Reply to Eaton and Pickavance

Philosophical Studies 173 (12):3231-3233 (2016)
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Abstract

David Eaton and Timothy Pickavance argued that interest-relative invariantism has a surprising and interesting consequence. They take this consequence to be so implausible that it refutes interest-relative invariantism. But in fact it is a consequence that any theory of knowledge that has the resources to explain familiar puzzles must have.

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2017

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10.1007/s11098-016-0660-0

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Brian Weatherson
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor

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References found in this work

Knowledge: A Very Short Introduction.Jennifer Nagel - 2014 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Counter-Closure.Federico Luzzi - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (4):673-683.
Evidence against pragmatic encroachment.Daniel Eaton & Timothy Pickavance - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (12):3135-3143.
Probability and scepticism.Brian Weatherson - 2013 - In Dylan Dodd & Elia Zardini (eds.), Scepticism and Perceptual Justification. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 71-86.

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