In this paper we present a concept of similarity in games, on which to ground alternative solution concepts, some of which differ from the classical notions in the field. In order to do this we impose a constraint on players’ beliefs that amounts to a variant of the well-known symmetry principle in classical bargaining theory. We show how this similarity relation helps to identify different Nash equilibria in games, and how these “similar Nash equilibria” can be extended to non-symmetric games. (...) While the notion is normative, it is nonetheless inspired by phenomena in which similarities between players lead to outcomes detected in behavioral studies. We study the strategic properties of the concept of similarity and discuss its relationships with Hofstadter’ notion of superrationality. (shrink)

We present a formal analysis of Douglas Hofstadter’s concept of superrationality. We start by defining superrationally justifiable actions, and study them in symmetric games. We then model the beliefs of the players, in a way that leads them to different choices than the usual assumption of rationality by restricting the range of conceivable choices. These beliefs are captured in the formal notion of type drawn from epistemic game theory. The theory of coalgebras is used to frame type spaces and (...) to account for the existence of some of them. We find conditions that guarantee superrational outcomes. (shrink)

What is the proper attitude toward what is expressed by a vague sentence in the face of borderline evidence? Some call this attitude “ambivalence” and distinguish it from uncertainty. It has been argued that Classical Epistemicism conjoined with classical probability theory fails to characterize this attitude, and that we must therefore abandon classical logic or classical probabilities in the presence of vagueness. In this paper, I give a characterization of ambivalence assuming a supervaluationist semantics for vague terms that does not (...) revise either. The theory, which I call the theory of Superprobabilities, identifies the proper attitude toward a vague sentence, in the presence of exact borderline evidence, as the set of classical probabilities of the evidence on each member of the set of all precisifications of a vague sentence. I defend the use of sets of probabilities against objections by generalizing the theory of Superprobabilities to a decision theory called Superrationality. I then compare the merits of the theory of Superprobabilities to Classical Epistemicism and nonclassical probabilities theories with respect to the problem of ambivalence. (shrink)