The Metaphysics of Emergence

Noûs 39 (4):658 - 678 (2005)
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Abstract

The following framework of theses, roughly hewn, shapes contemporary discussion of the problem of mental causation: (1) Non-Identity of the Mental and the Physical Mental properties and states cannot be identified with specific physical properties and states. (2) Causal Closure (Completeness) of the Physical The objective probability of every physical event is fixed by prior physical events and laws alone. (This thesis is sometimes expressed in terms of explanation: In tracing the causal history of any physical event, one need not advert to any non-physical events or laws. To the extent that there is any explanation available for a physical event, there is a complete explanation available couched entirely in physical vocabulary. We prefer the probability formulation, as it should be acceptable to any physicalist, though some reject the explanation formulation.) (3) Causal Exclusion There is at most one complete and wholly independent explanation for any given event or sequence of events

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Hong Yu Wong
University Tübingen

Citations of this work

Construction area (no hard hat required).Karen Bennett - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (1):79-104.
Metaphysical emergence: Weak and Strong.Jessica Wilson - 2013 - In Stephen Mumford & Matthew Tugby (eds.), Metaphysics and Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 251-306.
Emergence: Core ideas and issues.Jaegwon Kim - 2006 - Synthese 151 (3):547-559.
Properties.Francesco Orilia & Michele Paolini Paoletti - 2020 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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References found in this work

Special sciences.Jerry A. Fodor - 1974 - Synthese 28 (2):97-115.
Making sense of emergence.Jaegwon Kim - 1999 - Philosophical Studies 95 (1-2):3-36.
How properties emerge.Paul Humphreys - 1997 - Philosophy of Science 64 (1):1-17.

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