This study discusses the classifications of sects in a treatise named Firqa-ye Nājīye, written in Persian by a Shiite scholar in 982/1574. In this treatise, which is in the Merkez-i İḥyâʾi Heritage Library and has no other copy as far as we know, it has been tried to prove that the Twelver Shiʿa is the saved sect (firqa-yi nājiya) through seventy-three sects classification. The author summarized the seven doubts raised by the devil, the first events that caused the Muslim community (...) (umma) to disagree, and the general information about the sects from al-Milal wa-l-niḥal, the classifications of the sects from Sharḥ al-Mawāqif, but reconstructed the data in these texts according to the Shiite understanding. On the other hand, the main reason for writing this treatise is to respond to Jalāl al-Dīn Davānī’s claims rather than the classification of sects. Nasīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī determined a method for the identification of the saved sect as "differentiating from all sects in matters of theology". He claimed that the Twelver Shīʿīsm differed from the other sects in all matters of theology and was therefore the saved sect. Davānī stated that Twelver Shīʿīsm differed from other sects only with the belief in imamate, which is not the subject of creed, and that it generally agrees with Mu'tazila in other creeds, thus claiming that Tusi's claim is baseless. He also said that, when considered through the same method, Ashʿarīsm is more worthy of being the saved sect, because this sect differs from all sects in matters related to the creeds. Contrary to Davānī's claim, the author of Firqa-ye Nājīye stated that imamate was one of the most important principles of religion and also claimed that the Twelver Shīʿīsm differed from other sects in matters of creed other than imamate. However, he failed to provide sufficient data to justify this claim. (shrink)

This study discusses the treatise of Jalāl al-Dīn Davvānī (d. 908/1502) named Risāla fī taʻrīf ʻilm. This treatise criticizes a definition of knowledge adopted by some theologians in the late period (mutaʾakhkhirīn). The definition of knowledge at issue consists of three components: Attribution, discernment, no possibility of contradiction. Knowledge is an attribute as a category and with this attribution, a discernment is obtained. As a result of this process knowledge is acquired and there should be no possibility of this knowledge (...) to be inconsistent. Davvānī examines eight possibilities of the definition on knowledge. In each of these eight possibilities a different problems arises. According to Davvānī, the definition mentioned is problematic in all probability. Nonetheless, Davvānī does not propose another definition of knowledge that can replace the definition of knowledge that he criticizes. This article represents the process of reaching the definition of knowledge stated in the history of theological thought. The definitions on knowledge made from the first period (al-mutaqaddimīn) are summarized and the strengths and weaknesses of these definitions are explained. There are two main approaches regarding the nature of knowledge in Islamic thought: According to the first approach pioneered by Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī (d. 606/1202), absolute knowledge is a priory (badīhī) and undefinable. According to the second one, the nature of absolute knowledge is a posteriori (naẓarī) and definable. The first part of this article includes the definitions and criticisms of knowledge in Islamic thought. The second part discusses the claim of originality. In the second part, Davvānī’s treatise will be evaluated for the first time. According to the conclusion of the treatise, the definition made to find the essence of knowledge is unfounded in all respect. It is important to evaluate the treatise as a reflection of anti-essentialism in the history of Islamic thought. Most contemporary studies do not count this treatise among Davvānī’s works. In the biography book al-Aʿlām written by Khayr al-Dīn al-Ziriklī (d. 1976), Risāla fī taʻrīf ʻilm is counted among the works of Davvānī. In the introduction of more than one manuscript, the work is clearly attributed to Davvānī. As a result of the double-sided research, it has been ensured that the work belongs to Davvānī. However, in other two manuscripts containing the same treatise, the work is shown as belonging to an unknown person named Şāirzāda. But there is no information found about this person. This name seems more like a copyist (mustansıh) than an author. Possibly, such a mistake occurred as a result of confusing the two names. Davvānī’s small volume treatise sheds light on the intellectual atmosphere and level of its period. The definition of knowledge mentioned in the classical theology book of ‘Aḍud al-Dīn al-Ījī (d. 756/1355) called al-Mawāqif is superior to other definitions of knowledge. Instead of this definition of knowledge, which is presented as perfect, Jurjānī (d. 816/1413) preferred the definition of knowledge attributed to al-Māturīdī (d. 333/944) in the Sharḥ al-Mawāqif. This preference has been accepted as an implicit criticism for future generations, including Davvānī. Those who claimed that Jurjānī did not taken a random choice, carried on their criticism by going over the definition. The fine craftsmanship revealed in the treatise reveals that critical thinking is used intensively. The properly understanding of the treatise depends on knowing the science of logic and following it with intense attention. The definition of knowledge is examined from various angles with the help of concepts such as conception, ratification, judgment and contradiction (nakz) of the science of logic. In the science of logic, every layer of knowledge such as certainty, conjecture, imitation, doubt is investigated one by one. In the science of kalām, attention is paid that the ideal level of knowledge is precise. An uncertain knowledge is not considered knowledge according to kalām. Because the main goal of theologians is to build religious beliefs on the obtained certain knowledge. It is not accepted to base knowledge to a probable information on imprecise knowledge. For a knowledge among the knowns to reach the level of certainty, it must be correct and exclude other possibilities. Another condition is required for certainty in the definition of knowledge that Davvānī examines in his treatise is that the opposite is wrong. The fact that a piece of information is considered true depends on the fact that its reverse is false. In this treatise, it is discussed how to look for the contradictions or discrepancy that are wanted to be excluded. Knowledge is inseparable from the human mind, from outside of the world, or from the relationship between the two. (shrink)

The most fundamental subject and aim of the Islamic belief system is the subject of maʿrifatullah (knowing Allah). Studies on this subject are mostly called ithbāt al-wājib (the demonstration of God) in the literature. They are considered the most valuable work for kalām, philosophy and mysticism schools. Kalām schools started to use this conceptualization intensively after Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, mainly under the influence of Ibn Sīnā. Sūfis, on the other hand, most participated in these studies based on the theory of (...) the unity of existence. In kalām, all the principles of belief are ultimately grounded to explain and strengthen faith in Allah. For this reason, belief in Allah is referred to as aṣl al-uṣūl (the origin of all principles). Throughout history, scholars of kalām discussed the creedal issues of Islam in the Muslim society while it tried to answer the creedal issues abroad by the expanding Islamic geography with studies on ithbāt al-wājib. In this framework, the problems of prophecy and the hereafter are included in kalām. Since the beginning of the history of kalām, it has used the theory of atomism to a large extent, especially in defending the existence of Allah against materialists. The systematisation of Islamic philosophy and mysticism in time, the kalām cosmological argument, the argument from contingency of philosophers and the argument from kashf and ilhām of Sūfis strengthened this area from three different branches. On the other hand, the interaction of these schools within themselves and the diversification of the interlocutors of studies on ithbāt al-wājib brought these arguments closer together. The convergence in terms of terminology, subject and methodology, especially after Shahrestānī and Rāzī, revealed the tradition of philosophical theology. In this process, theologians began to use both the concepts of temporality (hudūth) and contingency (imkān) to use ontological, cosmological and teleological proofs. Dawānī, one of the eminent figures of these studies in the last periods of Ottomans, is the subject of our research, due to his skills in utilising these proofs of ithbāt al-wājib and his influence in the studies after him. His review of the matter can be observed in his effort in his works where he deals with the so-called deficiencies and errors of his predecessors regarding ithbāt al-wājib. For this reason, many annotations and commentaries were made for his treatises and ideas until the 19th century. Especially, the advance of materialism in the West in this century showed great influence on many scholars and intellectuals in the Ottoman Empire seems to be a parallel historical experience. Therefore, it has become necessary to utilise the arguments for the existence of Allah by supporting each individual argument together. In this regard, in our study, to see the process, we also discussed the views of Aḥmad Nūrī, one of the scholars in the last period Ottoman, who dealt with the common arguments about ithbāt al-wājib produced by the three primary schools of Islamic thought: kalām, Islamic philosophy and mysticism. (shrink)