐formed statement of law. This approach accommodates law as a locus not only of traditional rule‐based reasoning, but also of open‐ended internal moral reasoning invoking deeper values inherent in law and only imperfectly captured and implemented by formal legal rules. (shrink)

Harman has devised examples which suggest that not only justified true belief, but also knowledge, can co-exist with defeating evidence. Briefly, further evidence can be evidence against what one knows. If that is right, the presence or absence of defeating evidence cannot make the difference between non-knowledge and knowledge. So defeasibilism seems to fail-provided there is such a thing as knowing a truth there is further evidence against. And about that there is an air of paradox. Is it true (...) that 'If I know that h is true, I know that any evidence against h is evidence against something that is true'? Unless to know is to know that one knows, so that evidence against h is evidence against something I can tell is true because known, the conditional seems to hold only when the second occurrence of 'I know that' is dropped. But then there is no paradox. I argue that the puzzle can be made independent of the iteration principle (sections I and II), and that it trades instead on a long-standing dogma in the theory of knowledge (sections V and VI). The dogma can be stated as the thesis of the stability of knowledge. (shrink)

This paper is about the pragmatic inferences in play as conversational implicatures (Grice, P. 1989. Studies in the way of words. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press) occur. First, it constructs the deductivism versus abductivism debate that transpires from the extant literature but is rarely elaborated. Against deductivism, the paper argues that implicating inferences in conversational implicatures can instantiate an abductive logical form, as abductivism suggests. Against abductivism, however, it grants to deductivism that implicating inferences can have a deductive form provided (...) the latter is of a defeasible type. In sum, it thus argues for pluralist defeasibilism. Second, it turns to the issue of the ontological nature of implicating inferences and advocates normative inferentialism, on which these inferences are not primarily real psychological processes but rules of the practice of implicating. While this allows for the possibility of their psychological instantiation, to be sure, the paper also insists that psychological inferring processes in implicatures are neither necessarily isomorphic to the aforementioned rules nor even necessarily occur as an implicature occurs. (shrink)

ABSTRACTAccording to the Dogmatism Puzzle presented by Gilbert Harman, knowledge induces dogmatism because, if one knows that p, one knows that any evidence against p is misleading and therefore one can ignore it when gaining the evidence in the future. I try to offer a new solution to the puzzle by explaining why the principle is false that evidence known to be misleading can be ignored. I argue that knowing that some evidence is misleading doesn't always damage the credential of (...) the evidence, and therefore it doesn't always entitle one to ignore it. I also explain in what kind of cases and to what degree such knowledge allows one to ignore evidence. Hopefully, through the discussion, we can not only understand better where the dogmatism puzzle goes wrong, but also understand better in what sense rational believers should rely on their evidence and when they can ignore it. (shrink)

The paper introduces a new problem for fallibilist and infallibilist epistemologies – the diachronic threshold problem. As the name suggests, this is a problem similar to the well–known threshold problem for fallibilism. The new problem affects both fallibilism and infallibilism, however. The paper argues that anyone who worries about the well known problem for fallibilism should also worry about this new, diachronic version of the problem.