Abstract

This dissertation examines Kant's transcendental idealism with respect to his account of natural forces. Although force plays a crucial role in Kant's pre-critical writings, especially in his argument against Leibniz's pre-established harmony, it is conspicuously absent in the Critique of Pure Reason . I argue that force has to be excluded once Kant's philosophy takes its "critical turn" in order for his transcendental argument to be able to prove that the categories of thought apply to objects of experience. In order for the forms of thought to apply to the matter of sensibility, both thought and sensible intuition must not only be forms of unity, or unified forms, but also uniform in quality and capable of being measured in terms of extensive magnitudes. Force, on the other hand, is an intensive magnitude which is measured not in terms of homogeneous units, but in terms of degrees. It must be excluded from Kant's critical philosophy since the coherence of the experience that Kant seeks to justify requires the uniformity and consistency of the subject, the ground of knowledge. Nevertheless, the concept of force can still be found to be "at work" in the Critique of Pure Reason in Kant's schematism of the categories of quality and the principle of the anticipations of perception which are based on this schematism. In order for a quality to be predicated of an object it must have an impact on the subject and become an object of attention. Kant's controversial discussion of judgments of perception in the Prolegomena, can be understood as his attempt to incorporate force into his ontology by introducing a new category of thought, that of analogy. In the case of analogy, I argue, the copula of the judgment is not that of being but is that of force itself. This form of judgment ultimately becomes the reflective judgment in Kant's Critique of Judgment, which makes explicit the form of thought that would make the experience of force possible