Analysis 64 (1):8–10 (2004)
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| Abstract |
I defend the suggestion that the rational probability in the Sleeping Beauty paradox is one third. The reasoning in its favour is familiar: for every heads-waking, there are two tails-wakings. To complete the defense, I rebut the reasoning which purports to justify the competing suggestion – that the correct probability is half – by undermining its premise, that no new information has been received.
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| Keywords | sleeping beauty paradox |
| Categories | (categorize this paper) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.0003-2638.2004.00453.x |
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References found in this work BETA
On the Interpretation of Decision Problems with Imperfect Recall.Michele Piccione & Ariel Rubinstein - manuscript
Citations of this work BETA
Updating as Communication.Sarah Moss - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):225-248.
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When Betting Odds and Credences Come Apart: More Worries for Dutch Book Arguments.Darren Bradley & Hannes Leitgeb - 2006 - Analysis 66 (2):119-127.
Sleeping Beauty, Countable Additivity, and Rational Dilemmas.Jacob Ross - 2010 - Philosophical Review 119 (4):411-447.
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