La nada y el vacío son conceptos que podemos reconocer como fundamentales en la filosofía oriental, sin embargo, a diferencia de las concepciones adoptadas en Occidente, en el pensamiento antiguo chino –y haciendo énfasis en el daoísmo (??)– la nada no se presenta como algo de carácter ontológico, sino como un estado previo indefinible. De manera similar, el espacio vacío se manifestaba en las artes como la representación del lugar en el que ocurrían los cambios y las transformaciones de (...) la realidad, apuntando hacia el ideal del artista en dejarse fluir durante el proceso de creación. De esta manera se hacía presente la ausencia, acercándose al origen de todas las cosas. (shrink)

La personalità di Shitao, pittore cinese attivo durante l’inizio della dinastia Qing, merita di essere compresa nella comparazione della sua particolare vita, del suo lavoro artistico – soprattutto nella fase di piena espressione, – e dei pensieri filosofici che ha rivelato nei suoi Discorsi sulla pittura. A partire dall’unione di questi fattori, Shitao stesso stabilì un legame tra l’«unico tratto di pennello» e l’olistica fusione del suo spirito con la natura.

Spontaneity is an almost inevitable commonplace in discussions of Daoism, especially the Zhuangzi. The idea that spontaneity is one of the most important values in the Zhuangzi was presented by Angus Graham for the Anglo-European audience, and divulged among Chinese readers by Liú Xiàogǎn 劉笑敢 and Chén Gǔyīng 陳鼓應. Hungarian psychologist Csikszentmihalyi popularly combined Daoist spontaneity with the idea of flow. In the state of flow the person carries out an activity for the sake of the activity itself--autotelically--and acts with (...) complete spontaneity given that none of their movements requires thought or mediation. My study consists of three parts: First, I deal with different definitions of “spontaneous” and of the term that is commonly translated as “spontaneous” in Chinese texts, zìrán 自然 (literally, so-of-itself), as well as its use in the Zhuangzi. I conclude that spontaneity is not part of the axiological project of the Zhuangzi. Instead, we find that the idea of adapting is related to normative human values and behaviors, whereas spontaneity is a term merely descriptive of natural objects. Second, I analyze the famous Zhuangzian stories of skills, which are often quoted to argue for the value of spontaneity. I conclude that the goal of these stories is to develop a new type of vital attitude as “second nature” or “background ability” (John Searle). Since this attitude is mediated and achieved through effort, it is not spontaneous. Third, I explain the confusion between this “second nature” with “spontaneity” in recent scholarship has led to the so-called paradoxes of non-action and spontaneity (Edward Slingerland). I argue that these paradoxes disappear when we understand the different layers of meaning of wú-wéi and zìrán in the early Chinese textual context. (shrink)