The Laws of Peoples (LP) has a great deal to offer in at least three different respects: as the completion of Rawls's philosophical project, as a guide to foreign policy, and as a different way of understanding international relations (IR). This chapter outlines arguments put forward in respect to these three themes, demonstrating that they represent promising avenues for further debate, while pointing to LP's broader value and merit. It focuses on specific elements of world politics where Rawls's ideas (...) provide promising alternatives. The chapter explains how Rawls's realistic utopianism represents a form of theorizing that could constitute a genuine challenge to more traditional forms of thinking in IR. It examines some of the key ideas of Rawls's international theory through mapping the development of his thought, and indicates how critiques such as Sen's initially represented the predominant response. (shrink)

This chapter discusses the tradition of just war theory. It focuses on Rawls's comments in A Theory of Justice (TJ). The discussion is entirely in the service of an account of conscientious refusal to fight in war. The chapter focuses on Rawls's best developed discussions of the doctrines of just war and related ideas in The Law of Peoples (LP). It discusses the place of these doctrines in Rawls's account of the law of peoples, the importance of human (...) rights to the accounts, and Rawls's account of the conditions in which the hope for peace is reasonable. Rawls takes Kant's Perpetual Peace as a guide for the development of his views in LP. The domestic conditions that Rawls takes to be necessary to produce satisfaction for the right reasons are demandingly egalitarian. Rawls maintains that it would be unrealistic to hope for an international society comprised entirely of liberal people. (shrink)

Thomas Pogge has been challenging liberal thinking on global politics, often through critical engagement with John Rawls’ work. Pogge presents both normative and empirical arguments against Rawls: normatively, Rawls’ domestic Theory of Justice and global Law of Peoples are incompatible ideal theories; empirically, LP is too removed from the actual world to guide the foreign policy of liberal societies. My main purpose here is to contest the first, ideal theory criticism in order to direct more attention to the second, (...) non-ideal objection. I argue against Pogge that TJ and LP can be read as coherent, once one employs a Rousseauian rather than Pogge’s economic Kantian reading of TJ. The first two sections present Pogge’s view of TJ and contrast it with a Rousseauian alternative that is less cosmopolitan and economic and much more focused on the democratic and sovereign context of justice as fairness. The third section seeks to refute Pogge’s incoherence arguments, which encompass the identity of the parties to the international original position, their motivations and their decisions. Instead of a conclusion, the last section emphasizes LP’s non-ideal problems, and suggests that insofar as LP is the most robust liberal ideal theory of global politics, its empirical failure indicates the need to shift global justice theorizing even more to the non-ideal realm.Keywords: Rawls; Pogge; global justice; ideal theory; non-ideal theory; cosmopolitanism; statism; Rousseau; Kant; democracy. (shrink)