Justification of Belief Beyond a Reasonable Doubt

Dissertation, State University of New York at Buffalo (1998)
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Abstract

The law implements proof beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal cases through a "subjective state of certitude" in the juror's mind when voting for the defendant's guilt. However, courts and scholars have failed to produce an adequate account of the subjective certitude standard. Among these unhelpful approaches are moral certainty, hesitate to act, and firmly convinced. Additionally, quantitative approaches using Bayesian inference or weighted averages inappropriately limit the responsibility of the jury to that of fact finding. ;In place of subjective certitude, this project recommends a theory of reasonable doubt that regards the decision about guilt or innocence as an instance of justified belief. Relying on a pragmatist or contextualist model of epistemic justification, the projects interprets the practice of the criminal justice system to develop a better account of reasonable doubt. The project presents an example of pragmatist justification in an institutionally complex context; juries seek to satisfy a variety of contextually relevant criteria in a verdict. ;First, jury selection strives to establish a fair cross section of the community or vicinage while it challenges for cause or through peremptory challenge jurors with a bias or prejudice that prevents fair and impartial consideration of the evidence, law, and community's values. Selection also removes prospective jurors who will not deliberate as reasonable jurors along the lines of John Rawls's account of citizens in a liberal society. ;Second, jurors encounter questions of fact, mixed fact-law , and law questions in deciding on a verdict. Each kind of question requires evaluative judgments blending factual aspects with normative elements arising from the values in the community. ;Finally, jury deliberations aim at reaching a unanimous verdict based on good reasons grounded in the law, evidence, and values. A deliberative model of cognitive or volitional rationality, rather than a mathematical approach or social choice model, accords best with the design of the jury trial. The presumption of innocence and judicial instructions are important features in assuring institutionally rational outcomes. ;The analysis compares pragmatist-contextualist and subjective certitude verdict outcomes.

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