Virtue Ethics is Empirically Adequate: A Defense of the Caps Response to Situationism

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (S1):79-111 (2017)
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Abstract

According to situationists, the available empirical psychological data show that prevalent conceptions of virtue are ‘empirically inadequate.’ The charge is ambiguous. I begin by differentiating four families of empirical inadequacy charges, explaining the conceptual connections among the families, and showing how different situationists press different versions of the charges from each family. Then I explain how the empirical psychological model known as the ‘cognitive affective personality system,’ or ‘CAPS model,’ enables distinct responses to these varied charges. The CAPS response has come under fire, though, and I close by responding to the five main challenges raised against it.

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Ryan West
Wake Forest University

References found in this work

What we owe to each other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Lack of Character: Personality and Moral Behavior.John M. Doris - 2002 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Intelligent Virtue.Julia Annas - 2011 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Practical intelligence and the virtues.Daniel C. Russell - 2009 - New York: Oxford University Press.

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