Analysis 64 (1):8–10 (2004)

Authors
Ruth Weintraub
Tel Aviv University
Abstract
I defend the suggestion that the rational probability in the Sleeping Beauty paradox is one third. The reasoning in its favour is familiar: for every heads-waking, there are two tails-wakings. To complete the defense, I rebut the reasoning which purports to justify the competing suggestion – that the correct probability is half – by undermining its premise, that no new information has been received.
Keywords sleeping beauty  paradox
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DOI 10.1111/j.0003-2638.2004.00453.x
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References found in this work BETA

Sleeping Beauty: Reply to Elga.David Lewis - 2001 - Analysis 61 (3):171–76.

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Updating as Communication.Sarah Moss - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):225-248.

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