On objectivity and subjectivity in statistical inference: A response to Mayo

Synthese 67 (2):369 - 379 (1986)
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Abstract

In this paper we respond to the article An Objective Theory of Statistical Testing by D. G. Mayo (1983). We argue that the theory of testing developed by Mayo, NPT*, is neither novel nor objective. We also respond to the claims made by Mayo against Bayesian theory.

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The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1954 - Wiley Publications in Statistics.
Theory of Probability. [REVIEW]Ernest Nagel - 1940 - Journal of Philosophy 37 (19):524-528.

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