What Does the Virtuous Person Despise and to What Is He Superior?

Russian Studies in Philosophy 54 (6):501-518 (2016)
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Abstract

This article discusses Aristotle’s description of the virtuous person as inclined to superiority and to contempt. The issue is about superiority in the act, which is expressed in leading the origin of the act upwards to oneself, that is, about the superiority of the moral subject’s being. Contempt is not an estimation but something like a gesture removing any obstacle to being oneself. Aristotle creates a unified image to personify the idea of the moral subject and to answer the question of being human.

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