Belief does not entail a reasoning disposition

Synthese 199 (5-6):14975-14991 (2021)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Are there any dispositions one must have if one believes p? A widespread answer emphasizes the role of beliefs in reasoning and holds that if one believes p, one must be disposed to treat p as true in one’s reasoning. I argue that this answer is subject to counterexamples.

Categories

Keywords

Reprint years

DOI

10.1007/s11229-021-03451-7

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,612

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

My notes

Similar books and articles

Phenomenal dispositions.Henry Ian Schiller - 2020 - Synthese 197 (9):3969-3980.
Change in view: Principles of reasoning.Gilbert Harman - 2008 - In . Cambridge University Press. pp. 35-46.
What is the tertiary norm of belief?Jorren Dykstra - forthcoming - Analysis.
If You Believe You Believe, You Believe. A Constitutive Account of Knowledge of One’s Own Beliefs.Peter Baumann - 2017 - Logos and Episteme:389-416.
Beliefs’ self-knowledge: an objection to the method of transparency.Javier Vidal - 2019 - Revista de Humanidades de Valparaíso 14:429-448.
Practical Certainty.Dustin Locke - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (1):72-95.
If You Believe, You Believe.Peter Baumann - 2017 - Logos and Episteme 8 (4):389-416.
An epistemic modal norm of practical reasoning.Tim Henning - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):6665-6686.
A Puzzle About Weak Belief.Joshua Edward Pearson - forthcoming - Analysis.
Directly in Mind: An Account of First Person Access.Aaron Zachary Zimmerman - 2002 - Dissertation, Cornell University

Analytics

Added to PP
2021-10-21

Downloads
23 (#673,499)

6 months
6 (#702,272)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Simon Wimmer
TU Dortmund

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Essence and modality.Kit Fine - 1994 - Philosophical Perspectives 8 (Logic and Language):1-16.
Belief, Credence, and Pragmatic Encroachment.Jacob Ross & Mark Schroeder - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):259-288.
Potentiality: From Dispositions to Modality.Barbara Vetter - 2015 - Oxford, England and New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press.
Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1973 - Foundations of Language 13 (1):145-151.

View all 25 references / Add more references