Divisibility, logic, radical empiricism, and metaphysics

Abstract

We will explore the problem of the manner in which the world may be divided into parts, and how this affects the application of logic. We will also consider how this affects the problem of knowing the world. Such considerations bring us to discuss how the divisibility of the world relates to idealism, realism, and the radical empiricist program of James. The epistemological difficulties sometimes associated with realism will in particular be shown to be in principle the result of misunderstanding the nature of the divisibility of the world. When such divisibility is properly understood, we claim that there is no epistemological dilemma, at least in principle, although of course in practice there may be other difficulties. We conclude by tentatively analyzing these practical difficulties.

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