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On intuitionistic modal epistemic logic
Journal of Philosophical Logic 21 (1):63--89 (1992)
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Citations of this work
Transcendental Knowability and A Priori Luminosity.Andrew Stephenson - 2021 - History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 25 (1):134-162.
How to solve the knowability paradox with transcendental epistemology.Andrew Stephenson - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 13):3253-3278.
Factive knowability and the problem of possible omniscience.Jan Heylen - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (1):65-87.
Fitch's proof, verificationism, and the knower paradox.J. C. Beall - 2000 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (2):241 – 247.
Diamonds are a philosopher's best friends.Heinrich Wansing - 2002 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 31 (6):591-612.
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