Is Statism an Amoral Philosophy?

Studia Humana 9 (2):121-126 (2020)
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Abstract

Thick moral terms – such as theft, fraud, and counterfeiting – are terms whose very use implies a definitionally necessary moral evaluation of their content. In this paper, I shall argue that the philosophy of statism – that is, a philosophy grounded in the belief in the normative justifiability and desirability of monopolistic apparatuses of initiatory violence – is necessarily amoral insofar as it cannot apply thick moral terms in a logically consistent manner. By the same token, I shall argue that libertarianism – i.e., the view that only consensual social relations are morally acceptable – is the only general sociopolitical doctrine capable of accomplishing this task, thus, in contrast to statism, making its prescriptions susceptible to genuine moral evaluation.

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Critical notice.Frank Jackson - 1992 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 70 (4):475 – 488.
'Thick' Concepts Revised.Stephan L. Burton - 1992 - Analysis 52 (1):28 - 32.

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