Emergence of a Radical Sociology of Scientific Knowledge: The Strong Programme in the Early Writings of Barry Barnes

Dialectica 47 (1):3-25 (1993)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

SummaryThe early writings of Barry Barnes, as the co‐founder of the Edinburgh School of sociology of scientific knowledge, are explored to bring out and to evaluate his main presuppositions and arguments. Barnes is highly critical of anthropologists' conception of scientific knowledge, rationality, truth, and their asymmetrical explanatory approach towards different belief‐systems. Likewise he rejects the prevalent View of science among sociologists of knowledge, and also their approach to explanation of knowledge or belief‐adoption. His proposal is based on a Kuhnian model of science, and offers his own socio‐causal explanatory scheme applicable to all beliefs and knowledge‐claims. I have challenged the basis of his model of science and have tried to show that his use of Kuhn's concepts of normal practice and paradigm is problematic, and that his idea of social causation of beliefs is highly problematic.“new paradigms may gain support not because of any demonstrable superiority over the old but simply because scientists welcome the opportunity of a new try at explanation” Barry Barnes “all belief‐systems, scientific or preliterate, ‘true’ or ‘erroneous’, are most profitably compared and understood within a single framework” Barry Barnes

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,219

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

A critique of relativism in the sociology of scientific knowledge.Si Sun - 2007 - Frontiers of Philosophy in China 2 (1):115-130.
Levels of Reflexivity: Unnoted Differences within the "Strong Programme" in the Sociology of Knowledge.Edward Manier - 1980 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1980:197-207.
Conventionalism, scientific discovery and the sociology of knowledge.Angelo M. Petroni - 1993 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7 (3):225-240.
Toward a monistic theory of science: The `strong programme' reconsidered.Stephen Kemp - 2003 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 33 (3):311-338.
Realism, Reliabilism, and the 'Strong Programme' in the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge.Jeff Kochan - 2008 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 22 (1):21 – 38.
The Strong Programme.Finn Collin - 2008 - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 43:43-49.
Can relativism be reconciled with realism and causalism?Barbara Tuchańska - 1990 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 4 (3):285-294.
A Second Look at David Bloor’s Knowledge and Social Imagery.Peter Slezak - 1994 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 24 (3):336-361.
Interests and the growth of knowledge.Barry Barnes - 1977 - Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
The underdetermination of theory by data and the "strong programme" in the sociology of knowledge.Samir Okasha - 2000 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 14 (3):283 – 297.

Analytics

Added to PP
2013-11-21

Downloads
23 (#644,212)

6 months
8 (#292,366)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Citations of this work

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references