Researchers in neuroscience and biomedicine tend to exclude female animal subjects from preclinical studies. As a result, they fail to consider sex as a biological variable (SABV) while testing some drug or treatment, and this in turn hinders the development of safer and more efficacious treatments for women patients (section 1.1). In section 2, I consider the proposal that this exclusion is an epistemic injustice to women patients and argue that it fails. More strongly, I show that if we (...) accept Miranda Fricker’s notion of epistemic subjectivity, we cannot account for the exclusion even as an epistemic wrong against women patients. To account for the intuition that the exclusion is an epistemic wrong, I briefly outline a broader notion of what it means to be an epistemic subject. In section 3, I argue that the exclusion is an epistemic wrong because it violates the epistemic claim-rights of women patients. For thisI use Lani Watson’s work on epistemic claim-rights. In 3.1, I defend the claim that women patients have an epistemic claim-right against researchers’ exclusion of female animal subjects from preclinical studies. Finally, in 3.2, I consider some important upshots of my thesis. (shrink)

Researchers in neuroscience and biomedicine tend to exclude female animal subjects from preclinical studies. As a result, they fail to consider sex as a biological variable (SABV) while testing some drug or treatment, and this in turn hinders the development of safer and more efficacious treatments for women patients (section 1.1). In section 2, I consider the proposal that this exclusion is an epistemic injustice to women patients and argue that it fails. More strongly, I show that if we (...) accept Miranda Fricker’s notion of epistemic subjectivity, we cannot account for the exclusion even as an epistemic wrong against women patients. To account for the intuition that the exclusion is an epistemic wrong, I briefly outline a broader notion of what it means to be an epistemic subject. In section 3, I argue that the exclusion is an epistemic wrong because it violates the epistemic claim-rights of women patients. For this I use Lani Watson’s work on epistemic claim-rights. In 3.1, I defend the claim that women patients have an epistemic claim-right against researchers’ exclusion of female animal subjects from preclinical studies. Finally, in 3.2, I consider some important upshots of my thesis. (shrink)

This paper develops the conceptual framework of ’sex contextualism’ for the study of sex-related variables in biomedical research. Sex contextualism offers an alternative to binary sex essentialist approaches to the study of sex as a biological variable. Specifically, sex contextualism recognizes the pluralism and context-specificity of operationalizations of ’sex’ across experimental laboratory research. In light of recent policy mandates to consider sex as a biological variable, sex contextualism offers constructive guidance to biomedical researchers for attending to sex-related biological variation. As (...) an alternative to and critique of biological binary sex essentialism, sex contextualism contributes to current debates in philosophy of biology, feminist science studies, and social ontology on the construction of categories of gender/sex differences in scientific research. (shrink)

Policies that require male-female sex comparisons in all areas of biomedical research conflict with the goal of improving health outcomes through context-sensitive individualization of medical care. Sex, like race, requires a rigorous, contextual approach in precision medicine. A “sex contextualist” approach to gender-inclusive medicine better aligns with this aim.

En este artículo se desarrolla el marco conceptual del “contextualismo sexual” para el estudio de las variables relacionadas con el sexo en la investigación biomédica. El contextualismo sexual ofrece una alternativa a los enfoques sexuales binarios y esencialistas del estudio del sexo como variable biológica. Específicamente, el contextualismo sexual reconoce el pluralismo y la especificidad contextual que tienen las operacionalizaciones de “sexo” a través de la investigación experimental de laboratorio. A la luz de recientes normativas para la consideración del sexo (...) como variable biológica, el contextualismo sexual ofrece una guía constructiva a los/as investigadores/as biomédicos/as para abordar la variación biológica relacionada con el sexo. En tanto alternativa y crítica al esencialismo binario del sexo biológico, el contextualismo sexual contribuye a los debates actuales en filosofía de la biología, estudios feministas de la ciencia y ontología social en torno a la construcción de categorías de la diferencia sexual/genérica en la investigación científica. (shrink)