Din-bilim ilişkisi tarihsel süreçte olduğu gibi günümüzde de tartışılmaya devam etmektedir. Hristiyan Avrupa’sında ortaya çıkan tartışmaların İslam dünyasını da etkilediği bir vakıadır. İslam kelamcıları, İslam dini ile bilim arasında bir çatışmanın olmadığı genel kabulüyle hareket ederler. Özellikle bu noktada kelamın vesâil alanı, metafiziğin desteklendiği alan olarak kabul görmektedir. Modern dönemde vesâil alanında önemli bilimsel çalışmaların olduğu görülmektedir bunlardan biri de Nöroteolojidir. Nöroteoloji, davranışı nöral (sinirsel) temelde inceleyip açıklamaya çalışan bilim dalıdır. Bu noktada özellikle dindarlığın nörolojik temelleri ve evrimsel işlevi hakkında (...) önemli bilgiler sunmaktadır. Bu çalışmada kelamın en önemli tartışma konularından biri olan kesb nazariyesi, Nöroteolojik açıdan Benjamin libet deneyiyle değerlendirilmektedir. Deney sonuçları yayınlandığında o güne kadar felsefe ve bilim dünyasında tartışılagelen insanın irade özgürlüğü meselesine yeni bir tartışma zemini hazırlamıştır. Özellikle Eş’ârî’nin kesb anlayışının da ciddi tartışmalara sebebiyet verdiği bilinmektedir. Allah’ın mutlaklığı açısından ele alınan bu düşünce, insan özgürlüğü ve sorumluluğunu ortadan kaldırır düşüncesiyle eleştirilmiştir. Ancak Benjamin libet deneyinin, Eş’ârî’nin kesb anlayışına uygun veriler içermesi dikkat çeken bir husus olarak göze çarpmaktadır. (shrink)

In Islamic theological writings, under the heading of sustenance, the focus is generally on issues such as who is the provider of sustenance, whether haram is considered sustenance, and whether Allah’s consent exists for haram sustenance. Another issue that can be found between the lines of the subject of sustenance is whether it is haram for a person to work for sustenance or not. In fact, the pursuit of means of livelihood in order to sustain one’s life is, according to (...) the general and predominant acceptance of Muslim scholars, permissible and, in cases of necessity, wajib. According to a record in Uṣūl al-niḥal, during the formative period of itizālī thought, there were Mu‘tazilite sufis (ṣūfiyyat al-Muʿtazila) such as Bishr b. al-Mu‘tamir’s disciple Abū Imrān Mūsā b. al-Raqqāshī, al-Naẓẓām’s apostate disciple Fadl al-Hadathī, and Husayn al-Kūfī, about whom no information is available. These names, who seem to have earned their livelihood through almsgiving, defended the forbiddenness (taḥrīm al-makāsib) of all kinds of endeavour for sustenance, contrary to the acceptance of Muslim thinkers. However, it should be noted that for them, the forbiddenness in making an effort for sustenance does not cover the definition of sustenance, which is ‘all the benefits’, but only the effort in obtaining sustenance through means such as trade and agriculture. It is interesting to find such an extreme tendency among the Mu‘tazilites, who came to the fore with their rationalist discourses. “How could a Mu‘tazilite defend tahrīm al-makāsib?”, the issue of abandonment of striving for sustenance (tark al-makāsib), from which the idea of tahrīm al-makāsib is thought to have evolved, is mentioned, and then the Mu‘tazilite sufis views on tahrīm al-makāsib are tried to be based mainly on Mu‘tazilite sources and the criticisms of Mu‘tazilite authors against them are included. It has been determined that Mu‘tazilite sufis justifications for defending tahrīm al-makāsib concentrate on three points: (i) the absence of a just order due to the absence of a just imam and the possibility of supporting the oppressors (rulers) intentionally or unintentionally, and as a result of this, some of them describe the land of Islam as dār al-kufr, (ii) again in relation to the issue of imamate, in an environment where there is no justice, i.e. legal/moral order, the halāl and harām are so intertwined that they cannot be separated from each other, and in order to protect oneself from harām, the things that are subject to sustenance can only be purified through charity and become halāl, and (iii) the fact that trust in Allah is obligatory and any effort to pursue sustenance is contrary to tawakkul. The Mu‘tazilite authors criticised the proponents of tahrīm al-makāsib on the grounds that it is permissible to trade while maintaining a rational and ethical attitude, that one’s intention and interest in trade are important, and that tawakkul cannot be built on the right ground. As a result, the proponents of tahrīm al-makāsib disappeared because they could not gain a foothold in the Mu‘tazilite intellectual climate due to their erroneous reasoning. (shrink)

The study will examine how the contradiction between the freedom of will of man and the principle that God is the creator of everything is resolved through the risālah of al-Ṣādıq al-Qayṣarī and the commentary written by ʿİzzad ʿÂrif al-Divrīkī on this risālah. In addition, it is aimed to contribute to the literature by making the critical edition and translation of the risālah. The subject of will and human actions, which had been discussed in a theological and moral context in (...) the first centuries, developed with the periods of successors mutakallims and predecessors mutakallims and gained a metaphysical character. Moreover, the subject, which is intertwined with creation and existence theories, has gained great importance and has undergone change and transformation in the process. Because the subject is related to the metaphysical basis of free will and action of the human being. Therefore, our study will try to reveal the original aspects and contributions of these works by examining the contents of these works dealing with the subject of will and action, and that are also concerned with the subjects of existence and creation. (shrink)

In this article, the solution proposed by Osman Afīf Efendi, a late Ottoman scholar, to the problem of the creation of human actions in his Risālat al-irādat al-juzʾiyya will be discussed. Although the problem of the role of human beings in their actions, which has been debated since the early period of theology, has been the subject of works with different titles such as ḳaẓā wa ḳadar, ḫalḳu'l-aʿmāl, and efʿāl al-ʿibād, in the Ottoman scholarly tradition it was mostly dealt with (...) in the treatises on the particular will (al-irādah al-juz’iyyah). Osman Afīf Efendi's treatise is one of the last examples of this genre. In addition to al-Jabriyya, the majority of the Muʿtazilites, the famous view of the philosophers, Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī (d. 324/935-36), Abū Isḥāq al-Isfarāyīnī (d. 418/1027), Abū Bakr al-Bāqillānī (d. 403/1013), and the Māturīdī school, the author mentions an eighth view. Osman Afīf Efendi touches only the main ideas of the well-known views of the Jabriyya, the majority of the Muʿtazilites, and the Philosophers. On the other hand, he gives relatively more space to the views of al-Ashʿarī, al-Isfarāyīnī, al-Bāqillānī, and the Māturīdī school. Osman Afīf Efendi states that the solutions proposed by Sunnī scholars are united in the common denominator of being the middle way in the faith and emphasizes the similarities rather than the differences between these solutions. There are some indications in the treatise that the author endeavored to bring a different perspective to Ashʿarī's idea of Kasb. His explanations in the context of al-Bāqillānī and al-Isferāyīnī's views are in the form of a response to the criticisms levelled against the approaches of these scholars. One of the most striking points in the treatise is the statement that the view of the Māturīdī school is the same as that of al-Bāqillānī. Osman Afīf Efendi also touches upon the issue of human will, that is, the universal and particular will. In this context, he states that the particular will is not created. However, he does not provide a clear explanation of the ontic structure of the particular will, and he mentions the different opinions expressed by later Māturīdī scholars, such as the juzī will being a dispositional or intizāʿī state. (shrink)

Human actions have been one of the most discussed topics in the science of kalām since the first centuries of Hijra. Many scholars from different schools of kalām have tried to solve this problem. Efforts to solve the problem have brought different views. In this framework, three main views emerged Jabrī, Qadarī/Muʿtazilī and Salafī/Sunnī. The views of Islamic philosophers were added to these and this number was increased to four. Nevertheless, Sunnī scholars, who agree on the basic propositions, disagreed on (...) the nature of kasb. While there are differences of opinion between Ashʿarī and Māturīdī schools, there are also those who put forward different views among scholars belonging to the same school. Abū Bakr al-Bāqillānī (d. 403/1013), Abū Isḥāq al-Isfarāyīnī (d. 418/1027) and Juwaynī (d. 478/1085), Sadr al- Shrīʿa (d. 747/1346) and Ibn al-Humām (d. 861/1457) are the most obvious examples of this. These views on human actions have been mentioned in their works by scholars of kalām. One of these scholars is Gelenbevî Ismāʿil (d. 1205/1791). In this article, the views on human actions will be examined in the context of Gelenbevî’s work named Ḥāshiya ʿalā Sharḥ al ʿAqāʾid al ʿAḍudiyya. Gelenbevî makes concise or detailed explanations about the views mentioned in his work with the exception of Ibn al-Humām. In addition, he also mentions the views of al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111). While Gelenbevî mentions these views and the discussions that took place around them, He makes use of his works Ījī’s (d. 756/1355) named Mawāqif, Taftāzānī’s (d. 792/1390) Sharḥ al Maqāṣ̣ıd and Jurjānī’s (d. 816/1413) Sharḥ al - Mawāqif. Gelenbevî states that Ashʿari’s view is middle jabr (jabr al muṭavaṣṣıṭ) and even he is accused of being pure jabr (jabr al- maḫẓ). Based on the concept of partial will (al-irādah al-juzʾiyyah), he says that the views of Bāqillānī and Māturīdī school are the same and states that this view is more successful than Ashʿari’s in explaining human responsibility. This thought indicates that he is closer to the Māturīdī view of human actions than to Ashʿarī. He points out that Isfarāyīnī’s views are open to criticism in some respects. He implicitly states that he does not agree with the idea that Juwayni agrees with the Islamic philosophers. Rather than Muʿtazila’s views, it focuses on whether their views and the views of Islamic philosophers are the same. (shrink)