Aggregation and Reductio

Ethics 132 (2):508-525 (2021)
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Abstract

Joe Horton argues that partial aggregation yields unacceptable verdicts in cases with risk and multiple decisions. I begin by showing that Horton’s challenge does not depend on risk, since exactly similar arguments apply to riskless cases. The underlying conflict Horton exposes is between partial aggregation and certain principles of diachronic choice. I then provide two arguments against these diachronic principles: they conflict with intuitions about parity, prerogatives, and cyclical preferences, and they rely on an odd assumption about diachronic choice. Finally, I offer an explanation, on behalf of partial aggregation, for why these diachronic principles fail.

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Patrick Wu
New York University

Citations of this work

Embracing Self-Defeat in Normative Theory.Samuel Fullhart - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
Doing Less Than Best.Emma J. Curran - 2023 - Dissertation, University of Cambridge

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References found in this work

The possibility of parity.Ruth Chang - 2002 - Ethics 112 (4):659-688.
Rationality and Dynamic Choice: Foundational Explorations.Edward Francis McClennen - 1990 - Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
Take the sugar.Caspar Hare - 2010 - Analysis 70 (2):237-247.

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