No Money, No Representation: A Case Study of Zeguo Town in China

Politics and Society 46 (1):81-99 (2018)
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Abstract

Authoritarian regimes rely on fiscal resources to build patronage networks. And so it is with China. Budget making is usually dominated by government leaders. However, some local governments in recent years have invited ordinary people to review budgets and even to determine parts of budgets. Why would local leaders make themselves accountable to their constituencies in an authoritarian setting? Why would local governments in China tie their own hands? Using detailed description of a township government, this article argues that fiscal affluence based on land is an important factor for local governments in launching fiscal reform. Richer areas have become more fiscally accountable by opening up new discussion and encouraging citizen participation.

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The Dilemmatic Problem of Land Resources Allocation in China.Hai-Peng Zhang - 2008 - Nankai University (Philosophy and Social Sciences) 4:133-140.

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