Abstract

This thesis aims to answer this question: What role is morality to play in life? The answer is an inclusive view of the right life: segments of a right life is either morally justified or justified to oneself. The thesis begins with one of Bernard Williams' argument against morality, appearing in his often misunderstood article "Moral Luck." According to my interpretation, Williams' argument against the supreme authority of morality invokes a rather unfamiliar normative notion, i.e., the notion of self-justification: a morally offensive choice can be justified, overall speaking, by virtue of the fact that the agent is able to justify it to himself. Williams implies that an agent's self-justification carries normative weight with us in the sense that it not just expresses the agent's own attitude toward herself but also has the power to compel our overall attitude toward her. The argument hinges upon a plausible account of self-justification, which is to answer what counts as a self-justification and why it carries any normative weight with us. ;To complete Williams' argument against morality's supreme role in life, I discuss his analysis of two particular cases of self-evaluation: the cases of Gauguin and Anna Karenina. Then, I develop a general conception of self-justification, which takes an agent's self-justification as a result of an authentic way of living. In this conception, an agent can justify a choice to herself if and only if the agent can affirm the choice in light of a personal ideal which she creates and highly confirms, i.e., an ideal expressive of her true self. Thus, an agent who attains self-justification lives up to his true self, or put differently, leads an authentic way of life. ;As to the role of morality in life, my conclusion is that morality does not have supreme authority, but rather should be complemented by each individual's striving for authenticity. In a word, the right life is sought in the interplay between authenticity and morality