Abstract

This dissertation investigates the normative foundations and content of the rights of social citizenship . ;Part I sets out the theoretical foundations for the essay. Chapter I identifies the basic principles of justice which will inform the essay's analysis, principles which, taken together, give expression to the ideal of individual dignity which lies at the heart of the post-Enlightenment conception of political ethics. I show how these principles appear to support the institution of a key right of social citizenship, the right to a basic income , and I defend the institution of this right from an important libertarian challenge which also makes appeal to one of these principles. Chapter 2 then expands on the theoretical framework presented in Chapter I through a close examination of the concept of exploitation. Particular attention is paid to elaborating the 'reciprocity principle', introduced in Chapter I, which governs the enjoyment of social citizenship rights. ;In Part 2, drawing on the conceptual resources developed in Part I, we then proceed to develop a more concrete account of social citizenship suited to contemporary circumstances. Chapter 3 considers, and provisionally rejects, the case for introducing a substantial unconditional basic income on reciprocity-based grounds, and Chapters 4 and 5 then elaborate and defend an alternative 'basic opportunity package' which centrally consists of: a right to a basic income, subject to a reasonable work-test; a right to work; and a right to basic capital. ;In the conclusion, I argue that these rights constitute the main elements of a distinctive, radical liberal conception of economic justice and citizenship, a conception which has clear historical antecedants, and that the institution of these rights would establish a form of 'stakeholder capitalism' which, in a variety of ways, would be morally superior to the contemporary capitalism of Britain or the United States