We present recent results on the model companions of set theory, placing them in the context of a current debate in the philosophy of mathematics. We start by describing the dependence of the notion of model companionship on the signature, and then we analyze this dependence in the specific case of set theory. We argue that the most natural model companions of set theory describe (as the signature in which we axiomatize set theory varies) theories of $H_{\kappa ^+}$, as $\kappa (...) $ ranges among the infinite cardinals. We also single out $2^{\aleph _0}=\aleph _2$ as the unique solution of the continuum problem which can (and does) belong to some model companion of set theory (enriched with large cardinal axioms). While doing so we bring to light that set theory enriched by large cardinal axioms in the range of supercompactness has as its model companion (with respect to its first order axiomatization in certain natural signatures) the theory of $H_{\aleph _2}$ as given by a strong form of Woodin’s axiom $(*)$ (which holds assuming $\mathsf {MM}^{++}$ ). Finally this model-theoretic approach to set-theoretic validities is explained and justified in terms of a form of maximality inspired by Hilbert’s axiom of completeness. (shrink)

Assume that M is a transitive model of $ZFC+CH$ containing a simplified $(\omega _1,2)$ -morass, $P\in M$ is the poset adding $\aleph _3$ generic reals and G is P-generic over M. In M we construct a function between sets of terms in the forcing language, that interpreted in $M[G]$ is an $\mathbb R$ -linear order-preserving monomorphism from the finite elements of an ultrapower of the reals, over a non-principal ultrafilter on $\omega $, into the Esterle algebra of formal power series. (...) Therefore it is consistent that $2^{\aleph _0}>\aleph _2$ and, for any infinite compact Hausdorff space X, there exists a discontinuous homomorphism of $C(X)$, the algebra of continuous real-valued functions on X. (shrink)

We can measure the complexity of a logical formula by counting the number of alternations between existential and universal quantifiers. Suppose that an elementary first-order formula $\varphi $ (in $\mathcal {L}_{\omega,\omega }$ ) is equivalent to a formula of the infinitary language $\mathcal {L}_{\infty,\omega }$ with n alternations of quantifiers. We prove that $\varphi $ is equivalent to a finitary formula with n alternations of quantifiers. Thus using infinitary logic does not allow us to express a finitary formula in a (...) simpler way. (shrink)