Conventional Evaluativity

Australasian Journal of Philosophy (2):440-454 (2021)
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Abstract

Some expressions, such as ‘generous’ and ‘stingy’, are used not only to describe the world around us. They are also used to evaluate the things to which they are applied. In this paper, I suggest a novel account of how this evaluation is conveyed—the conventional triggering view. It partly agrees and partly disagrees with both the standard semantic view and its popular pragmatic contender. Like the former and unlike the latter, my view has it that the evaluation is conveyed due to the conventional meaning of the sentences in question. Unlike the former and much like the latter, my view suggests that the evaluation is a secondary rather than a primary content.

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Julia Zakkou
Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf

References found in this work

Freedom and reason.Richard Mervyn Hare - 1963 - Oxford,: Clarendon Press.
Relevance.D. Sperber & Deirdre Wilson - 1986 - Communication and Cognition: An Interdisciplinary Quarterly Journal 2.

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