In [10], we have shown that the statement that all ∑ 1 1 partitions are Ramsey is deducible over ATR 0 from the axiom of ∑ 1 1 monotone inductive definition,but the reversal needs П 1 1 - CA 0 rather than ATR 0 . By contrast, we show in this paper that the statement that all ∑ 0 2 games are determinate is also deducible over ATR 0 from the axiom of ∑ 1 1 monotone inductive definition, (...) but the reversal is provable even in ACA 0 . These results illuminate the substantial differences among lightface theorems which can not be observed in boldface. (shrink)

We show that the Axiom of Dependent Choice,, holds in countably iterable, passive premice constructed over their reals which satisfy the Axiom of Determinacy,, in a background universe. This generalizes an argument of Kechris for using Steel's analysis of scales in mice. In particular, we show that for any and any countable set of reals A so that and, we have that.

The theory of infinite games with slightly imperfect information has been developed for games with finitely and countably many moves. In this paper, we shift the discussion to games with uncountably many possible moves, introducing the axiom of real Blackwell determinacy \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathsf{Bl-AD}_\mathbb{R}}$$\end{document} (as an analogue of the axiom of real determinacy \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathsf{AD}_\mathbb{R}}$$\end{document}). We prove that the consistency strength of (...) \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathsf{Bl-AD}_\mathbb{R}}$$\end{document} is strictly greater than that of AD. (shrink)

In this paper I shall present a method for proving determinacy from large cardinals which, in many cases, seems to yield optimal results. One of the main applications extends theorems of Martin, Steel and Woodin about determinacy within the projective hierarchy. The method can also be used to give a new proof of Woodin's theorem about determinacy in L.The reason we look for optimal determinacy proofs is not only vanity. Such proofs serve to tighten the connection (...) between large cardinals and descriptive set theory, letting us bring our knowledge of one subject to bear on the other, and thus increasing our understanding of both. A classic example of this is the Harrington-Martin proof that -determinacy implies -determinacy. This is an example of a transfer theorem, which assumes a certain determinacy hypothesis and proves a stronger one. While the statement of the theorem makes no mention of large cardinals, its proof goes through 0#, first proving that-determinacy ⇒ 0# exists,and then that0# exists ⇒ -determinacyMore recent examples of the connection between large cardinals and descriptive set theory include Steel's proof thatADL ⇒ HODL ⊨ GCH,see [9], and several results of Woodin about models of AD+, a strengthening of the axiom of determinacy AD which Woodin has introduced. These proofs not only use large cardinals, but also reveal a deep, structural connection between descriptive set theoretic notions and notions related to large cardinals. (shrink)

We show that several theorems about Polish spaces, which depend on the axiom of choice ), have interesting corollaries that are theorems of the theory \, where \ is the axiom of dependent choices. Surprisingly it is natural to use the full \ to prove the existence of these proofs; in fact we do not even know the proofs in \. Let \ denote the axiom of determinacy. We show also, in the theory \\), a theorem (...) which strenghtens and generalizes the theorem of Drinfeld and Margulis about the unicity of Lebesgue’s measure. This generalization is false in \, but assuming the existence of large enough cardinals it is true in the model \,\in \rangle \). (shrink)

Asperó and Schindler have completely solved the Axiom [Formula: see text] vs. [Formula: see text] problem. They have proved that if [Formula: see text] holds then Axiom [Formula: see text] holds, with no additional assumptions. The key question now concerns the relationship between [Formula: see text] and Axiom [Formula: see text]. This is because the foundational issues raised by the problem of Axiom [Formula: see text] vs. [Formula: see text] arguably persist in the problem of (...) class='Hi'>Axiom [Formula: see text] vs. [Formula: see text]. The first of our two main theorems is that Axiom [Formula: see text] is equivalent to Axiom [Formula: see text], and as a corollary we show that Axiom [Formula: see text] fails in all the known models of [Formula: see text]. This suggests that [Formula: see text] actually refutes Axiom [Formula: see text]. Our second main theorem is that the [Formula: see text] Conjecture holds assuming [Formula: see text]. This is the strongest partial result known on this conjecture which is one of the central open problems of [Formula: see text]-theory and [Formula: see text]-logic. These results identify a fundamental asymmetry between the Continuum Hypothesis and any axiom which is both [Formula: see text]-expressible and which implies [Formula: see text], on the basis of generic absoluteness for the simplest of the nontrivial sentences of Third-Order Number Theory. These are the [Formula: see text]-sentences with no parameters. Such sentences are those which simply assert the existence of a set [Formula: see text] for which some property involving only quantification over [Formula: see text] holds. (shrink)

Takeuti introduced an infinitary proof system for determinate logic and showed that for transitive models of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with the Axiom of Dependent Choice that contain all reals, the cut-elimination theorem is equivalent to the Axiom of Determinacy, and in particular contradicts the Axiom of Choice. We consider variants of Takeuti's theorem without assuming the failure of the Axiom of Choice. For instance, we show that if one removes atomic formulae of infinite arity from (...) the language of Takeuti's proof system, then cut elimination is equivalent to a determinacy hypothesis provable, e.g., in ZFC + “there are infinitely many Woodin cardinals.” A slight extension of the proof system admits cut elimination for countable sequents under the same assumptions. A simple modification of the proof system yields analogs of the results above for the Axiom of Real Determinacy and uncountably many Woodin cardinals. (shrink)

Schmidt’s game and other similar intersection games have played an important role in recent years in applications to number theory, dynamics, and Diophantine approximation theory. These games are real games, that is, games in which the players make moves from a complete separable metric space. The determinacy of these games trivially follows from the axiom of determinacy for real games, $\mathsf {AD}_{\mathbb R}$, which is a much stronger axiom than that asserting all integer games are determined, (...) $\mathsf {AD}$. One of our main results is a general theorem which under the hypothesis $\mathsf {AD}$ implies the determinacy of intersection games which have a property allowing strategies to be simplified. In particular, we show that Schmidt’s $(\alpha,\beta,\rho )$ game on $\mathbb R$ is determined from $\mathsf {AD}$ alone, but on $\mathbb R^n$ for $n \geq 3$ we show that $\mathsf {AD}$ does not imply the determinacy of this game. We then give an application of simple strategies and prove that the winning player in Schmidt’s $(\alpha, \beta, \rho )$ game on $\mathbb {R}$ has a winning positional strategy, without appealing to the axiom of choice. We also prove several other results specifically related to the determinacy of Schmidt’s game. These results highlight the obstacles in obtaining the determinacy of Schmidt’s game from $\mathsf {AD}$. (shrink)

In this paper we study the logical strength of the determinacy of infinite binary games in terms of second order arithmetic. We define new determinacy schemata inspired by the Wadge classes of Polish spaces and show the following equivalences over the system RCA0*, which consists of the axioms of discrete ordered semi‐rings with exponentiation, Δ10 comprehension and Π00 induction, and which is known as a weaker system than the popularbase theory RCA0: 1. Bisep(Δ10, Σ10)‐Det* ↔ WKL0, 2. Bisep(Δ10, (...) Σ20)‐Det* ↔ ATR0 + Σ11 induction, 3. Bisep(Σ10, Σ20)‐Det* ↔ Sep(Σ10, Σ20)‐Det* ↔ Π11‐CA0, 4. Bisep(Δ20, Σ20)‐Det* ↔ Π11‐TR0, where Det* stands for the determinacy of infinite games in the Cantor space (© 2009 WILEY‐VCH Verlag GmbH & Co. KGaA, Weinheim). (shrink)

We define a parametrised choice principle PCP which is equivalent to the Axiom of Determinacy. PCP describes the difference between these two axioms and could serve as a means of proving Martin's conjecture on the equivalence of these axioms.

We analyze the set-theoretic strength of determinacy for levels of the Borel hierarchy of the form$\Sigma _{1 + \alpha + 3}^0 $, forα<ω1. Well-known results of H. Friedman and D.A. Martin have shown this determinacy to requireα+ 1 iterations of the Power Set Axiom, but we ask what additional ambient set theory is strictly necessary. To this end, we isolate a family of weak reflection principles, Π1-RAPα, whose consistency strength corresponds exactly to the logical strength of${\rm{\Sigma }}_{1 (...) + \alpha + 3}^0 $determinacy, for$\alpha < \omega _1^{CK} $. This yields a characterization of the levels ofLby or at which winning strategies in these games must be constructed. Whenα= 0, we have the following concise result: The leastθso that all winning strategies in${\rm{\Sigma }}_4^0 $games belong toLθ+1is the least so that$L_\theta \models {\rm{``}}{\cal P}\left$exists, and all wellfounded trees are ranked”. (shrink)

We determine the consistency strength of determinacy for projective games of length ω^2. Our main theorem is that $\Pi _{n + 1}^1$-determinacy for games of length ω^2 implies the existence of a model of set theory with ω + n Woodin cardinals. In a first step, we show that this hypothesis implies that there is a countable set of reals A such that M_n(A), the canonical inner model for n Woodin cardinals constructed over A, satisfies $A = R$ (...) and the Axiom of Determinacy. Then we argue how to obtain a model with ω + n Woodin cardinal from this. We also show how the proof can be adapted to investigate the consistency strength of determinacy for games of length ω^2 with payoff in $R^R\Pi _1^1$ or with σ-projective payoff. (shrink)

We introduce a new axiom called inductive dichotomy, a weak variant of the axiom of inductive definition, and analyze the relationships with other variants of inductive definition and with related axioms, in the general second order framework, including second order arithmetic, second order set theory and higher order arithmetic. By applying these results to the investigations on the determinacy axioms, we show the following. (i) Clopen determinacy is consistency-wise strictly weaker than open determinacy in these (...) frameworks, except second order arithmetic; this is an enhancement of Schweber–Hachtman separation of open and clopen determinacy into the consistency-wise separation. (ii) Hausdorff–Kuratowski hierarchy of differences of opens is faithfully reflected by the hierarchy of consistency strengths of corresponding parameter-free determinacies in the aforementioned frameworks; this result is valid also in second order arithmetic only except clopen determinacy. (shrink)

This paper criticizes non-constructive uses of set theory in formal economics. The main focus is on results on preference aggregation and Arrow’s theorem for infinite electorates, but the present analysis would apply as well, e.g., to analogous results in intergenerational social choice. To separate justified and unjustified uses of infinite populations in social choice, I suggest a principle which may be called the Hildenbrand criterion and argue that results based on unrestricted axiom of choice do not meet this criterion. (...) The technically novel part of this paper is a proposal to use a set-theoretic principle known as the axiom of determinacy ), not as a replacement for Choice, but simply to eliminate applications of set theory violating the Hildenbrand criterion. A particularly appealing aspect of \ from the point of view of the research area in question is its game-theoretic character. (shrink)

We study the notion of [Formula: see text]-MAD families where [Formula: see text] is a Borel ideal on [Formula: see text]. We show that if [Formula: see text] is any finite or countably iterated Fubini product of the ideal of finite sets [Formula: see text], then there are no analytic infinite [Formula: see text]-MAD families, and assuming Projective Determinacy and Dependent Choice there are no infinite projective [Formula: see text]-MAD families; and under the full Axiom of Determinacy (...) [Formula: see text][Formula: see text] or under [Formula: see text] there are no infinite [Formula: see text]-mad families. Similar results are obtained in Solovay’s model. These results apply in particular to the ideal [Formula: see text], which corresponds to the classical notion of MAD families, as well as to the ideal [Formula: see text]. The proofs combine ideas from invariant descriptive set theory and forcing. (shrink)

In his previous work, the author has introduced the axiom schema of inductive dichotomy, a weak variant of the axiom schema of inductive definition, and used this schema for elementary ) positive operators to separate open and clopen determinacies for those games in which two players make choices from infinitely many alternatives in various circumstances. Among the studies on variants of inductive definitions for bounded ) positive operators, the present article investigates inductive dichotomy for these operators, and applies (...) it to constructive investigations of variants of determinacy statements for those games in which the players make choices from only finitely many alternatives. As a result, three formulations of open determinacy, that are all classically equivalent with each other, are equivalent to three different semi-classical principles, namely Markov’s Principle, Lesser Limited Principle of Omniscience and Limited Principle of Omniscience, over a suitable constructive base theory that proves clopen determinacy. Open and clopen determinacies for these games are thus separated. Some basic results on variants of inductive definitions for \ positive operators will also be given. (shrink)

We prove within K\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${K}$$\end{document} that the axiom of determinacy is equivalent to the assertion that for each ordinal λ λ\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\kappa > \lambda}$$\end{document}. Here Θ\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\Theta}$$\end{document} is the supremum of the ordinals which are the surjective image of the set of reals R\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathbb{R}}$$\end{document}.

In the context of a weak formal theory called Basic Intuitionistic Mathematics $$\textsf{BIM}$$ BIM, we study Brouwer’s Fan Theorem and a strong negation of the Fan Theorem, Kleene’s Alternative (to the Fan Theorem). We prove that the Fan Theorem is equivalent to contrapositions of a number of intuitionistically accepted axioms of countable choice and that Kleene’s Alternative is equivalent to strong negations of these statements. We discuss finite and infinite games and introduce a constructively useful notion of determinacy. We (...) prove that the Fan Theorem is equivalent to the Intuitionistic Determinacy Theorem. This theorem says that every subset of Cantor space $$2^\omega $$ 2 ω is, in our constructively meaningful sense, determinate. Kleene’s Alternative is equivalent to a strong negation of a special case of this theorem. We also consider a uniform intermediate value theorem and a compactness theorem for classical propositional logic. The Fan Theorem is equivalent to each of these theorems and Kleene’s Alternative is equivalent to strong negations of them. We end with a note on ‘stronger’ Fan Theorems. The paper is a sequel to Veldman (Arch Math Logic 53:621–693, 2014). (shrink)

Determinacy axioms state the existence of winning strategies for infinite games played by two players on natural numbers. We show that a base theory enriched by a certain scheme of determinacy axioms is proof-theoretically equivalent to -comprehension.

Pursues the theoretical level of the two‐tiered epistemology of set theoretic realism, the level at which more abstract axioms can be justified by their consequences at more intuitive levels. I outline the pre‐axiomatic development of set theory out of Cantor's researches, describe how axiomatization arose in the course of Zermelo's efforts to prove Cantor's Well‐ordering Theorem, and review the controversy over the Axiom of Choice. Cantor's Continuum Hypothesis and various questions of descriptive set theory were eventually shown to be (...) independent of the standard axioms, and new axiom candidates—Gödel's Axiom of Constructibility, on the one hand, determinacy and large cardinal axioms, on the other—offer dramatically different solutions. This situation presents a new epistemic challenge to the set theoretic realist: on what grounds can we adjudicate between new axiom candidates? (shrink)

All spaces are assumed to be separable and metrizable. We show that, assuming the Axiom of Determinacy, every zero-dimensional homogeneous space is strongly homogeneous (i.e. all its non-empty clopen subspaces are homeomorphic), with the trivial exception of locally compact spaces. In fact, we obtain a more general result on the uniqueness of zero-dimensional homogeneous spaces which generate a given Wadge class. This extends work of van Engelen (who obtained the corresponding results for Borel spaces), complements a result of (...) van Douwen, and gives partial answers to questions of Terada and Medvedev. (shrink)

Strong Turing Determinacy, or ${\mathrm {sTD}}$, is the statement that for every set A of reals, if $\forall x\exists y\geq _T x (y\in A)$, then there is a pointed set $P\subseteq A$. We prove the following consequences of Turing Determinacy ( ${\mathrm {TD}}$ ) and ${\mathrm {sTD}}$ over ${\mathrm {ZF}}$ —the Zermelo–Fraenkel axiomatic set theory without the Axiom of Choice: (1) ${\mathrm {ZF}}+{\mathrm {TD}}$ implies $\mathrm {wDC}_{\mathbb {R}}$ —a weaker version of $\mathrm {DC}_{\mathbb {R}}$.(2) ${\mathrm {ZF}}+{\mathrm {sTD}}$ (...) implies that every set of reals is measurable and has Baire property.(3) ${\mathrm {ZF}}+{\mathrm {sTD}}$ implies that every uncountable set of reals has a perfect subset.(4) ${\mathrm {ZF}}+{\mathrm {sTD}}$ implies that for every set of reals A and every $\epsilon>0$ :(a)There is a closed set $F\subseteq A$ such that $\mathrm {Dim_H}(F)\geq \mathrm {Dim_H}(A)-\epsilon $, where $\mathrm {Dim_H}$ is the Hausdorff dimension.(b)There is a closed set $F\subseteq A$ such that $\mathrm {Dim_P}(F)\geq \mathrm {Dim_P}(A)-\epsilon $, where $\mathrm {Dim_P}$ is the packing dimension. (shrink)

Matthias Schröder has asked the question whether there is a weakest discontinuous problem in the topological version of the Weihrauch lattice. Such a problem can be considered as the weakest unsolvable problem. We introduce the discontinuity problem, and we show that it is reducible exactly to the effectively discontinuous problems, defined in a suitable way. However, in which sense this answers Schröder’s question sensitively depends on the axiomatic framework that is chosen, and it is a positive answer if we work (...) in Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory with dependent choice and the axiom of determinacy $\mathsf {AD}$. On the other hand, using the full axiom of choice, one can construct problems which are discontinuous, but not effectively so. Hence, the exact situation at the bottom of the Weihrauch lattice sensitively depends on the axiomatic setting that we choose. We prove our result using a variant of Wadge games for mathematical problems. While the existence of a winning strategy for Player II characterizes continuity of the problem (as already shown by Nobrega and Pauly), the existence of a winning strategy for Player I characterizes effective discontinuity of the problem. By Weihrauch determinacy we understand the condition that every problem is either continuous or effectively discontinuous. This notion of determinacy is a fairly strong notion, as it is not only implied by the axiom of determinacy $\mathsf {AD}$, but it also implies Wadge determinacy. We close with a brief discussion of generalized notions of productivity. (shrink)

Two-player, zero-sum, non-cooperative, blindfold games in extensive form with incomplete information are considered in this paper. Any information about past moves which players played is stored in a database, and each player can access the database. A polynomial game is a game in which, at each step, all players withdraw at most a polynomial amount of previous information from the database. We show resource-bounded determinacy of some kinds of finite, zero-sum, polynomial games whose pay-off sets are computable by non-deterministic (...) polynomial-time function-oracle Turing machines. We call a pay-off set -determined if, for any polynomial game G associated with the given pay-off set, either player has a winning strategy which is in for any subgames of G. We show that there exists an FP-strongly-determined pay-off set which is computed by an exponential-time oracle Turing machine, where FP is the set of polynomial-time computable functions. We also discuss several relationships between the determinacy of polynomial games and recursion-theoretic properties for the classes co-NP and co-NEXP. We show that the polynomial version of the axiom of choice holds under some assumption of polynomial determinacy for a pay-off set which is polynomial-time computable with parallel queries. This principle of choice implies that co-NP has the separation property. (shrink)

We show that if Ƒ is any "well-behaved" subset of the Borei functions and we assume the Axiom of Determinacy then the hierarchy of degrees on $P(^\omega \omega )$ induced by Ƒ turns out to look like the Wadge hierarchy (which is the special case where Ƒ is the set of continuous functions).

We extend the core model induction technique to a choiceless context, and we exploit it to show that each one of the following two hypotheses individually implies that , the Axiom of Determinacy, holds in the of a generic extension of : every uncountable cardinal is singular, and every infinite successor cardinal is weakly compact and every uncountable limit cardinal is singular.

The Axiom of Projective Determinacy implies the existence of a universal $\utilde{\Pi}^{1}_{n}\setminus\utilde{\Delta}^{1}_{n}$ set for every $n \geq 1$. Assuming $\text{\upshape MA}(\aleph_{1})+\aleph_{1}=\aleph_{1}^{\mathbb{L}}$ there exists a universal $\utilde{\Pi}^{1}_{1}\setminus\utilde{\Delta}^{1}_{1}$ set. In ZFC there is a universal $\utilde{\Pi}^{0}_{\alpha}\setminus\utilde{\Delta}^{0}_{\alpha}$ set for every $\alpha$.

Let L be a countable language, let I be an isomorphism-type of countable L-structures, and let a∈2ω. We say that I is a-strange if it contains a computable-from-a structure and its Scott rank is exactly ω1a. For all a, a-strange structures exist. Theorem : If C is a collection of ℵ1 isomorphism-types of countable structures, then for a Turing cone of a’s, no member of C is a-strange.

Jensen's celebrated Covering Lemma states that if 0# does not exist, then for any uncountable set of ordinals X, there is a Y∈L such that X⊆Y and |X| = |Y|. Working in ZF + AD alone, we establish the following analog: If ℝ# does not exist, then L(ℝ) and V have exactly the same sets of reals and for any set of ordinals X with |X| ≥ΘL(ℝ), there is a Y∈L(ℝ) such that X⊆Y and |X| = |Y|. Here ℝ is (...) the set of reals and Θ is the supremum of the ordinals which are the surjective image of ℝ. (shrink)

The present paper investigates the power of proper forcings to change the shape of the universe, in a certain well-defined respect. It turns out that the ranking among large cardinals can be used as a measure for that power. However, in order to establish the final result I had to isolate a new large cardinal concept, which I dubbed “remarkability.” Let us approach the exact formulation of the problem—and of its solution—at a slow pace.Breathtaking developments in the mid 1980s found (...) one of its culminations in the theorem, due to Martin, Steel, and Woodin, that the existence of infinitely many Woodin cardinals with a measurable cardinal above them all implies that AD, the axiom of determinacy, holds in the least inner model containing all the reals, L. One of the nice things about AD is that the theory ZF + AD + V = L appears as a choiceless “completion” of ZF in that any interesting question seems to find an at least attractive answer in that theory. Beyond that, AD is very canonical as may be illustrated as follows.Let us say that L is absolute for set-sized forcings if for all posets P ∈ V, for all formulae ϕ, and for all ∈ ℝ do we have thatwhere is a name for the set of reals in the extension. (shrink)

In [P. Larson, Martin’s Maximum and the axiom , Ann. Pure App. Logic 106 135–149], we modified a coding device from [W.H. Woodin, The Axiom of Determinacy, Forcing Axioms, and the Nonstationary Ideal, Walter de Gruyter & Co, Berlin, 1999] and the consistency proof of Martin’s Maximum from [M. Foreman, M. Magidor, S. Shelah, Martin’s Maximum. saturated ideals, and non-regular ultrafilters. Part I, Annal. Math. 127 1–47] to show that from a supercompact limit of supercompact cardinals one (...) could force Martin’s Maximum to hold while the axiom fails. Here we modify that argument to prove a stronger fact, that Martin’s Maximum is consistent with the existence of a wellordering of the reals definable in H without parameters, from the same large cardinal hypothesis. In doing so we give a much simpler proof of the original result. (shrink)

We generalize the ultrapower in a way suitable for choiceless set theory. Given an ultrafilter, forcing is used to construct an extended ultrapower of the universe, designed so that the fundamental theorem of ultrapowers holds even in the absence of the axiom of choice. If, in addition, we assume DC, then an extended ultrapower of the universe by a countably complete ultrafilter must be well-founded. As an application, we prove the Vopěnka-Hrbáček theorem from ZF + DC only (the proof (...) of Vopěnka and Hrbáček used the full axiom of choice): if there exists a strongly compact cardinal, then the universe is not constructible from a set. The same method shows that, in L[ 2 ω ], there cannot exist a θ-compact cardinal less than θ (where θ is the least cardinal onto which the continuum cannot be mapped); a similar result can be proven for other models of the form L[ A ]. The result for L[ 2 ω ] is of particular interest in connection with the axiom of determinacy. The extended ultrapower construction of this paper is an improved version of the author's earlier pseudo-ultrapower method, making use of forcing rather than the omitting types theorem. (shrink)

We show that, assuming the Axiom of Determinacy, every non-selfdual Wadge class can be constructed by starting with those of level $\omega _1$ and iteratively applying the operations of expansion and separated differences. The proof is essentially due to Louveau, and it yields at the same time a new proof of a theorem of Van Wesep. The exposition is self-contained, except for facts from classical descriptive set theory.

After showing that \ refutes \ for all regular cardinals \, we present a diamond-plus principle \ concerning all subsets of \. Using a forcing argument, we prove that \ holds in Steel’s core model \}}\), an inner model in which the axiom of determinacy can hold. The combinatorial principle \ is then extended, in \}}\), to successor cardinals \ and to certain cardinals \ that are not ineffable. Here \ is the supremum of the ordinals that are (...) the surjective image of the set of reals \. (shrink)

We analyze the degree-structure induced by large reducibilities under the Axiom of Determinacy. This generalizes the analysis of Borel reducibilities given in Alessandro Andretta and Donald A. Martin [1], Luca Motto Ros [6] and Luca Motto Ros. [5] e.g. to the projective levels.

§0. Preface. There has been an expectation that the endgame of the more tenacious problems raised by the Los Angeles ‘cabal’ school of descriptive set theory in the 1970's should ultimately be played out with the use of inner model theory. Questions phrased in the language of descriptive set theory, where both the conclusions and the assumptions are couched in terms that only mention simply definable sets of reals, and which have proved resistant to purely descriptive set theoretic arguments, may (...) at last find their solution through the connection between determinacy and large cardinals.Perhaps the most striking example was given by [24], where the core model theory was used to analyze the structure of HOD and then show that all regular cardinals below ΘL are measurable. John Steel's analysis also settled a number of structural questions regarding HODL, such as GCH.Another illustration is provided by [21]. There an application of large cardinals and inner model theory is used to generalize the Harrington-Martin theorem that determinacy implies )determinacy.However, it is harder to find examples of theorems regarding the structure of the projective sets whose only known proof from determinacy assumptions uses the link between determinacy and large cardinals. We may equivalently ask whether there are second order statements of number theory that cannot be proved under PD–the axiom of projective determinacy–without appealing to the large cardinal consequences of the PD, such as the existence of certain kinds of inner models that contain given types of large cardinals. (shrink)

Diagonalization is a proof technique that formal learning theorists use to show that inductive problems are unsolvable. The technique intuitively requires the construction of the mathematical equivalent of a "Cartesian demon" that fools the scientist no matter how he proceeds. A natural question that arises is whether diagonalization is complete. That is, given an arbitrary unsolvable inductive problem, does an invincible demon exist? The answer to that question turns out to depend upon what axioms of set theory we adopt. The (...) two main results of the paper show that if we assume ZermeloFraenkel set theory plus AC and CH, there exist undetermined inductive games. The existence of such games entails that diagonalization is incomplete. On the other hand, if we assume the Axiom of Determinacy, or even a weaker axiom known as Wadge Determinacy, then diagonalization is complete. In order to prove the results, inductive inquiry is viewed as an infinitary game played between the scientist and nature. Such games have been studied extensively by descriptive set theorists. Analogues to the results above are mentioned, in which both the scientist and the demon are restricted to computable strategies. The results exhibit a surprising connection between inductive methodology and the foundations of set theory. (shrink)

Non-determined game logic is the logic of two player board games where the game may end in a draw: unlike the case with determined games, a loss of one player does not necessarily constitute of a win of the other player. A calculus for non-determined game logic is given in [4] and shown to be complete. The calculus adds a new rule for the treatment of greatest fixpoints, and a new unfolding axiom for iterations of the universal player. The (...) technique of the completeness proof is inspired by the canonical model construction for propositional dynamic logic (PDL). In this paper, this is extended to the logic of determined games. It is proved that the calculus for nondetermined game logic, together with the axiom of determinacy, is complete for determined game logic. Next, it is shown that the axioms and rules of the new calculus can all be derived from the calculus proposed by Parikh in [5], for which the completeness was still open. This proves Parikh’s conjecture that his calculus is complete for determined games. (shrink)

We work under the assumption of the Axiom of Determinacy and associate a measure to each cardinal $\kappa < \aleph_{\varepsilon_0}$ in a recursive definition of a canonical measure assignment. We give algorithmic applications of the existence of such a canonical measure assignment (computation of cofinalities, computation of the Kleinberg sequences associated to the normal ultrafilters on all projective ordinals).

§0. Preface. There has been an expectation that the endgame of the more tenacious problems raised by the Los Angeles ‘cabal’ school of descriptive set theory in the 1970's should ultimately be played out with the use of inner model theory. Questions phrased in the language of descriptive set theory, where both the conclusions and the assumptions are couched in terms that only mention simply definable sets of reals, and which have proved resistant to purely descriptive set theoretic arguments, may (...) at last find their solution through the connection between determinacy and large cardinals.Perhaps the most striking example was given by [24], where the core model theory was used to analyze the structure of HOD and then show that all regular cardinals below ΘL are measurable. John Steel's analysis also settled a number of structural questions regarding HODL, such as GCH.Another illustration is provided by [21]. There an application of large cardinals and inner model theory is used to generalize the Harrington-Martin theorem that determinacy implies )determinacy.However, it is harder to find examples of theorems regarding the structure of the projective sets whose only known proof from determinacy assumptions uses the link between determinacy and large cardinals. We may equivalently ask whether there are second order statements of number theory that cannot be proved under PD–the axiom of projective determinacy–without appealing to the large cardinal consequences of the PD, such as the existence of certain kinds of inner models that contain given types of large cardinals. (shrink)

Assuming Con, a model in which there are unboundedly many regular cardinals below Θ and in which the only regular cardinals below Θ are limit cardinals was previously constructed. Using a large cardinal hypothesis far beyond Con, we construct in this paper a model in which there is a proper class of regular cardinals and in which the only regular cardinals in the universe are limit cardinals.

A set of reals is universally Baire if all of its continuous preimages in topological spaces have the Baire property. ${\sf Sealing}$ is a type of generic absoluteness condition introduced by Woodin that asserts in strong terms that the theory of the universally Baire sets cannot be changed by set forcings. The ${\sf Largest\ Suslin\ Axiom}$ is a determinacy axiom isolated by Woodin. It asserts that the largest Suslin cardinal is inaccessible for ordinal definable surjections. Let ${\sf (...) LSA}$ - ${\sf over}$ - ${\sf uB}$ be the statement that in all generic extensions there is a model of $\sf {LSA}$ whose Suslin, co-Suslin sets are the universally Baire sets. We outline the proof that over some mild large cardinal theory, $\sf {Sealing}$ is equiconsistent with $\sf {LSA}$ - $\sf {over}$ - $\sf {uB}$. In fact, we isolate an exact theory that is equiconsistent with both. As a consequence, we obtain that $\sf {Sealing}$ is weaker than the theory “ $\sf {ZFC}$ + there is a Woodin cardinal which is a limit of Woodin cardinals.” This significantly improves upon the earlier consistency proof of $\sf {Sealing}$ by Woodin. A variation of $\sf {Sealing}$, called $\sf {Tower \ Sealing}$, is also shown to be equiconsistent with $\sf {Sealing}$ over the same large cardinal theory. We also outline the proof that if V has a proper class of Woodin cardinals, a strong cardinal, and a generically universally Baire iteration strategy, then $\sf {Sealing}$ holds after collapsing the successor of the least strong cardinal to be countable. This result is complementary to the aforementioned equiconsistency result, where it is shown that $\sf {Sealing}$ holds in a generic extension of a certain minimal universe. This theorem is more general in that no minimal assumption is needed. A corollary of this is that $\sf {LSA}$ - $\sf {over}$ - $\sf {uB}$ is not equivalent to $\sf {Sealing}$. (shrink)

This volume contains the proceedings of the Logic at Harvard conference in honor of W. Hugh Woodin's 60th birthday, held March 27–29, 2015, at Harvard University. It presents a collection of papers related to the work of Woodin, who has been one of the leading figures in set theory since the early 1980s. The topics cover many of the areas central to Woodin's work, including large cardinals, determinacy, descriptive set theory and the continuum problem, as well as connections between (...) set theory and Banach spaces, recursion theory, and philosophy, each reflecting a period of Woodin's career. Other topics covered are forcing axioms, inner model theory, the partition calculus, and the theory of ultrafilters. This volume should make a suitable introduction to Woodin's work and the concerns which motivate it. The papers should be of interest to graduate students and researchers in both mathematics and philosophy of mathematics, particularly in set theory, foundations and related areas. (shrink)

We investigate Maker–Breaker games on graphs of size $\aleph _1$ in which Maker’s goal is to build a copy of the host graph. We establish a firm dependence of the outcome of the game on the axiomatic framework. Relating to this, we prove that there is a winning strategy for Maker in the $K_{\omega,\omega _1}$ -game under ZFC+MA+ $\neg $ CH and a winning strategy for Breaker under ZFC+CH. We prove a similar result for the $K_{\omega _1}$ -game. Here, Maker (...) has a winning strategy under ZF+DC+AD, while Breaker has one under ZFC+CH again. (shrink)